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Founded by J. M. Bocheński (Fribourg)

Edited by T. J. Blakeley (Boston), Guido Küng (Fribourg) *and*
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PHILOSOPHICAL SOVIETOLOGY

The Pursuit of a Science

Edited by

HELMUT DAHM
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THOMAS J. BLAKELEY
Boston College

and

GEORGE L. KLINE
Bryn Mawr College

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RICHARD T. DE GEORGE

Preface

On February 24-25, 1956, in a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev made his now famous speech on the crimes of the Stalin era. That speech marked a break with the past and it marked the end of what J.M. Bocheński dubbed the "dead period" of Soviet philosophy. Soviet philosophy changed abruptly after 1956, especially in the area of dialectical materialism. Yet most philosophers in the West neither noticed nor cared. For them, the resurrection of Soviet philosophy, even if believable, was of little interest.

The reasons for the lack of belief and interest were multiple. Soviet philosophy had been dull for so long that subtle differences made little difference. The Cold War was in a frigid period and reinforced the attitude of avoiding anything Soviet. Phenomenology and existentialism were booming in Europe and analytic philosophy was king on the Anglo-American philosophical scene. Moreover, not many philosophers in the West knew or could read Russian or were motivated to learn it to be able to read Soviet philosophical works.

The launching of Sputnik awakened the West from its self-complacent slumbers. Academic interest in the Soviet Union grew. Centers for the study of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe sprang up at university after university. The belief that one should know one's potential enemy led to the study of Soviet and East European history, politics, economics and geography. Growing interest in Soviet and East European philosophy came late on the scene.

There were three pioneers in the field of the critical study of Soviet philosophy in the West. Gustav Wetter in Rome, J.M. Bocheński in Fribourg, Switzerland, and George Kline in the United States were three lone figures who were interested enough in Soviet philosophy to take it seriously as a philosophy and to subject it to critical philosophical analysis prior to and in the immediate post-1956 period. Some of the contributions of each of the three are discussed in this volume. The volume itself is noteworthy not only because it celebrates these three figures, but also because it is the fiftieth volume in a unique series, whose international impact has far exceeded what anyone could have predicted, given its modest beginnings.

The *Sovietica* series began in 1959 with the publication of two volumes of bibliography of Soviet philosophy, the first covering articles that appeared in the Soviet journal *Voprosy filosofii*, 1947-56,

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and the second listing books from 1947-56, books and articles from 1957-58, and an index of names for the two volumes. The series was the product of the Institute of East European Studies of the University of Fribourg, under the editorship of the founder and Director of the Institute, J.M. Bocheński.

The Institute and the series clearly bore the Director's stamp and their continued success and flourishing are a testimony to his vision and leadership.

The fact that the *Sovietica* series began with the publication of two volumes of bibliography was no accident.

Bocheński was a well-known and respected logician and philosopher who carried his scholarly training with him when he turned his attention to Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy. He did not intend *Sovietica* to be a series of anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist polemics. Although he expected works in the series to be critical, he demanded that they be objective, be based on solid research, and be fully documented. Publishing the bibliographies as the first items in the series not only made this statement, but the bibliographies also were required for the scholarly works that followed, because no such bibliography existed in print - not even in the Soviet Union. Once the members of the Institute had developed the bibliographies for their research, the Institute made them available to other interested scholars. This spirit of sharing characterized the scholarly work of the Institute from the start.

The third volume in the series, which was also published in 1959, was a German summary of the widely-used (in the Soviet Union) text *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* (Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy). Although the German title given the work in the *Sovietica* series referred to it as the dogmatic foundations of Soviet philosophy, the summary nonetheless provided access to the work for many who did not read Russian. An assumption of the presentation was that the work's dogmatism would be apparent to any scholarly reader. That Bocheński published an accurate summary without refutation of the position presented is an indication of his objectivity, his openness, his confidence in the strength of Western philosophy, and his belief that Marxism-Leninism, at least at that time, could not withstand philosophical scrutiny.

Although the *Sovietica* series might have been or might still be considered critical of Marxist philosophy, especially in its Marxist-Leninist versions, the authors of the works in the series have given Marxism-Leninism philosophical respectability in the West that it would not otherwise have. The *Sovietica* volumes were frequently attacked by reviewers in the West for taking Marxist-Leninist philosophy seriously. The worst fate for any author is to have his work ignored.

To be critically reviewed or attacked by scholars in other countries is *ipso facto* to have achieved international recognition. Hence *Sovietica*, despite its critical stance, served to make Soviet philosophy known in the West, give it international recognition, and indirectly argue for its academic respectability at a time when the Western philosophical community did not accord it such respectability.

The *Sovietica* series was to grow in importance for those interested in learning about philosophy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the number of philosophers with such interests grew as the series did.

Yet in 1959 and in the early 1960s the bible for those in the West interested in Soviet philosophy was still Gustav Wetter's *Dialectical Materialism*. It was first published in 1952 and was translated into English in a revised version that appeared in 1958.

The book was divided into two parts. The first was historical, starting with Hegel, dealing with Marx and Engels, the Russian background of Marxism, Lenin, the debates of the 1920s, and the period up through Stalin's death. The second part was a systematic presentation and critique of matter, dialectics, the categories, dialectical materialism and modern science, and the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge and logic. Running 609 pages in its English translation it was the most comprehensive presentation of Soviet philosophy available in the West.

Wetter criticized Marxist-Leninist doctrines from the point of view of Thomistic philosophy. He evaluated it positively for its philosophical realism and for other aspects in which it coincided with the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. He carefully and objectively criticized it where in his view it was unclear, unconvincing, or mistaken. Without doubt, just as Plekhanov had raised a generation of Marxists, Wetter raised a generation of critics of Marxism through this fundamental work. No other work has had such an impact in the development of the study of Marxism-Leninism in the West. Nor has there been any comparable volume dedicated to historical materialism that has stood out and dominated the other treatments of its topic.

Wetter's *Soviet Ideology Today*, published in German in 1962 and in English in 1966, covered dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and the political economy of capitalism. But it never acquired the importance of his ground-breaking *Dialectical Materialism*. Part of the reason might have been that by the mid-1960s a number of other works on Marxism-Leninism had already appeared, and *Soviet Ideology Today* was one more work, rather than being a unique work dealing with that topic.

To some extent, the demise of Wetter's influence in the field, great as it initially was, is due to the fact that his work was known as the work of a single individual, despite his importance as a teacher. The

lasting impact of J.M. Bocheński on the study of Soviet and East European philosophy lies in his institutionalizing his work through the Institute of East European Studies, the *Sovietica* series, and one of the spin-offs of that series, the journal *Studies in Soviet Thought.*

As Bocheński was often quick to point out, in the Soviet Union there is a large cadre of philosophers whose sole task is to keep up with and refute Western philosophy. Scarcely any attack on Marxism-Leninism goes unanswered, and the developments of existentialism, analytic philosophy, pragmatism, phenomenology, Thomism, and the rest are all carefully followed by specialists, as are Western developments in logic, theory of knowledge, ethics, esthetics, and the other branches of philosophy. Such work is not left to the haphazard interest of individual Soviet philosophers, but is organized and institutionalized. Bocheński argued that comparable institutionalization was necessary in the West. His Institute was the only place in the West that specialized (and continues to specialize) in following the developments of Soviet philosophy and in publishing the results. There are now a few other institutes or centers that have one or more people with an interest in Soviet philosophy, and there are perhaps a few dozen individual specialists. But Bocheński's Institute and its offshoots remain the organizations that *par excellence* carry on the work he thought so essential.

Despite its influence, the Institute of East European Studies is physically small, consisting of a library and a few rooms. Bocheński turned down the opportunity to develop it into a large center with its own building and all the accoutrements that go with fancy institutes. He claimed that what was important was the work that got done. Large institutes inevitably lead to draining off time to maintain and increase funding; they develop a bureaucracy that contributes little to the academic activity of the institute; and they tend over time to lose their vitality, the camaraderie that a small and relatively poor institute has, and the dedication of purpose that a small institute can maintain.

No one can say what the Institute of East European Studies would have become had Bocheński seized the opportunity to expand it physically. Nonetheless, with the *Sovietica* series now publishing its fiftieth volume and *Studies in Soviet Thought* in its 27th year (and 33rd volume), the Institute has continued to flourish and pursue the work Bocheński started. Those he initially attracted and trained went on to continue his work and to spread its influence in the Western world. The *Sovietica* series has an international Editorial Board and the editors are Thomas J. Blakeley, of the Center for East Europe, Russia, and Asia at Boston College, Guido Küng, Director of East European Studies at the University of Fribourg, and Nikolaus Lobkowicz, former Rector and presently at the Seminar for Political Theory and Philosophy

at the University of Munich. All three received their training under Bocheński at Fribourg and all wrote articles for the first issue of *Studies in Soviet Thought.*

Studies in Soviet Thought first appeared as Volume 7 of the *Sovietica* series. It contained thirteen articles on various aspects of Soviet and East European thought, and was edited by J.M. Bocheński and T.J. Blakeley. It was in fact a report of the work being done at the Institute at the time of its appearance. Many of the articles presaged monographs that later appeared in the *Sovietica* series. Because of its wide coverage of East European Marxism and because of the newness for Western readers of the material with which it dealt, the volume was so successful that it was continued as a quarterly journal with J.M. Bocheński as Editor and T.J. Blakeley as the Managing Editor. The Editorial Board consisted of David D. Comey, Helmut Fleischer, and Siegfried Müller-Markus, all of the Institute of East European Studies. The Consulting Editors were Arnold Buchholz (Stuttgart), Helmut Dahm (Bonn), Zbigniew Jordan (London), George L. Kline (Bryn Mawr), Nikolaus Lobkowicz (Notre Dame), Gustav A. Wetter (Rome), and Karl A. Wittfogel (New York). The list included just about all the scholars of Marxism-Leninism in the West at that time.

Bocheński retired as Editor of the journal with Volume 16 (1976) and thereafter is listed as Founder. He similarly became listed as Founder of the *Sovietica* series with Volume 36 (1976).

The importance of the *Sovietica* series for those interested in the development of Soviet and East European philosophy can hardly be over-estimated. Lobkowicz' book on Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia and Z.A. Jordan's book on the development of Marxism-Leninism in Poland remain the classic works on Marxism in those countries. In 1964, Ignacio Angelelli translated and edited *Two Soviet Studies on Frege*, making original Soviet works available to the scholarly Western community. The Soviet Union had long published the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin in many languages throughout the world, and also translated some popular works of philosophy from the Russian. But the criterion used to choose books for translation into English seemed to be propaganda rather than scholarship. The *Sovietica* series brought to the attention of philosophers in the West texts that demonstrated the rising quality of the technical philosophical work being done in the Soviet Union, at least in the realm of logic. The series also continued to publish up-dated bibliographies for a total of five volumes, before *Studies in Soviet Thought* took upon itself their continuation through a running bibliography. The scholarly thread present from the beginning was not lost.

With Volume 33 the *Sovietica* series branched out with a work on *Hegel's Dialectic*, followed by a volume on *Vladimir Solovyev and*

Max Scheler. Volume 44 was *Mao Tse-Tung's Theory of Dialectic*. Nonetheless, the major emphasis continued to be on Soviet and East European Marxism.

The impact of J.M. Bocheński on the field of study of Soviet philosophy has overwhelmed that of any other single figure, not so much by his original research in the area - important as that was - as by the lasting success of the Institute, the series, and the journal he founded.

The third of the pioneers in the field was George L. Kline. Situated first at Columbia University and then at Bryn Mawr College, he was the only philosopher on the American scene with a critical interest in Soviet Marxism. There were a few others, to be sure, who followed Soviet Marxism as believers; and there were a few specialists in Russian pre-Marxist philosophy. Yet George Kline was known as the sole scholar with an impressive command of both pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy and early Russian and Soviet Marxism. His influence was not through institutionalization, as was Bochenski's, nor was it through a towering work, such as Wetter's. Rather it was through his influence in the American network of scholars interested in Soviet and East European studies, in his articles on a variety of topics dealing with Russian and Soviet thinkers - philosophers, poets, writers - and in his work in support of young scholars interested in the field and in his wide-ranging knowledge and contacts.

He helped bring the works of the Polish philosopher, Leszek Kołakowski, to the attention of Americans, and championed a number of lesser known Soviet figures who were eventually known as dissidents. He edited, translated and published widely on his own. His early interest in Russian and Soviet philosophy made him stand out in the 1950s and early 1960s. His work continued thereafter. But, as protégés of Bocheński arrived on the scene and as other independently trained philosophers began teaching and publishing in a number of American universities, he lost his unique status, while maintaining the stature that comes from having been a pioneer.

Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union has come a long way from the days immediately following Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's crimes. It has improved technically, and those trained in it are no longer the polemicists of the Stalinist and immediate post-Stalinist period. The interest shown in Soviet philosophers by the pioneers who first started taking it seriously has been vindicated. No longer does the question of whether "Soviet philosophy" is a contradiction in terms come as the automatic response to the statement that one is studying Soviet philosophy.

This is not to say that Western philosophers everywhere take Soviet and East European Marxism-Leninism seriously, that large numbers of

Western philosophers read or follow Soviet writings in philosophy, or that contemporary Soviet or East European versions of Marxism-Leninism represent the best of available Marxist writings.

Marxism in the West has been revived in the Anglo-American world in the form of analytic Marxism, which represents an effort to apply the rigor of analytic philosophy to the theories of Marx. The reconstructions that emerge are interesting and conceptually tighter than Marx' original theories, filled as they were with ambiguities. The power and originality of the humanistic Marxists of Eastern Europe over-shadowed Soviet Marxism-Leninism in the 1960s and the early 1970s. But theory proved impotent against the force of arms and in one country after another of Eastern Europe the humanistic Marxists were silenced, exiled, or forced to modify their views.

The importance of Soviet and East European Marxism-Leninism is not purely philosophical, even in the realm of philosophy. Marxism-Leninism is the official state ideology in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Marxism-Leninism's importance stems in large part from its union with state power. But that it has developed to the level of philosophical respectability should not be ignored and need not be denied. The importance in having even a small group in the West follow the developments in Soviet philosophy should not be overlooked. And Western philosophers owe a debt to the authors of the fifty volumes of the *Sovietica* series who made the fruits of their research available to Western philosophers. Even if their contributions were only to indicate that there was no change or development in Soviet philosophy, their informed reporting of such conclusions would be worth having. Since this is not the case, their contributions are all the more important.

Western interest in the Soviet Union has waxed and waned in the United States and Western Europe since 1956. At some points, as immediately after Sputnik, interest rose and money flowed into the development of Soviet and East European studies. After the initial interest, sources of financing tended to dry up as other pressing issues caught the attention of governments and foundations. This was followed by the realization that a critical shortage of specialists was again developing, leading to a new surge of interest and money. Despite the rollercoaster nature of the field, the *Sovietica* series has continued publishing volume after volume, in times of greater as well as in times of lesser interest.

In 1959 it would have been difficult to believe that there would be sufficient subject matter or interest to produce fifty volumes. The original intent was to publish individual monographs on the development and status of Marxism in each of the countries of Eastern Europe and to dedicate a volume to the Marxist-Leninist position in each of the

major areas of philosophy. The series did not develop as systematically as that, and the vagaries of history influenced the development of the series just as it had influenced the development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

The present volume, number 50 in the series, commemorates the work of the three pioneers in the Western study of Marxism-Leninism, whose contributions are fittingly celebrated in these pages.

The articles by Thomas J. Blakeley and Helmut Dahm put the work of J.M. Bocheński and Gustav Wetter in perspective.

Blakeley illuminatingly situates Bocheński's approach to Soviet philosophy by first detailing Bocheński's position on central philosophical issues. Bocheński's own philosophical concern is with logic and methodology, and this strongly influences his approach to and his evaluation of Soviet philosophy.

Bocheński's initial criticism of Soviet Marxism-Leninism centers on the doctrine of *partijnost'* (party-mindedness or partisanship). He pays more attention to Soviet philosophy and rates it more highly after 1947, as it turns more to logic and methodology. Bocheński then attacks dialectical logic and his criticism is mainly of dialectical materialism and of Lenin and Leninism, which he considers a Russian doctrine. He pays very little attention to Marx or Marxism and he insists on distinguishing Marxism from Marxism-Leninism. For Bocheński, whether or not Lenin is a faithful follower of Marx is irrelevant.

In his discussion Blakeley quotes some of the many Soviet replies to and criticisms of Bocheński. Blakeley concludes that Bocheński's scientific Sovietology has helped Soviet philosophers make their philosophy more scientific. While this is perhaps an over-statement, Bocheński's criticism has helped many in the West clarify the scientific status of Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Bocheński also exemplified the use of what he called "immanent" or internal critique. Rather than criticizing Marxism-Leninism from an external point of view, he demonstrated its internal logical shortcomings. He thus developed a critical approach that many have followed.

Dahm's article not only celebrates the accomplishments of Gustav Wetter, but it is also an original contribution to the field. In his article Dahm first places Wetter's work historically, giving us details of Wetter's life and glimpses into his personal outlook. The context Dahm develops is that of the Catholic Church and especially of a group of Jesuits who worked and are working in the field of Sovietology. That Wetter is a Jesuit is, of course, well-known, as is the fact that his criticism of dialectical materialism is from an explicitly Thomistic point of view. Yet, placing him with other Jesuits known in the field - such as Jean-Yves Calvez, Henri Chambre, and Peter Ehlen - both drives

home the importance of the Jesuit contribution and emphasizes the extent to which Wetter's work stood out within the philosophical discussions of that circle. Dahm pushes Wetter's Catholic perspective and Jesuit connection hard. He pushes them so hard as perhaps to give the mistaken impression to those who do not know Wetter's work first hand that Wetter engages in the kind of ideological polemic characteristic of much of Soviet writing on scientific atheism. In emphasizing Wetter's religious zeal Dahm also to some extent fails sufficiently to note the fact that Wetter's influence extends far beyond the Jesuits and far beyond Catholic readers. Wetter's *Dialectical Materialism* is well worth the reading even if one is not a Thomist and does not agree with his critique of Soviet philosophy from that point of view.

Second, in the course of his discussion of Wetter, Dahm examines four major approaches of Catholic Sovietologists to Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy and defends Wetter's Aristotelian-Thomistic stress on ontological and epistemological realism. This was Wetter's major concern, and Wetter developed the thesis that this was the core positive element in dialectical materialism. Its realism was both its strength and the place where it most closely coincided with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

Dahm's third claim is more speculative and controversial, and concerns Soviet philosophy. His thesis is that in the years following Wetter's major work Soviet philosophers themselves independently came to emphasize ontological and epistemological moderate realism, developing those aspects rather than the dialectical and Hegelian aspects. Dahm concludes that Wetter's work was especially important and significant because he emphasized this aspect of Soviet philosophy, and that later developments have in some sense shown him to be correct. One need not accept that conclusion to acknowledge the pioneering efforts of Gustav Wetter.

Dahm's emphasis on the "Catholic contribution" to the study of Soviet philosophy and the development of the realistic thread in Marxism might make the attentive reader consider both the possible dialogue between Marxism and Catholic thought along the realistic lines that Wetter emphasized, and paradoxically the great divide between Catholicism and Marxism when viewed, as Engels and Lenin emphasized, as opposing ideologies or world views.

Dahm then himself continues Wetter's critique of Soviet ontology, bringing the critique up to date and concluding that Soviet attempts to ground rationally their dialectical materialism fail miserably. Whether this means that dialogue is a waste of time or that rational consistency will force Soviet philosophers to move towards the Aristotelian-Thomistic position - a movement that dialogue might facilitate - Dahm leaves us to answer for ourselves.

Kline dominates the second half of this volume. His own paper on Marx' materialism is a considerably enlarged version of an important paper he published previously in *Annals of Scholarship*. In it Kline argues that Marx "neither developed nor defended a materialist ontology". This suggests that Marxism can do without dialectical materialism, and so the difficulties that Bocheński, Wetter and Dahm point out are not fatal to Marxism, even if they undermine the Engels-Lenin version of it.

Nonetheless, as Tom Rockmore points out, Kline's work is critical of original Marxism for other reasons. Kline helped make known Kołakowski's criticism of the Marxist-Leninist historical justification of clearly immoral actions. Kline also directly attacked Marx' "humanism of ideals" for not being a "humanism of principles". Philip Grier's survey of Kline's writings on Russian and Soviet philosophy similarly emphasizes Kline's commitment to "ethical individualism" and shows its relevance to his critique of Marxism and its many varieties.

Kline's general position is that the negative, morally repugnant aspects of Leninism and Stalinism are not aberrations of Marxism, but are to be found in Marx' position itself. As opposed to those who defend Marx while criticizing Lenin or Soviet practice, Kline finds the root of the failures of Lenin and Soviet practice already in Marx, simply waiting to spring up.

Thus, this fiftieth volume of the *Sovietica* series, while celebrating an institutional event and honoring three of the pioneers in Soviet philosophical studies, makes its own original contribution to the critique of Marxism-Leninism. The number of toilers in the field has significantly increased since the 1950s, in large part due to the pioneering work of these three. Soviet philosophy has also become richer since they played their central roles in the 1950s. Whether Soviet philosophy has become interesting enough to generate another fifty volumes in this series, only time will tell.

THOMAS J. BLAKELEY

J.M. Bocheński's Accomplishments as Philosophical Sovietologist

J.M. Bocheński's contributions to philosophic Sovietology began long after his path-finding work in the fields of logic[1] and the history of philosophy.[2] It is intriguing to ask Bocheński the historian of philosophy for an assessment of Bocheński the founder of a school of interpretation of contemporary Soviet philosophy. So, let us first look at the general principles of the Bocheńskian views on central themes in the history of philosophy. These will include, of course, his interpretation of Marx, Marxism and Marxism-Leninism (III), but begin with his own account of himself (I), and of major philosophers and trends in the history of philosophy (II). Then, we ask the Soviets themselves - who have sometimes expressed an appreciation for the Bocheńskian view on contemporary philosophy - for a reaction to the philosophic Sovietology of Bocheński and his school (IV), and end with some reflections on scientific Sovietology (V).

I. J.M. BOCHEŃSKI ON HIMSELF IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

There is no doubt that Bocheński sees himself in terms of a certain confluence of relatively clearly specifiable philosophic trends. He calls himself an analyst, a methodologist, a rationalist, an optimist, a Platonist, a cosmocentrist, an Aristotelian, and a Thomist.[3] We owe it to ourselves to examine each briefly.

A. Analysis

In his self-description of 1975 Bocheński says: "Coming now to my basic convictions, I would repeat that I should be called an analyst"[4], and then goes on to explain how he wants "analysis" to be taken. First of all, analysis is not a "school"; it is, rather, a "camp", marked by the following traits: it uses the method of logical analysis of language; it takes an objectivist attitude; it is naturalist; and it does not construct systems but focusses on specific themes.

Bocheński goes on to distinguish between "hard" and "soft" analysis, and describes himself as a "very hard" analyst. By this he

H. Dahm, T. J. Blakeley and G. L. Kline (eds.), Philosophical Sovietology, 11–51.
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means a "'hard' mathematical-logical analyst". (p. 25)

Without going at this point into the compatibility of this degree of 'hardness' with anything like Platonism or Aristotelianism, there is the evident question that such a strict mathematical-logical position generally has no non-mathematical-logical correlate - which is just a complicated way of saying that the harder the method gets the less of an opportunity there is to specify any sort of 'ground', be it 'ontic' or 'ontological'. In his *Contemporary European Philosophy* , Bocheński himself says of neopositivism that

> Originally its representatives believed that the new logic afforded them a decisive weapon against all other philosophies. Later they found themselves unable to deal with the traditional problems of theoretical knowledge while relying exclusively upon the new logic - which other schools were also beginning to use.[5]

In other words, there are 'contentful' (*inhaltlich, soderžatel'nye*) questions that have to be asked and that cannot be answered merely by the 'hard stuff'. However, even in his *Logic of Religion* Bocheński offers a paradigm of how such contentful questions are amenable to a more formal analysis than is generally thought possible or desirable.

B. Bocheński the Methodologist

On Bocheński's own account, methodology has most to do with "the views of the methodologists and not those of the scientists themselves"[6] and he obviously includes himself among the former rather than the latter. He supplies two, slightly differing, descriptions of what is meant by "methodology":

> The theory of applying logical laws to various domains is just what methodology is.[7]

and

> Methodology is the theory of method.[8]

while

> Method is the ways and means for proceeding in a given domain, *i.e.* the ordering of our activity, and this to some end.[9]

He goes on to specify that logic - including methodology as applied

logic - is a *sine qua non* for any science.[10] What he does not specify in this place is what role is played in science by 'hard analysis' over against 'soft logic'. In other words, one would like to find a differentiation between what is generally called hermeneutic and what is merely heuristics. Within Bocheński's own tradition *intentiones tertiae non dantur* precisely served to block the indefinite regress of something like 'from method as applied logic to the logic of method, and then to the method of constructing the logic of method, for which method of constructing the logic of method there has to be a logic, and so on'.

In what follows, we will come back to Bocheński's path-finding division of methods into phenomenological, linguistic-analytic, and deductive and reductive.[11] Behind this division lies a very specific hermeneutic or principle of interpretation.

C. Rationalism

To be a rationalist, for Bocheński, means to see reality "as cosmos, not as chaos ... where there are no mysteries, only problems ... "[12] What is more, "reality has a structure ... " and "'illogical structure' is a contradiction ... "; for a *nous* that is "*Verstand*" rather than "*Vernunft*", where *Verstand* is "the same as formal logic".[13] What makes us "rational", then, is the ability to do logic, rather than the basic intuitions that supply us with information about the real.

Rationalism, thus, here involves a sort of 'connaturality' - to use the Scholastic term, where the guarantee of a possibility of knowledge lies in some type of 'correlativity' between noetic and noematic, an intended (intentional) object and the (metaphysically) real (existent) object.

D. Optimism

According to Bocheński's account, his optimism goes along with his rationalism and that of many other thinkers. Since the world is so complex and we can, in any case, know only so much of it, it is just as easy to admit that we do have some warranted knowledge (along with all the superficial data that fill so many scienctific endeavors), as it is to give oneself over to scepticism and/or relativism - although he indicates in the same place[14] that scepticism offers the temptation of being a very simple theory. In fact, he uses this apparent simplicity as the occasion to express the idea that simple theories are false - something that will serve him in dealing with contemporary Soviet philosophy.

E. Platonism

"Platonism" is one of the wooliest terms in the history of philosophy. Admitting this, Bocheński nonetheless asserts that his Platonism includes both an ontological aspect - that there are ideal objects - and an anthropological side - that humans are capable of knowing and willing the ideal, *i.e.* of taking the ideal as both material and final object.[15] It is the latter that will come to the fore when we look at Bocheński's analysis and critique of Soviet philosophy.

Bocheński's Platonism, however, also has much in common with that of many contemporary formal logicians; namely, it is due to the tight connection between logic and mathematics that has been the case at least since the *Principia*, illustrating that while Platonism pushed to its upper limit is ultra-realism, when pushed to its lower limit, it is the most atomistic of empiricisms.

F. Cosmocentrism

By this, Bocheński means a certain sort of 'non-anthropocentric' attitude, where the human is taken as a very important part of the real - but still it is only a part of the real. To a great extent, this attitude is derivative of what Bocheński owes to Aristotle (a syntactic logic), Aquinas (a 'cosmo'-theology), and Kant (of the second *Critique*). In the context of discussing this trait, he also cites Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, against Augustine, Kant (of the first *Critique*), and Heidegger.[16]

G. Aristotelianism

After what has been said above, there are real difficulties in seeing what Bocheński can mean when he calls himself an Aristotelian. Of course, as Bocheński himself points out, Aristotle was and, to a great extent, remained a Platonist. However, it is well-known that Aristotle consciously distinguished himself not only from Plato but from all of Aristotle's predecessors - and this by traits that he considered very serious, not trivial. These include Aristotle's formal logic, his pretention to be able to do a 'scientific' metaphysics (where he alone manages to define what 'science' really means), and his original interpretation of substance (*ousia protera*) and essence (*ousia deutera*).

Describing what he terms his own "epistemological Aristotelianism"[17], Bocheński asserts that there is no apriori (*i.e.* what

is independent of experience), so that even formal logic is aposteriori. (One obviously needs to get clear on what 'aposteriori' means here!) Further, there is no significant distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions - what Bocheński calls a form of "positivism"; but which can just as easily be seen as the restoration of a 'realistic' theory of language.

Ontologism is another side of Bocheński's Aristotelianism: it means that significant statements can be made not just about words but also and mainly about objects.[18] Such a position was long anathema both to neopositivist formalism and to phenomenological 'constitutionalism' and one could have asked how such linguistic realism could be squared with 'hard' analysis. As it turns out, however, Bocheński has long been at the forefront of the position to which neopositivists and analysts would eventually have to (re)turn.

Finally, Aristotelianism means for Bocheński the acceptance of the priority of the real over the ideal, although in one place he refuses to elaborate on what this might mean[19] and, in fact, it is hard to see how this might square with the 'hardness' of his logic. It is not at all clear that Aristotle can be included among those who use 'hard' logic. A case can be made for distinguishing an Aristotle-type logic from a Plato-type logic, where the former is closer to (some might say "tainted by") ontology, while the latter is heavily influenced by mathematics, or by an ontology that has mathematical (formal) traits, rather than properly ontological ones.

Singularly complicating Bocheński's view of Aristotelianism is the fact that he sees an essential continuity between the formal logic of Aristotle and contemporary 'hard' logic.

H. Thomism

Finally, at the end of his *Selbstdarstellung*, Bocheński calls himself a Thomist and links this to Thomas Aquinas' acceptance of the central rule that "The thinking man should try to bring everything that he considers true into one, non-contradictory (*i.e.* consistent) framework."[20] One would still have to ask, however, how the Thomistic problem of faith and reason can be reconciled with 'hard' or mathematical logic; and this is a realm where Bocheński the philosopher, Bocheński the logician, and Bocheński the historian of philosophy meet in Bocheński the Sovietologist.

* * *

Summing up our brief characterization of Bocheński by himself,

we can distinguish two sets of descriptive terms: those that have to do with the nature of the Bocheńskian philosophic enterprise; and those he uses to situate himself *vis-à-vis* other great thinkers in the history of Western thought.

It seems that the first set of descriptive terms consists mainly of those drawn from

(a) logic and methodology,
(b) metaphysics and epistemology, and
(c) (formal) ontology and the philosophy of logic;

while the second set revolves around the persons of

(d) Wittgenstein and Quine,
(e) Plato and Aristotle, and
(f) Augustine and Thomas.

While the thinkers of (d) deal mainly with the problems of (a), all the other thinkers are involved with all the other problems, as well as with those of (a). However, characteristic of Bocheński's approach is that, although his 'hard' logic makes him 'naturally' fit in with the thinkers of (d), he requires of all these thinkers and all others that they reply to all these problems, as well as to all other serious philosophic problems.

To what extent does Bocheński succeed in avoiding the Scylla of allowing each thinker to get away with the relativism of being judged in terms strictly of his own principles, and the Charybdis of judging (=condemning) a given thinker through use of criteria drawn from the thought of someone else?

We can best answer this by asking a subsidiary and preliminary set of particular questions (those compatible with an 'analytic' approach):

1. Do "analysis" *à la* Bocheński and "analysis" *à la* Wittgenstein or *à la* Quine mean the same thing, different things, or one and the other?
2. Does "ontology" mean the same for Bocheński and Aristotle? or for Bocheński and Plato? or for Bocheński and Nicolai Hartmann?
3. Can "structure" and "system" be used at the same time? and do they apply just to some thinkers? or necessarily to all of them?

From our cursory analysis of what Bocheński has said (before looking at what he has done), we can lay out the following generalizations:

(1) There is, for Bocheński, a fundamental 'formalism' that inheres in any human thought; and, since all thinkers have to be using some formal logic, there is in all thinkers some logical 'formalism' - and, to this extent, analysis *à la* Bocheński and analysis *à la* Quine have a common core. A question we will raise in what follows is on what grounds Bocheński thinks his

formalism is closer to that of Quine and Wittgenstein than to that of Plato and Aristotle.

(2) In the final analysis, it seems that Bocheński holds that one has to articulate at the outset some categorial framework with an ontological import that assists in identifying "ontological commitments", *i.e.* in making metaphysical decisions - everyone does it and no one can do anything without doing it (something like Kant holds that everyone has some metaphysics, even if no one can do a scientific metaphysics without raising all sorts of difficult problems). How this is not an apriori will be considered below.

(3) As we will also see below, but have already alluded to above, Bocheński holds that what is intelligible has a structure; so, to the extent that any thought can be understood, it possesses a structure - hence, some sort of systematicity. So, to the extent that one can speak of a given thinker's thought, there has to be a structure and at least the possibility of systematization.

II. MAJOR PHILOSOPHERS AND SCHOOLS AS BOCHEŃSKI SEES THEM

Bocheński's writings in the history of philosophy have dealt mainly with the history of contemporary philosophy, which his major work in the history of philosophy divides into six trends.[20] However, to the extent that he has written extensively not only on logic but also on the history of logic, Bocheński has made many observations on ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as on Indian logic, and the thought of China. Also, Bocheński's self-proclaimed Platonism and Aristotelianism put him in the position of making frequent comments on these two thinkers.

As above, let us see how Bocheński applies his principles when it comes to actual historical figures. The framework is provided by a division - which he himself sees as useful but not paradigmatic - into ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary philosophies.

A. Bocheński on Ancient Logic and Philosophy

The dividing line between the ancient and medieval periods is, for Bocheński, the occurrence of Christianity - although there are thinkers who span the transition. Among these last, it is the Stoics who most interest Bocheński precisely because of their concentration on logic, but also because of their status as 'transitional' philosophers.

Equally because of the concentration on logic, it is Aristotle, Theophrastus and Chrysippus who figure prominently in the work of Bocheński, when it comes to ancient philosophy. In fact, he divides the history of ancient logic into three periods:

1. The pre-Aristotelian, without formal study of logical rules, while rules are being used consciously.
2. The Aristotelian period, running from Aristotle's *Topics* to the death of Chrysippus of Soloi (205/8 B.C.).
3. The period of commentaries, until the end of Antiquity.[22]

A clue, *e contrario*, as to why this particular division is used by Bocheński for the field of logic is to be found in a passage from his *Formale Logik*:

> Thereby, all that derives from this period - with few exceptions - is so imbued with the then prevalent biases that we have to assign this whole period to the pre-history of our science:
>
> The biases in question are basically three:
>
> 1. First there was the general conviction that formalism had little to do with 'true' logic. For this reason, formal-logical investigations were either left unnoticed or set aside with scorn as something ancillary.
>
> 2. Further - and in part precisely because of the first bias - Scholasticism was treated as a stormy interlude, a "dark middle age", without any science. Since, however, Scholasticism had a highly developed formal logic, the attempt was then made to find in history either other 'logics' (not only those of Noah and Epictetus, by Ramus, but then, later, that of Ramus himself) or, at least, a supposedly better interpretation of Aristotle - which brought the whole of research into a blind alley.
>
> 3. Finally, just as wide-spread was a remarkable faith in the linearly progressive development of every science, including formal logic. There was, then, a constant temptation to take the least of the 'moderns' as more valuable than the best of the classical past.[23]

This view on ancient logic fits in with Bocheński's thoughts in his 'Reflections on the Evolution of Philosophy', where we read:

> It thus seems certain that the evolution of philosophy does not consist in a succession of different attitudes, one of which drives out the other, to end up in a single, definitive doctrine. Nothing like this has ever happened and what we are observing today induces us in no way toward this view.[24]

We have thus learned two things about the Bocheńskian approach to

ancient philosophy as a point of departure for his approach to the history of philosophy as a whole: a philosophy is 'higher', the more it respects elements of formalism; and, there is no necessary progression from an earlier, lower, philosophy to a later, higher, philosophy. From these principles flows Bocheński's respect for Aristotle who not only invented formal logic but also employed large elements of formalism in other domains of his thought, *i.e.* there was an 'ontological relevance'. From this position is also derived Bocheński's recurrent interest in periods of 'upheaval' or transition. It is in Bocheński's works on the history of logic that we find the first complete presentation of Stoic logic as representing a rupture with the prevailing Aristotelianism while at the same time being one of the constant temptations of logical thought and laying a groundwork that will be recuperated during several subsequent historical periods - *e.g.* in 'Ockhamism' in the sixteenth century, and again in the nineteenth century.

This interest in periods of rupture, upheaval and transition will be at least one of the attractions at work in our subject's fascination with Marx and Marxism; for, as George Kline shows, the 'materialism' of Marx is indeed a peculiar form of 'ontology of crisis'.[25]

In other words, Bocheński sees Antiquity as marked by an Aristotle with sound formalism both in logic and general philosophy, and then by a formalism of another sort, carried by a type of movement that, in a sense, does not see a need for a special type of ontology to carry it along. This could suggest that the formal-logical quotient of a given philosophic view serves as Bocheńskian heuristic device, while the peculiar link to an ontology is the properly hermeneutic moment for this thinker.

B. Bocheński on Medieval Philosophy

For some of the same reasons underlying the above appreciation of ancient philosophy, Bocheński concentrates, in dealing with medieval philosophy, not on Augustine (whose avoidance of formalism was legendary) but on Thomas Aquinas, in whom he finds a remarkable degree of rationalism, formalism and system.

Given the paucity of Aquinatic logical works (outside of the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*)[26] and even of mention of logical problems in the works of the Angelic Doctor, one might guess that what Bochenski is admiring here is what is often called the 'external method' of the Scholastics rather than its logic proper. In other words, there is a set of 'procedures' that belong to the way Aquinas presents both questions and answers - his own and those of his predecessors - that is governed not just somewhat by his own tendencies but more by

what is dictated by the matter at hand, what the Soviets call the *soderžatel'nyj* perspective. Are we, then, talking about a logic or about a 'hermeneutic' or what Marx distinguishes as 'method of presentation', over against 'method of research'?[27]

Just as an Aristotle with a formally developed philosophic system, where a very formal logic (a 'hard' view) was a central element, was succeeded by the developments in Stoic logic, so the rationalism of Aquinas and High Scholasticism was followed by an Ockhamism where, again, Bocheński's interest is drawn to a logic and methodology of 'upheaval'.

C. Bocheński on Modern Philosophy

This period in the development of Western philosophy (1600-1900) does not receive much respect in the works of Bocheński - probably because it violates all of his principles of good logic and good philosophy: especially, there is a dearth of formalism, and the 'upheaval' phenomena seem to continue and to be cultivated in such a way that nothing characteristic of 'high philosophy' gets established during the whole period until the nineteenth century, if then. There is nothing but a 'flight from system to system'. In his *Formale Logik*, while 135 pages out of 517 are devoted to ancient logic and 124 to Scholastic logic, only 11 are devoted to the period between the latter period and the coming-to-be of mathematical logic![28]

For Bocheński, modern philosophy gestates out of Scholastic philosophy, as follows:

> Characteristic of scholasticism is its pluralism (assuming the plurality of really different beings and levels of being), its personalism (acknowledging the pre-eminent value of the human person), its organic conception of reality, as well as its theocentric attitude - God the Creator at its center of vision. Detailed logical analysis of individual problems is characteristic of scholastic method. Modern philosophy opposes every one of these tenets. Its fundamental principles are mechanism, which eliminates the conception of being as integral and hierarchical, and subjectivism, which diverts man from his previous concentration upon God and substitutes the subject as the center. In point of method modern philosophy turned its back on formal logic. With some notable exceptions, it was characterized by the development of great systems and by the neglect of analysis.[29]

Again we find the degree of formalism to be decisive, but we also

find here a 'dialectical' or more hermeneutic conception of how this modern period eventuates in the interplay among " ... idealism, scientific evolutionism and a simultaneous operation of both tendencies".[30]

D. Contemporary European Philosophy, According to Bocheński

As one of the leading experts on the history of contemporary philosophy - amply quoted both in the East and the West[31] - Bocheński has written extensively on the subject, so extensively that it is a bit of a challenge to elicit the principles of his treatment. His *Contemporary European Philosophy* ends up delineating six "main currents" in contemporary European philosophy:

the philosophy of matter (Russell, neopositivism, and dialectical materialism),
the philosophy of the idea (Croce, Brunschvicg, neo-Kantianism),
the philosophy of life (Bergson, pragmatism, historicism, *Lebensphilosophie*),
the philosophy of essence (Husserl and Scheler),
the philosophy of existence (Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, Jaspers), and
the philosophy of being (metaphysics, Hartmann, Whitehead and Thomism).

The effort to distinguish these leads to a set of characterizations that border on the least useful sort of hermeneutical dialectic[32]:

1. They are all anti-positivist, except for the positivists.
2. They pursue analysis, except for those who do not.
3. They are realists, except for the idealists.
4. They are pluralist, except for the monists.
5. They are actualists, except for the metaphysicians.
6. They are personalists, except for the materialists, etc.

These seem to have to do with the role of science in philosophy, with methodology, with several aspects of ontology, and with the psychological and ethical aspects. More than this, they might be discounted as an author's effort to begin with some introductory generalizations.

E. Some Bocheńskian Reflections on the Evolution of Philosophy

Early in his career (1948), Bocheński wrote a basic article, called 'Reflections on the Evolution of Philosophy' (see note 24, above), where he distinguished four 'elements of philosophy': pre-philosophy, fundamental attitudes, elaboration, and system.

By "pre-philosophy" Bocheński means whatever is needed for philosophizing but belongs to no particular philosophic trend. What he mainly has in mind, of course, is logic; for, every epoch and every philosophic enterprise needs logic in some form or another. But, he also means that there is always an ontological ground present, as well as some ethical and psychological beliefs. The evolution of this pre-philosophy, according to Bocheński, follows a law of

formation --> intensive development --> over-development --> decadence

where 'development' means, above all, 'degree of formalization'. There is also the matter of 'pre-categorials' which should be invoked in this context and which will be of import for dealing with historicism in its various forms. Aristotle mentions privation, to have, and a number of others - but every system-builder must have them.

By "fundamental attitudes", Bocheński means *Weltanschauung*. He asserts that there has never been an era with only one fundamental attitude; rather there seems to be a law of alternation of attitudes.

Is there - within the elaborations of the fundamental positions, at least - some sort of continuous development? Again, Bocheński inclines toward the attitude that there is an alternation of degrees of formalization.

Systems develop, decline, are repaired, and fall, simply because they are 'totalizing' and no totalization seems to be able to cover everything that has to be covered. This is because Bocheński holds that although there is not necessarily a linear progress in philosophy, there seems to be a progress in the exposition of the problems that come to the fore. Many of the materials needed to elaborate this aspect of Bocheński's thought are contained in his *Zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden*, but lack further elaboration.[33]

There are problems here that involve both the history of philosophy and a sort of historiosophy; but, let us let them come out as we look at J.M. Bocheński's development as a commentator on and critic of contemporary Soviet philosophy.

III. BOCHEŃSKI ON MARX, MARXISM, NEO-MARXISM AND CONTEMPORARY SOVIET PHILOSOPHY

Along with G.A. Wetter, J.M. Bocheński is the acknowledged expert on contemporary Soviet philosophy. He is, in fact, the founder of Sovietology as concerns research into and critique of the theory. Almost every Soviet list of 'falsifiers of Marxism' contains the names of Bocheński and Wetter, along with a number of others, depending on

the circumstances.[34] He has trained a number of researchers in the field, including N. Lobkowicz, Richard T. DeGeorge, F. Rapp, and the author of the present study.[35] It is he who established the periodization of this field.[36] Many of his analytic approaches have become part and parcel of what it means to be a Sovietologist in philosophy.

A. The History of Bocheński's Writings on Contemporary Soviet Philosophy

It was in the context of his usual history of philosophy activity that Bocheński began writing on contemporary Soviet philosophy. Although *Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat)*[37] was Bocheński's first major work on the subject, he had already in 1947 published an extensive essay on it in his *Contemporary European Philosophy*.[38] The 'Philosophy of Matter' section of this book deals with Russell, neopositivism and dialectical materialism (diamat).

This section on diamat is divided into the following parts: Characteristics; Origin and Representatives; Developments in Russia; Materialism; Dialectical Evolution, Monism and Determinism; Psychology; Epistemology; Values; and the presentation is fair, if pithy. Concluding the section on the philosophy of matter, Bocheński cites three traits that diamat has in common with the other twentieth-century materialists:

(1) they are throwbacks to the nineteenth century, for they generally remain with questions that were asked then but have been overcome by the living philosophic thought of the twentieth century;
(2) their theories are primitive, both in the terminology used and in the exactitude of formulating questions and arriving at answers;
(3) they do not answer the grave problems facing man and humanity, for they tend to overlook the specificity of the human in their pursuit of qualities of matter or language.[39]

By contrast, the presentation in *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism* contains a 'Historical Section' and a 'Systematic Section'. The former is divided into four chapters: Western Sources; Russian Sources: Lenin; The History of Philosophy in Soviet Russia; External Traits and Spirit. The systematic section contains eight chapters: Notion and Division of Philosophy; Realism and Rationalism; Materialism; Dialectic; Methodology; Historical Materialism; The Theoretical Value of Diamat; Concluding Remarks.

How do these two presentations differ, apart from the matter of length? The first and shorter version is an effort to give a general

acquaintanceship with diamat as one among many other "reactionary" philosophies that reach back in the nineteenth century. What is added for the case of diamat is Party-supervision. Criticism of "*partijnost'*" became so typical of Bocheński's early Sovietological work that for many Soviets this is all he seemed to have to say.

The longer essay is the result of much more thorough research, and pays attention to the institutional context of contemporary Soviet philosophy; *i.e.*, to how relationships to the Party and its discipline are part of the "fundamental attitudes", within which contemporary Soviet philosophers are forced to work. What is missing in this more extensive account, that is alluded to in the principles we have reviewed above, is any indication that the content of various doctrines is dependent on these Party-bound attitudes.

In the *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, four of the fifteen sections were written by Bocheński, either alone or in collaboration with others. These are: The Formal Structure of Communism; Philosophic, Sociological and Economic Bases; Religion; and Criticism of Communism. In the second of these, Bocheński lays out the basic formulae of contemporary Soviet philosophy in a format that will become characteristic of him, *i.e.* as a sort of catechism with sets of what he calls, as logician, "laws". It is basically religious material laid out in some sort of logical form. Uncharacteristically, the division into four periods in this work differs from that in the other two presentations. Here, the limit between the first and second periods is put at 1926, instead of 1922.[40]

In 1959, Bocheński and members of his school at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) founded a book series, *Sovietica*. In the Preface to one of the volumes - *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie* by Siegfried Müller-Markus - Bocheński continues in the catechetical form, saying:

(1) Philosophy plays an important role in Communism;
(2) during recent years, this philosophy has undergone significant qualitative development and is today of great interest even for Western philosophers;
(3) despite the uniform dogmatic foundations, it is so rich and varied that it can be investigated only through specialized research;
(4) Such research can be successfully carried out only by scholars who are trained both in a philosophic specialty and in general Sovietology.[41]

With its more positive assessment of the potentialities of contemporary Soviet philosophy and its forays into the methodological approaches to be taken in researching it, this text can be taken to represent

the real entry of Bocheński into Sovietology and, therefore, the actual birth of philosophical Sovietology. He was the first to insist on its scientific status and on separating it from "Kremlinology", the effort to predict Soviet events for political purposes.

In 1960, Bocheński published the first volume of *Studies in Soviet Thought* that was destined to become a quarterly journal that is still being published today at a rate of eight issues per year.[42]

Before looking at the programmatic statements that Bocheński began publishing in *SST*, we must take up one Bocheńskian work that could rival the Müller-Markus Preface for the honor of containing the birth of philosophic Sovietology. This is the *Einführung in die sowjetische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, which appeared in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, a supplement to *Das Parlament* (November 4, 1959).[43] Here we find an extensive discussion of the various terms, including "Sovietology", as well as a unique periodization: 1922-1931 is the first period of discussion; 1931-1947 is the quiet period; and 1947-now is the new period of discussion. Also interesting is that, although this third period is supposed to begin with the decree of 1947, the chronological table starts with the 1946 decree on logic and psychology in high schools. This last fact is due not merely to Bocheński's reliance on logic and formalism as signs of philosophic maturity; for, as V.F. Asmus says:

> My *Logic* of 1947 was essentially the first work on formal logic to appear, after a long period in which we published no works on formal logic. That was an era of nihilistic negation of formal logic, accompanied by denigration of its theoretical and pedagogical significance. Afterwards, when I received the proposition to write a book exposing the basic doctrines of classical or traditional logic, I resolved to limit the parameters of this work to traditional theory, not adding anything about mathematical logic or about the advances that had been made - *e.g.* concerning inference or proof - on the basis of mathematical logic. It could be that this decision was correct for purposes of initial information and for overcoming the period of the ignorance of logic, and that the 1947 book served its purpose. But, I could not repeat this experience. I am thoroughly convinced that today only a logic based on contemporary mathematical logic can be considered a scientific logic.[44]

In other words, the 'quiet period' ends either with the *Ždanovščina* or with the readmission of a scientific logic into the curriculum. Bocheński the logician was inclined to choose the latter, whereas Bocheński the Sovietologist and historian of philosophy consistently chose the former.

The inclusion in the *Einführung* of the Soviet view on the history of philosophy could be taken as the first sign that Bocheński was beginning to take Soviet philosophy more seriously than he had in the earlier works; for in this becoming conscious of itself as having concrete origins Soviet philosophy was beginning to become conscious of problems that had previously been ignored for doctrinal reasons. It had always been held that Marxism-Leninism naturally continued the thought of Engels and Lenin, just as these two had naturally continued the thought of Marx. A more differentiated view brought the Soviets to make a more sophisticated distinction along the course of historical development.

To return to *Studies in Soviet Thought*, from the beginning of publication of the journal Bocheński was making statements on how he saw the various factors and elements of philosophic Sovietology. The very first of these, 'On Soviet Studies'[45], establishes the 'line' of the Fribourg Institute by declaring that, because Communism is both a theory and a practice, Sovietology has to be either philosophic or sociological. It also laid out the methodological basis of the discipline. Despite the Soviet claim that bourgeois researchers are incapable of being 'objective' in any serious sense, the Bocheński claim is that an 'impartial' investigation of Soviet philosophy is not only possible but also critically necessary; for to admit the principle of *partijnost'* would be to admit the worst form of sociological and philosophic relativism.

In his lead article to the second volume of *SST*, 'The Three Components of Communist Ideology'[46], Bocheński establishes the analytic distinction of components within Communist ideology: the basic dogma, the systematic superstructure, and the declassified doctrines - reminiscent of the fundamental attitudes, elaboration of positions, and systematization. Many of the ideas presented in this and subsequent articles were evolved in the weekly meetings of the Institute of East-European Studies, founded by Bocheński at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) in 1957. These meetings took the form of *orgsov* (organizational meeting) or *nasov* (scientific meeting), and it was at one of the latter that Bocheński and David Comey evolved the notion of 'declassified' doctrines - with a play on the word 'class' in 'classified'.

'Why Studies in Soviet Philosophy?'[47] argues that while Soviet philosophers are becoming more informed about Western philosophy, Western philosophers are not only not studying contemporary Soviet philosophy but even constructing theories for not studying it. On the other hand, as a matter of fact, Soviet critiques of Western, or 'bourgeois', authors often prove to be (admissible) ways of making known to their Soviet colleagues authors these latter might not otherwise be able to read (either for reasons of language or because of doctrinal

taboos). When Bocheński goes on in this article to defend the sensefulness and relevance of contemporary Soviet philosophy, we can almost hear him talking with his earlier self, in his *Contemporary European Philosophy* and *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism.*

By 1963, Bocheński is able to write 'Research in Soviet Philosophy at the Fribourg Institute of East-European Studies 1958-1963', to show how his group has been able to put into effect his principles on the possibility and methodology of philosophic Sovietology.[48]

Bocheński the logician turned his hand, in 1964, 'Toward a Systematic Logic of Communist Ideology'[49], which attempts to give the definitive hermeneutic of Communist philosophy and thereby to show that contemporary Soviet philosophy has all the distinguishing traits of a full-blown philosophy (for, if it is logical, it is rational; and, if it is rational, it must be at least potentially systematic).

Some of the same themes recur in 'On Philosophical Dialogue'[50], which returns to the subjects of 'objectivism', 'impartiality' and ability to talk to Communist philosophers.

Polycentrism is the subject of 'The Great Split'[51], where Bocheński takes issue with overly simplistic descriptions of phenomena in the Communist world.

Bocheński's Sovietological output went into radical decline after the early years of *Studies in Soviet Thought.* He did not cease to be productive in other domains[52], but his Sovietological production was limited, outside of *SST*, to an article in the *Natural Law Forum*[53], the *Short Handbook of Communist Ideology* [54], and the *Guide to Marxist Philosophy.*[55] Most recently, he has published 'Marx in the Light of Modern Logic'.[56]

B. The Structural Principles of Bocheński's Philosophic Sovietology

What are the criteria that Bocheński uses in his assessment of contemporary Soviet philosophy? They certainly include those that he uses to assess any philosophic thought and, as we have seen, the presence of formalism and of logical structure is central. This obviously is the element we have to thank for the fact that, quite early on, Bocheński writes off the first period in contemporary Soviet philosophy (1917 to 1922) - for this is a time of purges against pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy professors - and the third or 'quiet' period (1931 to 1947) - for little philosophy was being done then; there was much ideology and propounding of slogans. These two are also periods when - at least as far as one knew at that time (since access to *Pod znamenem marksizma*[57] was limited) - there was almost no logic, as Asmus mentions in the passage we quoted above. There was little methodology.

In fact, there was not even a sufficient respect for the Hegelian formalism in the dialectical philosophy of the second period (1922 to 1931).

This is why we can notice a move on Bocheński's part that shows increasing respect for Soviet philosophy as the latter gains in respect for logic and methodology, *i.e.*, as it enters into its fruitful period (1947 to now). Bocheński and his disciples have also done much to gain recognition for Janovskaja (MGU), and Bakradze and Kondakov.[58]

As far as the 'cottage industry' that has grown up around Marx' so-called 'Logic of *Capital*' is concerned, Bocheński once revealed his attitude in a throw-away question on the so-called dialectical logic: "has it developed one law that is not also a law of formal logic?" On Marx himself, Bocheński said:

> Now Karl Marx, while being of great importance for Soviet political and social thought, seems to be of no relevance at all for Soviet theoretical philosophy, more precisely for dialectical materialism which, as everybody knows (or should know), is not a Marxian but rather an anti-Marxian theory.[59]

This is why, for a long time, Bocheński saw all of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism as belonging to the nineteenth century.

Bocheński also has a problem with the basic intuitions (*e.g.* materialism) and problem-identifications (*e.g.* all matter in motion) of contemporary Soviet philosophy; for, there is a strong streak of Romantic irrationalism in this materialism and pseudo-dynamism.

On the other hand, when Bocheński proclaims himself an optimist and cosmocentrist, he evidences an affinity with contemporary Soviet philosophy, in contrast to the pessimism and anthropocentrism of much of the rest of contemporary thought.[60] What is interesting in this affinity is the fact that the Soviets come to these attitudes from atheism while Bocheński comes out of a clear Theism. The poignancy lies especially in the fact that both are dealing from positions of faith. Such affinities are brought out by Bocheński himself in his 'Thomism and Marxism-Leninism' and his review of *Foma Akvinskij*, where he points out that Soviet anti-neo-Thomism is mostly in the hands of 'foreigners' - mainly Polish Marxist-Leninists.[61]

The official Soviet attitude toward Plato - that he was philosophic spokesman of the doomed Greek aristocracy, and the proto-idealist of Western thought[62] - would lead one to believe that there is nothing in common here with Bocheński's 'Platonism'. However, if we look a bit more carefully at what Bocheński means by his Platonism - ideal objects exist and are both known and willed by men - there is nothing here that excludes Soviet thought, which recognizes the universal as

'dialectically' present both in things and in our knowledge of things. They claim this not to be idealism but to be 'materialism', by which they mean some sort of 'realism' rather than a 'mechanical materialism'. But, Bocheński does find problems not with the basic Soviet position on this theme but with the way they elaborate it - *e.g.* in the so-called 'Leninist theory of reflection'.

Bocheński declares himself to be an Aristotelian and a Thomist. The Soviets certainly cannot be identified with the latter position but they evidently have to be assessed relative to the former, especially as several people - including George Kline in this volume[63] - have pointed out that contemporary Soviet philosophy, like Marx before them, misuses the word "materialism", especially when they try to spread it across all domains and all questions of philosophy.

IV. SOME CRITICAL CRITIQUES

How did this historian of philosophy who spent most of his life practicing and preaching logic manage to get into philosophic Sovietology? and how did he do once he got into it?

In the course of his transition from a superficial account of contemporary Soviet philosophy as just one among many trends to the more thorough account that sees a scientific Sovietology as a necessity, did Bocheński develop any new insights or tools as a historian of philosophy? or was he completely consistent throughout?

Was Soviet philosophy itself changing as Bocheński was studying it? Was Bocheński seriously influenced by the attention or lack thereof on the part of other Western philosophers?

A perhaps fitting way to approach an answer to this question is to ask some contemporary Soviet philosophers what they think of the work of Bocheński. We get, of course, three replies because they react to him as historian of philosophy, as logician, and as Sovietologist. We find him presented in the *Philosophical Encyclopedia* as follows:

> BOCHEŃSKI, Joseph Maria (b. August 30, 1902), Swiss neo-Thomist. He is one of the theoretical leaders of anti-Communism; a member of the Dominican Order; and Polish by nationality. He is Professor of History of Philosophy (since 1945) and Rector (1964-1966) of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). Bochenski is the founder and Director (since 1957) of the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg. He is founder and editor (since 1961) of the journal *Studies in Soviet Thought* and of the *Sovietica* series (since 1959). As a theoretician of 'Sovietology', Bocheński evolved from 'global' anti-Commu-

nism to more differentiated forms of its critique. Imbued with ideas opposed to Communism, Bocheński has come forward with assertions on the anti-humanist character of the Soviet system and on the philosophic inconsistency of the Marxist-Leninist world-view. Contemporary Communism is, according to Bocheński, one of the distorted versions of Marxism.

More recently, Bocheński has noted the rapid development of Soviet philosophy, as well as its achievements (in the elaboration of problems of science and of logic, in the growth of scientific output, etc.).

Bocheński has published works in the history of philosophy and in logic, in particular mathematical logic.

Works: *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, 2 Aufl., Bern, 1947; *Formale Logik*, Freiburg-München, 1956; *Wege zum philosophischen Denken*, 2 Aufl., Basel, 1960; *Logic of Religion*, NY, 1965; *Diamat*, Stuttgart, 1968.

Literature: 'Novye knigi za rubežom', 1958, No.21; 1960, No.16, 21; Bychovskij, B., 'Partii v filosofii i filosofskij kamuflaž', *Kommunist* 1967, No.1.[64]

This entry is by A. Altuchov of Moscow and is to be found in the Supplement, where Buber and Brentano are also featured. The facts are essentially correct; and the assessments are not particularly surprising. Both here and in the more recent *Filosofskij enciklopedičeskij slovar'* we note a recognition of the fact that Bocheński's views have 'evolved' in what - for the Soviets at least - is a 'progressive' direction.[65]

To judge by the usage that contemporary Soviet philosophers make of Bocheński's *Contemporary European Philosophy*, they consider his criticisms of 'bourgeois' philosophers to be both fair and adequate (and useful for their purposes). For example:

> The signs of the downfall of neopositivist conceptions are becoming clearer and clearer. Even a bourgeois philosopher like Bocheński, the neo-Thomist, declares that the one-sidedness of neopositivism is "simply awful" and its representatives are "defenceless" in the face of the problems of the twentieth century.[66]

As for Bocheński the logician, he is as appreciated in the East as he is in the West for his accomplishments, especially in the field of the history of logic.[67]

Contemporary Soviet philosophers react to Bocheński the Sovietologist on two distinct levels, both of which have undergone some development. First, he is seen as part of the group of "enemies of Marxism", *i.e.* those who devote their lives to the distortion and mis-

representation of Marxism, Marxism-Leninism and Communism. Secondly, contemporary Soviet philosophers recognize in Bocheński an opponent who may be wrong but who is at least well-informed on contemporary Soviet philosophy - an enemy to be feared but also to be respected. The *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie* that he founded and which continues to the present (1987), has been lauded by the Soviets themselves as something not being done anywhere in the Soviet Union but of great importance for the study of contemporary Soviet philosophy.[68]

Ignoring for the moment the *ad hominem* arguments that are so much part of contemporary Soviet philosophy's way of coping with its critics, let us look at the most frequent Soviet criticisms of the Sovietological work of J.M. Bocheński. These have to do with philosophy and how it is pursued, with the sources of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, with the nature of 'Leninism', and with how dialectical and historical materialism are constructed and correlated one with the other. On all of these Bocheński has definite opinions and the Soviet reaction is both predictable and easy to situate.

In a sense, the whole conversation between Bocheński and the Soviets revolves around the question of *partijnost'* or 'Party-mindedness', for it is this principle that governs at the outset the Marxist-Leninist understanding of what philosophy is and that determines how historical materialism comes out in the end, *i.e.* at the point where the status of the Party and of history are established.

Partijnost' is the principle that says that every philosopher is either materialist or idealist - *i.e.* he belongs to one 'party' or the other in philosophy - and that, accordingly, he *must* take certain positions. On the contemporary scene, the consistent *materialist* will necessarily take the side of Marxist-Leninist philosophy while the consistent *idealist* will be opposed to Marxist-Leninist philosophy all along the line.

On the question of the nature and methods of philosophy, we have seen that Bocheński considers himself to be an analyst, a rationalist, an optimist, a Platonist, an Aristotelian and a Thomist, who attends to method and has a cosmocentric attitude. Contemporary Marxism-Leninism agrees both to optimism and to a certain form of cosmocentrism - but the resemblance ends there. There is no question for the Soviets that Bocheński is an 'idealist'.

> In and of itself, the recognition of the objectivity of Being - in its independence of consciousness - does not imply a materialist position on the part of the philosopher. It is fully reconcilable with objective idealism, with the religious philosophy of *neo-Thomism*, as in the philosophy of Bocheński, Sciacca, and others. "A realist can be a materialist or a spiritualist, since realism only requires a

> recognition of being (that is) independent of thought, without determining whether this being is material or spiritual."(Bocheński, J.M., *Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus*, Bern, 1950, S.88)[69]

> The fact that the major schools of contemporary idealism (logical positivism, existentialism, neo-Thomism, pragmatism) deny the idealist nature of their philosophizing is a pure mystification. All of them are indisputably idealistic doctrines, oriented against materialism. The Dominican Father, Bocheński, declares, for example, that 'idealist thought is a matter of the past' (*Contemporary European Philosophy*, Berkeley, 1956, p.72).[70]

It is worth noting two things here. First Bocheński the idealist is quoted as an expert on idealism! and all contemporary philosophers who are not Marxist in some sense are "idealist" - despite all the differences that other people might find between the thinkers of these schools!

This historiographical lumping together as "idealist" of trends of thought as diverse as logical positivism (sensualism, empiricism or Platonism "from below", and formalism or Platonism "from above"), existentialism (irrationalism, anti-formalism, etc.), and pragmatism is one of the more frustrating traits of Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy. Bogomolov, for example, wants to deny that pragmatism belongs to *Lebensphilosophie*:

> In his *Contemporary European Philosophy* I. Bocheński names four basic trends within *Lebensphilosophie* - Bergsonism, pragmatism, Dilthey's historicism and German *Lebensphilosophie*. Our view is that the inclusion of pragmatism within *Lebensphilosophie* only confuses matters, as does the description of Dilthey as a "historicist".[71]

Aside from the fact that Bocheński sees both pragmatism and *Lebensphilosophie* as forms of *vitalism*, Bogomolov obviously goes on to confuse subjectivism and psychologism in accusing Bocheński of not distinguishing them.[72]

Sometimes, more extrinsic accusations are presented:

> From their characteristic silence about the achievements of the materialist worldview some contemporary idealists (Wetter, Bocheński, Hook, Frank, *et al.*) have recently turned to a falsification of the Marxist worldview as a means of fighting contemporary materialism.[73]

This is as much because Bocheński 'falsifies' Marxism-Leninism by calling it dogmatic as it is because he scorns their 'dialectical' logic.

> Just as absurd are the accusations of dogmatism made against Marxist philosophy by bourgeois and reformist theoreticians (Bocheński *et al.*). Soviet philosophers are fundamentally opposed to dogmatism; they fight against all dogmatic errors that could arise on the basis of contemporary actuality, as deviations from Marxism.[74]

If even the laws of logic are aposteriori for Bocheński, it is easy to see why he finds Soviet dogmatism repugnant.

> Contemporary 'critics' of the Marxist dialectic - Wetter, Bocheński and Sidney Hook, for example - consider 'incontrovertible' the argument, mainly against the laws of dialectical contradiction, that the classics of Marxism did not prove either the objectivity of the dialectic in general or the actuality of contradictions, but - on the best of interpretations - only provided illustrations for the dialectical ideas of Hegel.[75]

What is at issue here is the basic question of the 'disinterestedness' of theory. Both Christianity (and many other religions) and most forms of 'Marxism' reject either the possibility or the desirability (or both) of a 'context-free' philosophizing. The Greeks (especially Aristotle) and the Descartes-to-Hegel 'moderns' fought for such a theory not burdened by 'interests' from other domains - especially from the religious and political arenas.

The 'dogmatism' at issue here is repugnant to Bocheński precisely because it violates both rationalism and the penchant toward analytic method, that he sees as basic to any acceptable philosophic enterprise. 'Rationalism' obviously means following a logic which has a 'hard' core that not only is available to everyone but also imposes itself on any thinking man; and 'analytic' method is that which permits itself the luxury of isolating a problem from the interference of other problem-areas in order to be able to attend to just this problem - preferably in its purely formal aspects.[76] *Partijnost'* says that both of these are attitudes of self-deception, designed by and for the opponents of 'Marxism' (by which the Soviets mean 'Marxism-Leninism') for purposes that lie outside of the pure philosophy that these principles are designed to protect.

In short, Bocheński's claim is that contemporary Soviet philosophy is tainted with sociologistic irrationalism while the Soviets retort that his

so-called analytic approach is a subterfuge, designed to avoid facing up to the hard questions of our era.

One of these questions has to do with the origins, nature and status of 'Leninism' - especially as a distinct era in philosophy. Along with Wetter and most other observers and students of contemporary Soviet philosophy (including the entirety of the émigré community), Bocheński denies any philosophic originality whatsoever to Lenin. According to Bocheński, what Lenin did come up with - a certain 'voluntaristic' reformulation of Marxian determinism and a modified theory of 'imperialism' - are neither philosophic nor particularly original.

At issue here is the Marxist-Leninist appropriation of the 'economic determinism' of Marx. Whatever else Marx said - and despite any accretions due to Engels - his theory of society depends to a great extent on how the so-called 'forces of production' correlate with the 'relations of production': do the former determine the latter? or are the latter simply epi-phenomena of the former? Most interpretations - including that of Bocheński - see Marx as an economic determinist; the forces determine the relations in some essential way, and this gives history its character. The fact of the matter is that on any other interpretation Marx' thought comes down to just another historiosophy, since it would only be maintaining that material elements in history ('material culture') have some influence or other on the other elements ('spiritual culture') - a proposition that few would care to deny. It was Lenin who introduced what Bocheński - along with others - calls the element of 'political voluntarism'. Lenin did this not directly as a theoretician; he did it by carrying out a supposedly 'Marxist' revolution in a country where the conditions were not at all 'Marxist'. For Marx, the four - so-called 'iron' - laws of history would be prevailing in a country where the proletarian revolution was to break out. 'Falling profit-rate', 'increasing monopolisation', 'growing immiseration', and 'cyclical crises' described the material conditions for the occurrence of the 'inevitable' outbreak of social hostilities. These conditions certainly did not obtain in Lenin's Russia. Lenin changed this theoretical emphasis by carrying out a revolution that was not 'proletarian' but 'elitist' since it was the work of a conspiratorial elite, the Communist Party.

> Completely intolerable are the fabrications of the contemporary falsifiers of Marxism-Leninism - Sidney Hook, I. Bocheński, G. Wetter *et al.* (S. Hook, *Marx and the Marxists*, NY, 1955, p.77; I.M. Bocheński, *Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus*, Bern, 1956, S.34; *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, Cambridge, 1955, p.144), asserting that when Lenin and his cohorts carried out the socialist revolution, they departed from

> the 'economic determinism' of Marx, and followed a path of voluntarism and subjectivism.
>
> These fabrications are gross and designed to distort the meaning of Lenin's philosophic views, and of his doctrine on revolution. Attributing to the subjective factor great weight in the revolutionary victory, Lenin always insisted, nevertheless, on the presence of objective economic and political preconditions for the revolution. ... [quote omitted] Lenin's Marxist position here has nothing in common with subjectivism and voluntarism, and consequently carries through the historical materialism of Marx.[77]

"Subjectivism" threatens not only 'dialectical' logic and Marxist-Leninist epistemology; it is the bête noire of the Soviet view of history. It is "objective" forces that drive forward not only material production but also the development of ideas. Not only must the classics of Marxism-Leninism be objective sources of today's Marxism-Leninism, the Russian sources of Soviet-*Russian* philosophy have to be assimilated to the "objective" roots.

In a footnote attached to a passage in *The History of Philosophy* that refutes the denial of Leninism as an extension of Marxism, we read:

> Contemporary bourgeois "critics" of Leninism put forward the patently false assertion that Leninism is a purely Russian phenomenon, the roots of which supposedly lie not in Marxism but in certain Russian, non-Marxist political doctrines of the nineteenth century, *e.g.* in the anarchist-Blanquist views of Bakunin, Tkachev, Nechaev and others. Some of these bourgeois falsifiers calumniously assert that "Lenin radically changed the Marxian heritage both in content and in spirit", under the influence of Russian *narodniki* and anarchists ('Russian Thought and Politics', Cambridge, 1957, p.339; G. Wetter, *Der dialektische Materialismus...* Wien, 1958; 'The Mind of Modern Russia', New Brunswick, 1955; P. Scheibert, *Von Bakunin zu Lenin,* Leiden, 1956; *et al.*). Wetter goes as far as to find a "special affinity" of Leninism with the "Russian religious movement" of the Slavophiles and V. Solov'ev. An effort to oppose Leninism to Marxism is also undertaken by I. Bocheński (*Einführung in die sowjetische Philosophie der Gegenwart.* Beilage zur Wochenzeitung *Das Parlament*, 1959, B.45/49, No.4).
>
> All of these evil thoughts of the enemies of Leninism have a definite goal - to cast a shadow over Leninism, to raise doubts about its international character, and to split Leninism off from Marxism.[78]

In a footnote to a passage on Leninism and Marxism, we read:

> In this way, the Catholic "critic" of Marxism, I. Bocheński, unjustifiably counterposes Leninism to Marxism and consistently accuses Lenin's doctrine of being the "product of Russian civilization", *i.e.* a purely national phenomenon. (*Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus*, 2 Aufl. München, 1956, S.120).[79]

In a footnote to a passage on the "world-historical significance of Leninism", we find

> Contemporary "critics" of Marxism are losing sleep over the continuous growth in the international influence of Leninism. In their desire to reduce the attractiveness of Leninism and to distort the essence of the Leninist stage in the development of Marxist philosophy, they counterpose Lenin to Marx and try to confine Lenin within national limits. Thus, I. Bocheński - already known as a falsifier of Marxism - asserts that at the center of Lenin's philosophic interests stands some sort of "theory of the will", countermanding the "classical economic determinism of Marx". It is clear, Bocheński goes on, that he (*i.e.* Lenin) "proposed and carried out a revolution in Russia, a country which - according to Marxism - was least ripe for revolution, because it was the least industrialized ... This is Marxism, combined with typical Russian traits, flowing from Lenin's own personality ... " (*Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat)*, 2 Aufl., Bern, 1956, S. 34-35). Bocheński and anti-Communist ideologists like him prefer "not to notice" the international essence of Marxism and they refuse to see the incontrovertible fact that Lenin's elaboration of questions on the creative role of the workers and masses in history, of the role of progressive ideas, etc., is foreign to any voluntarism, and is based on a scientific knowledge of objective laws of development, and proceeds from the determining role of material social being relative to the consciousness of people.[80]

When Bocheński follows up his rejection of the so-called 'Leninist' period in philosophy with an explanation that traces Leninist voluntarism and imperialism back to the Russian sources of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, he is seen by the Soviets as adding insult to injury.

Having quoted in the main text Lenin about how even well-meaning bourgeois thinkers are still *bourgeois* thinkers, in a note we find:

> Inconsistent and absurd are the efforts of contemporary enemies of

> Marxism (N. Berdyaev in his *Meaning and History of Russian Communism*, I. Bocheński in his *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism*, G. Wetter in his *Dialectical Materialism, its History and System in the Soviet Union*, and A. Meyer in his *Leninism*, and others) to paint Marxism in Russia as an extension of the anarchist-conspiratorial, subjectivist and voluntaristic ideas of Bakunin, Tkachev and other *narodniki*. Devoid of scientific knowledge of the laws of social development, alienated from the mass revolutionary movements of the working class, ignoring the revolutionary experience of the proletariat of Western Europe, and inimical to materialism and dialectic, *narodnik* thought is the exact opposite of the views of Marxism, even in Russia, and could not serve as a source of Leninism.[81]

Occasionally, Bocheński, Wetter or another commentator on contemporary Soviet philosophy will actually agree with contemporary Soviet philosophers in criticizing one or another 'mistake' in contemporary Soviet philosophy or its roots. Even when this happens, however, the criticisms of these 'bourgeois' philosophers turns out, more often than not, to be for the 'wrong' reasons. For example, as a footnote to the Soviets' own account of Plekhanov's mistakes, we read:

> Despite their recognition of the great erudition of Plekhanov, in their works on Marxism, bourgeois ideologists incorrectly attribute to his Marxist works of 1883-1903 dogmatism and doctrinairism, as well as a tendency to an evolutionary metaphysics and "economic materialism".
>
> In his *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism* (2 Aufl. Bern, 1956. S.30), having recognized that Plekhanov and other Russian revolutionaries were aware of the revolutionary and atheist character of Marxism, Bocheński opposes to this recognition the profoundly mistaken view that this doctrine "has a doctrinaire and Messianic character", and this is what "drew" the Russian revolutionaries to it.[82]

In a footnote to a passage about the "cult of personality", we find:

> ... The insinuations of Bocheński, Wetter and other "critics" of Marxism are directed with vigor not against the real errors in philosophic work in the USSR during the cult of the personality, but against the militant Communist *partijnost'* of dialectical and historical materialism, which is an important principle that is not eliminable from the Marxist-Leninist tradition. ... [83]

In all of the above criticisms and others we are not mentioning[84], the philosophic issues are indirect, buried as they are in the sociological, political, and ideological concerns of contemporary Marxist-Leninist philosophers. Two subjects, where Bocheński and contemporary Soviet philosophy lock horns directly, involve the issues of the dialectic and of the meaning of freedom.

Scorn is too weak a word to characterize Bocheński's reaction to the dialectic in general and to the so-called 'dialectical logic' in particular. He finds the former to have had too many meanings in the history of philosophy to allow it to serve to designate anything intelligible today. From Plato to Hegel, 'dialectic' has meant many things; the Soviets claim that their dialectic is both none of these and all of these in a sort of dialectical fruit-salad, often known under the slogan of 'coincidence of dialectic, logic and theory of knowledge', or 'dialectical' logic. Contemporary Soviet philosophers, in reaction, see this principle as so basic to Marxism-Leninism today that they feel obliged to pick up the gauntlet. As we saw above:

> Contemporary 'critics' of the Marxist dialectic - Wetter, Bocheński and Sidney Hook, for example - consider 'incontrovertible' the argument, mainly against the laws of dialectical contradiction, that the classics of Marxism did not prove either the objectivity of the dialectic in general or the actuality of contradictions, but - on the best of interpretations - only provided illustrations for the dialectical ideas of Hegel.[85]

I.T Jakuševskij does a thorough presentation and analysis of Sovietologists on the objective dialectic, starting with Bocheński and Wetter, and ending with Marko and Falk.[86]

The subject of 'freedom' comes up for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Bocheński's Polish origin, but the more relevant of which is Bocheński's acute consciousness of the Hegelian roots of Marxist-Leninist determinism.

In the section entitled '"Critique" of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and Sociology by the Ideologists of Anti-Communism', after quoting Fetscher to the effect that "Contemporary Marxism-Leninism is the most influential political ideology in the world", the authors of *The History of Philosophy* say:

> I. Bocheński, professor at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) has specialized for a long time in the "critique" of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. In one of his books, where he criticizes Marxist philosophy, he frankly writes: "We have arrived at the opinion that dialectical materialism contains a series of

propositions which are basically correct and which we share." (*Diamat*, Bern, 1956, S.112) Among such propositions he cites stress on the importance of ideas for practice, the importance of philosophy for life, a "respect for speculative thought", and resoluteness and decisiveness in action. Like other neo-Thomists, Bocheński recognizes objective being, independent of human consciousness, but dependent on God.

While 'critiquing' dialectical materialism from an objective-idealist, Thomistic viewpoint, Bocheński denies the material character of objective lawfulness (*zakonomernosti*). He writes: "If Hegel's definition of freedom as 'consciousness of necessity' has any sense, this must be a necessity of a spiritual type, which is lacking among dialectical materialists, since for them necessity has to be of the laws of matter." (*ibid.* p.119).

Bocheński considers a definition of freedom as intuition of material lawfulness "senseless" and "contradictory". He presents things as if in dialectical materialism there is no distinction between natural and social lawfulness, and all social and spiritual phenomena are explained solely on the basis of the laws of "inanimate nature". Distorting the Marxist-Leninist conception of the laws of nature and of social life to the point of making them unrecognizable, Bocheński then calls dialectical materialism "primitive" and a philosophy "full of contradictions". (*Loc. cit.*).

Dialectical materialism does not at all reduce the variety and specificity of objective laws of various groups of phenomena solely to the laws of motion of inanimate matter, as Bocheński pretends. It seems that one must carefully distinguish (but not radically separate, as do the Thomists) the laws that are active in inorganic nature, in society, and in human thought.

To the Marxist doctrine on the objective laws of social development, Bocheński opposes the blind belief in divine prescience; to the scientific view of the world, unproven Scholastic constructs; to the revolutionary, transformatory activity of the popular masses, advocacy of passivity and servile inaction; and to the materialist dialectic, theological judgements on "God's will". It is clear, therefore, that Bocheński "criticizes" the materialist dialectic mainly because of its recognition of the principle of the automotivity of matter. He writes: "Precisely in the theory of automotivity, autodynamism as essential, according to Lenin, trait of this doctrine (namely, in the form of dialectical materialism, *ed.*), recognizing the eternal movement of matter as its most important attribute, the dialectic opens the way to the recognition of the existence of God." (*Ibid.* p.98)[87]

At issue here is Marxism-Leninism's firm commitment to a strict version of the theory of evolution that violates the *nemo dat quod non habet* of Bocheński's Scholasticism; *i.e.* one cannot replace benevolent divine Providence with a strict determinism, unless one can find a source of qualitative distinction that is just as strictly determinist. There can be an objective dialectic in a significant sense only if it is really objective - *i.e.* undetermined either by individual producer or by the Party.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

There have been in Bocheński's pursuit of a 'science' of Sovietology both high points (the 25th year of *Studies in Soviet Thought* and the 50th volume of *Sovietica*)[88], and disappointments.

Among the latter are certainly the misunderstanding of the enterprise on the part of his colleagues in the West and the imperfect work being done by some of his fellow Sovietologists - especially those who sink into Kremlinology.

Bocheński's reply to the former is contained in a note, 'Misunderstandings', in *Studies in Soviet Thought*:

> Now the progress in Soviet philosophy, observed and stated by Western Sovietologists does consist mainly in its progressive rationalization. And, therefore, this progress is to them a fact which they greet with great satisfaction.
>
> One is bound, however, to state that this pleasure is not free from bitterness and concern. There *are* things of which a Western student of Soviet philosophy might be quite rightly afraid. In the West, most Sovietologists who are not philosophers disbelieve completely that Soviet philosophical thought has any relevance at all; it serves, they say, exclusively to justify the power-politics of the respective countries. Most Western philosophers who are not Sovietologists deny any value to Soviet thought for other reasons, as stated. And, of course, professional anti-Communist politicians will do anything in their power to minimize the results obtained by Soviet thinkers.
>
> The small group of men who do read Soviet philosophical writings and are interested in them for their own sake, is not heard when they try to oppose this nearly universal trend in the West. And when they do it, they meet from the side of the Soviet philosophers with complete lack of understanding, expressed in (the) form of base insults.[89]

In an extensive commentary on such expressions of Bocheński's dissatisfaction, I.T. Jakuševskij of Leningrad turns this criticism against Bocheński's own efforts. The article is entitled 'Valuable Admissions of one of our "Critics"' and has the subtitle, 'On the "Sovietology" of Mr. Bocheński'.[90] Having sketched a whole series of Bocheńskian statements, illuminating the 'progress' made by contemporary Soviet philosophy since the early days (the 1940s and 1950s), Jakuševskij goes on to stress that these 'admissions' on the part of Bocheński stand in stark contrast to the latter's contention that 'Leninism' does not form a distinct period in the development of 'Marxist' thought. We read:

> There we have it! This professor of "Sovietology" has included himself among the dilettantes he so despises. Professor Bocheński has fallen into contradictions, from which no one can disentangle him. On the one hand, he asserts that the Leninist period in the USSR ended in the decade of the 1930s and he pontificates at length on its replacement by the new period, "contemporary Soviet thought". On the other hand, he is obliged - though with a whole series of qualifications - to admit that in the Soviet Union "the majority of leaders" are Leninists, (that they) are developing Leninism "as Lenin did with Marxism", that there is a constantly growing study of the works of V.I. Lenin, etc.[91]

Obviously because Bocheński's effort to put Sovietology on a scientific base sticks in the craw of contemporary Soviet official thinkers, Jakuševskij goes on to conclude:

> The writings of Mr. Bocheński have nothing to do with real science. His effort to found "Sovietology" as a science about Communism with serious and objective research into this field is a failure. ... The science and objectivity in his anti-Communist writings are no greater than what is found in the works of the "dilettantes". We can only consider Mr. Bocheński to be too modest when, having distinguished five groups of "pseudo-scientists" in "Sovietology", he fails to mention the sixth, that to which he himself belongs.[92]

B.E. Bychovskij, a frequent critic of contemporary Western philosophy, also did an extensive criticism of Bocheński - especially on the matter of *partijnost'*.[93] Bocheński's replique is a classic note on the comparative merits of neo-Thomism and Marxism-Leninism[94], both of which have problems of faith and reason.

In his much less sarcastic *Dialectic and "Sovietology"*, Jakuševskij

presents us with a flatteringly Bocheński-esque set of conclusions:

> To our mind, the following immanent traits and peculiarities are characteristic of the 'Sovietological' critique of the materialist dialectic and of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a whole:
>
> 1. The criticisms of the 'Sovietologists' are *inimical* to Marxism-Leninism and class-bound in their essence ...
>
> 2. 'Sovietological' criticism uses the old *anti-materialist* philosophic positions and is based on *idealism* which for many of them is openly allied with theology. ...
>
> 3. Criticism by the 'Sovietologists' comes from the methodological position of *anti-dialectics* and is based on *metaphysics*. ...
>
> 4. The 'Sovietological' criticism is *sophistical* to its core. ...
>
> 5. Criticism by the 'Sovietologists' has a clearly *eclectic* character. ...
>
> 6. The 'Sovietological' critique is *subjectivist.*
>
> The method of the 'Sovietologists' comes down to the following schema: presentation of the theoretical propositions of dialectical-materialist philosophy with the commentary of the 'Sovietologist' in question, the result of which is radical distortion (usually trivialization) of the basic theses, to such an extent that they are often unrecognizable. These criticisms are not able to escape the confines of their own dogmatism, according to which the Marxist dialectic - like Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a whole - is supposedly primitive and dogmatic. Ending up construing various theories in the names of Marx and Lenin and distorting Marxism-Leninism in such a way as to discredit it as a science, the 'Sovietologists' end up revealing their own limitations, inconsistency and contradictions - traits they want to see as the 'main features' of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.
>
> 7. Criticism by the 'Sovietologists' is essentially *negative.* ... All we have said allows us to conclude that 'Sovietological' criticism is *anti-scientific* in its very essence. ... In actuality, the 'Sovietologists' appear as opponents of basic scientific analysis ...
>
> This is why the character and level of the anti-Communist critique of the materialist dialectic does not at all correspond to the character and level of the theoretical elaboration of the dialectic by Soviet scholars and Marxist philosophers abroad. No matter what efforts the 'Sovietologists' deploy toward the falsification of the materialist dialectic, it was, is and will remain the *science* on the most general laws of the motion and development of nature, society and thought, via the universal scientific method of knowledge and of the revolutionary transformation of the world.[95]

Many observations could be made about this and similar passages to be found in this and other books. It will suffice for us to note in conclusion that Bocheński's pretension to a *scientific* Sovietology has been instrumental in forcing the contemporary Soviet philosophers themselves to take a more *scientific* approach both in and toward their own work. Proof that "science" is being taken here not in historical materialism's sense of 'class-bound knowledge' but in that of Bocheński's rationalism and formalism is to be found in Jakuševskij's phrase, "the universal scientific method of knowledge".

What more fitting monument to Bocheński's scientific Sovietology could one imagine than the fact that contemporary Soviet philosophers have themselves been drawn into being scientific in a sense that is recognizable to all of us!

NOTES

1. The main logic works of J.M. Bocheński are *Ancient Formal Logic* (1951), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1963. 122 pp. and *Formale Logik,* Freiburg/München, Alber, 1956. 639 S. (English: Notre Dame U.P. 1961, 557 pp. under the title *A History of Formal Logic*). For his other logic works, see the lists in: *Contributions to Logic and Methodology: Essays in Honor of J.M. Bocheński*, ed. by A.T. Tymieniecka and C.D. Parsons, Humanities Press, 1965; and *Contemporary Marxism. Essays in Honor of J.M. Bocheński*, ed. by James J. O'Rourke, Thomas J. Blakeley, and Friedrich J. Rapp, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1984. 267 pp.

2. *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart* (1947), Bern, Francke, 1951 (English: *Contemporary European Philosophy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California U.P., 1956, 326pp.). See also the two bibliographies listed in note 1, above.

3. *Philosophie in Selbstdarstellungen*, Hrsg.v. Ludwig J. Pongratz. Band 1 mit Beiträgen v. Ernst Bloch, Joseph M. Bocheński, Alois Dempf, Hermann Glockner, Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg, Pascual Jordan, Werner Marx, Josef Pieper, Helmuth Plessner. Hamburg, Meiner, 1975. pp. 11-36.

4. *Ibid.* p. 24. His exact words are: *"Um jetzt zu meinen Grundüberzeugungen zu kommen, möchte ich wiederholen, dass ich als Analytiker bezeichnet werden darf."*

5. J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, pp. 54-55.

6. I.M. Bocheński, *Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethoden*, Bern, Francke, 1965, 150 S. (English: *Contemporary Methods of Thought*) p. 7. (German)

7. *Ibid.* p. 16.

8. *Ibid.* p. 17.

9. *Loc. cit.*

10. *Ibid.* p. 19

11. *Ibid.* pp. 21 f.

12. J.M. Bocheński, *Selbstdarstellung* pp. 25-26.

13. *Ibid.* pp. 25-26.

14. *Ibid.* p. 28.

15. *Ibid.* p. 31.

16. *Ibid.* p. 32.

17. *Ibid.* pp. 32-33.

18. *Ibid.* p. 33. Cf. also 'Logic and Ontology', *Philosophy East and West,* Vol.24, No.3 (July 1974).

19. *Ibid.* pp. 33-34.

20. *Ibid.* p. 35.

21. J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, pp. 41 f.

22. J.M. Bocheński, *Ancient Formal Logic*, p. 9.

23. J.M. Bocheński, *Formale Logik*, S.7.

24. J.M. Bocheński, 'Reflexions sur l'évolution de la philosophie', *Studia philosophica* VIII (1948) p. 19.

25. See George L. Kline's article in the present volume.

26. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle,* Transl. by Pierre Conway, O.P., Quebec City, M. Doyon, 1956. 449pp.

27. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Everyman's Library, Vol.2, p. 873. The passage is in the 'Preface to the Second Edition', and has been copiously commented upon by both neo-Marxists and recent Western commentators.

28. Cf. J.M. Bocheński, *Formale Logik, passim.*

29. J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, pp. 1-2.

30. *Ibid.* p. 8.

31. Examples can be found, *e.g.*, in: A.S. Bogomolov, *Nemeckaja buržuaznaja filosofija posle 1865 goda* (German Bourgeois Philosophy After 1865), Izd. MGU, 1969. p. 113; I.S. Narskij, *Sovremennyj pozitivizm* (Contemporary Positivism), Izd. AN SSSR, 1961. p. 63; *Istorija filosofii* (History of Philosophy), M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1957-1965, 6 vols. (=*IF*); and *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (Philosophic Encyclopedia), M., Sov. Encyc., 1960-1970, 5 vols. (=*FE*) - both *passim.*

32. J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, pp. 36-38.

33. See note 6, above.

34. He is listed with Wetter, Hook, Meyer and Lange (M.T. Iovčuk, 'Marksistskaja filosofskaja mysl' na XII Meždunarodnom filosofskom kongresse i ee kritiki' (Marxist Philosophic Thought at the Twelfth International Congress and its Critics), *Filosofskie nauki* (*FN*) 1959, 2, str. 146), with Wetter and Popper (G.A. Brutjan, 'Zametki o nekotorych filosofskich tečenijach v SŠA našich dnej' (Notes on some Philosophic Trends in the US Today), *FN* 1970, 6, str. 173), with Chambre, Maritain, Hyppolite, Marc, Teilhard de Chardin, Calvez, Wahl, Fetscher and Wetter (V.E. Kozlovskij, *Marksistskaja dialektika i ee sovremennye protivniki* (The Marxist Dialectic and its Contemporary Opponents), Moskva, Mysl', 1978, str. 77). He is on three different lists in the Jakuševskij volume in note 86, below (pp. 7,34,99). See also *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* 1, str. 421; 3, str. 30; 3, str. 51; *Filosofskij enciklopedičeskij slovar'*, str. 729; *Istorija filosofii* VI, 2,

str. 39, 215, 405, 464.

35. Many of his students contributed to *Contemporary Marxism. Essays in Honor of J.M. Bocheński*, ed. by James J. O'Rourke, Thomas J. Blakeley, and Friedrich J. Rapp, Dordrecht-Holland, Reidel, 1984. 267 pp.

36. Cf. J.M. Bocheński, 'History of Soviet History of Philosophy', *Studies in Soviet Thought* V, p. 311.

37. J.M. Bocheński, *Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat)*, Bern, Francke, 1960. 180 S.

38. J.M. Bocheński, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, pp. 61-70.

39. *Ibid.* p. 71.

40. See note 36, above.

41. Siegfried Muller-Markus, *Einstein und die Sowjetphilosophie. Krizis einer Lehre, Bd.I: Die Grundlagen. Die spezielle Relativitätstheorie*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1960. 481 S. Bd.II: *Die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1966. 509 S. Here: Bd.I, S.xi.

42. *Studies in Soviet Thought (SST)* Edited by J.M. Bocheński and T.J. Blakeley, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1961. 141 pp. This became a quarterly journal in 1962. There were occasional years with eight issues, until 1982, when eight issues a year became the rule.

43. Although it appeared in a newspaper, this is a very serious study.

44. V.F. Asmus, *Izbrannye filosofskie trudy* (Collected Philosophic Works), Izd. MGU, 1969. T. I, str. 5.

45. *Studies in Soviet Thought* (*SST*) 1 (1961) 1-11. The other articles are by T. Blakeley, G. Küng, N. Lobkowicz, H. Dahm, H. Fleischer, S. Müller-Markus, Z. Jordan, L. Vrtacic and A. Buchholz.

46. *SST* 2 (1962) 7-11.

47. *SST* 3 (1963) 1-10.

48. *SST* 3 (1963) 294-321.

49. *SST* 4 (1964) 185-205.

50. *SST* 6 (1966) 243-259. On Bocheński and dialogue, see notes 64 and 65, below.

51. *SST* 8 (1968) 1-15.

52. Among the works of his post-Sovietological period, we find: *The Logic of Religion*, NY UP, 1965, and *Was ist Autorität? Einführung in die Logik der Autorität*, Freiburg i/B, 1974.

53. 'Soviet Philosophy: Past and Present and Prospects for the Future', *Natural Law Forum* (Notre Dame) 8 (1963) 7-20.

54. J.M. Bocheński, *Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der sowjetischen Philosophie (Stand 1958). Zusammenfassung des 'Osnovy Marksistskoj filosofii' mit Register*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1959,

96 pp. (English: *The Dogmatic Principles of Soviet Philosophy (as of 1958). Synopsis of the 'Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii' with Complete Indices*, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1963, 78 pp.

55. *Guide to Marxist Philosophy. An Introductory Bibliography*, Chicago, Swallow, 1972. 81 pp.

56. J.M. Bocheński, 'Marx in the Light of Modern Logic', *Center Journal* 1985, 4, 9-21.

57. Until the publication of Jürg Hänggi's bibliography, even a list of the contents of this journal was hard to find (cf. *SST* Volumes 27 and 28, both in 1984).

58. *SST 13*, pp. 1-10.

59. Cf. 'A Problem of Policy', *SST* 10 (1970) pp. 59-61. See also *SST* VII, 3, p. 255: "There can be no doubt that Marx has had and still exerts a vast *political* influence; it might also be true that his thought is very relevant for sociology and national economy. However, if only his properly philosophical achievements are taken into consideration, an impartial historian of philosophy would be hard-pressed to rank him as a first-class thinker."

60. Bocheński and other 'religious thinkers' are guilty of an individualism bordering on anarchism, according to N.D. Korotkov in his *Social'nyj aspekt problemy čeloveka v religioznoj filosofii* (The Social Aspect of the Problem of Man in Religious Philosophy), Kiev, Naukova Dumka, 1978. str. 173-175.

61. Cf. 'Thomism and Marxism-Leninism', *SST* VII (1967) pp. 154-168; and 'A Book on Aquinas', *Ibid.* pp. 172-173.

62. For example, "*Po svoim političeskim i filosofskim vzgljadam, po charakteru političeskoj dejatel'nosti on byl predstavitelem reakcionnoj afinskoj aristokratii.*" (In his political and philosophic views and in the nature of his political activity, he was a representative of the reactionary Athenian aristocracy). *Istorija filosofii* T.I, str. 105.

63. Cf. George L. Kline's article in this volume.

64. *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (*FE*), T. 5, str. 623-624.

65. Here is what one finds in the more recent *Filosofskij enciklopedičeskij slovar'* (Philosophic Encyclopedic Dictionary), M., "Sov.Encik.", 1983. p. 60 (*FES*)

> Bocheński, Joseph Maria (b. August 30, 1902 in Czuszów Poland). A Swiss neo-Thomist philosopher of Polish origin. He is one of the leaders of anti-Communism and a member of the Dominican Order. He was Director (1957-1972) of the Institute of East-European Studies at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), as well as founder and editor (since 1961) of the journal, *Studies in Soviet Thought* and of the *Sovietica* series (since 1959). Bocheński falsifies the theory and practice of socialism, accusing it

of 'expansionism' and 'anti-humanism'. He identifies Marxism-Leninism with 'dogmatism' and with religious faith. Recognizing in recent years the achievements of Soviet philosophy and the strengthening of its international role, Bocheński has, in the spirit of convergence, turned to 'dialogue' with Marxist philosophers. He is author of works on the history and methodology of philosophy, of logic and theology.

Works: *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart*, Bern, 1951; *Der sowjet-russische dialektische Materialismus*, Bern, 1962; *Logic of Religion*, NY, 1965; Diamat, Stuttgart, 1968; *Wege zum philosophischen Denken*, Basel, 1973; *Was ist Autorität?* Basel, 1974; *Marxismus-Leninismus*, München, 1974.

Literature: 'Novye knigi za rubežom', 1958, No.21; 1960, No.16, 21; Sitkovskij, E.P., 'Protiv filos. antikommunizma', in *Antikommunizm - vrag čelovečestva*, Praga, 1962; Jakuševskij, I.T., 'Cennye priznanija odnogo iz našich "kritikov" (O 'sovetologii" g-na B.)', *VF* 1964, 10; Bychovskij, B.E., 'Partii v filosofii i filos. kamufljaž', *Kommunist* 1967, 1.

66. *Istorija filosofii* (*IF*), M., Izd. AN SSSR, 1957-1965. 6 vols. Here: T. 2, str. 438.

67. *Sovremennaja filosofija i sociologija v stranach zapadnoj Evropy i Ameriki* (Contemporary Philosophy and Sociology in Western Europe and America), M., Nauka, 1964. 471 str. Here: p. 208. Cf. also Bogomolov and Narskij in note 31.

68. Cf. V.I. Borščukov, 'Cennye bibliografičeskie posobija' (A Valuable Bibliographical Tool), *VF* 1954, 3, 195-200.

69. *FE* 1, str. 210, in the article on 'Being'

70. *FE* 2, str. 206, in the article on 'Idealism'

71. Cf. Bogomolov, *op. cit.* n.413.

72. *Loc. cit.*

73. *FE* 2, str. 214. in the article on 'Idealism'

74. *FE* 2, str. 38, in the article on 'Dogmatism'

75. *FE* 2, str. 113, in the article on 'Unity and Conflict of Opposites'

76. The real issue revolves around the famous "basic question" of all philosophy. In a classical confrontation with B.E. Bychovskij, Bocheński says:

> Bychovskij falsely accuses me of denying that there *are* certain connections between the various answers to the different questions confused in the so-called 'basic problem'. What I did say was that they are different problems and that it is simply impossible to make such a massive identification of them, as Bychovskij and his colleagues do.

Here again are the different questions I distinguished. There are at least three, though perhaps a fourth should be added.

1. The *epistemological problem*: what is the nature of knowledge?

The two most important answers are:

1.1 Knowledge consists in assimilating a pre-existing entity (epistemological realism).

1.2 Knowledge consists in creating the known entity (epistemological idealism).

2. The *mind-body problem*: what is the nature of the relations between the two? There are very many possible answers to that question; let us, however, pick out those two which are particularly dear to Marxist-Leninists, namely:

2.1 Body is basic, mind secondary (materialism).

2.2 Mind is primary, body secondary (mentalism).

3. The *ontological problem*: what are the relations between the real and the ideal (in the Platonic meaning of the term)? Here again, out of the many possible answers we shall select two which seem to suit the Marxist-Leninists best:

3.1 The real is basic, the ideal secondary (ontological realism).

3.2 The ideal is basic, the real secondary (ontological idealism).

To which one more problem may be added:

4. The *theological problem*: is there a personal entity, different from nature, which is the basis or the cause of it? Here only two answers are possible:

4.1 There is no such entity (atheism).

4.2 There is such an entity (theism).

We have, consequently, eight different theorems, and a great many combinations of them are mathematically possible (exactly $2^4=16$). Now both Bychovskij and I are of the opinion that not all mathematically possible combinations are also semantically possible, that is, if we add to the material symbols of the different theorems the corresponding rules of meaning. But the difference between us is this: while Bychovskij seems to think that out of the 16 only 2 remain as semantically possible, I maintain that this is an over-simplification due to bad analysis, and that, as a matter of fact, the number of semantically possible combinations is far greater. This is due perhaps to a difference in our general attitudes:

Bychovskij, like many Soviet philosophers, oversimplifies; he tries here and elsewhere to reduce everything to the white-black pattern. However, I do not believe in the fruitfulness of such a method. It seems to me that every simple scheme in philosophy is *apriori* wrong, because the world, as I see it, is most complex.

But to return to our question. What is the position of Bychovskij and the Marxist-Leninists in general? They believe that every epistemological realist (if he is a true one) must be a materialist, an ontological realist and an atheist. Likewise, they seem to imply that every epistemological idealist (if he is a true one) must logically be a mentalist, an ontological idealist and a type of theist. Sometimes they go so far as to assert the equivalence of such statements - which would mean that, putting figures as abbreviations of the corresponding sentences:

(A) 1.1≡2.1≡3.1≡4.1

(B) 1.2≡2.2≡3.2≡4.2

Bocheński goes on to develop a comparison of Thomism and Marxism-Leninism on the basis of these categories, showing how unsophisticated the Marxist-Leninist schema is. (Cf. *SST* VII (1967) 158-160).

77. *IF* V, str. 12-13

78. *IF* V, str. 21-22

79. *IF* VI, kn. 1, str. 18

80. *IF* VI, kn. 1, str. 135.

81. *IF* IV, str. 41-42

82. *IF* IV, str. 185; and there is more from Wetter on the same subject.

83. *IF* VI, kn. 1, str. 153

84. The criticisms of Bocheński and his disciples are not as numerous as those of the Kremlinologists. Nevertheless, there is seldom an issue of *VF* or *FN* that does not take issue with one or another of them on a wide range of subjects.

85. *FE* 2, str. 13 on 'Unity and Conflict of Opposites' (cp. note 75, above)

86. I.T. Jakuševskij, *Dialektika i "Sovetologija"* (Dialectic and "Sovietology"), M., Nauka, 1975. 206 str. Here: pp. 70-75 *et passim.*

87. *IF* VI, kn. 2, str. 219-220

88. *SST* celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1985 and will publish its 33rd and 34th volumes in 1987.

89. Cf. *SST* V(1985) p. 317.

90. *VF* 1964, 10, str. 143-147.

91. *Ibid.* str. 147.

92. *Loc. cit.*

93. B.E. Bychovskij, 'Partii v filosofii i filosofskij kamuflaž' (Parties in Philosophy and Philosophic Camouflage), *Kommunist* 1967, 1.

94. Cf. note 60. See also 'On Bychovskij on Idealism', *SST* 13(1973) 151-152, in reply to Bychovskij's 'Erozija idealizma'

(Erosion of Idealism), *Kommunist* 1972, 10, 105-113.

95. I.T. Jakuševskij, *loc. cit.*

HELMUT DAHM

The Philosophical-Sovietological Work of Gustav Andreas Wetter S.J.

I. HIS LIFE

Gustav Andreas Wetter was born on May 4, 1911, in Mödling near Vienna (*Niederösterreich*). Already in 1925 - when he was just fourteen - he began to study Russian and to develop an interest in political and religious conditions in Russia. After graduation from the *Elizabeth-Gymnasium* (Vienna V) in 1930, he entered the *Pontifical College for Russia* (*Russicum*) in Rome, in order to become a Roman-Catholic priest, devoting his life to work in Russia.

A year earlier, Pope Pius XI had used the *Motu proprio, "Quam curam"* (August 15, 1929) in officially founding the *Russicum*. The impulse in this direction came from the French Jesuit, Michel d'Herbigny (1880-1957), who had published early in the twentieth century a widely read book[1] on the Russian philosopher of religion, Vladimir Solov'ev (1853-1900), whom he compared with the English theologian, John Henry Cardinal Newman (1801-1890). Father d'Herbigny was a key figure in Papal policy toward Russia in the 1920s and 1930s.[2]

Wetter studied at the Gregorian Pontifical University (*Gregorianum*) from 1930 to 1936, where he earned the doctorate in philosophy and the masters degree in theology. During the Christmas season of 1935, he was ordained priest in Rome, according to the Byzantine-Slavic Rite. In 1936, he was accepted into the Society of Jesus, and then went to Yugoslavia for a year. On his return from Yugoslavia, Wetter devoted himself, at the Papal Oriental Institute in Rome (1937-1941), to special study of Church history in the East. This course of study ended in 1941 with a dissertation - under the direction of Bernhard Schultze, S.J. - on the all-unitary metaphysics of the Russian philosopher of religion, Lev Karsavin (1882-1952). He received the academic title of *doctor scientiarum ecclesiasticarum.*

Drafted into the German Army in July of 1942, Wetter worked first in the Medical Corps in Bavaria, then in a translation detachment in Munich, and ended up in a translation school in Berlin. In May of 1943, Wetter was mustered out of the Army because he was a member of the Society of Jesus.

It was in the Fall of 1943 that Wetter - as professor of the history of Russian philosophy at the Papal Institute for the Eastern Church - began

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to lecture on the Soviet-Marxist phenomenon. It was from these lectures that came the original Italian version of his major work on *Dialectical Materialism. Its History and System in the Soviet Union*, published by the almost notoriously Communist publisher, Giulio Einaudi (Turin).

Wetter was Vice-Rector (1947 to 1949) and then Rector (until 1954) of the *Russicum*. During the same period, he began to lecture on Russian and Marxist philosophy at the *Gregorianum*. He began to teach the same subjects at the Papal Institute for the Eastern Church, where he had already been appointed full professor in 1957. In 1970, he returned to the *Gregorianum*, founded there the "Center for Marxist Studies", and continued his teaching activity at the Oriental Institute as visiting professor. Even though he retired in 1981, Wetter continued teaching on a limited scale until he was 73; and he continues to direct the "Center for Marxist Studies" to this day.

When he originally entered the *Russicum* in 1930, Wetter intended to become a worker-priest in order to exercise his ministry in Russia. Things turned out quite differently. The original impulse flowered into a full and successful teaching and research career in the fields of Russian and Marxist philosophy, over a period of nearly fifty years, both at the Oriental Institute and the *Gregorianum*.

II. HIS CONTEXTS

The scientific activity of Professor Wetter as a member of the Society of Jesus happened in two major places - seven years as Director of the *Russicum* and more than forty years of professional research and teaching at the Oriental Institute and the *Gregorianum*.

These contexts show his activities to be part of a larger effort, since the 1920s, on the part of the Society of Jesus to deal with the "Russian problem". Earlier efforts had been undertaken - with the exception of Vladimir Solov'ev and Joseph G. Strossmayer (1815-1905) who became Bishop of Djakovo in 1850 - mainly by Jesuits of Russian origin, like Prince Ivan S. Gagarin (1814-1882) and Count Ivan M. Martynov (1821-1894).[3]

Professor d'Herbigny, who began teaching at the *Gregorianum* in 1921, served as President of the Papal Oriental Institute - founded by Pope Benedict XV on October 15, 1917 - for nine years, from 1923 to 1932. In 1922, this Institute was entrusted to the Society of Jesus by Pope Pius XI. The Oriental Institute - as well as the Biblical Institute - was turned into an independent "associate" of the *Gregorianum* in the *Motu proprio, "Quod maxime"* (September 30, 1928).[4] Msgr. d'Herbigny was also a member of the "*pro Russia*" committee that was

formed, in 1925, by the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Church, and which became independent in 1930.[5] Both in 1925 and 1926, d'Herbigny - as head of this committee - visited Bolshevik Russia. During the second of these visits, he - a newly consecrated bishop himself - was able to consecrate a series of bishops. From 1930 to 1934, Michel d'Herbigny directed the *Commissio pro Russia*, that lost its independence by being returned to the Sacred Congregation of the Eastern Church (cf. the *Motu proprio "Quam sollicita"* of December 21, 1934)[6], but continues to exist to this day.[7] Accordingly, responsibility for Byzantine and Slavic Christians in the East - as before April 1930 - returned to the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Church, while the Latin-rite Christians of the East (in the bishoprics of Tyraspol, Kameniec-Podolsk, Luck-Žitomir, in the Archbishopric of Mohilev, and in the Apostolic Vicariate of Vladivostok) fell, as before, under the care of the Vatican Secretary of State.[8]

The *Russicum* - that was directed by Wetter from 1949 to 1954 (he was assistant to the Director as of 1947) and is currently under the leadership of Professor Josef Mácha - has been training, for almost sixty years now, priests for the ecumenical work of the Roman Catholic Church directed toward Russia. The Society of Jesus also has, since 1969, a Center of Russian Studies near Meudon, France - a Center that originally was a college for Russian students, first in Constantinople and then in Namur (Belgium).

It was on November 30, 1985 that the General Council of the Society of Jesus called into being a "committee for the study of Russian affairs" - the *Delegatio pro rebus russicis*, under the leadership of Rev. Bernd Groth, who has been teaching at the *Gregorianum* since 1985. This committee took on the task of awakening within the Society of Jesus interest in and initiatives toward working in Russia and on Russian problems, and of encouraging vocations for a Russian ministry among members of the Society, especially among those already involved in the field or showing a special inclination toward it.[9] It was also decided that this committee on Russian affairs should closely co-ordinate the work of the four main institutions: the Papal Institute for the Eastern Church, the *Russicum*, the Russian Studies Center in Meudon, and Professor Wetter's Center for Marxist Studies at the *Gregorianum* This co-ordination is to further research into and presentation of the Christian values of Europe that are common to East and West, in the spirit of Pope John Paul II's encyclical of June 2, 1985, on the Apostles to the Slavs - Cyrill and Methodius. The *Delegatio pro rebus russicis* thus intends to put main stress on two activities: the strengthening of pastoral work among Roman-Catholic Russians; the intensification of knowledge about Russia in the linguistic, historical, cultural, scientific and theological domains, with

the intent of providing a better understanding for the situation of the Russian people and, when and where possible, to seek for the establishment of fruitful relations with Soviet Russia.[10]

We thus get some idea of the spiritual grounds and the practical and intellectual creativity of G.A. Wetter, as they appear in the greater contexts of his life. Not only is he Jesuit and scientific researcher with a long history and strong institutional contexts, he also took part in a broad movement that was driven by the high-quality work of himself and his fellow Jesuits. Since the Second World War, the following members of the Society of Jesus made serious contributions to the field of philosophical Sovietology:

Albert M. Ammann (1890-1974), professor at the Papal Institute for the Eastern Church, whose basic *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte* (Sketch of the Church History of the Eastern Slavs, Vienna, Herder) appeared in Italian in 1943 and in German in 1950.

Walter Brugger (b. 1904), professor at the Munich Higher School for Philosophy, has written many works, including *Der dialektische Materialismus und die Frage nach Gott* (Dialectical Materialism and the Question About God, Munich, Berchmans, 1980).

Jean-Yves Calvez (b. 1927) is professor at the Parisian *Institut Catholique* and at the *Institut d'études politiques* in Paris. He has published, among other books and articles, *La pensée de Karl Marx* (The Thought of Karl Marx, Paris, Seuil, 1956).

Henri Chambre (b. 1908), professor at the *Institut d'études sociales* at the Parisian *Institut catholique,* published *Le marxisme en Union Soviétique - idéologie et institutions, leur évolution de 1917 à nos jours* (Marxism in the Soviet Union - Ideology and Institutions, Their Evolution from 1917 to the Present, Paris, Seuil, 1955).

Peter Ehlen (b. 1934) is professor at the Munich Higher School for Philosophy and author of the following significant books: *Der Atheismus im dialektischen Materialismus* (Atheism in Dialectical Materialism, Munich, Pustet, 1961); *Die philosophische Ethik in der Sowjetunion. Analyse und Diskussion* (Philosophical Ethics in the Soviet Union. Analysis and Discussion, Munich-Salzburg, A. Pustet, 1972); and *Marxismus als Weltanschauung. Die weltanschaulich-philosophischen Leitgedanken bei Karl Marx* (Marxism as a Worldview. The Philosophical Leitmotifs in Karl Marx, Munich-Vienna, Olzog, 1982).

Heinrich Falk (b. 1912), professor at the Munich Higher School for Philosophy, has written: *Die Weltanschauung des Bolschewismus. Historischer und dialektischer Materialismus gemeinverständlich dargelegt* (The Worldview of Bolshevik Historical and Dialectical Materialism, Presented in a Generally Understandable Form, Würzburg, Echter, 1951); *Das Weltbild Peter J. Tschaadajews nach*

seinen acht 'Philosophischen Briefen' (Chaadaev's Worldview, According to his Eight *Philosophic Letters*, Munich, Osteuropa Institut, 1954); *Kirche und Kommunismus. Der dialektische Materialismus und Seine Verurteilung* (Church and Communism. Dialectical Materialism and its Condemnation, Düsseldorf, Patmos, 1956); and *Die ideologischen Grundlagen des Kommunismus* (The Ideological Foundations of Communism, Munich, Olzog, 1961).

Eduard Huber (b. 1922) is professor at the *Gregorianum* and author of *Um eine 'dialektische Logik' - Diskussionen in der neueren Sowjetphilosophie* (About a 'Dialectical Logic': Discussions in Recent Soviet Philosophy, Munich-Salzburg, Pustet, 1966).

Baron *Ivan Kologrívov* (1890-1955) began teaching at the Oriental Institute in 1946 and published, among other works: *Die Metaphysik des Bolschewismus* (The Metaphysics of Bolshevism, Salzburg, Pustet, 1934); *Von Hellas zum Mönchtum* (From Hellas to Monasticism, Regensburg, Gregorius, 1948); and *Le Verbe de vie* (The Word of Life, Bruges, Beyaert, 1951).

Friedrich Muckermann (1883-1946) was editor of the Catholic monthly, *Der Gral* (The Grail) from 1920 to 1935. He also published *Wladimir Solowiew - Zur Begegnung zwischen Russland und dem Abendland* (Vladimir Solov'ev. On the Encounter Between Russia and the West, Olten, Walter, 1945).

Helmut Ogiermann (b. 1910) *professor emeritus* at the St. George Theological School in Frankfurt, published a contribution to the discussion under the title *Materialistische Dialektik* (The Materialist Dialectic, Munich-Salzburg-Cologne, A. Pustet, 1958).

Bernhard Schultze (b.1902) was Wetter's thesis director. Schultze's *Russische Denker - Ihre Stellung zu Christus, Kirche und Papsttum* (Russian Thinkers in Their Stance Toward Christ, the Church and the Papacy, Vienna, Herder, 1950) was a comprehensive survey of Russian intellectual and spiritual history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Josef de Vries (b.1898) *professor emeritus* at the Munich Higher School for Philosophy, was author of many works, including: *Die Erkenntnistheorie des dialektischen Materialismus* (The Theory of Knowledge of Dialectical Materialism, Munich-Salzburg-Cologne, Pustet, 1958) and *Materie und Geist - Eine philosophische Untersuchung* (Matter and Spirit: A Philosophic Investigation, Munich-Salzburg, A. Pustet, 1970).

III. HIS WRITINGS

A complete list of the writings of G.A. Wetter would contain more than

220 entries. At the end of the present report, the reader will find a chronological listing of 42 writings - only the most important. We limit ourselves below to those of these that illustrate our presentation of Wetter's work from a systematic viewpoint. These are:

- *on Soviet-Russian Philosophy*

Der dialektische Materialismus. Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion, Wien-Freiburg/B, 1-3 Auflage 1952-1956, 4-5 1958-1960, and

Die Umkehrung Hegels. Grundzüge und Ursprünge der Sowjetphilosophie, Köln, 1. Aufl. 1963, 2. Aufl. 1964;

- *on the Materialist Conception of History of Soviet-Russian Philosophy*

Sowjetideologie heute 1 - *Dialektischer und historischer Materialismus,* Frankfurt/M-Hamburg, 1962-1979. This work is important for the questions of mode of production as ground of social life, of the 'dialectical' play of forces between relations and forces of production, of the categories of 'base' and 'superstructure', as well as of the five so-called social-economic formations. To these questions belong the notions of classes, state, right, class conflict, social revolution, and parties. The domain of social consciousness involves the questions on the class character of ideology and on the role of the popular masses in history and, finally, on the various forms of social consciousness - science, philosophy, art, morality and religion.

- *on Philosophic Questions of Science's View of the World and the Image of Man in Leninist Marxism*

Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion, Hamburg, 1958, with sections on quantum mechanics, theory of relativity (mass and energy), chemistry (resonance and mesometrics), cosmology and cosmogony, the origins of life and cell-theory, as well as genetic theory, anthropology and psychology; and, finally

- *on the Tradition of Russian Thought*

Über Lev Karsawins (1882-1952) Ontologie der Dreieinheit. Die Struktur des kreatürlichen Seins als Abbild der Göttlichen Dreifaltigkeit (Rome, Orientalia Christiana Periodica, 1943), and
Zum Zeitproblem in der Philosophie des Ostens. Die Theorie der

'Allzeitlichkeit' (Freiburg, Scholastik, 1949), and
'Die russische religiöse Philosophie und der Marxismus' (guest lecture at the University of Vienna on April 12, 1984; published in *Pro Fide et Iustitia. Festschrift für Agostino Kardinal Casaroli zum 70. Geburtstag,* hrsg. v. Herbert Schambeck, Berlin, 1984), and
'Ursprünge und erste Entwicklung der russischen Philosophie - Gedanken zu einer Philosophie ihrer Geschichte', in *Die nicht-marxistische Philosophie Osteuropas im 20. Jahrhundert*, hrsg. v. Helmut Dahm (forthcoming).

IV. HIS ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE ACADEMIC SPHERE

G.A. Wetter directed eight doctoral dissertations in the field and took part in the progression of eight other dissertations. In both cases - *i.e.*, those he directed and those with which he assisted - three had to do with Marxist-Leninist thought while the others concerned important representatives of Russian philosophy: Nikolaj Berdyaev (1874-1948), Pavel Florensky (1882-1937), Semen Frank (1877-1950), Ivan Il'in (1883-1954), Nikolaj Lossky (1870-1965), Lev Shestov (1866-1938) and Nikolaj Strachov (1828-1896). Also to the domain of Russian philosophy, belongs the interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the works of Alexandre Kojève (b. 1902 in Moscow: d. 1968 in Paris), done by G. Gonzales Rivera in 1976. It was Kojève who declared in his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris, 1947) that Hegel's *Phenomenology* would not admit to a dialectic of natural being.

A. Doctoral Dissertations Directed by G.A. Wetter

Emmanuele Andrés Mato, 'El hombre en Karl Marx y en actual materialismo dialéctico' (Man in Karl Marx and in Contemporary Dialectical Materialism). 174 pp. Submitted on January 29, 1968.

Rupert Gläser, 'Die Frage nach Gott in der Philosophie S.L. Franks. Zur Untersuchung seines religionsphilosophischen Hauptwerks *Nepostižimoe*' (The Question of God in the Philosophy of S.L. Frank: An Interpretation of his Major Work in the Philosophy of Religion, *Nepostižimoe*). 266 pp. Submitted on June 14, 1974 and published in *Das östliche Christentum. Abhandlungen im Auftrag des Ostkirchlichen Instituts der deutschen Augustiner.* Hrsg. von Prof. Dr. Hermenegild M. Biedermann, OSA. Neue Folge, Bd. 28, Würzburg, 1975.

Eduard Huber S.J., 'Um eine "dialektische Logik". Diskussionen in der neueren Sowjetphilosophie' (About a 'Dialectical Logic'. Dis-

cussions in Contemporary Soviet Philosophy). Submitted on December 17, 1964 and defended on March 22, 1965. Published by Pustet in Munich in 1966. (259 pp.) From 1968 to 1973, Huber was director of the Center for Russian Studies in Meudon. He served from 1975 to 1980 as rector of the Oriental Institute in Rome. He also succeeded Wetter as professor at the *Gregorianum.*

Marc Luyckx, 'L'oeuvre de jeunesse de N. Berdiaev. De sa découverte du marxisme à celle du Dieu Chrétien' (N. Berdyaev's Early Works: from the Discovery of Marxism to that of the Christian God). 339 pp. Submitted on March 20, 1972 and defended on May 17, 1972.

Slavko Platz, 'Intuitio et cognitio exsistentiae Dei secundum Nicolaum O. Losskij. Investigatio in gnoseologiam philosophiae russicae religiosae'. 229pp. Submitted on July 11, 1970.

Romanus Skórka, S.J., 'La théorie marxiste de la vérité. Etude à partir des écrits de Adam Schaff'. 327pp. Submitted on April 15, 1966.

Rev. Robert Slesinski, 'Florensky's Metaphysics of Love'. 314pp. Submitted on April 28, 1982.

Rev. Rudolf L.W.Tannert, 'Zur Theorie des Wissens. Systematisch-kritische Darlegung der gnoseologischen Untersuchungen von S.L. Frank (1877-1950). 280pp. Submitted on April 14, 1971.

B. Dissertations Reviewed by G.A. Wetter

Giuseppe Bucaro, 'L'uomo libero in K. Marx' (Strutturazione del problema della libertà nelle opere di K. Marx: Dalla tesi di laurea ai Manoscritti del '44). 330pp. Directed by P. Huber. Submitted on April 27, 1977.

Ivan Devčić, 'Der Personalismus bei Nikolaj A. Berdjajew. Versuch einer Philosophie des Konkreten'. 346pp. Submitted on June 2, 1980.

Ingeborg Fleischhauer, 'Philosophische Aufklärung in Russland. Rationaler Impuls und mystischer Umbruch: N.N. Strachov'. 270pp. Submitted in 1977 to the University of Konstanz.

Guillermo Gonzales Rivera, 'Saber absoluto e historia. La interpretación de la Fenomenología del Espíritu según Alexandre Kojève'. 354pp. Submitted on April 28, 1976.

Konrad Keler, 'Il valor della soteriologia e cristologia atea di Milan Machovec'. 333pp. Submitted on March 17, 1978.

Rev. Wolfgang Offermanns, 'Mensch werde wesentlich! Das Lebenswerk des russischen religiösen Denkers Ivan A. Iljin für eine Erneuerung der geistigen Grundlagen der Menschheit'. 305pp. Directed by Francis O'Farrell. Submitted on June 30, 1977. Published in *Oikonomia. Quellen und Studien zur orthodoxen Theologie,* hrsg. v.

Fairy v. Lilienfeld, Bd. 11, Erlangen 1979.

Nikola Stanković, 'Justificatio Dei bei Lew Schestow. Der Kampf gegen das Böse'. 236pp. Directed by P. Huber. Submitted on November 9, 1981 and defended on January 27, 1982.

Ioannes Paulus Strilić, 'Das Problem des unendlichen Weltalls in der heutigen Sowjetphilosophie'. 503pp. Submitted on October 5, 1972.

V. HIS WORK FROM A SYSTEMATIC VIEWPOINT

A. Dialectical Materialism

Wetter's main work, *Der dialektische Materialismus - Seine Geschichte und sein System in der Sowjetunion* (Dialectical Materialism. A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union), appeared in its German version in five editions between 1952 and 1960. It also appeared in four other languages - Italian, English, French, and Spanish. Its "foremost intent" was to provide "sufficient documentary material for the intellectual confrontation with Bolshevism"[11], or "with Soviet Communism ... and this in some order".[12] Wetter had noticed that at the end of World War II the "spiritual defence had become difficult due mainly to a lack of a genuine knowledge of the philosophical doctrines of Bolshevism".[13] To a great extent this situation was due to the fact that most intellectuals in the West had no access to the original Bolshevik sources - either through lack of knowledge of the Russian language or through inability to gain access to the writings.[14]

Decisive for the presentation of the theme were two perspectives that also determined the division of the materials - into questions having to do with the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and those involving Marxism-Leninism as doctrine and worldview. As regards the extraordinarily successful first German edition of his *Dialectical Materialism...*, Wetter originally intended simply to do a German version of his Italian book (1947), based on his 1945 lectures at the Oriental Institute. In view, however, of the rapid developments in Soviet philosophy at that time and of the numerous works that were being published by Soviet philosophers, Wetter decided to rework completely the materials - and we saw the result for the first time in 1952.[15]

Part I, the historical part - or, better, the part that dealt with the intellectual history of the CPSU - began with the philosophic roots of Marxism in Hegel, Feuerbach, and the French positivism of the middle

of the nineteenth century. It then moved from Marx and Engels, through the revolutionary movements in Russia[16], to the philosophic trends within Russian Marxism before the October revolution.[17] The presentation finally arrived at a special treatment of Lenin and his views, and their influence on the various segments of the development of philosophy in the Soviet Union.

Part II, which described the systematic structure of contemporary Soviet philosophy, dealt first with two methodological principles - the unity of theory and practice, and the principle of party-mindedness (*partijnost'*). It then went on to examine the concept of matter, the materialist dialectic, and the doctrine of categories. Finally, it looked at dialectical materialism's relationship to modern science, to epistemology, and to logic. As of the fourth edition, "it was necessary to pay special attention to the changes wrought by the de-Stalinisation, especially the return from the Stalinist to the Engelsian formulation of the doctrine of dialectic and the resultant rehabilitation of the law of the negation of negation, as well as changes in the category system, and questions raised by philosophic problems of the natural sciences".[18]

Wetter's stroll through the totality of dialectical-materialist doctrines evidenced the following structure: he began with how the elements of this doctrine set themselves off from any other materialism, especially from vulgar or mechanistic materialism. Then he made visible the internal contradiction between the dialectic and materiality. Further, he investigated three "points of contact between dialectical materialism and non-Marxist, Russian philosophic trends".[19] In a further step, he worked on the similarities between the respective modes of thought of Soviet philosophy and of Scholastic-Thomistic philosophy, using the very essence of the basic law of the materialist dialectic (the unity and conflict of contraries) to show the incompatibility of the two modes of thought. Finally, he counterposed to and against the materialist version of history as an atheistic doctrine of salvation, the Christian-Catholic vision of history.

Relative to the first point, Wetter notes several positive elements: namely,

1. Dialectical materialism vigorously defends the right of philosophy to its existence as a special field of study.
2. Dialectical materialism professes a realist theory of knowledge.
3. Movement is interpreted - as in Aristotle - as "change in general".
4. There is a consequent recognition of essential differences among the distinct domains of reality.
5. Finally, the dialectic is something that brings creativity, vitality and intentionality into reality.

As regards the internal contradiction between dialectic and materiality, Wetter turned his main attention to two items - the Hegelian principle of the coincidence of dialectic, logic, and theory of knowledge, on the one hand, and the concept of matter, on the other. As Wetter showed - not only in his *Dialectical Materialism...* but also in his 1963 piece on *Hegel's Turn as the Basis and Source of Soviet Philosophy* - the failure of the Marxist-Leninist imitation of the essential identity of thought (idea) and being (matter) is due to the confusion with the no longer identical pairing of matter and consciousness; for, Marxist-Leninist philosophy teaches that consciousness as such is a property only of a part of (physical) reality, that which is highly organized. This means that the developmental process of matter essentially does not completely coincide with that of its consciousness so that this coincidence cannot be used to guarantee truth, and the question of knowledge is posed in a way similar to that of realist philosophy.

To get around this difficulty one, "even after the 'turn' of Hegel, identifies being with thought, with the difference that one no longer calls it 'idea' but 'matter'... This, however, would presuppose that this 'matter' be already at its origin somehow *essentially* 'consciousness', rather than this latter appearing only as the highest product of matter. In such a case, we would be back in Hegel's idealism, and the whole difference between Hegel and dialectical materialism would consist in the merely terminological substitution of 'matter' or 'nature' for 'idea'."[20] This would "mean ... either to give the word 'matter' a fully new sense, using it not just for spiritual but for outright divine attributes, or to take upon oneself a contradiction that would run through the entire system."[21]

Striking "points of contact" are found by Wetter "above all with the tendency - so opposed to Marxism and any materialism - that one finds in a certain special trend in Russian philosophy; namely, Slavophilism in its religious-philosophic version (Ivan Kireevsky, Alexej Khomjakov), and with the resulting powerful movement of Russian religious thought that flows over Vladimir Solov'ev to the modern Russian philosophers of religion - Bulgakov, Berdyaev, Frank, Florensky, Karsavin, and others."[22] From this viewpoint, three aspects are stressed by Wetter as relevant for dialectical materialism:

1. There is the 'mystical' cast that the 'materialist turn' of Hegel's dialectic gives to Soviet philosophy. Wetter noted "that it is just this dose of 'mysticism', coming from the dialectic, that helped give Marxism the success that it enjoyed in Russia".[23]

2. Then there is the anti-idealist and anti-intellectualist postulate of the unity of theory and practice, in conjunction with the specifically

Leninist notion of party-mindedness (*partijnost'*). Wetter saw here "a striking similarity to the basic idea of Slavophil thought, the notion of 'holistic knowledge' (*cel'noe znanie*).[24] Knowledge, on this account, is not purely theoretical, but also "has existential import; in fact, it appears as the existential encounter between the knower and the substantial, personal truth that involves a truly religious responsibility"[25], that finds its completion "in the cognitive process of the church that enfolds the whole of mankind in a massive organism".[26]

3. Finally, there is the typically romantic vision of a universal set of interconnections, and of a correlative internal bonding and unity, that penetrate the infinite diversity of the Universe. According to Wetter, "this intuition, too ..., like that of the idea of unity of contraries, goes back to a tradition of Platonism and even more of neo-Platonism".[27] Such an idea of *panta hen* - a total unity in the sense of the lordship of something like Plotinus' *nous* is to be found not only in the Patristic writings of Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and others but also in the Russian religious philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. "The entire philosophic development of its perhaps greatest representative, Solov'ev, is dominated by this intuition of total unity."[28]

With this - carefully qualified - assessment of the 'related' mind-sets of Marxist-Leninist and Catholic theological thought, Wetter went on to say "that Soviet philosophers ... base their research not on a philosophic method but on an explicitly theological one. It is a method that asks not if a proposition is true or false in itself but if it is found among the revealed truths of a teaching authority that has been proved to be infallible".[29] In this context, however, Wetter goes on, one must stress that despite all formal resemblances there is an essential difference between these two mind-sets: "For, before the Catholic theologian argues from the authority of divine revelation, he has proved to himself in a purely philosophic way the existence of God, and has used scientific-historical methods to establish that this God actually did provide revelation to the world. For Soviet philosophers, on the other hand, the authority of the 'classics' of Marxism is not open to discussion, but has to be accepted in blind faith."[30]

Similarly, Wetter sees the basic categories of thought of and questions asked by Soviet philosophy as corresponding to a great extent with those of Scholasticism, and "even of Thomism".[31] To this extent, dialectical materialism as practiced by contemporary Soviet philosophers, evidences "much greater similarity with the Scholastic *forma mentis* ... than with that of the Hegelian dialectic".[32] Just the mere fact that Engels applied the dialectic to nature caused Soviet dialectical materialism to become a form of thought that is "internally more akin to the Scholastic-Aristotelian doctrine of act and potency" than "to a real Hegelian dialectic".[33] There are, in addition, a whole series of points

of contacts in respect to single philosophic doctrines. For example, the transformation of quantity into quality correlates with the Scholastic *mutatio substantialis*; the dialectical-materialist category of chance, with the Scholastic understanding of contingence as the possibility of non-being and also in the sense of being that is not necessary; and the dialectical-materialist notion of the coming-to-be of concepts, with the Thomistic theory of abstraction.

The basic law of the materialist dialectic on the unity and conflict of contradictions as the source of all movement excludes God the Creator as prime mover in a conscious and willful manner. It is precisely this willful and subjective basic attitude that gives clearest evidence of the opposition between Soviet philosophy, on the one hand, and Catholic - and any Christian or theistic - thought, on the other, despite any of the previously mentioned formal points of contact and resemblances; and this gap is unbridgeable. Wetter stresses that here "it lies at hand that dialectical materialism is not one philosophic system among many others; but, it is a world view that is faithful to an historic force that is at work in history."[34]

Accordingly, this author of the main critical work on dialectical materialism came unerringly to the conclusion that Bolshevism as scientific Communism - despite its rational claims - is less a scientific doctrine than a pseudo-religious faith; it is an atheistic doctrine of salvation. Wetter went on: "Its point of departure is the emphatic recognition of a world that 'is in a bad way' and that has to be 'saved'. It was Marx who discovered the path to this 'salvation'; and this discovery counts as a veritable 'revelation': it is not the accidental accomplishment of a genius, but the necessary product of an objectively proceeding process of social development; it is a discovery that can come about only at a certain stage of development - when 'the fullness of time has come'. Even the subjective attitude toward this 'revelation' is drawn from the realm of the religious."[35]

Commenting on this conversion process of man from God, where there is not just a denial of God but a "transformation of the religion of the God-man into a pseudo-religion of the Man-god, Wetter noted:

> The denial of God that is fundamental to contemporary Soviet dialectical materialism thus has deeper roots than a mere wrong conclusion during the proof of the 'laws of the materialist dialectic'. The exclusion of the 'prime mover' is not the *result* of this process of demonstration, but its *point of origin*, that is present before all argumentation, as the *result of a willful decision.* Soviet atheism proves to be - seen in the context of the history of ideas - as *a historical force*, behind which is to be found the dynamism of a hundred years of spiritual development, and the overcoming of

> which will take totally other methods than precise philosophic distinctions and the revelation of some philosophic errors in reasoning. The Bolshevism that fights under the banner of an *essentially and unremittingly atheistic* dialectical (and historical) materialism reveals itself - despite all the formal and structural similarities - as in its very essence *the true opponent of Christianity* and especially of the Catholic Church. It is not just a social doctrine and a political power; it is more and more revealed to be *a pseudo-religious movement of thought.*[36]

Atheism as religion was - as Wetter did not hesitate to mention - one great theme of Dostoevsky's novel, *The Devils* (*Besy*, 1871/1872). Šatov - former serf of the Lieutenant General's widow, Stavrogina; failed student and sometime tutor for a merchant family - says there that socialism must in its essence be atheism. This atheistic destination is made clear already in its basic doctrines which are to be built exclusively on the bases of science and reason. Science and reason, however, have always played in the life of peoples a secondary and subservient role, and this will remain so in the future. It is mainly another force that forms and moves peoples. This is "the force of the insatiable urge to go to the end that simultaneously denies the end. This is *the force of the eternal and tireless affirmation of one's own being and of the denial of death.*"[37] Šatov calls this the "esthetic" principle of the philosopher or also the "ethical" principle of "the search for God", and declares: "The goal of all popular movements ... is exclusively the search for God, for their God, unconditional in Itself, and in whom is the only true belief."[38] In other words: "God is the synthetic personhood of the whole people."[39] In such a way, then, He unexpectedly becomes (for the mythical thought of Leninist Marxism) an attribute of the collective, belief in the truth of which becomes religion. Šatov goes on to say that this has been the case of all great peoples who have led mankind. When a great people no longer believes that it has exclusive truth and when it no longer thinks that it alone is called to and capable of bringing the dead back to life and saving them, then it turns into mere ethnographic material and ceases to be a great people. Since, further, there can be but one truth, there can only be a single people that has the true God. This is the sense in which the Russian people is the sole and exclusive "bearer of God". This is precisely how one has to understand the atheism that provisionally calls itself socialism.[40] Pëtr Verchovensky - the wise and all-knowing serpent of intrigue and conspiracy - offers a confirmation as follows: "Here, little father, a new religion is suppressing the old one; this is why so many soldiers are flowing by; for, something momentous is happening here."[41] It is then question of a "decision" that gives "mankind the possibility of freely

constructing itself socially, and not just on paper".[42]

As Dostoevsky clearly saw, it was enough to have the myth, the conceptual or heroic account, the legend. "The main thing is that one have a legend", he has Peter Verchovensky say in *The Devils* to Nikolaj Stavrogin, who is taken as personifying the new idea of the secretly salvific future. Verchovensky's ecstatic vision could just as well have been said of Communism:

> It will make its appearance; it will come. We will set loose a legend that is better than that of the *castrati*[43] of Messiah Ivan Filippovič. There is someone like that but no one has ever seen him. What kind of legend can we circulate! The main thing is that a new force come into existence. This is what is needed and it is after this that everyone is crying. Now, how is it with socialism? It has destroyed the old forces but has not brought forth new ones. But, here is the force - and what a force! - like nothing ever seen before. We will need to apply pressure only once to the lever in order to move the whole world. Everything will move! ... It exists; but no one has seen it. It is in hiding... But, ... then it will spread over the earth like wildfire: [it] has been seen; one has seen [it]... It brings a new truth and hides itself![44]

Then, at the end of his *Juvenile* (*Podrostok*, 1875), Dostoevsky described, three or four years later, the father of the author of the *Illustrations*, Andrej Petrovič Versilov as

> ... a noble of one of the oldest families and also a partisan of the Paris Commune; ... a true poet who loved Russia, but fully denied it for the same reason; ... without any religion, but nearly ready to die for something indeterminate, that he could not name, but in which he passionately believed, following the example of the majority of the Russian-European civilizers of the Petersburg period in Russian history.[45]

Wetter measured this atheistic 'religion' against the *Three Conversations* of Vladimir Solov'ev[46] - especially the third with its 'Short Account of the Enemy of Christ'[47] - against Mariology and the ecclesiology of the "secret Revelation"[48], as well as against the encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris* of Pope Pius XI.[49] The resulting view of history is anchored in belief in Christ and turns the anti-theistic *non serviam* of Communist ideology into the *fiat* that turned the Virgin Mary into the *virgo ecclesiae* giving us the certainty

> that we do not stand alone in our fight, ... that our fight will be

> successful - even that in Mary the final victory is already anticipated in a pre-emptive way. The process of the "divinisation" of the world began with the incarnation of the son of God, and will end when the offspring of the 'woman' crushes the head of the 'serpent'.[50]

VI. HIS INFLUENCE

Wetter's monumental presentation of dialectical materialism capped a development that had been marked by particular studies of Soviet-Russian ideology as philosophy; he did the *summa* for the field and did it just as it was "undergoing profound transformations".[51] The works that benefitted from his pathfinding labor - by J.M. Bocheński[52], W. Theimer[53], M. Reding[54], J. Hommes[55], M.G. Lange[56] and H.B. Acton[57] - had and continue to have their own originality but could not compare with the breadth and scope of Wetter's accomplishment. This is clear from an examination of Bocheński's small book, entitled *Soviet-Russian Dialectical Materialism (Diamat).* Published by Francke in Bern (Switzerland), it appeared in 1950, two years prior to the first German edition of Wetter's main work. Actually, however, Bocheński's *Diamat* only covered in shorter form the same material as Wetter's Italian original of early 1948, while Theimer's *Marxism* of 1950 dealt, for the most part, with the materialist conception of history and political economy. The value of the works that have appeared since Marcel Reding's comparison with Aquinas - his Graz inaugural lecture 'Thomas Aquinas and Karl Marx' (1952) - cannot be taken as inferior; and this includes both Jakob Hommes' existential-dialectical interpretation and H.B. Acton's phenomenalistic version of dialectical materialism. On the contrary, since 1955 the methodological approach of Wetter has encouraged differentiated - analectic-realist or dialectical Hegelian - interpretations of the essential components of Soviet-Russian philosophy.

Comparing the positions of the four main Catholic practitioners of philosophic Sovietology, we see that there are two completely clear trends:

1. Wetter's Aristotelian-Thomistic stress on the ontological and epistemological realism of Soviet-Russian philosophy; and
2. Hommes' existentialistically anthropologised and humanistically radical Hegelianism with its application of consciousness' dialectic of being to matter.

To delineate the positions of Bocheński and Reding is a bit more difficult.

A. Bocheński's Position

In his short account of dialectical materialism in 1950, Bocheński followed - as he himself said in the introductory chapter on 'Sources and Method'[58] - "in broad contours" Wetter's account that was available to him in the Italian original version.[59] Bocheński's 'Systematic Section' includes accounts of the ontology, epistemology, dialectic and formal logic of Soviet-Russian philosophy. Its recourse to Lenin's definition of the philosophic concept of matter gives it a theory of being that means that "its 'materialism' ... is only a realism" and this is due to "the assertion of the priority of being over consciousness".[60] In its epistemology, "contemporary dialectical materialism evidences strong Aristotelian" traits.[61] The same is true of the formal-logical stages of knowledge - sensation, concept, judgement and inference. For - as Bocheński notes in this context - "it is not difficult to see that this doctrine that stands between rationalism and empiricism is Aristotelian in most of its premisses".[62] Even within the theory of the dialectical leap, Bocheński finds similarities with the Thomistic theory of substantial change.[63] These views agree completely with those of Wetter.

Bocheński's contribution on the essence and content of the dialectic in the *Handbook of World Communism* (1958), however, has another tone. "It is true", we read there, "that the Communists have rejected the idealism of Hegel but the dialectic is fully appropriated."[64] This means that "Communism is ... essentially Hegelianism."[65] This shift in emphasis came from the decision that the Soviet notion of movement was idealistic. In the *Diamat* book Bocheński's interpretation of this problem was limited to the assertion that "The Concept of motion gives the word 'matter' for the dialectical materialists a meaning that is not normal at all."[66] For, "if movement is the essential form of matter, this means that all that is is in the process of becoming - and nothing more."[67] In the *Handbook of World Communism*, however, his position turns to making a metaphysical conclusion out of the fact that matter is conditioned by motion. Such a conclusion can be supported only by giving too much credence to the efforts of I.V. Il'in to interpret Hegel's philosophy as a "contemplative theology".[68] For, continues Bocheński, "the sole difference between Hegel and the Communists consists in the fact that what he called 'idea' is now called 'matter', and both [words] probably have no meaning - for both Hegel and the Communists fail to say just what idea or matter are".[69]

With his assertion on the essentially Hegelian character of Soviet-Russian philosophy Bocheński necessarily comes close to the dialectical interpretation of the 'technological eros' of Jakob Hommes. But, there is an important question as to whether there can still be any

meaning to his statement in the American study *On Soviet Philosophy* (1951) to the effect "that Soviet philosophy joins Thomism in defending certain important doctrines"[70], after such a change in position. The reason for the difficulty that inhabits this view can be found by comparing the subtle reasonings of Il'in with the *Handbook's* massive attribution to the Marxist-Leninist theory of being of a method and system that Bocheński previously had qualified as "pre-Socratic".[71] Such discontinuity and disparity forces one to be careful about the variable results of Bocheński's interpretation. But, M.M. Rozental' was probably not completely wrong when, in *Novoe vremja*, he spoke of "marvelous metamorphoses of this critic of Marxism".[72] What is most striking here is that a qualified representative of the dialectical school within Soviet-Russian philosophy reacts negatively to Bocheński's assertion that Soviet-Russian philosophy "fully and completely" absorbs Hegelian thought[73], saying that "Marxism [has] quite clearly not absorbed the Hegelian dialectic 'fully and completely'".[74]

In the *Handbook of World Communism* of 1958 Bocheński does a metaphysical deepening of the argument from his 'The Communist Ideology and the Worth, Freedom and Equality of Men in the Sense of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of May 5, 1949'[75] about the "the true is the whole" proposition from the Preface to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* that Il'in applies to God.[76] For, he notes: "What is central here is not the fact that God is named or even that this God is identified with a concept, or even the pantheism and acosmism[77], but the idea that anything individual or singular is only a 'moment' of the 'whole'. 'The true is the whole', says Hegel."[78] In other words, in both cases - in 'The Communist Ideology...' (1956) and the *Handbook...* (1958) - Il'in's commentary on Hegel is recognized as a key to the authentic understanding of Soviet-Russian philosophy. With this questionable but understandable correlation, Bocheński sought to ground the momentous assertion that "Communism is essentially Hegelianism", despite the fact that this assertion not only is lacking in his *Contemporary European Philosophy* (1947/1951), the 'Bolshevist Catechism' (1948), and his *Diamat* book - notwithstanding the use there of Il'in - but also lacks any foundation in the most recent developments in Marxism-Leninism.

B. Marcel Reding's Position

This professor of Catholic moral theology was born in Luxemburg (Mecher) in 1914. He studied in Freiburg/B, Paris and Tübingen, and taught in Graz and at the Free University in Berlin. That he occupies a special place among researchers into Marxism and Sovietology can be

seen from the fact that in 1955 he was officially invited to visit the Soviet Union and had the opportunity - as a Catholic priest! - to spend two weeks travelling throughout the Soviet Union in the company of I.V. Poljanskij, Head of the Commission for Religious Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. During his stay in the capital, Reding was invited by the Academy of Sciences to take part in a colloquium on the theme of 'Atheism', along with the Vice-President of the Academy, K.V. Ostrovitjanov, and Professors Petr Fedoseev (b.1908), Aleksej Gagarin (1895-1960), and Vladimir Sapošnikov (1884-1968). In contrast to the popular and politically significant report on Reding in *Pravda* (December 29, 1955), the day after his meeting with Mikojan[79], there was strictly no news from Fedoseev's Institute of Philosophy, where the colloquium had taken place.

Only a year later does Reding's name appear as opponent of the ideologically oriented Party propagandists. Teodor Ojzerman (b. 1914) - Professor of Historical Materialism at Moscow State University (Philosophy Department) - takes issue with Reding's 'Thomas Aquinas and Karl Marx' (inaugural lecture in 1952 at the University of Graz) in the course of his *Kommunist* article on 'The Contemporary Form of Medieval Scholasticism'.[80] At issue - here as in Reding's *Der politische Atheismus* (1957)[81] - is his thesis that Aristotle, Aquinas and Marx had enough in common that they would be able to understand one another and to have a good discussion. Ojzerman's critique reads:

> Reding tries ... to prove that Saint Thomas and the great founder of the scientific ideology of the proletariat, K. Marx, shared a teacher, that they were 'competent and original Aristotelians'. As proof, Reding refers to the Aristotle used by Marx in the first volume of *Capital* that proves - according to Reding - the spiritual affinity of Marx' economic doctrines with those of Aristotle. He sees another even more striking proof in the correlation of the philosophy of Marxism with the philosophy of Hegel - called by Reding himself 'the most important and original Aristotelian of the previous century'. What is common among the philosophic views of Marx, Aristotle and Saint Thomas - at least according to Reding - is the 'fight for the re-establishment of sensuous reality, of the material world, and stress on the orientation of the individual to the social'. There is no point in bringing forth proofs that Marx was not an Aristotelian and that his whole doctrine was completely contrary to the religious idealism of Thomas Aquinas.[82]

This criticism remains unclear to the extent that Ojzerman is not accurate in presenting Reding's comparison of Marx and Aquinas as to what these two have in common. Comparing these incomparable figures

from the history of thought, Reding is not at all definite. He says: "One cannot translate Marx simply into Aristotle"[83], and he sees Aquinas as in a similar situation. This clarification does not prevent Reding from expressing the conviction that "the Marxian image of man - especially his ethics and political views - could only gain from an enrichment through Aristotelian-Thomistic thought".[84]

In these texts - especially as regards the relevance of the psychological content of Aristotelian philosophy - Reding is clearly dealing in approximations and suggestions. What is at issue is the fact that the young Marx (1840-1841) used many Greek sources in the work on his doctoral dissertation.[85] At the same time, the core of his comparative approach - Marx' recognition of the realistic critique that is at work in Aristotle and Aquinas - is not touched by this limitation. It was very important for Marx, for example, to assert - in contrast with Cartesian rationalism and Kantian thought but in agreement with the *Prior Analytics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle - that not every judgement involves truth and falsity but only those that refer to states of affairs. He discovered and adopted it while studying Aristotelian psychology.[86]

Reding goes on to point out "that throughout his whole life, Marx was reading Aristotle, quoting him, and protecting him against criticism".[87] Whence Marx argued - despite a definite sensualist cast to his idea of man, due to Feuerbach - "realistically in an Aristotelian sense" in his theory of knowledge, "and this realism" remained "decisive for him".[88] But, according to Reding, the empiricist ground came "very close to the old Aristotelian-Thomistic position. What is worth noting is that this is called materialist by Engels. However, only the method - taking sensual reality as the point of departure in order to seize general ideas - is materialist. In this sense even Aristotle and Thomas could be called materialists."[89]

In this way, the comparison that Reding carries out between selected statements and positions of Marx and of moderate realism leads to the result that one "can find the empirical and realistic tendencies of Marxian materialism ... with certain adjustments ... in Aristotle and in Thomas, even though the latter was a Christian thinker".[90]

C. The Position of Hommes

Jakob Hommes (1898-1966) was professor of philosophy at the Regensburg School for Philosophy and Theology, and provided interpretations of Soviet-Russian philosophy that were strongly influenced by his identification of Marxian thought with Hegelianism. He is open, however - both in his *Der technische Eros*[91] and *Krise der Freiheit*[92] - to the criticism that he presents both systems, Marxian and

Hegelian, as basically anthropological and existential basic ontologies of a Heideggerian bent. Soviet-Russian 'dialecticians' come out against this enterprise with good reason.[93] To quote Hommes' own pithy expression: "Marx sees two basic ideas in Hegel forming the essence of the dialectical method: the account of work as self-production of man, and the observation that man alienates himself and needs to find a way back to harmony with himself."[94] These theories are "clearly not economic but philosophic"[95], as is the praxis that in social revolution leads to "restoration of full humanity"[96] - a restoration that "for Marx - as the *Theses on Feuerbach*, among other works, show - counts when he tries to introduce social critique as the path to salvation".[97]

We find a contrasting view from Professor Vasilij Sergeevič Molodcov (1900-1985) - member of the Department of Dialectical Materialism of the Moscow State University (its head in 1960), and Dean of the Department of Philosophy at the time of Reding's visit - who in speaking on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the University (May 11-12, 1955) said:

> Not long ago, one began to hold in philosophy an idealist notion as to its object. Teachers were defining it in a spirit of Hegelianism and reducing the object of dialectical materialism to a theory of thinking.[98]

Molodcov used his polemical remarks - as happened in all the articles celebrating the 125th aniversary of Hegel's death (1956)[99] - to correct the "humanistic" tendency promoted by Stalin to understand man as the *esse movens motum* of dialectical triadicity - productive force, labor, value, *i.e.*, as 'essence' of the Hegelian process of reflection. This effort was brought, by substitution of labor for productive force, close to the logical self-movement that Hegel introduces in his *Encyclopedia* as being or immediacy which, through negation of itself, is mediation of itself and correlation with itself. According to this conception of socialist 'humanism', man - at least collectively, as 'species-being' - is raised above and transcends the Hegelian discouragement of simple 'being posited' as a 'being for-another' he becomes the absolute essence, the Hegelian God that can use subjectivised and anthropologized labor as its function. God's self-creation in Hegel becomes the self-production of man through labor. The idealistic ground is evidently far from the existential anthropological interpretation of the Hommesian analysis since - even for the socialist 'humanism' of late Stalinism - there can be no question of the Hommes contention that labor and not man had dethroned the Hegelian spirit from 'mediated immediacy' and, as dialectical unity of one, all and true, had arrogated to itself the ideologically directed collective power over both nature and

man.[100]

The turn to the 'force of production-production-consumption' triad restored to labor its own objective value and thereby dedialectified the self-production of species-being man to the self-satisfaction of men in the interest of new accomplishments within the developmental totality of self-moving, objectively natural necessities. Unable to miss the materialist accent of these formulae on the total priority of being, Hommes tries to explain the difference between that and his own account by calling the former 'gnostic'. (Such a monistic 'gnosis', with exclusive grounding in man's relationship to himself, has never existed[101]). He asserts:

> To those who hold to the requirement that man must stand to himself and maintain himself relative to the given world as an understanding and persistent subject, historical materialism replies that man must be understood here rather as an objective being.[102]

In other words, Hommes is of the opinion that, for the materialist conception of history, the being of all beings in their specificity is given primarily in and through man, *i.e.* through the purely historical attitude or self-grounding of human society. This means:

> In the form of the objective world as such, man here refuses all supra-human manifestations of human existence. In the thinking of being he distinguishes himself from the world as given, so as to intuit from the given reality as such, where he is as body, the 'soul' of the world. The being of objective beings is seen here by man only as his own being, as the being of society, in which he makes his products out of objective being, and so in objective being rediscovers his essential force of production ; he 'intuits' it.[103]

It is not difficult to see how one could prove that in this text Hommes opens himself up to the accusation of inconsistency. If everything that has been hitherto said about nature, labor and man is to retain its meaning, then one must give up the "historical self-belongingness of man". For

> what drives Marx in this way (*i.e.* the dialectical method) beyond Hegel and into complete atheism is the knowledge that the reduction of human life to a God-man subject precisely destroys the sense of that dialectical turn in the relationship of man to the objective world. For, in Hegel man does not ground his life in himself, if the dialectical method is to be maintained; rather man grounds himself in the absolute that appears to him. As this absolute, man directs

> his own essence - that, according to Hegel, he perceives in the object as its ground and core - beyond his own life.[104]

Whence it is not so much man that lives nor does he live himself; rather what lives is "what appears in him only as his 'means', the absolute"[105], which means the "abstract of himself".[106]

In December of 1957, L.N. Pažitnov launched a full attack on the Hommes theme of the 'gnostic myth' of the 'self-belongingness of man', in a work on the Hegelian categories of 'alienation' (*Entfremdung*), 'objectivity' (*Gegenständlichkeit*) and 'thingness' (*Dinghaftigkeit*), using the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts*(1844) of Marx. Pažitnov's willingness to enter into a discussion of the early Marx - *i.e.* the portion of his thought that Hommes sees as decisive because Marx was not doing economic theory but philosophy, even though most of his life's work was devoted to economic and social theory[107] - was in itself remarkable. It is then very probably a contribution of Hommes - along with some prominent representatives of social-philosophical 'humanism' in Poland (Zygmunt Bauman, Helena Eilstein, Leszek Kołakowski, Jerzy Szacki, Jerzy Wiatr, and others) - to have drawn the Soviet-Russian philosophers into a first examination of their attitude toward the early works of Marx. As Pažitnov showed, the attempt of Hommes to use the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* in order to take his *Technical Eros* as presenting "the dialectical essence of labor ... *only* as an unfolding of the objectivity of man"[108] was in fact - as was to be expected - a failed effort. His conclusion reads as follows:

> In the process of elaborating the category of 'alienated labor', Marx comes to the firm conviction that Hegel's understanding of the object *exclusively as objectified subject* is *completely insufficient.* The process of objectification of labor is simultaneously its alienation. Hegel 'solves' this difficulty in a very simple way: completely in accord with his idealist point of departure, he identifies objectification in general with alienation.
>
> Marx cannot accept such a solution. For him this state of affairs is the proof that the essence of the object *does not* coincide with the objectified subject, but has its own content ... . Already (in 1844) Marx has clearly seen that for a materialist viewpoint it is impossible to explain this content solely and exclusively through the prior activity that is fixed in the object and that mediates each successive act of objectification. In other words, the materialist analysis of alienated labor as a *special* historically concrete form of relationship between subject and object draws Marx on to a study of the internal dialectic of the movement of the object itself; *i.e.* its

> aspects and relations that lie outside the realm of what shows itself in the process of the immediate, practical objectification of the activity of the subject and of what determines the peculiar character of the process itself.
>
> In the course of this work (the *1844 Manuscripts* are meant) Marx comes upon - *in the object of political economy* - the trail of the actual and objective *sphere of the launching of alienation*, where the essential decision about the subject-object problem is made. And so, he introduces into philosophy the *viewpoint of the material productive praxis of social-historical man.* Not consciousness but being, *not logic but political economy* - here lies, from the very outset, the central opposition between the Marxian understanding of this question and that of Hegel.[109]

Pažitnov's evaluative position was complemented a little later by Varlam V. Kešelava's 'Marx' Critique of the Hegelian Method of Speculative Construction in the Years 1844-1845', which also takes issue with the so-called 'irrationalists': Merleau-Ponty, Kojève, Hyppolite and Hommes. We read there:

> The irrationalists[110] do not understand the *esoteric* sense of the Hegelian dialectic - its central point, the idea of 'alienation' - or they do not want to understand it. They understand the Hegelian overpowering and supersession of 'objectivity' and 'thingness' *not as an epistemological procedure* that is strictly limited to the theory of knowledge; rather, they see this overpowering and supersession as a real elimination of objectivity. In other words, actuality, objective reality, is first taken as a product of the alienation of consciousness, but then it is robbed of this deceptive reality so that it loses even this appearance of autonomy.[111]

Relative to the criteria established by Wetter, it is immediately clear that friend and foe feel obliged to take position; and there seem to be two major alternatives: the first is 'Marx or Hegel?' and the other is 'analectic or dialectic?'

D. Marx or Hegel?

The above discussion brings clearly to mind the central problem of Marxist-Leninist philosophy that has resulted from the tension between a strictly ontological or strictly economic interpretation of Marx, dating from the controversy between the mechanists and Deborinite dialecticians. In turn, the dispute turns on the differences between the

Marx of the *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) and the Marx of *Capital* (1867), between a strictly materialist Marxism and a strictly idealist Hegelianism.[112] The resulting deformation of the real problem comes clearly into view as soon as one considers that the materialist - what Reding insists is realist and intellectualist - approach of Marxian thought moves into a utopian spiritualism or 'inverts'. Hommes, of course, goes even further in this direction with his existential or anthropological deification of the act. And one cannot but recall that, for example, Franz von Baader (1765-1841) quite rightly saw in Hegel's account of matter as externalisation of spirit (God) a materialism.[113]

As complex and polyvalent as Marx' view of the world was, for Soviet-Russian philosophy his materialist (realist) economic totalisation serves as irrefutable axiom, and the resulting self-understanding that came to light - without reference to its historical validity - served to underpin every analysis of its development as a doctrine. This state of affairs serves to exclude the reflective interpretation of Hommes who - as distinct from Merleau-Ponty, Hyppolite and Kojève - saw in the distinction between the 'philosophic' conception of the young Marx and the 'economic' dialectic of reality of *Capital* less a flagrant contradiction than a practical application of the theory.[114] This also calls into question Bocheński's too apodictic assertion that "Communism is essentially Hegelianism". This would have meant accepting the basic view of dialectical materialism even about ontological processes - *i.e.* processes in the world of being - as just as questionable or less so than the positing and superseding processes in the world of thought[115], in accord with the essence of the method of reflection. Even if Bocheński does not enter fully into this line of interpretation, one still has to note that a mainly or exclusively Hegelian interpretation of Soviet-Russian philosophy could not be squared with the Leninist stance which, it must be admitted, did open violence to this philosophy - a violence that could not be avoided.

Nor can it be objected that the tension between the metaphysical materialism, on the one hand, and the ontological synthesis that is tainted with spiritualism, on the other, is always threatening to spring loose from the binding links and to destroy the unity by reasserting their respective freedoms. For, the decision as to the possibility or impossibility of such an outcome depends in the end on the view that efforts of this sort are subject in dialectical materialism to a renunciation of the one-sided negation and to acceptance of transcendence (in the sense of *creatio ex nihilo* and *motor immobilis*), as well as to derivation of the single quality (in the sense of atomistic materialism) - all of which will work and can be logically espoused only on the assumption of the common and simultaneous evolution of both elements of the system.

In Lenin's 'Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy'

(1909) - by which he means empirio-criticism - matter is identified with the most diverse entities: things, bodies, objects[116]; the world of sense; objective reality[117]; the physical, external world[118]; objectively real being[119]; and, finally, nature.[120] In Lenin's eyes, only one thing remained unchangeable - the reflection in human consciousness, independent of human consciousness, of an existing and self-developing external world. Knowledge of objects and knowledge of this external world is knowledge of nature. This nature is infinite and exists as such. It is this strictly categorical and unconditional recognition of the existence of infinite nature outside of human consciousness and outside of human sensation that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativistic agnosticism, as well as from idealism.[121] Accordingly, there were for Lenin (as for Engels) two basic trends in the solving of philosophic problems:

> Whether one recognizes primacy to nature, to matter, to the physical, to the external world, and sees consciousness, spirit, sensation, the psychic, etc. as secondary - that is the basic question which, now as before, divides philosophers into two large camps.[122]

(Lenin had put before the *epistemological* condition, in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, the *ontological* condition that for philosophic materialism there was only the requirement: that one recognize that matter has the property of being objective reality; and that means it is existing outside of our consciousness.[123])

It cannot be denied, however, that the infinite existence of matter as nature is a metaphysical notion, and consideration of its structure is a matter of metaphysics. For, metaphysics emerges precisely as questioning about the structure, sense and ground of the real: or, wherein consists the manifoldness of the actual; or, what is the being of beings; and, why is there something - as Schelling wondered - rather than nothing?[124]

As Heidegger has shown, all research that searches for being never finds being but encounters only beings; so, "Metaphysics is the pushing of the question about being, to grasp it as such and make it available to the understanding."[125] In other words, "The truly metaphysical question" is that "about the being of beings."[126] It looks into the depths of reality (θεωρειν), towards the ultimate ground of the innermost real possibility of ideal objects, without which there could be no diversity and no formal possibility of distinct empirical objects, and the truths that go along with them. By ideal objects are meant the contents of general ontology - like the so-called *transcendentals* (*e.g.*, the one, the true, the good), the *categories* of finite being (substance

and accident), the *ontological laws* of all beings, and the *general metaphysical structures* of ideal objects (*e.g.*, the being of being, the unity of the one, etc.), as well as the causal and other principles.[127]

Engels explained in *Anti-Dühring* (1877-1878): "When we speak of being and only of being, then unity can only consist in the fact that all objects involved are, exist."[128] In other words, it is common to all things that they have being; existence applies equally to them all. In Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (1943) one finds a similar statement: "l'être est ce qu'il est"[129], being is what is. This shows the lack of perspicacity of Engels' assertion; for, the unity of the world does not consist in its being, since it must be before it can be one; which is why Engels goes on to assert that the real unity of the world consists "in its materiality"[130], and he cleverly adds "This is proved."[131]

What is this materiality of the world? In his *Dialectic of Nature* (1873-1886, 1925), Engels proposed that matter as such is a pure creation of the mind and an abstraction. By ignoring the qualitative differences among things, it is possible to see the latter as purely corporeally existing and to collect them all under the concept of matter. Matter as such, *i.e.*, "as distinct from the determined, existing matters", is then "nothing sense-existing", but just a mere abstraction. This *epistemological* assertion that is closer to realism than to materialism comes into conflict with an *ontologically* clever assertion of Engels: namely, from the contemporary perspective, the opposition between efficient cause and final cause "is finally ended, since we know ... from experience that matter, and also motion as its mode of existence, is uncreated and is also its own final cause".[132]

We should note that both of Engels' ontological assertions - from works that Marx read in manuscript[133] - relate to contents of the general theory of being and thereby to trans-experiential ideal objects. They are unmistakeably metaphysical.

In his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin essentially agrees with these views of Engels. He holds above all to the assertion on the ontological unity of the world, repeating that nature exists infinitely. This is why dialectical materialism categorically and unconditionally holds to only one principle, namely, that one recognize the existence of nature outside of consciousness and sensation.[134] The physical world as self-moving matter was for Lenin a philosophic category for designating objective reality, of which he said that it is given to men in sensations as something independent of them and is copied, photographed, and mirrored in their sensations.[135] This is why materialism was proved, for him, when one recognized the elementary particle theory of modern physics as a picture or approximate copy of objective reality.[136] Things like 'essences' of things or 'substances' had only relative value for him. Against Bogdanov (1873-1928), he

affirmed the changeable essence of things and changeable substances, as well as the possibility of substantial change. He agreed with Engels that unchangeable was only one thing - the reflection of the self-developing external world in but independent of human consciousness.[137]

All this comes close, in a certain sense, to an Aristotelian-Thomistic - or, 'analectic' in the sense of synthesizing and reproducing - account of philosophy as understanding and thinking.

Dialectical materialism's theory of being and of method is based on the otherwise unproven assumption that the essences of things (according to Marx, Engels, Lenin and Soviet-Russian philosophy this is infinitely existing nature as matter) are necessarily preformed and potential to forms of motion, even those as yet undiscovered. Pavel Kopnin (1922-1971) called this the idea as a conceptual system relating to an external world that is independent of consciousness (a *universale reflexum* that is an *ens rationis cum fundamento in re*). Kopnin's explanations are of definite value in that they present an authentic interpretation of Lenin's notes and excerpts. Lenin is seen as "... in general providing a materialistic reading of Hegel - which means ... leaving God, the absolute and pure ideas mainly to the side.."[139] This is also to be seen in the light of Lenin's view of Hegel as "materialism standing on its head"[140], and of Engels' reading of Feuerbach (1886-1888), where "finally the Hegelian system is a materialism that is idealist in method and content "[141] and Hegel's conceptual dialectic is to be taken "off its head where it is standing, and put back on its feet".[142]

Nikolaj Vladislavovič Vol'skij (Valentinov), in a humorous book on his *Meetings with Lenin*[143], found it worthwhile to bring together the *abracadabra* of Lenin's marginal notes on Hegel's *Science of Logic*. Among the "reviews and notes that he (Lenin) noted while reading Hegel", Valentinov sees the following assessments as worth noting: "On page 104[144], 'nonsense' (and 'idiocy about the absolute')[145]; on page 108, 'extremely foggy presentation'; on page 113, 'why for-itself is one is not clear to me. Hegel is here, in my view, ultra-obscure'; on the same page, 'obscure is the meaning'; on page 114, 'that gives the impression of a great distortion and emptiness!'; on page 116, 'the transition from quantity to quality (which is precisely the main point, for Valentinov) .. (is) of such obscurity that one understands nothing'; on page 117, 'this is all unintelligible', 'ultra-obscure'; on page 133, 'very obscure'."[146]

In view of this sort of Leninist critique of Hegel, Valentinov thinks it worth asking "what remains after crossing all that out".[147] "Even if one arrives at something that remains, are we sure Lenin even understood it?"[148] Pushing the matter a bit, Valentinov refers to Lenin's remark about "a thousand such places in Hegel" that Charles

Pearson (1857-1936) had justifiably scratched as nonsense. "To teach that is senseless", since "nine tenths ... is husk and shell".[149] "Nine tenths", continues Valentinov, "is not longer a fragment, but almost the whole thing."[150] There are also samples of marginal notes from the *Philosophic Notebooks* [150] - like 'nonsense', 'ha-ha', 'compact idiocy', 'weird things in Hegel', 'tasteless..., disgusting, smelly', etc.[152]

Despite all this useless commentary, there are some passages by Lenin relevant to the third book of Hegel's *Logic*, that can help us understand what is at issue here. They identify "idea = nature itself"[153] and " = unity of the concept and reality"[154], equal to the knowledge of man[155], or to truth.[156] Relative to the first principle of philosophic materialism, however - according to which the being of nature is material, objectively real and independent of consciousness - when faced with the choice among different definitions of object and subject, one has to give preference to the formulation that says "the dialectic ... is not in the understanding of man, but in the idea, *i.e.* in objective reality".[157] In other words, "The dialectic of things creates (*sozdaet*) the dialectic of ideas and not vice versa."[158] "Hegel ... wrongly put the dialectic of things (appearances, world, nature) in the dialectic of concepts."[159] In short, for Lenin the "dialectic of the idea = the dialectic of nature itself".[160]

To the difference between the younger and older Marx - *i.e.* between the philosophical and political-economic understanding of the 'alienation' of the species-being of man and its supersession, or between the voluntarism of class conflict and the determinism of social-economic development and the sequence of modes of production, Lenin adds the difference between the Aristotelian-Thomistic analectic of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and the Hegelian interpretation of the ontological and social coming-to-be of the dialectic of nature in the *Philosophical Notebooks*. This obvious differentiation that appears in the *Philosophical Encyclopedia* in the form of the "identity of the oppositions that appear between concepts"[161] has always been the occasion of intense discussions between the defenders of formal logic, on the one hand, and the partisans of a dialectical ontology of identity, on the other - between Mark Mitin (b. 1901) and Abram Deborin (1881-1963); between Nikolaj Kondakov and Mark Rozental' (1906-1975); between Konstantin Bakradze (1898-1970) and Savle Cereteli (1907-1966); between Savva Pavlovič Dudel' (b. 1910) and Viktor Vladimirovič Borodkin.[162] This same differentiation, however, also served to create a mystification that Assen Ignatow calls "encryption" or "conceptual magic".[163]

E. Analectic or Dialectic?

The conflict about the general validity and authority of formal logic - which lasted with some small interruptions from 1948 to the beginning of the 1960s and is reported on by Wetter from the ontological aspect of the materialist dialectic[164], the correlation of thought and being[165], the question of theory of knowledge[166], and in a final chapter on logic[167] - had made it clear to many Soviet philosophers that the spiritualist dialectic of Hegel was inhospitable to a materialist/realist ontology, and therefore useless.

The perceptibly realistic school of Tiflis, at the high point in the discussion about formal logic of Konstantin Bakradze (Tiflis, 1951) and Nikolaj Kondakov (Moscow, 1954)[168], brought out in Georgian a standard text on *Questions of Dialectical Materialism*, with quality contributions by Bakradze, S.B. Cereteli, P.G. Gudzabidze, B.I. Lutidze and D.M. Keburija.[169] This collective work tried to maintain a balance between formal logic and materialist dialectic, while developing a category system that leaned heavily on Aristotle. It also wanted to see the "identity of oppositions between concepts" in the only senseful way, *i.e.* as grounded in the category of relation, and pushed any kind of method of reflection *ad absurdum*. This book restored to form the rank of essential structure, as was then also the case in the category theories of Vasilij Tugarinov (1898-1978) and in those of Mark Rozental' and Grigorij Straks (b. 1909).[170] The book even explains that "praxis as criterion of truth validates and confirms true thought, but does not give to it its character of truth".[171]

In short, that realist version which also characterized the previously mentioned article by Keselava on "alienated self-consciousness", was coming closer in long strides to a critique like that used by Bernhard Lakebrink in his fundamental attempt at a comparative illumination of the Hegelian and Aquinatic modes of thought.[173] Lakebrink decisively asserted in 1955: "It is the basic error of the dialectician that he unwittingly turns the negations and abstractions of our understanding into something *as such*, *i.e.* an *ens naturae*, and thereby turns the *modus intelligendi* into the *modus essendi*."[174] "Spirit's being has the power to allow nothing to be and to have contradictions simultaneously before it, so as to grasp the objectively opposed in one view and one knowledge (*una scientia*)."[175] However, "All these relations through which being is related to nothing and nothing to itself as nothing are simply *relationes in ratione tantum*.[176] To transfer them to being as something belonging essentially thereto would be ... false."[177]

Over against such a dialectical-sophistic method that is always positing the contradictory but establishing only the contrary, analectic thought is fully justified in recalling two ontological states of affairs:

1. *Non est contradictio simpliciter vel absolute, sed contradictio participata in contrariis.*[178]
2. *In contradictoriis vero absolute non sunt extrema realiter diversa, quia non ens non est aliqua res, sunt tamen extrema contradictoria semper realiter non eadem.*[179]

Toward the middle of the 1950s, the representatives of formal logic in the Soviet Union were quite far from denying these ontological assertions or refusing the insights they contain. In the Georgian text we mentioned above, Cereteli studied "thoroughly Lenin's assertion on the absolute character of the (conflict of) contradictions and the relativity of their unity". He stressed "that Lenin understood in this assertion not at all the contradiction of the same aspects as absolutely opposed, while the unity was only provisional agreement".[180] This can only mean, in the view of Lakebrink, that in the instant "when both aspects are negations", this is when "according to dialectical doctrine, the contradition appears in all its acuity". "At the same time, it reveals itself as that which is primary - as identity. Precisely as negation, the two sides are one and the same."[181] Analectically, however, the *duplex negatio* is no contradiction, but only a *modus loquendi*. "*Ens enim non ponit suum oppositum, scilicet non ens.*"[182]

These same insights were fundamental to Keševelava's considerations in *Voprosy filosofii*:

> While Hegel strides along the path that knowledge follows in forming elementary abstractions, and ignores the specific character of the progress of thought in empirical material, he finally cuts himself off from access to knowledge of objective reality, and locks himself into the sphere of pure thought. As a consequence, he falls victim to the illusion that conceptual totality and concreteness are the result of the self-developing concept. In reality, however, totality and concreteness are 'in no way the product of the concept that thinks and develops itself outside of sense intuition and representation'; rather it is the elaboration of intuition and representation in the concept.[183]
>
> The exclusion of intuition and representation out of the process of knowledge leads to loss of the real link with the object, and to disappearance of reality. This results, in the end, in the mystification of the real state of affairs: the logical world turns out to be the base of the objective world; conceptual concreteness, dialectical reflection and spiritual reproduction of the really concrete, are presented as the really concrete and the theoretical method of the ascent from abstract to concrete becomes the process

> of the generation of this reality. Since Hegel has the previous development of science and philosophy before his eyes, he presents things in such a way that the available concrete, empirical reality appears to be constructed from the mere concept.[184]

A few months earlier, Pažitnov (in the work mentioned above) had discovered the real weakness of the Hegel position - it remains in the domain of pure thought. He goes on in the same work:

> In the end, it turns out that the real opposition of man to the world of his objectified labor appears in Hegel's thought as an opposition within spirit - between 'self-consciousness' and 'objectivity' as its alienation. What is more, since in Hegel the 'objectivity' itself appears 'as self-consciousness' and as a product that contains nothing 'objective' in itself, the opposition of consciousness to object is extraordinarily formalised and appears, as Marx writes, "as the opposition between the in-itself and for-itself, between consciousness and self-consciousness, between the object and the subject, *i.e.* as opposition between sensuous reality or real sensation and abstract thought within thought itself"[185].[186]

F. The Alternative

In all the disputes on early Marxism - *i.e.* a left-Hegelian, dialectical version of dialectical materialism - there was a remarkable avoidance of any contact with the concept of nothing that inhabits the method of reflection. This concept does not appear either in the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* or in the fourth edition of the *Short Philosophic Dictionary* by Rozental' and Judin.[187] More recently, Vasilij Rožin (b.1908) has begun to talk about the source of dialectical development, using the ideas of "being" and "nothing", without, of course, any reference to Hegel's doctrine of essence.[188] This conduct follows a very simple logic. The ontological problem of the unity of materialism and absolute motion put the Soviet-Russian philosophers of the 1950s in the presence of an unavoidable choice:

> *either* they affirmed Hegel's method of reflection, including the concept of nothing; but, only by giving up materialism could the absoluteness of movement be explained. The metaphysical outcome of this position was and remains an implicit change of materialist ontology to the dialectical logic of the Hegelian theory of categories, and a crypto-essentialization of matter to the concept of "mediated immediacy" in the "movement of nothing to nothing, of

the negation that coheres with itself"[189], in so far as the terminology will still have any sense.

or the Soviet-Russian philosophy defended a materialist realism with extensive approximation to Aristotle, whence follows the impossibility of explaining absolute motion. One should not forget that the peculiarity of Aristotelian philosophy consists in the fact that it is not a philosophy of being but a philosophy of beings. This is why its act and potency serve to explain the changes of the 'what' as limited to the realm of corporeal being. This is why the absoluteness of the dialectical movement of Hegel must inevitably disappear into Aristotelian particularity, and will undergo the criticism of Thomism, especially in so far as the question of the being of beings is not asked by Aristotle and remains unanswered.

Only the changes within beings were problematic and became object of philosophic questioning. The being of prime matter, on the other hand, was taken for granted and even as necessary. Alongside the eternal "God" of Aristotle (ὁ θεος), as the primary and unmoved mover, there was the eternal, uncreated, but in movement, matter that - at least as moved - depends completely on him.[190]

The acceptance of the second member of this alternative involves not only the renunciation of a solution to the problem of motion, but also a loss of the integrative function of the whole dialectical method, since the latter requires the recognition of the principle of identity. This will make it impossible for Soviet-Russian philosophy to maintain the dogma of the primacy of matter and of the total dependency of thought on matter. The basis for this inability is that Hegel defines identity as a negative relationship to itself. Whence follows the necessity of proving not just the monism of the whole philosophic system, but also that of substance itself.

G. The Problem of the Monism of Origin and of Substance

Along with Marx, Engels came to the view that the Hegelian system was an inverted materialism with an idealist method and content.[191] The complete erroneousness and deviancy of such a view - that is based on a misunderstanding of the absolute idea of Hegel and of his principle of identity - was decisively demonstrated by G.A. Wetter in his *Die Umkehrung Hegels - Grundzüge und Ursprünge der Sowjetphilosophie* (Cologne, 1963). As he showed, Hegel's monism is not just a monism of the origin, but also a monism of substance. Nature is not only a product of the absolute idea; it is this absolute idea itself, even if in its

other-being. For a materialist transformation of Hegel, it is not enough to see idea and spirit as products of matter. For, this would be nothing but a simple monism of origin. To accomplish a real turn-around of Hegel, one would have to identify completely idea and spirit with nature and matter; the principle of identity would have to be invoked to make them essentially one. Only this would be a materialist monism of substance, too.[192]

Such a monism of substance is unrealizable since the sensual, and immediate being, and things in their changes, are precisely not conditioned by themselves but by something other.[193] According to Hegel, sense is different from thought in that the former deals with the particular while the latter involves the universal. But, the particular finds itself in a context. As a result, the sense particular can, as a particular, only be an outside-another, the other forms of which are the next-to-another and the after-another.[194] Identity in the Hegelian sense - as negative relationship to oneself who is distinct from itself[195] - does not apply to the sense level. In other words, when in the realm of being - the realm of the immediate, sensual, things, in Hegel's terms - something becomes other, then this particular something is gone, it disappears. "This is not the case in essence; here we find no actual other, but only differentiation - the relation of one to *its* other."[196]

H. Causality Instead of Negativity

There is in the materialist dialectic - as Wetter's 'turn-around of Hegel' makes evident - another serious error: the law of the transition from quantity to quality does not make it possible to provide a philosophic explanation of quality. The so-called theory of 'leaps' can at best describe this process. More important in this context is the fact that dialectical materialism not only does not deny the general validity of the principle of causality, but vigorously and energetically defends it, although its effort to explain the coming of the higher out of the lower through the 'leap' violates this principle. Wetter writes:

> Not just a partisan of dialectical materialism, but any advocate of a dialectical worldview will admit that the dialectic does not explain becoming ... because some sort of 'cause' makes something new come forth. A dialectical view sees the new coming to be in a basically non-causal way, *i.e.*, because every positive determination contains in itself its own negativity, whereby it goes outside itself, changes and goes into motion ... Is such a conception conceivable on a materialist basis? Definitely not. Its basic point of departure is the identity of thought and being that

> underlies the whole Hegelian philosophy but is refused by dialectical materialism. What drives this ... dialectical conception of becoming is negativity... This is, however, a process of becoming in actuality itself, and not just in thought; therefore, reality must itself contain a real negativity. For a philosophy that uses epistemological realism and for natural thought, too, this is fully impossible. To ascribe to 'nothing' - negativity as such - a reality is the same as assuming an existing non-existent. For an epistemological realism, this is absolutely impossible. ... For Hegel, the whole of reality is nothing other than an extensive process of thought of absolute spirit that is thinking itself. ... (For) Marx and Engels ..., however, reality (is) no longer essentially absolute idea or identity of thought and being, but matter. Thereby disappears, however, the very possibility of talking about a real negativity.
>
> If there is not negativity in reality any longer, then it cannot have an effect in actuality, and becoming can only be causally explained. This brings in the principle of causality, which excludes the effect containing more than is in the cause.
>
> Dialectical materialism thus no longer has the possibility of explaining the progressive evolution of the world. It only has two ways out: *either* to retreat to the position of mechanistic materialism, denying the existence of higher levels or even any higher development of matter at all; *or*, to preserve the higher development of the world as uneliminable, and have to admit the existence of a 'higher', outside the world, that would explain the upward development of the world.
>
> What actually drives development cannot, therefore, be a true contradiction for dialectical materialism (A = non-A); there can only be a 'conflict of opposites' (A = B), *i.e.*, a conflict between two positive determinations. As soon as there is no longer a non-A with its negativity as driving force but the 'conflict' between two positives, A and B, we return to a purely causal conception.[197]

An unrestricted recognition of a metaphysical principle of causality is also valid, of course, for the proof for the existence of God!

I. Aristotle

From all this one has to conclude that if Soviet philosophic thought is to develop at all, it must do so in a direction that is pre-Aristotelian-Thomist or totally outside of this sort of thought. Whatever beginnings of a true dialectification existed - urged on by the 1925 publication of

Engels' *Dialectic of Nature*[198] and even more by Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* (1929-1930) - were broken by the 1931 condemnation of the Deborinites and by the courage of the formal logicians in resisting a materialist pseudo-dialectic. There was, consequently, a gradual affirmation of a realist mode of thought and a shunting to the side of the traditional Russian dependence on intuition.

It was to be expected that the disjunctive posing of a whole series of questions around the system's immanent contradiction between thought and being - on the one hand, the principle of identity, the method of reflection and absolute motion and, on the other, epistemological realism, relativity of the finite to the infinite as *mutua similitudo* with an analectic *analogia proportionalitatis*, and motion as a *medius modus* relative to the transcendental *esse secundum quid* - would make Soviet philosophy more manageable and would also force a re-evaluation of its relationship to Aristotle. Used for this operation were above all Lenin's notes on Hegel's 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy': "Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 'Ideas' is a criticism of idealism as idealism"[199], and also the positive evaluations of Aristotle by Marx and Engels.[200] The shift in the critical attitude toward the "greatest thinker of antiquity" (Marx) and the "most universal brain among the ancient Greek philosophers" (Engels)[201] was founded on the argument that the medieval use of Aristotle was more than questionable. We read in the Soviet-Russian *History of Philosophy* in six volumes (1957-1965):

> The Scholastics tried to use Aristotle's doctrines for their theological objectives, and for the grounding and defence of Catholicism. The historical Aristotle is as far from the Scholastic Aristotle as Heaven is from earth.[202]

The Soviet-Russian philosophers created in this way a plausible cover for carrying out an undisturbed Aristotelianization, without fear of being accused of a provocation on the political level. The accusation of the Hegelianizers that this Aristotelianization amounts to a new and more subtle mechanistic revisionism[203] was pre-empted with the arguments that, according to Marx, "already Aristotle cleverly indicated the superficiality of a method that takes an abstract principle as the point of departure, but denies the self-negation of this principle in the higher forms"[204], and that Lenin described Aristotelian metaphysics as "elementary dialectic".[205] Thus, Vasilij Rožin continued to point out that in the philosophical-historical conflict between a categorial and static (metaphysical) and anti-metaphysical dynamic (dialectical) understanding of being, Aristotle belonged to the "dialectical trend".[206] He was agreeing here with Cereteli (1907-1966) who analysed the

meanings of "dialectic"[207] and came to the conclusion that the Aristotelian ontology is dialectical.[208]

J. On Scholasticism

These first clear steps toward a methodological Aristotelianization of Soviet-Russian philosophy in the middle of the 1950s led indirectly to the need to confront the hitherto systematically ignored medieval Scholasticism, especially in reference to matters of ontology, epistemology and sociology. Such a presentation was undertaken by Orest Vladimirovič Trachtenberg (1889-1959), professor of the history of foreign philosophy (since 1943) at Moscow State University and senior member (since 1939) of the Institute of Philosophy. His *Sketches in the History of Western European Medieval Philosophy*[209] (approved for publication in November 1957) is an accurate and analytic comparative study. It is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that, as the author himself points out, "we almost totally lack any complete Marxist studies on the history of medieval philosophy".[210] Trachtenberg calls his book *Sketches* because he wants to undertake a constructive "attempt to meet the need for a reference work on this subject".[211] In fact, the attempt succeeds and to a degree far exceeding the presentation in the first volume of the contemporaneous *History of Philosophy*.[212]

Trachtenberg's sketches include pre-Scholasticism and early Scholasticism by dealing with John Scotus Eriugena, Gerbert and Anselm and their extreme realism (Chapter I). Chapter II deals with Abelard and the dispute on universals. This is followed by a short presentation of Arab philosophy and its influence on European thinking (Chapter III), and of the Dominican reception of Aristotle - including attention to mystical (Amalrich) and materialist (David of Dinant) pantheism (Chapter IV), the second part of which is devoted to orthodox Scholasticism (Albert of Saxony, Thomas Aquinas) and to Meister Eckhart. Trachtenberg's account in Chapter V of Averroism takes him into the turbulent events at the Universities of Paris and Oxford. Chapter VI describes the emergence of science (Roger Bacon) and Chapter VII is devoted to nominalism (Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and the Ockhamists). A final chapter (*Vmesto zaključenija*) provides a summary and interpretation.

An understandable concentration on the science aspects can be forgiven an author who does such a good job and who shows a knowledge of the events which was exceptional for its time and place. There is also a concern on the part of the author to recognize the value of the emerging Aristotelianization and the influence of classical realism

on dialectical materialism. Aristotle's doctrine on the eternal character of matter and its motion serve admirably in this context. A similar expertise and accuracy can be found in I.M. Kičanova's 'The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas'.[213]

* * *

This is the main reason why his work on dialectical materialism and on Soviet-Russian philosophy as a whole has to be seen as the major Catholic contribution to this endeavor. The same must also be said of Wetter's tireless efforts to reveal the salvational message of this totalizing philosophy that has devoted itself to all-out war with revealed Christianity.

Wetter's quite accurate description of the inclination and tendency of Soviet-Russian philosophy toward ontological, logical and epistemological realism finds striking expression in Vasilij Zubov's *Aristotle*[215], that had been preceded by Aleksandr Achmanov's (1893-1957) posthumous *The Logical Doctrine of Aristotle*.[216] Twelve years after Zubov's book, publication began of the Russian edition of Aristotle's works, following the version of the Oxford Classical Texts and that of G. Budé.[217] The 2300th anniversary of Aristotle's death in 1978 "gave renewed impetus to study of the philosophic heritage of the great thinker".[218] The resulting works appeared in the 1980s, including: *Aristotle* by Čanyšev; *Aristotle. Life and Meaning* by Losev and Tacho-Godja; *The "Organon" of Aristotle* by Lukanin; Bočarov's *Aristotle and Traditional Logic*; and *The Ethics of Aristotle* by Gusejnov.[219]

Continuing the work of Trachtenberg (1957), Vasilij Sokolov (b. 1919) published *Medieval Philosophy,* Džochadze and Stjažkin (1932-1986) put out *Introduction to the History of Western European Medieval Philosophy*, and Bernard Bychovskij (1898-1980) produced *Siger of Brabant*.[220] Interest in this main ideological opponent had arisen already at the end of the 1960s with Viktor Garadža's *Neo-Thomism - Reason - Science*.[221] This "criticism of the Catholic view of scientifically certain knowledge" was followed in 1971 by Mark Želnov's *Critique of the Theory of Knowledge of Contemporary Neo-Thomism*, the third chapter of which dealt with the "metaphysical realism" and the "Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas".[222] Evgenij Babosov also published *The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Modernization of Catholicism*, where the author deals with the changes wrought in the religious worldview through cybernetics, physics, astronomy, genetics and anthropology, as well as through their theoretical and practical influences.[223]

According to Zubov, there are the following points of comparison

and contact for dialectical materialism:

1. The notion of continuum and of the absolute necessity of the eternal circuit of the movement of the heavenly bodies. Thus: "If the infinite has no beginning, then nothing would be the first whereby something could come to exist." and: "If a thing exists necessarily, then it is eternal; if, however, it is eternal, then it exists necessarily."[224]

2. The "physicalist" doctrine of *potential* infinity, whereby "being is connected with existing magnitudes."[225]

3. The doctrine of sense-perceptible magnitudes and forms. In some animals sensation establishes something in the soul. When this has happened a number of times, then there is a differentiation, and something of the sensations remains, a certain concept (*lógos*). From sensation thus flows memory and from oft-repeated memory of one and the same follows experience (*empeiría*), the beginning of art (*téchne*) and science - art when it is question of becoming and science when it is a matter of what is. Thus: "Art arises when from many empirical representations (*taes empeirías ennoaimáton*) a single universal view (*katholou mía hypolaepsis*) is acquired on similar objects."[226]

This all conveniently agrees with many epistemological statements of Lenin, where he says that philosophic materialism holds that the formation of concepts, the knowledge of laws and principles, and the application of axioms is based not only on the "million-fold observation"[227] of similar sensations and practical experience thereof as single facts of consciousness, but also on the "million-fold repetition"[228] of logical forms. Criticizing Hegel's *Science of Logic* in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin says:

> There is here a profound and pure materialist content ...: human practical activity had to bring the consciousness of man a million times to repetition of the same logical figures, in order for the latter to acquire the status of axioms.[229]

It is more difficult for Soviet-Russian philosophers to make reference to Aristotle when it comes to the matter of movement.[230] Aristotle's *Physics* includes the famous sentence:

> Everything that moves is moved necessarily by something else. For, if it does not contain the principle of movement within itself, it must be moved by something else.

If it is the case that a body can remain indefinitely at rest in its natural place, while movement cannot be maintained without limit, then the question has to arise for Aristotle as to which force (*dynamis*) keeps the spherical world-whole in motion. The answer comes in the form of the

principles of the impossibility of self-movement, and of the necessity of an unmoved prime mover.[232]

Such an outcome is unsatisfactory for a philosophy of radical this-sided-ness and the rationally oriented dialectical-materialist searchers for species-being are forced to look for a rationally grounded interpretation of the whole of the world in a third interpretation of matter. The two versions of matter that are held to be untenable and bankrupt by these Soviet thinkers are:

1. the metaphysical account in terms of the Aristotelian *hylē protē* and the Scholastic *materia prima* - *i.e.*, matter as pure possibility, as possible being, *ens possibile*; and
2. the physicalist version[233] which takes matter as corporeal substance or as all material beings as a whole, and the multiplicity of contingents.

Then, they add to these a third possibility which if it is not convincing is at least conceivable, and this is

3. the metaphysical account of Ibn Roshd (Averroes, 1126-1198) and his European followers, favoring the monistic substantiality of prime matter.

K. Averroes

At the beginning of the 1960s Alautdin Machmudovič Bogoutdinov (Dušanbe, Tadžikistan) and the same Orest Trachtenberg, we mentioned above, accurately presented this mode of thought in the *Philosophic Encyclopedia*.[234] Attributed to Averroes' *Tahâfut al-tahâfut* (Refutation of the Refutation) are the following views: contrary to the religious view about the creation of the world, the original *materia prima* could neither come to be through *creatio* nor disappear through *annihilatio*. God's being does not pre-exist the existence of prime matter. The sole function of God is to actualize the potentiality that matter contains. Motion is as eternal and permanent as the original matter. The material world has no limits in time, but is limited in space. Time exists and is measurable only on the basis of motion. Motion - emerging, changing, ceasing - is contained potentially in matter. Necessity rules nature. Even God, as "prime mover" and heart of the cosmic organism, acts with necessity.

Trachtenberg's Averroes article in the *Philosophic Encyclopedia* summarizes two chapters (III and V) of his *Sketches in the History of Western European Medieval Philosophy*[235], where he handles both Latin and Arab Averroism with singular mastery.[236] This is particularly the case for ontology, anthropology and theory of knowledge.

In ontology, Averroes opposes to the theory of creation a theory of

development. His *Large Commentary to the 12th Book of the "Metaphysics"* of Aristotle contains the view that the so-called 'creation' can only be a form of motion that is based in *prime matter* as in both substratum and subject(!). According to Averroes,

> the primary, unformed matter contains potential forms as 'seeds'. *Forms are therefore not extrinsic to but immanent in matter.* If the forms were to come to matter from the outside, this would be a sort of *creatio ex nihilo*. The forms are as eternal and uncreated as is matter. God creates neither matter nor form. The task of the "prime mover" is to convert possible forms into actual forms, *i.e.*, to develop the seeds contained in matter... *Prime matter is universal potency, that hides the seeds of the forms*; the prime mover does nothing but turn potency into act.[237]

The assertion that matter and form are eternal renders, as Trachtenberg correctly notes, "the recognition of a creator of the world superfluous". This Soviet historian of philosophy goes on to say that

> Averroes distinguishes between an abstract 'productive' nature (*natura naturans*) and an empirical 'produced' nature (*natura naturata*). This division was earlier found in John Scotus Eriugena (c.810-877) and later picked up by Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) but above all by Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677).[238]

Hegel, too, basically held to the view of Averroes that the form does not come to matter from the outside but carries as totality - *i.e.* as the free and infinite form of the *concept* - the principle of matter in itself. Following this assertion in the logic volume of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophic Sciences*, Hegel adds

> ... matter, which should be *positive and unconditional,* contains *as existence*, both the reflection-in-another and being-in-itself; as *unity* of these determinations it is *itself the totality of the form.* However, the form already contains as totality of the determinations the reflection-in-itself, or *as self-referential* form it has what is involved in the determination of *matter. Both are the same* in themselves. This their unity is *posited* as the *relation* of matter and form, which are still distinguished.[239]

Both doctrines on God thus arrive at the same result, namely that the absolute is "self-thinking thought, the ideal final cause".[240] They differ only in that that of Averroes does not use the negative self-relatedness.

1250 saw the publication of a reasonably complete collection of the

works of Averroes in Latin translation. This availability occasioned the 13th-century discussion that Trachtenberg describes in his chapter on Averroism in the West and on Siger of Brabant (1235-1281).[241] After the first rejection of Averroism in 1240, Etienne Tempier (1210-1279), Chancellor of the University of Paris (and since 1268 Bishop of Paris), condemned (in 1277) 219 Averroistic theses in the works of Siger of Brabant. These revolve around five central issues:

- denial of Divine Providence (irrelevance of the question of a transcendent aspect to being);
- assertion of the eternity of the world (divine being as *form* and prime mover, *natura naturans*, and *matter* as moved world, *natura naturata*);
- affirmation of the numerical unity of human understanding (a panpsychism of human species understanding);
- double truth theory (where the scientific and *natural* religion of reason is higher than *revealed* religion);
- denial of free will (on the basis of the timeless necessity of all being and phenomena).

This philosophic position that Siger of Brabant professed during his tenure at the Sorbonne (1266-1277) was influential not only in France but also in Renaissance Italy; so much so that Pope Leo X was obliged to condemn it again in 1513. Nevertheless, the Latin Averroism of Siger of Brabant remained influential into the 17th century not only at the School of Padua (cf. Agostino Nifo and Cesare Cremonini) but also throughout Europe, thanks to people like Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and Jakob Böhme (1575-1624).

L. Panphysism

The metaphysical ontology of Averroes, with its panhyleism of the unity, internal structuring, and eternal self-movement of *matter*, had been preceded by the panmorphéism of the Amalricans and the panphysism of David of Dinant. These thinkers assumed that *hyle* (ordinary matter) was the sole substance of bodies and that *morphé* (*nous, ratio, mens*) was the *sole* substance of souls. Since, however, God is *the most universal being* and as such is the substance *of all things*, in the end, matter, spirit and God are identical and the world can only be seen as its own self-actualization in various forms. One thus ends up with the following synthesis and opposition:

Panhyleism as
monistic materialism

Siger of Brabant

Omnia sunt modi generalissimae essentiae divinae in materia prima et forma possibili consistentis. Sequitur, nihil existere sine materia.

Panmorpheism as
mystical pantheism

Amalrich of Bena

Omnia sunt Deus. Sequitur, creatorem et creaturam idem esse - sicut ens unum transcendens in re, quod nec est Deus nec creatura.

Panphysism as
materialist pantheism

David of Dinant

Omnia sunt natura (physis) Sequitur, materiam et spiritum et Deum idem esse.

This is also the true essence of the metaphysical ontology - that of the "principles of true humanity" - that underlay the Communist ethics of Jakov Abramovic Mil'ner-Irinin. The thoroughly Averroist views of this extraordinary book were seemingly approved by the 1963 permission of the Academy of Sciences for publication of the book. In the same year, the same Academy approved publication of Vasilij Zubov's *Aristotle*, the third chapter of which deals extensively with Arab Aristotelianism and with Averroism. In public discussions that took place in February and June of 1968, however, the views of Mil'ner-Irinin were condemned as unscientific and as "contradicting the basic principles of Marxism and of scientific atheism". The author had pursued an understanding of nature as follows:

> The eternal creative power of nature that flows from its essence as *causa sui* can express itself only in a constant and endless self-renewal. This excludes its reproducing of itself as absolute, eternal, simple, indivisible, changeless and one (for, there would be no innovation but just a circular motion). It can only express itself by reproducing itself in what is conditioned, finite, contingent (and temporal), complex, divisible, changing and diverse - in a word, in what is accidentally necessary, in the non-completable and strictly regulated process of the formation of limited and contingent existences in an indefinite series in time.[242]

Bringing together all our observations on the Soviet accounts of Aristotle, the following picture emerges: the philosophy of Hegel and its 'conversion' by dialectical materialism rests basically, on the one hand, on the panmorpheistic and spirit-conditioned Arab Averroism and, on the other, on the matter-conditioned Latin Averroism: we have its interpretations by Amalrich of Bena (Hegel), and by Siger of Brabant (Marx and Engels). A clearly metaphysical, *i.e.* extra-empirical, notion of nature - totally foreign to Soviet philosophy - appears in Mil'ner-Irinin as the union of the two forms of interpretation, in the form of the ultimate identity of matter, spirit and God, according to the thought of David of Dinant.

Trachtenberg presents this complex of thought as follows:

> The philosophy of David of Dinant is of great interest; for it turns out to be a materialist pantheism and is clearly the first materialist doctrine in the Western European Middle Ages. ... The basic ground of this philosophy is the pantheistic unity of the material, spiritual and divine principles - a unity that constitutes the melding of these three principles. But, this unity lies not in the empirical world, and not in the reason of the individual, and not in the matter of single things, but in a higher realm, where reason *as such* melds into God and "prime matter". The pantheism of David of Dinant, who is often taken as a student of Amalrich of Bena, differs from that of the latter in a serious way. The pantheism of Amalrich is spiritualistic. God as the highest and eternal form is the basis of all things. David, on the other hand, takes a decidedly materialist standpoint. For him, there ... is no difference between matter and spirit; everything is corporeal. All things, both corporeal and spiritual, are based solely on matter. Matter is the highest reality and is identical with God. David looks for his materialist pantheism not in experience, but in an argumentation that is 'dialectical' in the medieval sense of the term.[243]

What Lenin says in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909) about the word "energy" can legitimately be used in reference to the incorrect use of the word "nature", namely: "When one 'draws into' this concept both spirit and matter, then the opposition is superseded *verbally*, but the ... basic absurdity ... remains."[244]; for "If the sensible world is objective reality, then the door is closed to any other reality or quasi-reality ... Outside of this 'physical' reality there can be no other external world."[245] Therefore: "To talk as if such a notion [like 'sensible world', 'physical', meaning the 'physical' external world] is 'outdated' is ... childish nonsense, a meaningless repetition of the arguments of the popular reactionary philosophies."[246]

We read in the *Short Philosophic Dictionary* - published in 1938 by Mark Rozental' (1906-1975) and Pavel Judin (1899-1968) in the wake of the *Short Course...* - under 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism': "In the history of philosophy metaphysics has been understood as that part of philosophy that deals with phenomena which *transcend the limits of experience* (like God, soul, freedom of the will, etc.)."[247] This was, for Lenin and his spiritual heirs, the decisive postulate and criterion of materialist thought - *not to transcend the limits of experience.* His critique of empirio-criticism emphatically asserts: "All knowledge arises from experience, sensations, perceptions."[248] And the only question is whether the source of perception lies in the objective world. If one affirms this, one is a materialist. As Lenin's philosophic definition of matter shows[249], he is using a physicalist notion of the objective world.[250]

The "natural essence" of matter which Mil'ner-Irinin describes as the absolutely infinite cause of itself outside of time and space certainly cannot be the object of sense perception; and stands closer to Bogdanov's "universal substitution" or to Lunacharskij's "divinization of the highest human powers". In other words, following Averroes and his Latin interpreters, Mil'ner-Irinin epistemologically shoves into "nature" all possible forms, thus doing a "'universal substitution' of the psychic by the whole of physical nature."[251] Lenin notes that this "'substitution ... implicitly divinizes ... the 'highest human powers' since it separates the psychic (forms of thought) from man and substitutes the expanded, abstract and deadly divine 'psychic in general' (as all possible forms) for the whole of physical nature"[252], whereby the *logos* is inserted into "the irrational flow of the given".[253]

> As a matter of fact, the conceptual setting aside of matter as the 'substratum' (the first substrate, the hypokeímenon), as outside of nature, involves the implicit assumption of thought as the 'fundamental' (*i.e.* as something basic, originary, and independent of matter) element in philosophy.[254]

In short the physically oriented thought of Lenin cannot be reconciled with the ontological thought of Mil'ner-Irinin. In the sixth chapter on freedom of the latter's *Ethics*, "abstract (idealist) monism is replaced by a thoroughly scientific, natural-historical monism, the basis for which is the concept of the objective and eternally self-contradictory *essence* of nature as *causa sui*[255], that supposedly "disposes of absolute and infinite *potential* for being".[256] In his previous chapter on labor, epistemology, logic and abstraction, the author tried to show how one "in the ascension from abstract concept of the thing, where is reflected its internally contradictory, simple and necessary nature can come ... to

a concrete concept that itself cannot "persist in changelessness"[257], thus arriving at the basic category of "nature-essence", without doing metaphysics.

Unfortunately, the effort does not succeed[258], mainly because the spirituality of consciousness, *e.g.* as *intellectus agens*, and the synthesis of thought in the judgement remain unexplained. There is also no account of how the what that is attained by sense knowledge comes to be universal, or of how the abstraction reached by the *intellectus agens* is in the judgement the condition of an affirmative synthesis (*esse*) with being as the highest concept of material things (*ens*).

Of course, "no one doubts", continues Mil'ner-Irinin, "that consciousness, spirit, and thought are essential for man".[259] However, these notions simultaneously appear in his works as attributes and essential traits of nature as *causa sui*, or at least as modifications of such traits. Thus, there still is - to use his own words - "here an open question as to with which traits (material) nature can produce something, that is so (immaterially) different, and as to whether such an emergence does not appear as a *creatio ex nihilo*".[260]

In any case, whether it is "nature-essence" as basis of all beings or the essence of matter as the sole substance - one is tempted to say, as the being of beings, these are all trans-experiential and metaphysical notions and modes of expression. Mil'ner-Irinin claims to have derived them *dialectically* but does not succeed in making clear how this happened. The criticism that Mil'ner-Irinin's ideas underwent in 1968 was presented by A.D. Kosičev as if these were aberrations of an isolated individual and had no further effect on the interpretation of the basic category of matter within contemporary Soviet philosophy. Such is not the case.

The year 1982 saw the publication in Tashkent of a collective work of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Tashkent Institute of Philosophy and Law of Uzbekistan, under the title *Materialist Dialectic - Laws and Categories*.[261] A total of thirty-six authors worked under the general editorship of A.P. Šeptulin.[262] This book was the first in a series and sought to treat its subject from the viewpoint of organic systematicity.[263] It repeated with astonishing clarity and precision just the ontological views that Mil'ner-Irinin had introduced two decades earlier. A few examples should suffice.

Relative to the understanding of matter as objective reality and as the substance of beings (*priroda ... suščestvujet; bezuslovnoe priznanie ee suščestvovanija* ...) Šeptulin himself says:

> All phenomena that are observable in the world are diverse manifestations of one material nature. In this respect, even consciousness is an attribute of certain material structures - *e.g.*

> relatively stable systems of movement - that are not opposed to other properties of matter; it rather is in the same series with them. Like other attributes of material structures consciousness finds its final cause in matter, in one or another material organisation, and in the functioning and development of certain material systems. When we talk of matter as substance, then we must keep in view that its function here is not as purely objective reality, but as the universal that embraces this objective reality - it is what stays the same despite changes in material structures, changes in state, and transitions from the universal as such to the universal exemplified. The essence of matter as substance (as subsisting being) are the most universal properties and relations of material structures, the most universal conditions and forms of being (of beings), and of the universal dialectical laws. Matter as substance is not sense-perceptible. In direct perception man has to do with manifestations and with concrete properties and relations, where the universal and particular, the necessary and accidental, law and its specifications are inextricably intertwined. Substance, however, represents the internal, the necessary, the inclusive universal, the deepest essence of beings - what in all material structures is one, that organically unites them and forms them into a unitary system.[264]

Three statements in this text are worth noting:

1. The essence of matter as objective reality is *substance;*
2. this substance proves for dialectical thought to be the intrinsic, *necessary*, all-inclusive *universal*, as the *deepest essence* of being (in the *Philosophic Notebooks* of 1914-1916 Lenin noted that "knowledge of matter has to be deepened to knowledge (to the concept) of substance, in order to discover the *causes* of the phenomena"[265]);
3. this substance, however, *cannot be perceived with the senses* (in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* of 1909 Lenin categorically declared that matter as *philosophic* category for designating *objective reality* is *given to man in his sensations*[266]).

Chapter XIV asserts that form is included in content and content is included in form.[267] We read there:

> In Marxist philosophic writings we find the dominant view that the *content* plays a *determining* role relative to form, that it has the *leading* role. There are, however, authors that not only hold to this view, but who also give priority to content in its interaction with form. Such a categorial assertion is wrong to our mind. Of course

> content determines form. *But, the form also determines the content, especially through laws (necessary connection)*, that are fundamental to the development of objects; and these belong to the form.[268]

In Chapter XVIII the laws, necessary connections and properties are designated in their totality as *essence*[269], the isolation of which can be done only "through abstraction".[270] This takes "essence as the *necessary ground*, through which the whole variety of observable phenomena in their apparent chaos and contradiction can be understood and explained".[271]

In the next chapter (XIX) the *ground of essence* is made even clearer: as the "determining core" of necessary properties and connections thus appearing as what it grounds or as what is grounded by it.[272]

> The ground is the basic source of the essence and of the essential determinations of the objects. It determines, through the essence, all other aspects and relations of the object. The ground is what is most essential in the essence, *i.e.*, the totality of the necessary properties and relations, that are conditioned by the determinant essential core (the ground) and under whose influence the grounded is built. ... Thereby, the 'grounded' is that which is generated by the ground; it is the complete totality of the necessary properties and connections of the object, that are conditioned by the functioning and development of the determining core ... of the object.[273]

All of this must, of course, also be the case of the natural essence of the ontological notion of matter.

The final chapter (XXIII) opens the discussion of possibility and actuality with the notion of reality from the *Philosophic Encyclopedia* and the *Philosophic Notebooks*, that sets objective reality equivalent to all real existents.[274] Then it is claimed that the theory of *dialectic* uses the category of the actual *in a narrower, more limited meaning*, that brings out the actual as the dialectical opposite of the possible:

> Essential to an approach to the category of the real within the dialectic is consideration of its correlation with the category of the possible. ... Relative to the possible as potential, the real appears as the actual that has realized itself, as what has come to be, within which new possibilities develop. As opposites, possibility and reality emerge in dialectical unity: while they exclude each other, they presuppose each other, and one cannot be without the other. To the extent that the possible appears within the real and represents

> the future in the present, it thereby liberates its oppositional relationship to the real, and it is in this relationship that the continuity of the process of change consists.[275]

Applied to "the most profound essence of being", this means:

> Matter develops itself through actualisation of its own possibilities in such a way that it creates the requisite conditions within already existing reality. ... So, the development of matter occurs through the constant transition of possibility into reality and the emergence of all new possibilities. Every single material thing has a variety of different possibilities, which are conditioned not just by *any* form of being, structure ..., but through *all* forms, *i.e.* by all of reality.[276]

Their structural correlation is according to the following notions:

Possibility, necessity and reality for processes, where the actualization of possibility is conditioned by *contingent* properties and relations;

Possibility and *reality* for processes, where the actualization of possibility is conditioned by *necessary* properties, relations and functions.

As to what builds the foundation - possibility or reality - the *Materialist Dialectic* says:

> Reality is actualized possibility. Here, possibility determines reality that comes to be. But, reality also carries possibility within itself. Therefore, reality also determines possibility. Precisely in the case of the categories of possibility and reality it is impossible to distinguish a *foundation*. ... They reciprocally condition each other[277]

just like content and form.

For Hegel, there was *no becoming* in the *negative* elaboration of the absolute, since he sees the absolute neither as primary, unreflected immediacy nor the self-reflective determining of essence, but as absolute form and absolute identity with itself.[278] By the way, Lenin calls this "nonsense".[279] In Hegel's *positive* presentation of absolute philosophizing, knowledge has the impression that the absolute is not the primary and the immediate, but is its own result.[280] Reality has then to be taken as *reflected* absoluteness. *Being is not yet real:* it is the first immediacy; *its reflection is therefore becoming* and transition into the other.[281] This is where the philosophy of dialectical materialism takes its point of departure. The auto-causality of nature-essence, "matter", contains both possibility and reality. In other words, whereas for Hegel being as absolute is posited with absolute necessity which means mediation with itself, that is absolute negation of mediation

through another, or being which is only identical in being, and reality and possibility go back into this absolute necessity[282], for the philosophy of dialectical materialism self-actualizing being constantly must come out of a pure possibility of matter, the nature-essence.

Such a position directly violates, however, the logical principle of *ab esse ad posse valet illatio, sed non vicissim.* Even for Hegel, the effect does not contain more than the cause, although he dialectically asserts the reversibility of this axiom.[283] Against this metaphysical speculation of Hegel, Kleutgen - in his *Philosophy of Olden Times*[284] - objected that Hegel's rational thought is dialectically obliged to make out of the so-called absolute the universal of the phenomena. While this is already the repetition of an error of Latin Averroism, contemporary Soviet philosophy clearly adds the principle of monistic substantialism, pressing it to put under its self-causing "matter", which is neither perceptible by the senses nor objective and thus a metaphysical idea, the *possibility* of a move from *nature as cause* of itself to *nature as effect* of itself, *i.e.* from absolutely infinite *essence* to actual infinite *being*.[285]

Just as there are serious differences between the Marx of the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* and the Marx of *Capital,* so the same has to be said about the Lenin of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and the Lenin of the *Philosophic Notebooks.* This means that "creative further development" can mean more than one thing here. Mil'ner-Irinin's *Ethics* and the *Materialist Dialectic* (of Šeptulin *et al.*) also show that Leninist dialectical materialism has shifted in quality. It has clearly become a metaphysics with a materialist cast that resembles that of Arab Aristotelianism, well delineated and expressed by Ibn Roshd-Averroes and his Latin interpreters. Such a metaphysics strangely comes to support the two essential elements of the official Soviet ideology - atheism and collectivism - and is of some use to them because of its seemingly scholarly character. Actually, however, the argumentation of the conceptual method of this metaphysics runs into trouble. Because of the link between values and certain aporiae, ideology and science get mixed up. Acknowledgement of a generally human morality is not accessible to those who both accept and reject the possibility of some sort of God.

What is at work in the end is the realization of the untenability of an ideological thought that offends elementary formal logic and claims absolute validity for itself and its overall mysticism. There is also the consciousness that rational understanding and dialectical reason are subsidiary to the analectic logic of the heart (*i.e.*, to internal experience), represented by St. Paul, St. Augustine, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Shestov and Solzhenitsyn, *qui ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus, testimonium reddente conscientia.*[286]

M. The Ontology of Information

This account of the Soviet version of Aristotelianism and of their own materialist form of Averroism has taken us beyond the work of G.A. Wetter, to that of metaphysical ontology. This was necessary, however, because these developments have not been reported, even in James Scanlan's remarkable book, *Marxism in the USSR - A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought*[287], the second chapter of which is devoted to 'Materialism as Ontological Theory'.[288] This chapter deals with the principles and with Lenin's definition of matter[289], followed by a section on modern physics, including the theory of relativity and quantum theory.

Taking as occasion the dispute between Vladimir Orlov and Serafim Meljuchin, Scanlan goes into the question of the many properties of the concept of "matter". However, the concept of "information", that has been so important since the early 1960s, appears only in Scanlan's fourth chapter on logic and theory of knowledge, forgetting what Konstantin Morozov said about every process of reflection involving information as a property of all matter, even inorganic nature. For the opposite view - that information and reflection are tightly interwoven but the former is not a universal trait of matter - Scanlan refers to Nikolaj Ivanovič Žukov[290], not to be confused with Nikolaj Nikolaevič Žukov-Verežnikov who wrote a book on genetic information.[291] N.I. Žukov wrote *Information - The Philosophic Analysis of Information as a Central Concept of Cybernetics*[292], where he claims that there is "material information ... in any system of *organized* nature ... *e.g.* in the cell or in technical devices"[293], but "ideal information" is "social in nature" and to be understood as

> the *conceptual* aspect of the process and interaction of *free* information, that comes from the outside and is bound up with the *bound* information in the brain. Since, however, consciousness does not exist outside of thinking men, the presence of *ideal* information *is dependent on the activity of the brain.*[294]

Since, again, "in the world there are material and ideal processes and nothing more, so *semantic* information is *material* information, fully objective and reflected in consciousness".[295]

Especially because of the implications of the so-called man-machine symbiosis, Marxist-Leninist philosophy has a hard time explaining just this sort of information. It is true that Žukov grounds bound information in complex structures that "encode the whole experience of a subject"[296], but he holds "the mechanical, physical and chemical

forms of reflection" in inorganic nature[297] to be so little structured and organized - facing "the qualitatively other character of the forms of reflection in living nature"[298] - that "the presence of information and control" really comes into question only for what is living or an artifact.[299]

Such a view is questionable if only one thinks about the structure of the atom or elementary particles, or about cosmic processes, not to speak of the (three) principles of philosophic materialism, and the (two) regularities and (three) basic laws of the dialectic, on which is based the whole relational framework of the universal material substance.[300] This is why Arkadij Ursul' says in his *The Nature of Information*[301] one can find such "'prototypes of control with feedback ... in physical, geological and other processes ... even in inorganic nature".[302] Ursul"s position is clearly that:

> Since all objects of inorganic nature interact with each other, they share information with one another. ... In inorganic nature, one can detect *three sorts of movement of information*: conservation (corresponding to bound information), reception, and transmission (of so-called free information) ... Any system of inorganic nature ... participates totally in the informational process."[303]

These positions of Ursul' begin to be problematic in the context of cosmological ontology.[304] For, "in fact, information not only does not exist without reflection, it is impossible without the other attributes of matter, like motion, space, time, etc."[305] This means that there is "only a unity, correlation, and mutual penetration (of these properties of matter)".[306] In turn, this means that we have fallen into dealing with the two main principles of Marxist thought - the general movement and development of being and thought, and the unity of the world and of its properties - as well as with the highest and primary basic principle of the (materialist) dialectic - the unity and conflict of opposites. Ursul' goes on to say that reflection in inorganic nature does not mean just deconstruction of the quality of objects; there are also processes of reflection where objectivity remains preserved and that are "bound up with complexification, increased control and greater organization".[307] Universalized, this means that "the existence of a variety of reflections is conditioned by the existence of structural information, and vice versa".[308] Relative to micro- and macro-systems, this involves differing energy levels and the correlative intensity of the transfer of information. "Reflection as an aspect of interaction and a sort of causal connection involves the transposition of diversity from cause to effect."[309]

There can be little doubt that there is some similarity between these

views and Aquinas on efficient causality and change of forms.[310] This fully agrees with Wetter's assertion that dialectical materialism in its Soviet version is far closer to Scholasticism than to the Hegelian dialectic.[311] The main difference between these two views lies in their answers to the decisive question on the *origins* of structural information, which Marxist-Leninist philosophy today counts as a property or attribute of matter. Zukov, however, goes so far as to agree with Norbert Wiener that information can be neither matter - as the totality of material things in nature - nor energy. Zukov adds:

> To contradict this, as some researchers do, means to despise contemporary science and philosophy, and to fly in the face of the logic of the facts. Matter is factually not information, but properties and relations of matter can be information, when they are suitably handled by a cybernetic system (that does not have to be the human being). If the cybernetic system is the human being, however, then we have to do with information about information.[312]

Concerning the origins of structural information in matter as cosmic substance, cause and effect can help neither as auto-causality nor as an infinite series of causes and effects; for, in the first case, the cause must pre-exist itself and, in the latter case, each member of the series is just something with the quality of being cause of the next - but a series of qualities can never be the cause of something real.[313] For Soviet Marxist philosophy, either of these positions means that either there is no basis for the structural qualities, or that they are indefinitely contingent.[314] This is true even for the statistical account of quantum theory, as Ursul'notes: "The fact that in addition to dynamic reflection there is also statistical reflection contradicts the metaphysical understanding of the process of reflection that only attends to the dynamic determination of the reflection by the reflected, and denies indeterminacy."[315] Against this erroneous view, Aquinas asserts that the necessary and the contingent are differences at the level of being, and no force in nature can control them completely. The strongest of forms still must take account of the "elasticity of matter"; since there is no "first natural cause" and there is a multiplicity to nature, there have to be fully independent series of causes.[316]

In other words, there is an indefinite series of possibilities that does not present itself as an actual whole.[317] What is more, human knowledge can comprehend the whole of this conditioned reality not in direct perception but only in laws that thought devises in the form of "abstraction" from matter. From this follows that the recognizable being among the variety of single beings involves indeterminacy. Otherwise, one would have to suppose that the particular is made by the

universal. Actually, however, the universal is always drawn from or abstracted out of something else; *i.e.*, the abstracted universal always leaves something out of consideration and to this extent always appears less determined that the particular. Hence, "the individual as individual is not available to knowledge. Probabilites always supply some intelligibility ... but, to this extent, the contingent ceases to be contingent. ... Accordingly, chance or contingency as such is never conceivable because it would be something indeterminate."[318]

Equally senseless is the idea that one can find a general hypothesis for the world, that would cover every single phenomenon.[319] By comparison, the insight that "creation is in no way a change, but rather the dependence of the creature on the founding principle"[320] is a clear expression of causal dependency.[321] In short, the coming to be of the world can be the work only of an 'alpha-point' (Teilhard de Chardin) that really explains all else, whereas a mere property of reflection of original matter cannot explain this.[322] On the other hand, 'indeterminacy' cannot be created but must be seen as a condition of a closed material system.[323]

Leonid Petrušenko's work on feedback[324] found completion in his 1971 ontology, in *The Self-Movement of Matter in the Light of Cybernetics*[325], where - despite the reserves of his editors[326] - one finds a solid account of the "systematicity of the properties of matter" (first part) and of the role of increased organization and feedback. The final chapter, 'Circularity as a Form of the Self-Movement of Matter'[327], cybernetically recognizes what I said in my earlier criticism of the (three) laws of the dialectic: namely, the materialist interpretation of these laws is based, first, on the false assumption that every development is progressive development and, secondly, on a questionable "monism of quality" in its relationship to the "dialectic of evolution".[328]

Even Petrušenko sees "feedback in nature requiring an increase in entropy. Relative to the whole system of nature, both (feedback and entropy) belong to the whole and have a similar degree of generality..."[329] This "unique law" results, for Petrušenko, from an understanding of the universe as system: the structure of its self-movement is this law.[330] Here he agrees with Il'ja Novik who explained that "we can look at the limitless universe, that develops according to its own laws without divine intervention, as a gigantic control system that is its own milieu and that develops itself".[331] Petrušenko also sees "the essential and determining relation between the problem of self-movement and cybernetics passes through the notion of system"[332], meaning "that it is senseless to speak of the progress or regress of the world as a whole or as a system ... ; for, the progress of the world as a system ... consists in the non-directionality and inexhaustibility of its changes ...

of its circular development and self- modification."[333]

The encounter of Žukov and Ursul' leads us to a few critical remarks: Petrušenko's assertion that movement forward and upward "is ultimately determined by increase in entropy" is a statement of scientific fact; while his further statement that, despite entropy, the material world will continue in existence because of the structure of the self-movement of the whole, is a mere assertion - and we are back at the man-machine analogy. As concerns the circular development of the universe, Aristotle himself used the explanation by which it was clear that it did not dispense one from finding an explanation for the cause of the whole. Even though things are eternal, they have their principles and it is these that ground their being.[334] For Aristotle, however, it was a question of the ground of being not of its beginning. What is more, the endless indeterminacy is precisely an argument against the perfection of the world, indicating rather its relativity and dependence. In other words, "If God is outside of time, one cannot say that He continues to supply being to the world; rather, it is the world that depends on Him that continues. God is the reason why the world is and that it always is; but, He is not always the cause for the world to be"[335], precisely because of secondary efficient causality.[336]

N. The Spiritual Character of Information

Already in his book on the feedback principle, Petrušenko claimed that in matter as universal cosmic substance the dialectic of entropy and organized differentiation is at work.

> Consequently, matter has tendencies toward indeterminacy and toward increasing stability. ... In nature these two tendencies exist as one possibility, which comes to be when the appropriate conditions obtain. For us, only one of these (entropy) is clearly present; but this does not mean that the development of matter is one-sided and uni-directional. ... Rather, we can infer from the basic laws of the dialectic that there are objective processes in nature that run in the direction of an increase in differentiation.[337]

Just this conclusion by Petrušenko leaves in the dark the hows, whys and wherefores of "the complex system's ability to move in the direction of greater organization".[338] This leaves open only two possibilities of interpretation: the heat-death of the Universe which Petrušenko discusses[339] and rejects[340]; or the assumption of spiritual energy, along the lines of Teilhard de Chardin.[341] The latter remains foreign to Petrušenko, probably because of its intensional character and

and his connection with the man-machine analogy.

Principles of Marxist Philosophy[342] recognized in 1958 the "non-materiality of human consciousness". Five years later, G.A. Wetter revealed in a work on the "conversion" of Hegel the reasons why assertions as to the immateriality or even spiritual character of self-consciousness are incompatible with materialist monism. These are basically three:

First, to interpret consciousness or spirit as product or function of highly organized matter means not to take seriously the qualitative difference between them. The attempt to see the brain as the result of a long evolution and spirit as the product of this brain, runs up against mechanicism. The assumption of a gradual evolution leaves no room for qualitative differentiation.

Second, to have a material organ, the brain, exercise an immaterial function is close to having the ear assume the function of seeing.

Third, to take consciousness as immaterial property of matter is a *contradictio in adjecto* - for, what is immaterial matter?[343]

Beyond this question of immaterial matter, there is that of the place of the human species-being in the Universe. It turns out that the assertion of a higher sort of information above that of inorganic motion and of an even higher above that, thought, requires a law of qualitative leap that brings the Soviets to a negative relationship to the man-machine analogy.

This analogy says that one cannot exclude the subservience of man to so-called artificial intelligences; which is why Tugarinov (1898-1978) and Georg Klaus (1912-1974) were among the few to accept the possibility of such a position. Klaus does this on the basis of the third case of the Turing machine[344], where the machine can represent all states of man, but not vice versa. He says: "If ... the highest level of the human intellect is taken as point of departure for an 'intelligence multiplier', then machines are possible that provide a richer picture of the world."[345] "Humans would be limited to supplying the initial data."[346] "Information for initiating the process would come from self-analysis of human intelligence and, therefore, presupposes self-consciousness. It is precisely the existence of self-consciousness that most radically disproves radical behaviorism, that denies the existence of consciousness and replaces analysis of consciousness with analysis of behavior."[347]

This insight is based on the recognition of a foundational correlation of totality, organization, system and structure, on the one hand, and informational spiritual content, on the other. This is also the sense of Marx' statement on conscious or spiritual form, in which labor belongs to man alone. One need only recall his famous passages on the bee and the architect.[348] This means that human labor depends on the

spiritual forces of man and that is why Marx can accept Ben Franklin's definition of man as the tool-making animal.[349] The cybernetic era is not to be allowed to question this superiority of man, who supplies the initial data and is alone the κυβερνητης, the pilot of the ship.

Thus is man's supreme role in the Universe assured. But, this brings along with it a series of unpleasant consequences for Marxist atheism; for, if there is a feedback connection of all things to all things, then there must be a dynamic ordering of all informational links and this has to be immaterial in nature. If thought and society have to be explained through leaps and negated negations then these have to occur on the originary inorganic level. What is more, dialectical materialism has to assume a "leap" out of the chaos of maximal probability; and, for this it needs a spiritual principle of the whole. This line of reasoning led the Czech Marxist, Jan Kamarýt, to speak of the inevitability of a "cybernetic proof for the existence of God".[350]

John Eccles (b. 1903), who won a Nobel prize for the discovery of and research into transmission of signals over nerve cells, comes up with the same results. In the notable book he published with Karl Popper, *The Ego and its Brain*[351], we read:

> I am forced to believe that there is something that we can call the supernatural source of my uniquely self-conscious spirit or my uniqueness of soul ... This notion of supernatural creation opposes, for me, the improbability that my uniqueness is determined genetically."[352]

Short of adding a few more Soviet sources[353], we are in a position to conclude that the Soviet effort to provide a rationally strict grounding for the monism of their materialism and for the identity principle of their dialectic fails miserably in the face of modern science - especially as concerns the notion of information. This leaves all of Wetter's insights and analyses in full force.

O. Historical Materialism

In his *Ludwig Feuerbach* (1888) Engels (1820-1895) asserted that "the question on the relationship of thought to being, of spirit to nature" is "the most important question of all philosophy". Depending on the answer to this question, philosophy divides into two large camps. Those who "affirm the primacy of spirit over nature, and ultimately accept creation of some sort" form the "camp of idealism". "The others who see nature as primary" belong to the various "schools of materialism".[354]

Lenin (1870-1924) adopted this position in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* In the first part of Chapter I, where he is polemicizing against the epistemology of Ernst Mach (1838-1916), Lenin says that here it is question "of the opposition between materialism and idealism, of the difference between the two basic lines in philosophy". "Should we move from things to sensations and thoughts, or from thought and sensation to things? Engels holds to the first, or materialist, line, while Mach holds to the second, or idealist, line."[355] In the fifth section of Chapter IV, where Lenin is dealing with the empirio-monism of Bogdanov (1873-1928) he makes the point that a philosophy that teaches that physical nature is derived is pure fideism; despite Bogdanov's insistence that he refuses religion of any form. Lenin notes:

> If nature is derivative, then it is clear that it can only be derived from something else which is itself not derived .... Consequently, there would be something greater than nature that generated it. This is called, in Russian, *God.* ... The absolute idea, the universal spirit, the world-will, the 'universal substitution' of the psychic for the physical (=Bogdanov) - all are one and the same idea in different formulations.[356]

The ample article by L. Ljachoveckij and V. Tjuchtin on the 'Basic Question of Philosophy' in the *FE* contains an indication that Hegel began talk about the basic question in this sense. The *FE* quotes the latter as saying that philosophy falls into "two basic forms" according to the opposition between thought and being - "the realistic and the idealistic".[357]

This understanding of the basic question was transposed by Lenin to the materialist conception of history or - as Engels called it - the effort "to reconstruct the science of society and to bring it into accord with the materialist foundation".[358] In the fifth part of his *Granat Encyclopedia* article on Marx, Lenin says: "Materialism, as a general principle, explains consciousness through being and not vice versa; so that materialism in its application to the social life of man requires that social consciousness be explained through social being."[359] Lenin thereupon cites the classical locus from Marx[360], which - it should be noted - had already been broached in the *Communist Manifesto.*[361] The passage in question, with which Wetter's presentation of historical materialism in *Sowjetideologie heute* also begins[362], reads as follows:

> In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of

development of their material productive forces.

The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.[363] At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto.[364] From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society.[365]

Accordingly, Wetter's analysis of historical materialism begins with the *mode of production* as the basis of social life, going into the dialectical play of forces between the forces of production and the relations of production. This is used to view base and superstructure and the

economic conditioning of the five social-economic formations, finally getting into the criticism of the essential questions as to whether or not and to what extent this conception of history is materialistic, deterministic, optimistic and economistic, and what weaknesses can be found in it. The core of this chapter on the materialist conception of history can be designated through Lenin's words that the "social relations of production" form the "basic idea" of Marx' "whole system"[366], and that the "final goal" of his doctrine consists in the discovery of "the economic developmental law of modern society".[367]

The chapter that follows in Wetter's book is devoted to social and political life of humanity, dealing with the notions of class, state, law, class conflict, and parties and revolution. He there questions the notion of classes and class conflict as well as the dialectical development of socialism into Communism. The chapter on social consciousness is noteworthy for its section on the reflection of social being and on the class character of ideology, while the chapter on the various forms of social consciousness should be studied for its ideas on science and morality. The ideas that occur here can be summed up as follows:

(1) The social and political life of mankind is dealt with from the *Manifesto* with its reduction of history to class conflict[368], its assertion that the proletariat eliminates itself in eliminating class conflict[369], and the observation that oppressed and oppressor reduce each other in revolution.[370]

(2) Where there is question of social consciousness, there is reference to Engels' contention that the fight is not just theoretical and political but also practical and economic[371], and to the fact that when socialism becomes a science, it necessarily gains control over how science is done.[372] Wetter comes quickly to the point that there has been no theory of the working class; socialism is the only alternative to bourgeois theory and is the work of a socialist intelligentsia, not of workers.[373] Since there is no third - worker's - ideology, any diminishing of socialist ideology leads to firming up bourgeois ideology.[374]

(3) When the discussion turns to the various forms of social consciousness, science and morality are featured. According to Wilhelm Schulz, Marx in *Capital*, Volume 1, explaining what he means by tools (hammers, scythes, etc.) and machinery (steam engines, etc.), finds that "technology reveals the *active* attitude of man to nature in the production of his life, including his social conditions of existence and the resultant spiritual products."[376] Lenin repeats this proposition in his encyclopedia article on Marx.[377] It was at the Third All-Russian Congress of Communist Youth Organizations (October 2, 1920) that Lenin asserted that "our morality fully serves the interests of the proletarian class war ...".[379] "The class conflict goes on; it has just

changed its form ... We say that what is moral is what serves the destruction of the old exploitative order and the unity of all workers ... in the construction of the new, Communist society. Communist morality is morality that serves this fight and unifies the workers against any exploitation, against any private property, since private property puts into the hands of the individual what has been produced by the labor of the whole society."[380]

a. Critique

Against the assertion that Marx and Engels 'extended' (Lenin) dialectical materialism to the social domain, Wetter replies that historical materialism is chronologically prior to dialectical materialism. He notes: "What is today known as dialectical materialism - in the sense of the most universal developmental laws of nature and society - first came to be when Engels tried to show 'that in nature the same dialectical laws of motion are at work as in the apparently random events of history'."[381]

The notion that the self-movement of society is ultimately - meaning materialistically, deterministically and economistically - determined by the dialectical interaction of the forces and relations of production, is initially seen by Wetter as "an impressive solution".[382] But, scientific Communism successfully uses here - as in other fields - the questionable method (Wetter even calls it a trick) of transposing the confirmation of a partial statement to the verification of the whole materialist conception of history.[383] This is why 'refutation' of historical materialism "is most difficult on the basis of historical details".[384] Similarly, such invalidation through historical facts has little relevance to the notions of base and superstructure.[385] This lack of possibility of empirical refutation brings Wetter to the conclusion that "Since ... Marx' theory of history is ultimately a *philosophy* of history, it is primarily interested not in the facts of history but in the ultimate causes of the course of history; *i.e.* in the philosophic and epistemological considerations that make a judgement possible."[386]

b. Philosophic and Epistemological Considerations

Can historical materialism rightly be called a 'materialism'? To answer this Wetter begins by asserting that "production ... is through and through a spirit-conditioned phenomenon".[387] As proof, he invokes the following considerations: the forces of production are mainly tools and machines. The latter, however have to count among the products of human immaterial or spiritual activities. "Without the activity of

human consciousness, tools would not have come to be."[388] What is more, the more perfected these instruments of production become, the "greater is the influence of spirit, of scientific activity in the fields of physics, chemistry, etc. The more complex the technology, the greater the need for the most abstract of human activities, viz., mathematics ... Something similar is the case for relations of production since production is a social process that is not possible without planning, organization, direction, law, etc."[389] In short, it is "easy to see that the influence of science and law on the mode of production is a constitutive one".[390] Accordingly, Wetter's conclusion on the so-called *materialistic* "basic idea of the whole Marxist system" (Lenin) reads as follows:

> From all of this it follows that the immaterial activity of human consciousness is a constitutive element in the mode of production, and since it is penetrated with spirit, the ultimate determinant of history is not a material factor.[391]

In the social dialectic - as the interaction between man and tools that causes the self-development of the forces of production - man is decisive in many respects and from many angles. Wetter sums this up and simultaneously expresses a final judgement on the viability of Soviet Marxism-Leninism:

> This all shows that tool and man are not equal partners in the process of production; rather man - precisely as spiritual and creative - plays a predominant role in the perfecting of the forces of production. Therefore, the further development of the forces of production cannot be derived from the 'dialectical' interaction of various factors among the forces of production (men and tools), or from the interaction between forces and relations of production. It is ultimately due to the spiritual (scientific, organizational, etc.) activity of man. These considerations further show that the so-called *materialist* conception of history presupposes a primacy of spirit; it is, thus, not a historical *materialism*.[392]

c. *Science as Direct Force of Production*

In its double issue of 1939 (11-12) the journal *Bol'ševik* used a text from Marx to show that the development of the instruments of production demonstrates the degree to which the knowledge of society "including science has changed into a direct force of production".[393] This means that the real creation of social wealth "depends less on labor

time or amount than on the development of science and the technology needed to apply it".[394] The article on science in the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* adds that this process comes to expression today in the automation and computer-control of production. The transformation of natural science into direct force of production occurs through the perfection of methods of production.[395]

The 21st Party Congress (1959) followed Khrushchev in predicting that the USSR would overtake the US in some domains of production by 1965, and in per capita production by 1970. According to the *Voprosy filosofii*, "... by then, the USSR will thereby attain the ... highest standard of living in the world ..."[396], showing "the absolute superiority of the socialist world-system over the capitalist system".[397]

Faced with the failure of this prediction, the 24th Party Congress (1971) turned to promoting the less apodictic notion of the "scientific-technological revolution" (STR)[398], that was now to be the solution for providing the "material-technological basis of Communism" - a slogan that has increased since the 27th Party Congress (1986) and the reign of Andropov.

One finds the ideological kernel of this view of the world in the assertion that the transformation of science into a direct force of production - more precisely: the unique and decisive force of production - is the essential trait and the special accomplishment of the STR. Already in Marx (1863) - according to this account[399] - one reads that science has become an independent factor in capitalism's mechanical mode of production.[400] These texts pro- vide some interesting details on the relationship between machines and the talents of those who use them:

- machines will come to play a more important role in production than the effort and skill of the worker;
- the science that is actualized in machines, chemical processes, etc., appears as a force that is opposed to the laborer;
- their use - as application of science to production - is a function of the separation of the "spiritual forces" of these processes from the knowledge and talents of the individual workers;
- thereby are formed small groups of workers who are highly qualified in comparison to the 'de-cognified' (*entkenntnisten*) mass of workers;
- it is only the capitalist mode of production that learned to apply science consciously and massively, in ways unimaginable by previous epochs.[401]

By contrast, Babosov limits himself to discussing Marx' statement that "elements of science enter directly into production".[402]

Comparison of Marx' original assertions with the contemporary commentaries - *e.g.*, that of A.A. Kusin - give evidence of the lack of

substance of the latter. Kusin's *Karl Marx und Probleme der Technik* (Leipzig, 1970) takes up the difficulties that the continuing division of labor occasions for the "totally developed individual", "for whom the various social functions flow one into the other"[403]; whereby the "universal flexibility of the worker" corresponds to an "absolute availability of man for the changing needs of labor".[404]

From the viewpoint of the socialist (=proletarian) revolution - the elimination of alienated labor and of the division of labor[405] - Marx, according to Kusin, spoke of elimination of the division of labor only in the context of the worker having become an appendage of the machine.[406] On the other hand, Marx clearly held that the separation of science from the worker was a function of the absence of fully developed individuals.

Less easily 'up-dated', however, than these arguments out of experience, are the apriori arguments that flow from the ideological axioms of the Marxist-Leninist theory of society. Heinrich Stork brings this out in a masterful analysis:

> It cannot be the case that science belongs on the one hand to social being and on the other (as technology in the sense of 'spiritual force of the material process of production') to social consciousness. This bifocal answer skirts around the basic question as to which is primary, spirit or nature.[407] Science would then be both material and immaterial - an impossibility according to dialectical and historical materialism... It would also be senseless to try to assign 'scientific praxis' to (material) social being and the theories to social consciousness, precisely because the expression 'to make science into technology' means the inclusion of theory in production.[408]

One must therefore recognize that science is without question a part of social consciousness which, if it is to occupy the "central place in Communism", might well take on the role of 'religion'.[409] This would mean that science would be conditioned by production, while Marxism-Leninism claims that the development of science comes to be "the point of departure for the revolutionizing of practice".[410] Henceforth it would be necessary for science to 'overfly' (*operežala*) production, in order to make possible the further development and progress of technology.[411] Stork says:

> The overflight of science (social consciousness) over production (social being) comes up against the 'materialist' answer to the basic question of philosophy. Social consciousness here is not only relatively independent but acquires a determining influence over social being. Nevertheless, one insists that the independence of

> science remains relative; even in the 20th century its progress is 'ultimately determined through practice and the furtherance of production'.[412] The furtherance of production thus asks questions of science and thereby causes it to progress. One should agree here with Petrov[413] that it is not the questioner that is the cause of the answer.[414] It raises an issue and can be seen as a partial cause; but, for example, the question might remain without any answer at all. It is the answerer who determines whether there is an answer and of what kind. ... Concretely we may say that the furtherance of production causes the progress of science neither alone nor ultimately. The decisive cause for this progress is the scientifically thinking man who questions, experiences, hypothesizes, and empirically verifies. Production could be the ultimate cause of scientific development only if labor really caused man to come to be.[415] As we have already seen[416], this cannot work, since the furtherance of production would then play the role that it does in the idealistic conception of history.[417]

This clear posing of the dilemma is not only found in Wetter's *Soviet Ideology Today*, but also has been recently confirmed by Assen Ignatow's discussion of ideological *aporia*.[418]

Thus, difficulties appear in the Marxist-Leninist theory of society, that are analogous to those we found in the dialectical-materialist theory of being, having to do with structural information, causality and evolutionary determinism. Social theories, like "elimination of alienated labor" and "transformation of science into a direct force of production", fail because of a lack of an adequate dialectical-materialist ontology. For, on the one hand, the man-machine symbiosis is in ontological analogy to a metaphysical programmer; and, on the other hand, the universal material substance must be both earlier than and later than itself.[419] One can see how insoluble these problems are in Blauberg and Pantin's dictionary.[420]

d. Morals

In an October 20, 1986 speech, Gorbachev declared that Lenin had expressed at the beginning of the century "a colosally profound idea" - namely "the priority of universally human values over those of one class or another".[421] Evgenij Plimak goes on to interpret this thought in the sense that collective Marxist thought has since come to the conclusion that the current correct form of combat consists in how to guarantee the survival of mankind:

> It seems that this position goes far beyond mere tactical considerations.[422] The conflict of opposing social forces does not disappear in the nuclear age. We are forced to see that compromise positions need to be worked out and followed.

There is no talk of abandoning revolutionary Marxism but only of recognizing the transformation of the historical conditions for the fight.[423]

This interpretation obviously did not please a segment of the leadership and just three weeks later, on December 5, 1986, *Pravda* printed 'On the new Political Thought', under the byline of Viktor Afanas'ev, the editor-in-chief. It is claimed that although socialism will eventually succeed worldwide and this will not happen in all places at the same time, the nuclear threat is no reason for abandoning the classical class conflict position. It does mean that human conflicts now have to be approached mainly with political means, looking for dialogue in the name of peace. Such a dialogue can come to be only if everyone recognizes generally human values. This means that the CPSU while recognizing universally human values does not give up the final goal - the construction of Communism. Afanas'ev says:

> The CPSU carries on a relentless ideological fight with its class enemies. Marxists are not pacifists. They take just wars - defensive and liberation struggles - for natural and lawful.[424]

The discussion on the 'Class and Universally Human in the Nuclear Age' went on in an article with this same name by Yuri Zdanov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, also in *Pravda*.[425] Zdanov argues that since Gorbachev has called for a 'nuclear-free' world (February 1987), one should drop the talk about any (Soviet) refusal to recognize universally human norms. The author recalls that classes and class wars are notions invented by bourgeois ideologists who see classes as eternal and unavoidable. This is why these bourgeois ideologists cannot offer anyone any hope for the future.

In contrast, Marxism has augmented the doctrine on classes and class war with the knowledge that the proletariat is the class that history has chosen to bring economic antagonisms and classes to a final end:

> The proletariat shows itself to be the consistently revolutionary class when it understands its humanist and world-historical role, draws all capable classes with it, and raises them to understanding universally human tasks. Marxism-Leninism is precisely not the doctrine of the destiny of classes but the doctrine of the destiny of all of mankind.[426]

Ždanov concludes that the current danger of human annihilation does not change the truth about class relations or about the class approach to the solution of global problems. Economic conflicts still exist; only the form of class conflict has changed. Surprisingly enough (because Lenin called Plekhanov, in his *State and Revolution*, "a Russian renegade of Marxism, who acquired a deplorable reputation"[427]), Ždanov describes these changes in Plekhanov's words: "If the proletariat wants to protect its class interests on the widest basis in the political conflict, it must come out for the universal interests of truth, culture, justice and humanity."[428]

Thereupon follow assertions on a cosmic picture of the world and of mankind, that have been dealt with elsewhere.[429] Ždanov declares that since man is a law-bound product of the development of the Universe, he is by nature a cosmic being. Life, therefore, is inhabited by the resultant structure and, as highest repository of this structure, humans have a duty toward the cosmic whole.

Over against the regularity and necessity of nature, there is the realm of social laws, where human freedom comes to the fore. Only man is capable of freely moving through nature and of appreciating its beauty and of having feelings about it. Ždanov says: "This uniqueness inhabits not only mankind but each individual life, which thereby has eternal and unique worth."[430] Or,

> The development of mankind through all historical troubles, difficulties, conflicts and contradictions brings it at every stage closer to freedom, unity, and organic totality.[431]
> ... Absolute and universal values belong to the whole of humanity, to each people, to each individual. Understanding of this fact forms the basis and core of contemporary humanism.[432]

As astounding and unsettling as such statements might seem at first glance, neither they nor their 'dialectical' essence is fully compatible with the axioms of the dominant ideology. Jakov Mil'ner-Irinin devoted his *Ethics or the Principles of True Humanity* - published by the AN SSSR in 1963[433] and examined in a German volume[434] in an analysis by the present author - to supplying an impressive example of this. Objections to Mil'ner-Irinin's position were raised in a February 1968 symposium in Moscow, that resulted in a volume, *Contemporary Problems of Marxist Ethics*, under the editorship of G.D. Bandzeladze.[435] Two objections to Mil'ner-Irinin had to do with the science of the ought and the principle of conscience[436], where he was supposedly 'innovation-hungry', 'abstract', and "in contradiction with the basic principles of Marxism and of scientific atheism".[437] At the

All-Union Conference of Directors of Social Science Departments (June 1968), Leonid M. Archangel'skij (1925-1982) - a leading expert in Marxist-Leninist ethics[438] - carried the matter further, accusing Mil'ner-Irinin of trying to put the individual above the social.[439] A.D. Košicev of the University of Moscow[440] notes in the conference report:

> In *Contemporary Problems of Marxist Ethics* (published in Tiflis by G.D. Bandzeladze) we find an article by Ja. A. Mil'ner-Irinin which attempts to derive the true principles of morality from an 'eternal nature' of man, and to make them independent of historical eras and of social classes.[441]

The fact is that such 'reproaches' are justified neither by the book in question nor by the two articles that are mentioned. Rather, Mil'ner-Irinin consistently maintains the position of Marx' Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, according to which man as species consists in the ensemble of social relations (*sovokupnost' obščestvennych otnošenij*).[442] Already in the Preface of the Mil'ner-Irinin book ethics is said fundamentally to go into the question of human existence and into the question of the essence of man. Obviously man changes as species from one social-economic formation to another but the "essence of man remains" and "the totality of social relations remains unchanged".[443] To call this ideologically false is to reject the doctrine of Marx and Engels.

Following up on this notion of essence, Mil'ner-Irinin can say "that the conscience of man is the subjective (ideal) expression of his objective, social nature or, equally, of his active, creative- transformatory, revolutionary nature".[444] Given the dependence of social consciousness on a concrete social-economic formation, the "sole morality for contemporary man is the Communist (proletarian) morality" and "thereby also universally human morality".[445]

In the first chapter of the *Principles of True Humanity* we read about conscience that "The essence of man is the totality of social relations."[446] This is said to mean that "The bearer of the moral consciousness of society - its conscience - was, is and will be, as long as men exist, solely working humanity."[447] This conscience that is common to all men is social in nature. It is a necessary subjective (ideal) principle of moral existence that inhabits the social nature of man.[448]

This version of ethics founded on a principle of collectivity does not prevent Mil'ner-Irinin from asserting social ideals (meaning generally Communist principles of social property, planning, etc.) that include human freedom and the worth of the individual person.[449] And such individual values are said to be able to be discussed "only on the basis of social ownership of the means of production".[450]

As a result, the 'highest good' - 'good' as the highest command of conscience, as the ideal and the highest accomplishments of the creative man - is the "conscious effort" to "achieve the rational (perfect) social order that is worthy of man"[451]; *i.e.*, Communism, as the "new world that man is called upon to actualize, as the highest ideal of the good".[452] On the matter of the setting of historical goals, Mil'ner-Irinin says in the chapter 'On Wisdom':

> That is the state of affairs from the viewpoint of the future, from that of universal and not class-bound and national interests, and from that of the essence of man as creator and transformer, and of his continuous actualization and indefinite historical development. There is not the slightest doubt that just as there will be no class differences, there will be no national differences. ... Humanity will attain a generally human culture in form as well as in fundamental content. ... Any work of art, science or philosophy has eternal value only in function of this universally human content that appeals to the immortal conscience of mankind.[453]

In the volume we mentioned above, Bandzeladze notes that Mil'ner-Irinin's *Ethics* is a "philosophic poem that embraces almost all branches of philosophy and fascinates the understanding and heart of the reader".[454] This very pertinent characterization must be complemented by the observation that there is a deceptive 'dialectical' identification of incompatible matters of fact. For example, there is Zdanov's *Pravda* article with its 'uniqueness' of man and humanity[455] in conjunction with the generally Communist principle of collectivism. Despite his assertion on the personal value of each[456], Mil'ner-Irinin says that each man is free not as an individual but only as mankind.[457] Elsewhere, he makes reference to man's social nature and his spiritual worth as a free being[458], consciousness of which creates a void between man and the rest of nature.[459]

The same 'dialectic' of only apparent identity is also at work when it comes to reconciliation of class interests and universally human interests. Zdanov's article ends with the notion that the working class aims at not just class interests but at a world where generally human interests are introduced and engaged for the achievement of socialism.[460] This corresponds fully with Mil'ner-Irinin's statement we mentioned above.[461]

This mode of argumentation belongs to what Mil'ner-Irinin calls "dialectical-materialist logic" or "logic in the proper sense", adding that it reflects the "'objective' logic of things" and the "objective and free necessity of man's social essence".[462] The subsequent statements might lead to confusion but are worth taking into account:

> In the light of the logic of human reason, the 'logic of things' or of being appears fully alogical because run through with chance occurrences, even if these are nothing but modal expressions of the objectively contradictory and alogical essence of nature. The alogical character of objective necessity does not keep it from being the ultimate ground of the logic of reason... Logic in the proper sense - the logic of reason - is equally an expression of the objectively necessary social (moral) ... nature of man as of the objective necessity of being, since it is totally the product of materially creative and socially historical practice. In human logic - the logic of reason - the objective necessity of natural being and the equally objective necessity of the social and moral ... essence of man ... are melded into one ... [463]

Under these circumstances, one can hardly talk of a two-valued logic of true and false; Aristotelian logic and its metaphysics fall by the wayside.[464] In the face of strong protests[465], N.I. Kondakov declared and demonstrated all of this dialectical account to be an impossibility.[466] He basically points out the practical matter of fact that no one can affirm and deny the same of the same at the same time.[467] As the Good Book says, "All you need say is 'Yes" if you mean yes, 'No' if you mean no; anything more than this comes from the evil one".[468] The CPSU's effort to make it seem as if one can be Communist and value generally human values as above or equal to Communist values is thus very questionable.

Only someone without knowledge of the history of Soviet philosophy over the past thirty years could see the above state of affairs as new. One can find from 1980 Miran Mčedlov's *Coming of a new Type of Civilization*, the second chapter of which is devoted to the 'Principles of True Humanity'.[469] As concerns the philosophic presentation of political ethics as found in Leninist Marxism[470], one need only return to Mil'ner-Irinin's work of a quarter of a century back.[471] It was this author that was the first to ask the question on the fundamental meaning of life, together with Petr M. Egides, who also dealt with this subject in 1963[472], in 1966[473], and in 1967.[474]

Relative to the universally human, this means for Mil'ner-Irinin - as for M. Mčedlov some time later - the projection of the Communist principles of true humanity, whose bearer is the proletariat, onto the historical future. In other words, the restoration of the universally human or humanist culture - both as to eternal content as well as to its really existent form - will be complete when men have no more class or national distinctions.[475] This means that the locomotive of the historical process - the social revolution of the oppressed classes - leads

finally to the "ultimate historical outcome of the destruction of the classes, the wasting away of the state and law, and the final triumph of the most universal moral principles".[476] This view fully corresponds with that we find in the *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii* that appeared in Moscow in 1958 and in German in 1959.[477] We read there that the content of a socialist ideology is at the same time generally human.[478]

With his unerring gaze and keen sense for the essential, G.A. Wetter takes up this same notion in his *Soviet Ideology Today*[479], and reveals its essence:

> It begins to be clear at this point where this whole theory is leading. Since the revolutionary battle of the proletariat leads, according to Communist theory, not only to the liberation of the proletariat but also to the elimination of class divisions in general, this class is the first to espouse the interests of the whole of society and its ideology expresses not only its own interests but those of all mankind.[480]

All of these viewpoints were brought together in the *Short Dictionary of Ethics* by Oleg Drobnickij (1933-1973) and Igor Kon (b. 1928).[481] The closing article says that Marxist ethics rejects both moral relativism and moral absolutism. Through all the changes in social-economic formations, some things remain the same; so, some moral demands also remain (*e.g.* against stealing, murder, etc.). Generally human in morals is also the logical structure of ethical consciousness, but it is only the abstract form that remains the same. In every era, new content is put into these forms, mainly the content of the society in question. It was Lenin who said that Communist morality includes the basic rules of all human cohabitation that have been elaborated over time. In the case of some basic notions - justice, humanism, equality - only under Communism have they achieved their full and true content.

> Communist morality is proletarian and therefore class-bound in origin; but since it is ultimately directed toward the satisfaction of the interests of all mankind, and looks to the further development of mankind's historical needs, it is in this sense authentically universally human morality.[482]

There can thus be no real doubt on Mil'ner-Irinin's assertion that the path of progress leads through the elimination of classes to the final triumph of universally human principles[483], through a "class war of values" to "absolute hegemony of Communist morality"[484], whereby "the sole morality for contemporary man is Communist morality" and thereby "universally human morality".[485]

P. Viewing the Results Under a Magnifying Glass

Since Gorbachev took over there[486], one hears in the Soviet Union talk of 'reforms'[487] as well as of 'revolutionary measures'.[488] But, one cannot have both maintenance of continuity and elimination of the *status quo*, as one reads in *Kommunist* - relative to Russia in the early years of the century.[489] The author of this article, Aron Avrech - member of the Institute of History of the AN SSSR - notes Lenin's phrase that "all great historical questions are finally decided through force" and reforms are at best by-products of the revolution.[490]

Not for the first time, the Soviet Union is in a serious social-economic crisis. According to Marxian revolutionary theory, this has to lead to the transformation of the existing social relations and its political order, if such is not prevented by economic reforms. Some evidence for this came from events in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1970 and 1980. If societies over history have been distinguished by the types of relations of production[491], and these are fully antiquated in the Soviet Union of today - then the base-superstructure idea cannot not have an effect on the Soviet Union and on the countries it dominates.

The General Secretary of the CPSU is fully conscious of this state of affairs and has warned of it on several occasions. Two examples will have to do.

At the 20th Party Meeting of the Polish Union Party, Gorbachev said on June 30, 1986 in Warsaw:

> The Socialist revolution prepares the way for the general progress of society. This does not mean, however, ... that the relations and forces of production have been brought into harmony once and for all ... On the agenda now is the question of the continuous renovation of socialism on its own ground. Otherwise, there would be blockages and stagnation in social life, and the economic and social problems could come to a dangerous pass.[492]

As Professor V.N. Kalmykov of the University of Gomel stressed in *Filosofskie nauki*[493], in his address before a meeting of the Czech-Soviet Friendship Society in Prague on April 10, 1987, Gorbachev said:

> The radically reformed and rebuilt social-political basis of society was and remains the irrevocable foundation for the development of socialism. Within this process, however, the need can and does

> arise periodically to change the forms of the social relations (among which are the material social relations, including the so-called relations of production). This task must be constantly undertaken in socialist society, precisely through the perfecting of one side or another of the social relations. If the needed transformation is not carried out or is delayed, one must reach for more radical means and for revolutionary methods.[494]

Whatever this means in the concrete, it can mean nothing good and Lenin would see it as requiring the use of force.

Consciousness of the seriousness of the situation can be seen in what is called the "socialist crisis theory". The current political leaders of the Soviet Union are inclined toward the "reformist alternative" to social-economic revolution. At the same time, their social theorists are speaking of a "revolution of another sort" and of a "revolution within the Communist formation".[495] On the subject of this "revolution of another sort", Professor Richard Kosolapov of the University of Moscow said:

> Social scientists have drawn the necessary conclusions from the unfavorable tendencies and difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in a broader and more correct understanding of the meaning of revolution in social development. If revolutions in types of interformation (*i.e.* revolutions between two different economically conditioned forms of society) cease where the transition from capitalism (and the pre-capitalist social-economic formations) to socialism as the first phase of Communism begins, this does not mean that the new society will develop only along an evolutionary path. The Soviet Union's transitional period between capitalism and socialism was marked by radical changes, like industrialization, collectivization, and the cultural revolution. This means that (the) practice (of that time) long ago forced the question as to the peculiar traits of other sorts of revolutions, *i.e.* of types of intraformation ... that are characteristic of the Communist formation, and how these sorts of revolution interact with evolutionary development. The narrowness and opportunism of some of our colleagues kept this question from being asked and answered in a timely fashion. The current reconstruction (*perestrojka*) is all-inclusive, involving the need to move sharply from extensive to intensive socialist reproduction, the need to connect the achievements of the STR with the socialist organization of the economy, and the remaking of all social relations, and more. For the activity of the Party it is important to see that this reconstruction is not a one-time happening but a process that will last for a long time.[496]

This seemingly sensational pronouncement appears on closer examination to be closer to the dictatorship of the proletariat than to genuine revolution. Lenin had come close to a "reformist alternative to revolution" in 1917, in 1919, and in 1920, when he said that a gigantic increase in the productivity of labor should make it possible "to catch up with and surpass advanced lands economically (and not just politically)".[497] Stalin told a meeting of industry officials in February 1931 that "we are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced industrial countries. We must make this up within ten years or we are sunk."[498] Khrushchev and Gorbachev said similar things. The latter wanted the productive potential to be reconstructed in 15 years![499] This will be an immense enterprise since - as Gorbachev admits - the most immense efforts have hitherto caused only slight ripples on the water.[500]

What is more, to bring a genuine revolution one must - according to Marx and Lenin - radically change the relations of production.[501] Soviet relations of production have come to be marked by four essential traits, the so-called "universally Communist principles": common ownership of the means of production; planning of the economy; collectivization of labor and social arrangements; and universal social equality. These four are axiomatic for Soviet society and its leadership[502], as can be seen from many recent documents, including the 'Decree on *Kommunist*' of August 22, 1986[503], and the resolution of the Plenum of January 28, 1987.[504]

Now, it is an open secret that the universally Communist principles that are supposedly the main traits of socialism are precisely the causes of the state of crisis that is endemic to the Soviet economy and that endangers the forward thrust of the Soviet workers. These principles hem in any serious efforts at reform. The conflict remains unsolvable if the terms of a solution remain like those laid down by the Central Committee in its decision on *Kommunist*:

> ... innovation and flexibility have to be combined in a Leninist way with clarity of class-position and with world-view and methodological fundamentalism.[505]

What can innovation have to do with class positions?

In his *Pravda* article of March 6, 1987 on the relationship in the nuclear age between what belongs to class and what belongs to humanity, Yuri Zdanov joins Gorbachev in wishing to convey the impression that the Soviet Union will, no matter what the obstacles, comport itself in line with a humanistic morality to achieve a humane world-order. There has to be an end to the separation of universally human values from politics! Zdanov adds that proletarian class

consciousness is not egoistic but generally human in character.

At least one clarification is called for: already in his 'What is to be done?' Lenin stated that "there is no such thing as an ideology that is outside or above the classes".[506] Marx' letter of March 5, 1852 to Weydemeyer is well-known, as is Lenin's use of it in *State and Revolution*. What is important for Lenin is the "restoration of Marx' real doctrine on the state".[507]

> ... the theory of class conflict is not an invention of Marx but of the bourgeoisie and, in general, it is palatable to the bourgeoisie. Whoever recognizes only class conflict is not yet a Marxist. ... To limit Marxism to the class conflict theory means to base Marxism on and reduce it to what is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. Marxist is only he who extends the recognition of class conflict to the recognition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is the deepest difference between Marxism and the petty (and even the great) bourgeoisie. This must be the acid test for a true understanding and recognition of Marxism.[508]
>
> [The] period of transition from capitalism to Communism [is] in reality ... inevitably a period of intense and bitter class conflict; consequently, the state during this period inevitably must be democratic in a new way and dictatorial in a new way. Further, the essence of the Marxist theory of the state is understood only by someone who has grasped that the dictatorship of one class is necessary not just for any class society and not just for the proletariat that has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the whole historical period that distinguishes capitalism from 'classless society', *i.e.*, from Communism.[509]

It is clear that the Marxist-Leninist theory of base and superstructure has a peculiar trait, not to say an incompleteness or lack of logic: in the transition from capitalism to socialism, the political revolution is the necessary condition for economic change, while the bourgeois and feudal revolutions see the economic precede the political.[510] This has to mean that in the proletarian revolution, and only in it, private property as the source of all evil can be eliminated only through a political revolution. In other words, the liquidation of private property is conceivable not as the result of economic moves but only as the outcome of a purely political act of the will; or - to speak in Wetter's words - it is "the fruit of a prejudice ..., that has its roots in a domain that lies much deeper than that of the understanding".[511] The objective economic position seems irreconcilable with the basically subjective political attitude.[512] For Wetter, this is important because the Communist ideology is "not just any philosophic system among many

others, but a world-view and committment to a historical force working in history".[513]

There thus can be no question here of confronting the representatives of a Communist-formed future society with rational arguments to the effect that the generally Communist principles of the existing Soviet society contradict the essence and nature of man irreparably and incorrigibly. The matter here is not one of knowledge or of insight, but of the will, as Assen Ignatow has described in 'The Question of the Demonic in Communism'. Looking at the mind-set of the Communist rulership under the title of *Psychology of Communism*, Ignatow notes:

> If the demonic is understood as the anti-Godly, as what opposes the divine, the concealed but active hate of Communists for God and immortality is an unquestionable evidence of the demonic.[514]

To this extent, what is at issue here is that one handles unreasonable expectations by observing the limits that one must consciously put on the ideological prejudicing of the will. The Soviet system came to be - contrary to the the doctrine of social-economic determinism - through a radically political act of the will. This is why - with the help of revolutionary emotions aroused by economic failure - this system can be eliminated only by a similarly radical act of political will. Since, however - to maintain the same simile - demons cannot be driven out through recourse to Beelzebub[515], it must be clear that such a restorative act of the political will cannot be done by those who are in power and then lose it. Precisely for this reason is the idea that serious change is going on in the Soviet Union a false image.[516]

Translated by
T.J. Blakeley

NOTES

1. Cf. M. d'Herbigny, *Un Newman russe - Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900)*, Paris 1911(3) and 1934(6). English: *Vladimir Soloviev, a Russian Newman*, London 1918.

2. Rev. Michel d'Herbigny, French priest, was born in 1880 in Lille and died in 1957 in Aix-en-Provence. He was a Jesuit and professor of Sacred Scripture and theology. He began teaching at the *Gregorianum* in 1921. In 1923, he was named President of the Papal Oriental Institute. In 1926, he became the titular bishop of Ilion with a mission to Russia. From 1930 to 1934, he was head of the papal *Commissio pro Russia*. He wrote numerous works, including a *Théologie de l'Eglise* (1913). Cf. *Grand Larousse encyclopédique*, t.5, Paris, 1962, p. 858.

3. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Grundzüge russischen Denkens - Persönlichkeiten und Zeugnisse des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, München, 1979, pp. 197 and 209f. Among the main works of Gagarin, we find: *Les starovères, l'église russe et le pape* and *La Russie sera-t-elle catholique?* both: Paris, 1857. It was Martynov who translated the latter into Russian. He himself published in 1858 in Paris *Les manuscrits slaves de la Bibliothèque Impériale de Paris avec un calque* and, in 1863, the *Annus ecclesiasticus Graeco-Slavicus*.

4. Cf. the *Motu proprio "Quod maxime"* of September 30, 1928, in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis (AAS)*, Vol. XX, Num. 10, October 1, 1928, pp. 309-315; here pp. 311 f.

5. Cf. the *Motu proprio "Inde ab"* of April 6, 1930, in *AAS* Vol. XXII, Num. 4, April 7, 1930.

6. Cf. the *Motu proprio "Quam sollicita"* of December 21, 1934, in *AAS*, Vol. XXVII, Num. 3, March 1, 1935.

7. Cf. the *Annuario Pontificio*.

8. Cf. Albert Ammann, *Abriss der ostslawischen Kirchengeschichte*, Wien, 1950, pp. 628 f.

9. Cf. Rolf Gallus, 'Jesuiten studieren "russische Probleme"', in *Salzburger Nachrichten*, March 13, 1986.

10. *Loc. cit.*

11. See the first preface to the *DiaMat* editions of 1952-1956, p. v.

12. See the second preface to the *DiaMat* editions of 1958-1960, p. vi.

13. See note 11, above.

14. *Loc. cit.*

15. *Loc. cit.*

16. See also Astrid von Borcke, *Die Ursprünge des Bolschewismus - Die jakobinische Tradition in Russland und die*

Theorie der revolutionären Diktatur, München, 1977; and Nikolaj Berdjaev, *Istoki i smysl russkogo kommunizma (The Origins and Sense of Russian Communism)*, 1937.

17. See also Leszek Kołakowski, *Główne Nurty Marksizmu*, Paris, 1976-1978.

18. See note 12, above, p. vi.

19. Wetter *DiaMat* editions 1-3 (henceforward *DiaMat I*) p. 571, and editions 4-5 (henceforward *DiaMat II*) p. 631.

20. *DiaMat I* p. 541 and *DiaMat II*, pp. 595 f.

21. *DiaMat I* p. 569 and *DiaMat II* pp. 629 f. See also N. Berdiajew, *Wahrheit und Lüge des Kommunismus*, Luzern, 1934, p. 84; and N. Losskij, *Dialekticeskij materializm v SSSR* (Dialectical Materialism in the USSR) Paris, 1934, p. 60.

22. *DiaMat I* p. 571 and *DiaMat II*, p. 632.

23. *DiaMat I* p. 572 and *DiaMat II*, p. 632.

24. *DiaMat I* p. 572 and *DiaMat II*, p. 633.

25. *Loc. cit.*

26. *DiaMat I* p. 573 and *DiaMat II*, p. 633.

27. *Loc. cit.*

28. *Loc. cit.* and *Diamat II*, p. 633 f.

29. *DiaMat I* p. 575 and *DiaMat II*, p. 635.

30. *Loc. cit.* and *Diamat II*, p. 635 f.

31. *DiaMat I* p. 576 and *DiaMat II*, p. 636.

32. *Loc. cit.*

33. *Loc. cit.*

34. *DiaMat I* p. 577 and *DiaMat II*, p. 637 f.

35. *DiaMat I* p. 577 and *DiaMat II*, p. 639.

36. *DiaMat I* p. 579 and *DiaMat II*, p. 640.

37. Fedor Michajlovič Dostoevskij, *Polnoe sobranie šocinenij v tridcati tomach (Pss)*. t. 10: *Besy* (The Devils), Leningrad, 1974. p. 198.

38. *Loc. cit.*

39. *Loc. cit.*

40. *Ibid.* pp. 199-200.

41. *Ibid.* p. 315. The notebooks for *The Devils* contain the following passages:

Verchovenskij: "Then we have Fourier - that is an unknown Christianity without Christ."

Liputin: "Socialism - that is a substitute for Christianity; that is a new Christianity, that leads to renewal of the whole world. It is the same as Christianity; but, without God."

Necaev: "If it is Christianity, then is it worthwhile even talking about such a foolishness?"

- "But this is a Christianity without God, and that makes the biggest

difference."
- "In my view, God does not do that much harm. One could preserve or keep (*aufbewahren*) God for the case that one would need Him."

In his impressive *Sociologie du Communisme* (Paris, Gallimard, 1949), Jules Monnerot - who comes closest to Wetter in complete independence of judgement - describes the Bolshevik version of Communism as the "'Islam' of the 20th century". In the first chapter of the first part, that deals with "the Russian model", he says: "The confusion of politics and religion was one of the characteristic traits of the Islamic world. It allowed the governmental leaders to work outside of their own boundaries as leaders of the faithful (*Emir al muminim*)... Such religions have no limits. Soviet Russia - as the geographic center of Communist expansion - can take such borders only as provisional. The borders of the Russian expansion always represent only the provisional limits of the expanding 'Islam'. Like victorious Islam, Communism does not know a distinction between politics and religion. When it simultaneously raises the claim to be universal state and universal doctrine, this happens not within a *definite* civilization or world, but *over the whole earth.*" (p. 21) Therefore, for Monnerot, it is "completely clear that the battle today is not just a *vertical* one - a fight of the lower classes against the higher - but also and equally a *horizontal* one - the fight of a 'world' and 'mind-set' against another 'world' and another 'mind-set'." (p. 19) "At the end of the road is the most total domination that men have ever undergone; it allows no limits to its spread (except those temporarily given by the terrestrial globe), and no barrier of time (fanatic Communists will never talk about post-Communist eras), and no limits to its influence on the individual. This 'will to power' demands from every man it possesses complete acquiescence and allows into his psychological life no room for anything but economics." (p. 20)

42. Dostoevskij, *Pss*, t. 10, p. 315.

43. *Skopcy* - the castrated (*Pss,* p. 325). Cf. *Enciklopedičeskij slovar'*, t. 59, St. Petersburg, 1900. pp. 223-227.

44. Dostoevskij, *ibid.* p. 325 f.

45. *Ibid.* p.455.

46. *Sobranie sočinenij V.S. Solov'ëva*, t. 10, Bruxelles, 1966. pp. 81-221.

47. Cf. especially *Kratkaja povest' ob antichriste* (Short Story from the Anti-Christ), pp. 193-220:
Starec Ioann: "Great ruler! The most precious thing in Christianity is for us *Christ Himself,* Himself and all that comes from Him, for we know that the whole content of the divine is corporeally in Him. But, also from you, Ruler, are we ready to receive any salvation, if only we can recognize in your beneficent hand the holy hand of Christ.

Therefore...: Confess yourself here before us to Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who became incarnate, came down to earth, rose from the dead, and will come again - confess yourself to Him, and we will lovingly recognize in you the predecessor of His second glorious coming." (p. 212 f.). See also Wladimir Szylkarski, *Solowjew und Dostoevskij*, Bonn, Schwippert, 1948.

48. *Revelation*, 12 and 22, 17.

49. *AAS* March 31, 1937, p. 96. Cf. *DiaMat I*, pp. 586-589 and *DiaMat II*, pp. 638-641.

50. *DiaMat I*, pp. 586 f.

51. Cf. Note 11, above.

52. Joseph M. Bocheński, *Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus (Diamat)*, Bern, Francke, 1950. 213 S. (Henceforward: *Diamat*).

53. Walter Theimer, *Der Marxismus: Lehre, Wirkung, Kritik*, Bern, Franke, 1950. 253 S.

54. Marcel Reding, *Thomas von Aquin und Karl Marx. Vorträge im Rahmen der Grazer Theologischen Fakultät*. Graz, Akademischer Verlag, 1952. 22 S.; *Der politische Atheismus*, Graz-Wien-Köln, Styria, 1957. 361 S.

55. Jakob Hommes, *Der technische Eros. Das Wesen der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, Freiburg, Herder, 1955. 520 S.; *Krise der Freiheit. Hegel - Marx - Heidegger*, Regensburg, Pustet, 1958. 331 S.

56. Max Lange, *Marxismus, Leninismus, Stalinismus. Zur Kritik des dialektischen Materialismus*, Stuttgart, Klett, 1955. 210 S.

57. H.B. Acton, *The Illusion of the Epoch. Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed*, London, Cohen and West, 1955. 278pp.

58. Bocheński, *op. cit.* pp.7-10.

59. *Ibid.* p. 10.

60. *Ibid.* p. 89.

61. *Ibid.* p. 96.

62. *Ibid.* p. 132.

63. *Ibid.* p. 118.

64. *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*. In Zusammenarbeit mit zahlreichen Gelehrten hrsg. v. J.M. Bocheński u. Gerhart Niemeyer, Freiburg-München, Alber, 1958. 762 S. here: p. 31 (Henceforward: *Handbuch*).

65. *Handbuch* p. 31.

66. Bochenski, *Diamat* p. 103.

67. *Loc. cit.*

68. See Ivan Aleksandrovič Il'in, *Filosofija Gegelja kak učenie o konkretnosti Boga i čeloveka* (The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine

on the Concreteness of God and Man), Moscow, 1918.

69. *Handbuch* p. 33.

70. In the *Review of Politics* July 1951, p. 351.

71. *Loc. cit.*, according to F. Orestano.

72. *Novoe vremja*, Moscow, Nr. 10, March 1957, quoted from the German version: 'Eine missglückte Attacke im "psychologischen Krieg"', *Neue Zeit* Nr. 10, 1957, pp. 27-29.

73. See *Beilage zur Wochenschrift "Das Parlament"*, Bonn, February 8, 1956.

74. Mark Moiseevič Rozental' in *Neue Zeit* Nr. 10, 1957, p. 27. See also A.I. Vladimirova, 'Protiv idealističeskoj fal'sifikacii dialektiki' (Against the Idealist Falsification of the Dialectic) *VF* 1957, 1, 162-173.

75. See note 73, above.

76. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke*, Stuttgart, Glockner, t. 2, 1951. Preface: "Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen." (p. 24)

77. *Acosmism* = "Worldlessness", a philosophical and religious doctrine which affirms the nothingness of the world. Hegel called the pantheism of Spinoza acosmism, since God is there the only reality, while everything else is but accident. Cf. Heinrich Schmidt, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, 20.Aufl. Stuttgart, Kröner, 1978. p. 9.

78. *Handbuch* p. 32.

79. Cf. *Pravda* December 12, 1955: *'Priem A.I. Mikojanom professora M. Redinga'* (Reception of Professor M. Reding by A.I. Mikojan), in his function as Dean of the Faculty of Theology of the University of Graz.

80. Teodor I. Ojzerman, 'Sovremennoe oblic'e srednevekovoj scholastiki', *Kommunist* 1957, 1, 88-101 (on Reding's *Thomas von Aquin und Karl Marx*, Graz, 1952). Cf. also Juzef Borgos (Józef Borgosz, b. 1928), *Foma Akvinskij*, perevod s pol'skogo M. Gurenko, Moscow, Mysl', 1966. 213str.

81. Marcel Reding, *Der politische Atheismus*, Graz-Wien-Köln, Styria, 1957. 361 S. (henceforward: *DpA*).

82. Ojzerman, *op. cit.* p. 100.

83. *DpA* p. 354.

84. *Loc. cit.*

85. *Ibid.* pp. 61, 163 and 177.

86. See *MEGA (Marx/Engels, Gesamtausgabe) I*, 2, p. 107.

87. *DpA*, p. 81.

88. *Ibid.* p. 89.

89. *Ibid.* p. 109; see also George L. Kline's article in this volume.

90. *Ibid.* p. 174.

91. Jakob Hommes, *Der technische Eros. Das Wesen der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung*, Freiburg, Herder, 1955. 520 S. (henceforward: *DtE*).

92. Jakob Hommes, *Krise der Freiheit. Hegel - Marx - Heidegger*, Regensburg, Pustet, 1958. 331 S.

93. On this, see *Sovremennyj sub'ektivnyj idealizm. Kritičeskie očerki* (Contemporary Subjective Idealism. Critical Essays), M. 1957, including T.I. Ojzerman, 'Reakcionnaja suščnost' nemeckogo ekzistencializma' (The Reactionary Essence of German Existentialism) pp. 424-473; and G.D. Sul'ženko, 'Francuzskij katoličeskij ekzistencializm - filosofija irracionalizma i mistiki' (French Catholic Existentialism - A Philosophy of Irrationalism and Mysticism) pp. 474-526. Further: V.I. Micheev, V.I. Šiškin, 'Marksistskaja kritika ekzistencializma' (A Marxist Critique of Existentialism) *VF* 1957, 3, 200-202 (on G. Mendes' book, *Studien über die Existenzphilosophie*, Berlin, 1956); L.N. Pažitnov, 'Kritika Marksom gegelevskoj koncepcii sub'ekta-ob'ekta' (Critique by Marx of the Hegelian Conception of Subject and Object) *VF* 1957, 6, 35-46. In *DtE* Hommes understands the category of *Dasein* in Hegel and Marx as human self-creation through labor (p. 26 ff.) and the dialectic: "The path of man out of his self-alienation" (p. 37 ff.); "ecstatic 'objectivity'" (p. 50 ff.) and "the historical self-belonging of man in self-alienation and self-reconciliation" (pp. 223 ff.).

94. *DtE* p. 50; *MEGA I*, 3, pp. 155 ff.

95. *DtE* p. 287.

96. *Loc. cit.*

97. *Ibid.* p.288.

98. Cf. *V MGU* 1955, 7, 99. See also V.S. Molodcov, 'Ob ošibkach v ponimanii predmeta dialektičeskogo materializma' (On Errors in the Understanding of Dialectical Materialism) *VF* 1956, 1, 188-194.

99. See the articles of Soviet philosophers on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Hegel's birth (1970), as well as the new writings on Hegel in Helmut Dahm (Kritik der kommunistischen "Rechtfertigung des Guten") in Peter Ehlen (Hg.), Jakov A. Milner-Irinin and Helmut Dahm, *Ethik*, München, 1986, p. 605 f., note 171.

100. See Dahm in P. Ehlen, *Ethik*, pp. 509-516 (Eine allgemeinmenschliche Moral gibt es nicht: Vom Klassenkampf der Werte zum Absolutheitsanspruch kommunistischer Sittlichkeit) and p. 585 (die dialektische Methode), as well as p. 586 (den Monismus des dialektischen Materialismus).

101. See *Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik.* Hrsg.

v. Friedo Ricken, München, Beck, 1984. pp. 72 f.

102. *DtE* p. 480.

103. *Loc. cit.*

104. *DtE* p. 455.

105. *Loc. cit.*

106. Jakob Hommes, *Zwiespältiges Dasein. Die existenziale Ontologie von Hegel bis Heidegger*, Freiburg i/B, 1953, Nr. 95.

107. *DtE* p. 288

108. *DtE* p. 51. Cf. K. Marks i F. Engel's, *Iz rannich proizvedenij* (From the Early Works), Moscow, 1956, p. 560 f. "The actualization of labor is its objectification."

109. L.N. Pažitnov, *op. cit.* pp. 44 f. and 46.

110. Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, 'Marxismus und Philosophie', *Die Umschau*, Mainz, 1947; *Les aventures de la dialectique*, Paris, 1955; A. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*, Paris, 1947; J. Hyppolite, *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel*, Paris, 1955; J. Hommes, 'Von Hegel zu Marx', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, München, 1953; *Der technische Eros*, Freiburg i/B, 1955.

111. Varlam Varlamovič Keševlava, 'Kritika gegelevskogo metoda spekuljativnoj konstrukcii' (Critique of the Hegelian Method of Speculative Construction) *VF* 1958, 4, p. 114. See also Keševlava, *Mif o dvuch Marksach* (The Myth of Two Marxes), Moscow, Gt., 1963. 120 str.

112. Cf. V.E. Evgrafov, L.A. Kogan, V.S. Kružkov, 'Istoričeskie predposylki i osobennosti sovetskoj filosofskoj nauki na različnych etapach stroitel'stva i razvitija socializma' (The Historical Presuppositions and Peculiarities of Soviet Philosophic Science at Various Stages in the Construction and Development of Socialism), Chapter 1 in V.E. Evgrafov (Hg.), *Istorija filosofii v SSSR*, t. 5, kn.1, Moscow, Nauka, 1985, pp.7-110, especially 30-34.

113. See Franz von Baader, *Philosophische Schriften und Aufsätze*, Münster, 1831, Bd. II, p. 70 f.

114. *DtE* pp. 287 f.

115. Accordingly, Keševlava goes on (see note 111, above): "For Hegel ... alienated self-consciousness ... is the object, which means: self-consciousness goes from 'pure activity' to the positing of itself as the object (cf. the *Phenomenology of Mind*). In Hegel everything happens in the sphere of pure thought. ... Consequently, in Hegelian philosophy we have to do with a pure self-circuiting of thought. Even in the middle links of this movement - the negation of the purely logical, and the transition from the abstract-universal to the finite and particular - the positing of the actual and real does not exceed the limits of thought, since this finite itself is a creature of thought... The Hegelian system of absolute idealism is thus a mental construct, in

which the real world is presented 'as the result of a thought that grasps itself, digs into itself and develops itself'."(K. Marks, *K kritike političeskoj ekonomii*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 214, 256).

116. Cf. Lenin *Pss*, t.18, *Materializm i empiriokriticizm*, Moscow, 1961, p. 294: *ob'ektivnoj real'nosti vsem i každomu izvestnych veščej, tel, predmetov...*

117. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 275: *svojstvo byt' ob'ektivnoj real'nost'ju* and p. 365: *čuvstvennyj mir est' ob'ektivnaja real'nost' ...*

118. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 365: *mir est' dvižuščajasja materija...; fizičeskij, vnešnij mir, vne katorogo ničego byt' ne možet.*

119. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 346: *ob'ektivno real'noe bytie...*

120. Cf. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 18, p. 277 f.: *priroda beskonečna, ona beskonečno suščestvuet...*; p. 298: *mir - dvižuščajasja materija; priroda = materija*; p. 356: *vzjat' za pervičnoe prirodu, materiju, fizičeskoe, vnešnij mir...*

121. Cf. *Ibid.* pp. 277 f.

122. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 18, p. 356; see also pp. 240 f. and p. 274; cp. F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, in *Marx-Engels Werke (MEW)*, Bd. 21, Berlin (Ost), Dietz, 1962, pp. 275 f.

123. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 275; cp. pp. 131 and 281.

124. See the *Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik* (cf. note 101, above), pp. 115-117.

125. Martin Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?* Frankfurt/M, 1981, 12. Aufl. p. 38.

126. *Ibid.* p.39.

127. See Walter Brugger, *Summe einer philosophischen Gotteslehre*, München, 1979, pp. 179-187.

128. *MEW*, Bd. 20, p. 40.

129. See J.-P. Sartre, *L'être et le néant - Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*, Paris, 1943 (here: 4th ed. p. 33).

130. *MEW*, Bd. 20, p. 41.

131. *Ibid.* p. 41.

132. *Ibid.* p. 519.

133. Cf. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 18, p. 260; see also Thomas Sowell, *Marxism - Philosophy and Economics*, London-Boston-Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1985, p. 11: "Marx wrote for Engels' *Anti-Dühring* the tenth chapter of the second part; it was on political economy and called 'From "Critical History"'."

134. Cf. Lenin *Pss*, Bd. 18, pp. 277 f.

135. *Ibid.* p. 131.

136. *Ibid.* pp. 274 f. and p. 281.

137. *Ibid.* p. 277.

138. See Pavel Vasil'evič Kopnin, 'Ideja i ee rol' v poznanii'

(The Idea and its Role in Knowledge) *VF* 1959, 9, p. 61; and Helmut Dahm, *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, Wissenschaft u. Politik, 1963, p. 26 (the attempt of Kopnin to assign within Soviet-Russian philosophy an ontological and epistemological position to the 'idea' with all of its baggage from Hegelian idealism).

139. Lenin, *Pss*, Bd. 29, Moscow, 1963: *Filosofskie tetrady* (Philosophic Notebooks), p.93. The *Philosophic Notebooks* of Lenin - excerpts from Marx, Engels, Feuerbach, Hegel, Aristotle, and F. Lasalle, along with Lenin's commentaries and marginal notes from 1914-1916 - were first published in the *Leninskie sborniki*, IX and XII (1929-1930). These excerpts and summaries, the most important of which is the fragment 'On Questions of Dialectic' (pp.316-322), were materials for a large work that Lenin planned to write on the dialectic as a philosophic science. Lenin was even more driven to a systematic elaboration of the philosophic grounds of Marxism by the fact that the Second International was denying such grounds with the argument that there was a link between the economic ideas of Marx and the philosophy of Kant. The *Philosophic Notebooks* appeared in book form in 1933, 1934, 1936, 1938, and 1947. Dietz brought the German version out in 1954.

140. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p.93.

141. *MEW*, Bd. 21, p.277.

142. *Ibid.* pp. 292 f.

143. N. Valentinov (Vol'skij, 1879-1964), *Vstreči s Leninym* (Encounters with Lenin), New York, Chechov, 1953. 358pp. (henceforward: *Vstreči*).

144. Valentinov used the Russian 4th edition of the works of Lenin (Moscow, 1946-1950, 35 vols.), where the *Filosofskie tetradi* take up the 20th volume. We continue to refer to the 5th edition.

145. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p.93: *čus ob absolute.*

146. *Vstreci* pp. 345 f., and Lenin, *Pss* t. 29, p. 97: *sugubo tumannoe*; p. 103: *počemu Fürsichsein est' Eins, mne nejasno. Zdes' Gegel' sugubo temen*; p. 104: *temna voda;* p. 105: *sie proizvodit vpečatlenie bol'šoj natjanutnosti i pustoty*; p. 107: *perechod količestva v kačestvo v abstraktno teoretičeskom isloženii do togo temen, čto ničego ne pojmes;* p. 108: *vse sie neponjatno, sugubo temno;* p. 121: *očen' temno.*

147. *Vstreči* p. 345.

148. *Loc. cit.*

149. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 138: *eto na 9/10 selucha, sor.*

150. *Vstreči* p. 346.

151. See notes 139 and 144, above.

152. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p.154: *vzdor;* p. 155: *cha-cha!*; p. 167: *splošnaja čuš'*; p. 185: *smešnoe v Gegele*; p. 287: *pošlo...Merzko,*

vonjuče!

153. *Ibid.* p. 189: *dialektika idei (= samoj prirody)...*

154. *Ibid.* p. 151: *ideja = edinstvo Begriff'a s real'nost'ju.*

155. Ibid. p. 176: *Ideja (čitaj: poznanie čeloveka);* and p. 180: *Momenty poznanija (= "idei").*

156. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 180: *(ideja) istina vsestoronnja*; and p. 183: *Ideja est' "istina".*

157. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 181.

158. *Ibid.* p. 178.

159. *Loc. cit.*

160. *Loc. cit..*

161. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 179. Lenin's confidence that he had the innermost essence of the dialectic in view grew until he made the affirmation: *toždestvo protivopoložnostej meždu ponjatijami.* Cf. A.Ch. Kasymžanov, 'Filosofskie tetradi', *Filosofskaja enčiklopedija*, t. 5, Moscow, 1970, p. 369; and *Filosofskij enciklopedičeskij slovar'*, Moscow, "Sov.encik.", 1983. p. 739.

162. See all the references in Helmut Dahm, 'The Role of Economics in Soviet Political Ideology', in *Economics and Politics in the USSR - Problems of Interdependence*, ed. Hans-Hermann Höhmann, Alec Nove, Heinrich Vogel, Boulder and London, Westview, 1986, pp. 17-40; especially *The Question of Method*, pp. 20-26 (notes: pp. 36 f.).

163. Cf. Assen Ignatow, *Aporien der marxistischen Ideologielehre - Zur Kritik der Auffassung der Kultur als "Ideologie in letzter Instanz"*, München, Minerva, 1984, 160pp.; and his *Psychologie des Kommunismus - Studien zur Mentalität der herrschenden Schicht im kommunistischen Machtbereich*, München, Berchmans, 1985: Third Part: *Das magische Denken*, pp. 109-124.

164. *DiaMat I* IV-VII chapters of the systematic section; cp. *DiaMat II* Chapters III-V of the same part.

165. *DiaMat I*, VIII chapter of the second part; cp. *DiaMat II*, Chapter VI, Section 1.

166. *DiaMat I*, Chapter IX of the second part; cp. *DiaMat II*, Chapter VI of the second part, sections 2-4.

167. *DiaMat I*, 10th chapter of the second part; cp. *DiaMat II*, 7th chapter of the second part.

168. Cf. K.S. Bakradze, *Logika*, Tbilisi, 1951; N.I. Kondakov, *Logika*, M., AN SSSR, 1954. 512pp. Cf. Helmut Dahm, 'Renaissance der formalen Logik', *Ost-Probleme*, Bad Godesberg, 1957, 8, 254-267.

169. Cf. S.V. Gabilija (Tiflis), 'Novoe posobie po dialektičeskomu materializmu' (A new Textbook for Dialectical Materialism), *VF* 1957, 1, 193-198.

170. Cf. V.P. Tugarinov, *Sootnošenie kategorij dialektičeskogo materializma* (The Correlation of the Categories of Dialectical Materialism) Leningrad, 1956, pp. 82 f.; M.M. Rozental' and G.M. Štraks, *Kategorii materialističeskoj dialektiki* (Categories of the Materialist Dialectic) Moscow, 1956, pp. 212-218 and 251-254.

171. Quoted from the review by Gabilija (note 169, above).

172. Cf. Keželava, *op. cit.* (note 111, above), especially pp. 115 f.

173. Cf. Bernhard Lakebrink, *Hegels dialektische Ontologie und die thomistische Analektik*, Köln, Bachem, 1955. 503pp. (henceforward: *Hegel-Thomas*).

174. *Ibid.* p. 152.

175. *Ibid.* p. 143.

176. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I. q.13, a.5, c.

177. *Hegel-Thomas* p. 142.

178. Thomas Aquinas, *De IV opp. II. 7.*

179. *Ibid.* III. 8.

180. *VF* 1957, 1, 195.

181. *Hegel-Thomas* p. 145.

182. Thomas Aquinas, *De IV opp. I, 2.*

183. K. Marks, *K kritike političeskoj ekonomiki* (On the Critique of Political Economy), Moscow, 1952. p. 214.

184. Keželava, *op. cit.* (see note 111, above), pp. 116 f.

185. K. Marks i F. Engel's, *Iz rannich proizvedenij* (From the Early Works), Moscow, 1956, p. 625. See the whole last section of the third manuscript, 'On Critique of National Economy - Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts from 1844: Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and of Philosophy in General' (pp. 621-642). On p. 625, we read: "The actual being of the absolute spirit is abstraction."

186. Pažitnov, *op. cit.* (see note 93, above), p.41.

187. Cf. the *Bol'šaja sovetskaja enciklopedija (BSE),* Tt. 1-50, Moscow, 1949-1957; and M. Rozental', P. Judin (eds.), *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'*, Moscow, 1954.

188. Cf. V.P. Rožin, *Marksistsko-leninskaja dialektika kak filosofskaja nauka* (The Marxist-Leninist Dialectic as Philosophic Science), Leningrad, 1957, pp. 90 f.

189. Hegel, *Logik II*, 14 (Meiner), Stuttgart, 1958, Bd.4, p. 494, where we read: "*...die Bewegung von Nichts zu Nichts, und dadurch zu sich selbst zurück*". Cf. the Glockner edition (see note 76), t. 4 (*Logic I*), Stuttgart, 1958, p. 494.

190. See Josef de Vries, *Grundbegriffe der Scholastik*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 1980, pp. 11-21 (act and potency); cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, q.3, a.17, *responsio.*

191. Cf. F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der*

klassischen deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1888 (Vol. 21 in *MEW*; see there pp. 263-307 and especially p. 277 and pp. 292 f.).

192. Gustav A. Wetter, *Die Umkehrung Hegels - Grundzüge und Ursprünge der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, Wissenschaft u. Politik, 1963, pp. 50 f. (henceforward: *Umkehrung*).

193. Cf. Hegel, *op. cit.* (see note 76, above) p. 224.

194. *Ibid.* Bd. 8, p. 73.

195. *Ibid.* Bd. 8, p. 271.

196. *Ibid.* Bd. 8, 260.

197. *Umkehrung* pp. 64-67.

198. Wetter referred in this context to an article by P. Prokof'ev, 'Krizis sovetskoj filosofii' (The Crisis of Soviet Philosophy), *Sovremennyja Zapiski*, 1930, XLIII. See *DiaMat I*, p. 150 and note 10; cp. *DiaMat II*, p. 153 and note 9.

199. Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 255.

200. Cf. *Istorija filosofii (IF)*, Pod red. M.A. Dynnika, M.T. Iovčuka, B.M. Kedrova, M.B. Mitina, O.V. Trachtenberga, t. I, Moscow, 1957; here: II/3, pp. 112-129: The Philosophy of Aristotle, especially p. 113.

201. *Ibid.* p.113. See also *Filosofskaja enciklopedija (FE)*. Gl.red. F.V. Konstantinov, T. 1, Moscow, 1960, p. 94; and Marks/Engels, *Iz rannich...*, p. 27; Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 326.

202. *IF*, t. I, p. 286; see also Chapter III, Section III: 'The Philosophic and Sociological Thought of West-European Countries in the 5th to 14th Centuries', pp. 277-296; and also *FE*, t. 1, pp. 91-95 (Aristotle).

203. Cf. *Istorija filosofii v SSSR* (The History of Philosophy in the USSR), gl. red. V.E. Evgrafov (see note 112, above), t. 5, kn. 1: This was a matter of the decision of the Central Committee of the CP (b) 'On the Journal "Pod Znamenem Marksizma"' of January 25, 1931. A similar event was the August 22, 1986 decision of the Central Committee 'On the Journal "Kommunist"', in *Pravda* of the same day and in *Kommunist* 1986, 12, 3-10.

204. K. Marks, 'Tetradi po istorii epikurejskoj, stoičeskoj i skeptičeskoj filosofii' (Notebooks on the History of Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptical Philosophy), in *Iz rannich...* p.125

205. *IF* t. I, p. 119; and Lenin, *Pss*, t. 29, p. 327: 'Konspekt knigi Aristotelja "Metafizika"'.

206. Cf. V.P. Rožin, *Marksistsko-leninskaja dialektika kak filosofskaja nauka* (Marxist-Leninist Dialectic as Philosophic Science), Moscow, 1957, pp. 130 and 172.

207. See Chapter III (Dialectic and Metaphysics) of the book in notes 47 and 169, above, as well as *VF* 1957, 1, 194.

208. Cf. Gabilija, *op. cit.* p. 194; and S.B. Cereteli, *Dialek-*

tičeskaja logika, Tbilisi, 1965 (in Georgian) and 1971 (in Russian, quoted here), 472 pp. Cf. 'Logic and Ontology' (pp. 17-19), 'Formal and Dialectical Logic' (pp. 21-23), 'Logic as Philosophic Science' (p. 23), 'Dialectical Logic as a Science' (pp. 27-34), as well as the whole fourth chapter, 'Logical Laws of Thought' (pp. 81-142).

209. O.V. Trachtenberg, *Očerki po istorii zapadno-evropejskoj srednevekovoj filosofii*, Moscow, Gt., 1957, 256 pp. See also *FE* t. 5, p. 255.

210. Trachtenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

211. *Loc. cit.*

212. *IF, t.* I, pp. 277-296.

213. Cf. I.M. Kičanova, 'Filosofija Fomy Akvinskogo', *VF* 1958, 3, 104-117.

214. In Reding's Berlin lecture on the thought of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1958/9), we find talk about 'leaps into higher forms of existence'. See also F.Ch. Kessidi and V.V. Kondželka, 'Aristotel' v ocenke Marksa: problema teoretičeskogo vosproizvedenija dejstvitel'nosti' (Aristotle According to Marx: The Problem of the Theoretical Reproducing of Reality), *FN* 1984, 1, str. 71-78.

215. Vasilij Pavlovič Zubov, *Aristotel'*, M., AN SSSR, 1963. 367str. (25, 000 copies)

216. Aleksandr Sergeevič Achmanov, *Logičeskoe učenie Aristotelja* (The Logical Doctrine of Aristotle), M., 1960.

217. *Sočinenija Aristotelja v četyrech tomach* (The Works of Aristotle in Four Volumes), M., 1975-1984. Guillaume Budé was the leading Greek scholar of his time. He lived from 1467 to 1540.

218. Cf. *VF* 1986, 2, str. 35.

219. Cf. A.N. Čanyšev, *Aristotel'*, M., 1981; A.F. Losev and A.A. Tacho-Godja, *Aristotel'. Žizn' i smysl* (Aristotle. His Life and Impact), M., 1982; R. Lukanin, *"Organon" Aristotelja* (Aristotle's *Organon*), M., 1984; V.A. Bočarov, *Aristotel' i tradicionnaja logika* (Aristotle and Traditional Logic), M., 1984; A.A. Gusejnov, *Etika Aristotelja* (Aristotle's Ethics), M., 1984.

220. Cf. V.V. Sokolov, *Srednevekovaja filosofija* (Medieval Philosophy), M., 1979; D.V. Džochadze and N.I. Stjažkin, *Vvedenie v istoriju zapadnoevropejskoj srednevekovoj filosofii* (Introduction to the History of Western European Medieval Philosophy), Tbilisi, 1981; B.E. Bychovskij, *Siger Brabantskij* (Siger of Brabant), M., 1979.

221. Viktor Ivanovič Garadža, *Neotomizm - razum - nauka. Kritika katoličeskoj koncepcii naučnogo znanija* (Neo-Thomism, Reason, Science. Critique of the Catholic Conception of Scientific Knowledge), M., Mysl', 1969. 216str.

222. Mark Vasil'evič Želnov, *Kritika gnoseologii sovremennogo neotomizma* (Critique of the Epistemology of Contemporary

Neo-Thomism), M., MGU, 1971, 360str. Here: pp. 140-197.

223. Evgenij Michajlovič Babosov, *Naučno-techničeskaja revoljucija i modernizacija katolicizma* (The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Modernization of Catholicism), Minsk, NiT, 1971. 456str.

224. Cf. Zubov, *Aristotel'*, pp. 87-90; and *O nebe* (On the Heavens) II, 12, 292a.

225. Zubov, *op. cit.*, pp. 94f.

226. *Ibid.* pp. 94f.

227. Cf. Lenin, *Soč.* t. 18, M., 1961. pp. 46, 120, 197.

228. Cf. *ibid.*, t. 29, M., 1963. p. 172.

229. *Ibid.* p. 172.

230. Zubov, *op. cit.* pp. 133-135.

231. *Ibid.* p. 135; and *Fizika* (Physics), VII, 1, 241b.

232. *Ibid.* pp. 138-142.

233. Lenin, *op. cit.*, t. 18, p. 230.

234. Cf. 'Ibn Rošd', in *FE* t.2, M., 1962, pp. 190f.; and S. Grigor'jan, 'Averroizm' in *ibid.* t. 1, 1960, p.18.

235. Trachtenberg, *op. cit.* (Note 209, above)

236. See, in particular, Chapter III, 'Medieval Philosophy in the East and its Influence on the Western-European Philosophy', pp. 46-90; and Chapter V, 'Averroism in the West and Siger of Brabant', pp. 120-134.

237. Trachtenberg, *op. cit.* pp. 66f.

238. *Ibid.* p. 68.

239. Hegel (Glockner), Bd. 8, S. 296f. and Bd. 9, pp. 67f.

240. Trachtenberg, *op. cit.* p. 69.

241. *Ibid.* pp. 120-134.

242. Jakov Avramovič Mil'ner-Irinin, *Etika - ili principy istinnoj čelovečnosti* (Ethics or the Principles of True Humanity), M., AN SSSR, 1963. (German: Peter Ehlen (Hg.), Jakov A. Milner-Irinin - Helmut Dahm, *Ethik*, München, 1986, pp. 107 and 543). Mil'ner-Irinin was among the most notable representatives of Marxist ethics in the Soviet Union in the 1960s (others included Leonid Archangel'skij (1925-1982), Gela Bandzeladze, and Oleg Drobnickij (1933-1973)). His main work, *The Principles of True Humanity,* distinguished itself from the presentations both of Aleksandr Šiškin (1902-1977) and Gela Bandzeladze by its speculative, in the Heideggerian sense, depth that asks about the being of beings.

Zubov deals with Averroism in the third chapter of his Aristotle book, *Sud'ba nasledija* (Fate of a Heritage), especially pp. 219-223 and 243-247. After Plato, Averroes receives the most attention, forty pages.

For the discussion on Mil'ner-Irinin's views, see Peter Ehlen's

Die philosophische Ethik in der Sowjetunion - Analyse und Diskussion, München-Salzburg, Pustet, 1972, pp. 9-11; Helmut Dahm, 'Kritik der kommunistischen "Rechtfertigung des Guten"', Mil'ner-Irinin/Dahm, pp. 537f. The Soviet views may be found in *VF* 1968, 8, pp. 198-208; *FN* 1968, 6, str. 171-174; *FN* 1969, 1, str. 45.

243. Trachtenberg, *op. cit.* pp. 96-97.

244. Lenin, *op. cit.* t. 18, p. 287.

245. *Ibid.* p. 365.

246. *Ibid.* p. 131.

247. *Kratkij filosofskij slovar'* (Short Philosophic Dictionary), Pod red. M. Rozentalja i P. Judina, M., Gt., 1939. Cf. 'Metafizika', pp. 171-174; here: p. 174.

248. Lenin, *op. cit.* t. 18, p. 129.

249. Cf. *ibid.* p. 131: "*Matter* is a philosophic category for designation of *objective reality,* which *is given to man in his sensations,* and is copied, photographed and reflected by his sensations, and exists independent of him."

250. *Ibid.* pp. 281, 283, 365.

251. *Ibid.* p. 367.

252. *Ibid.* p. 367. See, also, p. 300 and p. 304. "Either *materialism* or *universal* substitution of the *psychic* for the *whole* of physical nature..."

253. *Ibid.* p. 367.

254. *Ibid.* p. 286.

255. Cf. Mil'ner-Irinin/Dahm, *Ethik*, S. 149, 265 and 438.

256. *Ibid.* S. 221 f.

257. *Ibid.* S. 136.

258. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, 1963, S. 104-109 (On the Theory of Abstraction); *Meuterei auf den Knien - Die Krise des marxistischen Welt- und Menschenbildes*, Olten-Freiburg, 1969. S. 96-116 (Marxist Philosophy and the Modern View of the World).

259. Cf. Milner-Irinin/Dahm, *Ethik*, p. 219.

260. *Ibid.* S.. 221.

261. *Materialističeskaja dialektika - Zakony i kategorii* (The Materialist Dialectic: Laws and Categories), Taškent, 1982, 344 str. (henceforth: *Materialist Dialectic*).

262. See *FE* t. 5, M., 1970, p. 504.

263. Cf. *Materialist Dialectic* p. 3.

264. *Ibid.* pp. 39f.

265. Lenin, *op. cit.* t. 29, p. 142.

266. Cf. note 249, above.

267. *Materialist Dialectic* p. 238.

268. *Ibid.* p. 239.

269. *Ibid.* p. 258.
270. Cf. *ibid.* p. 266.
271. *Ibid.* p. 267.
272. Cf. *ibid.* p. 272.
273. *Ibid.* pp. 273f.
274. Cf. *ibid.* p. 315.
275. *Ibid.* p. 317.
276. *Ibid.* p. 321.
277. *Ibid.* p. 240 f.
278. Cf. Hegel, Bd.4 (*Logik I*), Stuttgart, 1958, S. 664f. (The Explication of the Absolute).
279. Cf. Lenin, *op. cit.* t. 29, p. 140.
280. Hegel, *op. cit.* Bd. 4, S. 673.
281. Cf. *ibid.* S. 678.
282. Cf. *ibid.* S. 693f.
283. Cf. *ibid.* S. 704.
284. See Joseph Kleutgen S.J., *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit*, Bd. I and II, Münster, 1860 and 1863, Bd. I, S. 348-350. See Helmut Dahm in Milner-Irinin/Dahm, *Ethik*, S. 580-582.
285. Cf. Hegel, Bd. 4, S. 703 (Formal Causality).
286. *Romans* 2, 15.
287. James P. Scanlan, *Marxism in the USSR - A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought*, Ithaca and London, Cornell UP, 1985. 363pp. (henceforth: Scanlan, *Marxism*).
288. *Ibid.* pp. 57-99.
289. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, 1963. Chapter 4: 'Basic Laws, Regularities and Principles', pp. 21-28; and 'Der Streit um die Materie des Diamat', in *Ost-Probleme*, Bad Godesberg, Nr. 27, 1956, S. 912-925.
290. Cf. Scanlan, *Marxism*, p. 156.
291. Cf. N.N. Žukov-Verežnikov, *Teorija genetičeskoj informacii - Teoretičeskij i eksperimental'nyj očerk* (The Theory of Genetic Information: Theoretical and Experimental Sketch), Moscow, 1966. 320str.
292. N.I. Žukov, *Informacija - filosofskij analiz informacii, central'nogo ponjatija kibernetiki*, Minsk, 1966. 166 str.; iz. 2, pere. i dop., Minsk, 1971, 279 str., quoted from the second edition (henceforth: N.I. Žukov, *Informacija*). Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Der gescheiterte Ausbruch. Entideologisierung und ideologische Gegenreformation in Osteuropa (1960-1980)*, Baden-Baden, 1982, S. 79-148. (henceforth *DgA*).
293. N.I. Žukov, *Informacija*, p. 242.
294. *Ibid.*p. 242.
295. *Ibid. p. 245.*

296. Ibid. p. 243.
297. Cf. N.I. Žukov, *Informacija* pp. 43f.
298. *Ibid.* p. 45.
299. Cf. *ibid.* p. 53.
300. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, 1963, Kapitel 4, S. 21-28.
301. Arkadij Dmitrievič Ursul', *Priroda informacii - filosofskij očerk* (The Nature of Information - Philosophic Treatise), M., Gt., 1968. 288str. (henceforth: Ursul', *PrI*); cf. by the same author *Informacija - Metodologičeskie aspekty* (Information: Methodological Aspects), Moscow, Nauka, 1971, 296 str.
302. *Ibid.* p. 111: The author explains that "Self-regulation (in the sense of control with something like feedback) is the ability of a system to return to its earlier state, that was previously disturbed". See also L.A. Petrušenko, *Princip obratnoj svjazi. Nekotorye filosofskie i metodologičeskie problemy upravlenija* (The Feedback Principle. Some Philosophic and Methodological Problems of Control), M., Mysl', 1967, p.231.
303. Ursul', *PrI*, pp. 112f. Petrušenko understands by "bound information" information that is based on feedback (see Dahm, *DgA*, S. 130).
304. See Paragraph 13 in *PrI*, pp. 214-231.
305. *Ibid.* p. 214.
306. *Ibid.* p. 215.
307. *Ibid.* p. 224. In the passages on structural information, Ursul' says: "In reality the existence of a diversity of reflections is conditioned by the existence of structural information." (p. 226)
308. *Ibid.* p. 226.
309. *Ibid.* p.229.
310. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Grundzüge russischen Denkens - Persönlichkeiten und Zeugnisse des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, München, 1979, S. 447-449.
311. See note 32, above.
312. N.I. Žukov, *Informacija*, p. 242; iz. 1, pp. 145-150.
313. Cf. Anton Sertillanges, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquin*, Köln-Olten, 2. Aufl. 1954, S. 153. (henceforth: Sertillanges)
314. *Ibid.* S. 129, 335, and 339.
315. Ursul', *PrI*, p. 230.
316. Sertillanges, S. 387.
317. "Since knowledge comes to be through the linking of the knower with the known, one has to assume that the known 'acts' in order to transmit its form, and that the knower 'suffers' in receiving this form." Sertillanges, S. 123. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De potentia*, III, 7.
318. Sertillanges, S. 393.

319. Cf. Moisej Aleksandrovič Markov, 'O edinstve i mnogoobrazii form materii v fizičeskoj kartine mira' (On the Unity and Diversity of Forms of Matter in the Physical Picture of the World), in *VF* 1980, 11, pp. 60-75.

320. Sertillanges, S. 295.

321. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Grundzüge...* S. 447-449.

322. Cf. Evgenij Michajlovič Babosov, *Tejjardizm: popytka sinteza nauki i christianstva* (Teilhardism as an Attempt at a Synthesis of Science and Christianity), Minsk, 1970, 264str.

323. Cf. Wolfgang Büchel, *Philosophische Probleme der Physik*, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, Herder, 1965. S. 55f.

324. Cf. L.A. Petrušenko, 'Filosofskoe značenie ponjatija "obratnaja svjaz'" v kibernetike' (The Philosophic Significance of the Notion of "Feedback" in Cybernetics), in *Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta - Ekonomika, Filosofija, Pravo*, Leningrad 1960, 17/3, str. 76-86; 'Vzaimosvjaz' informacii i sistemy' (The Correlation of Information and System), *VF* 1964, 2, 104-114; 'Teorija organizacii - samostojatel'naja oblast' znanija' (Organization Theory as an Independent Domain of Knowledge), *VF* 1966, 2, str. 140-143; *Princip obratnoj svjazi. Nekotorye filosofskie i metodologičeskie problemy upravlenija* (The Feedback Principle. Some Philosophic and Methodological Problems of Control), M., Mysl', 1967. 277str. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *DgA* (note 292, above), S. 97-99.

325. L.A. Petrušenko, *Samodviženie materii v svete kibernetiki. Filosofskij očerk vzaimosvjazi organizacii i dezorganizacii v prirode* (The Self-Movement of Matter in the Light of Cybernetics. A Philosophic Account of the Correlation Between Organization and Disorganization in Nature), M., 1971. 292str. (henceforth: Petrušenko, *Samodviženie*).

326. *Ibid.* pp. 273-277.

327. *Ibid.* pp. 203-272.

328. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Die Dialektik...* Köln, 1963. S. 133-151.

329. Petrušenko, *Samodviženie,* S. 259f.

330. Cf. *ibid.* p. 268.

331. Il'ja Bencionovič Novik, *Kibernetika. Filosofskie i sociologičeskie problemy* (Cybernetics. Philosophic and Sociological Problems), M., Gt., 1963, p. 179.

332. Petrušenko, *Samodviženie*, p. 269.

333. *Ibid.* p. 272.

334. Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* A. 10, 28.

335. Sertillanges, S. 300.

336. Cf. Dahm, *DgA*, S. 140-145.

337. Petrušenko, *op. cit.,* (note 324, above), p. 259.

338. Cf. *ibid.* p. 253, n. 1.

339. Cf. Norbert Viner (Wiener), *Kibernetika i obščestvo* (Cybernetics and Society), M., 1958, pp. 27f. and 43.

340. Cf. Petrušenko, *Princip obratnoj svjazi...* pp. 257-262.

341. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Oeuvres* 1, Paris, 1955, and 7, Paris, 1963.

342. Cf. *Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii*, M., 1958.

343. Cf. Wetter, *op. cit.* (note 192, above), S. 60f.

344. Cf. A.M. Turing, 'On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the *Entscheidungsproblem*' in *Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,* 1937, 2. Ser., V. 42-43; 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', in *Methodos*, Milano, 1954, Vol. VI, 23; A.M. Tjuring (Turing), *Možet li mašina myslit'?* (Can a Machine Think?), Moscow, 1960. Cf. V. Dončenko, *FE* t. 5, Moscow, 1970, str. 265.

345. Georg Klaus, *Kybernetik und Gesellschaft*, Berlin (Ost), 1964. S. 129.

346. *Loc. cit.*

347. *Ibid.* S. 130.

348. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, 1961. S. 186. Wolfgang Wieser, in his *Organismen - Strukturen - Maschinen. Zu einer Lehre vom Organismus* (Ffm, 1959) adds to the discussion: "Here the notion of structure or *form* is important ... Wherever elements coalesce to a meaningful whole, structures appear, whose construction follows certain laws. The totality in which we discover structures, we call a 'system'. There are inorganic, organic, sociological and technical systems. ... What is basic to all of them is the phenomenon of organization. *Organization* is a principle that cannot be reduced either to matter or to energy, but is itself a parameter that is expressed through the measure and order of a system. Wiener formulated this about ten years ago, but there is no denying that the basic ideas go back to Plato and Aristotle." (S. 12f.)

349. Cf. *ibid.* S. 188.

350. Jan Kamarýt (see note 158, above), in *Filosofská misul* (Sofija) 1962, 4, str.42.

351. Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, *Das Ich und sein Gehirn*, München, 1982. S. 699. Cf. also *Theologisches*, Abensberg, 1983, 3 (155), Spalte 5136-5139 (Wolfgang Kuhn, *Wie wirkt der Geist auf die Materie?*).

352. *Ibid.* S. 658.

353. Nothing essential has changed in regard to the untenability of Leninist atheism, at least since the end of the 1950s. There is still the question of the inability of the dialectic to explain matter's self-informedness. See the discussion on the dialectic between Apostol

and Bunge in *Studies in Soviet Thought* 1985, 29, 2, 89-138.

354. Cf. F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, in *MEW* Bd. 21, Berlin (Ost) 1962, S. 275 f.; quoted by Wetter in *Sowjetideologie heute 1*, Frankfurt/M-Hamburg, 1962. Part One : 'Dialectical Materialism'; Chapter 2, 'The Concept of Philosophy', S. 25.

355. Cf. Lenin *Pss* Bd. 18 (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism), Moscow, 1961, pp. 34-35.

356. *Ibid.* pp. 239-241.

357. 'Osnovnoj vopros filosofii', in *FE* t. 4, str. 172, and Gegel' (Hegel), *Soc.* t. 11, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, p. 208.

358. *MEW* Bd. 21, 1962, S. 280 f.

359. Lenin, *Pss* t. 26, 1961, pp. 55 f.

360. Cf. *MEW* t. 13, 1964, S. 9.

361. Cf. *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*, Stuttgart, 1953, S. 12 f.: "At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organization of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder." (Tucker, pp. 477-478). "Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?" (*ibid.* p. 489).

362. Wetter, *op. cit.* pp. 158-159.

363. Cf. Marx/Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, Stuttgart, 1953, S. 22 f. and 27 f.

364. *Manifesto, passim.*

365. Lenin, *Pss* t. 26, pp. 56-57.

366. Cf. Lenin, *Pss* t. 29, p. 16.

367. Marx' Preface to *Capital*, cited by Lenin, *Pss* t. 26, p. 60. Cf. H. Dahm, *Meuterei auf den Knien*, Olten-Freiburg, 1969, S. 127-174.

368. *Manifesto, loc. cit.*

369. *Ibid.* S. 34.

370. *Ibid.* S. 6.

371. Lenin, *Pss* t. 6, p. 25 ('Čto delat'?').

372. *Ibid.* p. 27.

373. *Ibid.* pp. 30-31.

374. *Ibid.* pp. 39-40.

375. Cf. Wilhelm Schulz, *Die Bewegung der Produktion*, Zürich, 1843, S. 38.

376. *MEW* Bd. 23, S. 392 f.
377. Cf. Lenin, *Pss* t. 41, pp. 298-318.
378. Lenin, *Pss* t. 41, pp. 298-318, especially pp. 308-312.
379. *Ibid.* p. 309.
380. *Ibid.* p. 311.
381. Wetter, *op. cit.* S. 161.
382. *Ibid.* p. 197.
383. *Ibid.* p. 186.
384. *Loc. cit.*
385. *Ibid.* p. 187.
386. *Ibid.* p. 188.
387. *Loc. cit.*
388. *Ibid.* p. 189. See *Capital*, Volume 1, Part III, Chapter 5: "The use and the creation of instruments of labor, although proper to certain sorts of animals *in nuce*, characterizes the specifically human labor process, and this is why Franklin defines man as 'a tool-making animal'." We might note the parallel here with the Scholastic *animal rationale.*
389. Wetter, *loc. cit.*
390. *Ibid.* p. 189.
391. *Loc. cit.*
392. *Ibid.* pp. 198-199.
393. Cf. *Bol'ševik* 1939, 11-12, p. 63; *FE* t.3, p. 567.
394. *Bol'ševik*, *op. cit.* p. 61.
395. Cf. *FE* t. 3, pp. 562-584, especially pp. 567 f.
396. *Peredovaja*: 'Na novom etape stroitel'stva kommunizma' (On a new Segment of the Construction of Communism), *VF* 1958, 12, str. 3-13; here pp. 12 f.
397. *Ibid.* p. 13.
398. Cf. A.M. Rumjancev, 'Programma sozdanija material'no-techničeskoj bazy kommunizma' (Program for Creating the Material-Technical Basis of Communism), in *Nauka i žizn'* 1970, 1, pp. 13-22; L.I. Brežnev, *Otčetnyj doklad CK KPSS XXIV s'ezdu KPSS* (Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress of the CPSU), Moscow 1971; Pavel Kovaly's review of three books on the STR in *SST* 1974, 1-2, pp. 139-148; Arnold Buchholz, *Am Ende der Neuzeit*, Stuttgart, 1978, and 'The Role of the Scientific-Technological Revolution in Marxism-Leninism', in *SST* 1979, 2, pp. 145-164; F. Rapp on three relevant books, in *SST* 1981, 2, pp. 159-162.
399. Cf. E.M. Babosov, *Naučno-techničeskaja revoljucija i modernizacija katolicizma* (The STR and the Modernization of Catholicism), Minsk, 1971, pp. 11-28; especially pp. 14-17. (henceforward: Babosov *NTR*)
400. Cf. 'Materialy instituta marksizma-leninizma pri CK KPSS

- Iz rukopisnogo nasledstva K. Marksa' (Materials of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU. From the Posthumous Manuscripts of Karl Marx), *K* 1958, 7, str. 19-23. Two of these documents appear here in Russian for the first time and the first appeared in German in 1939. The second fragment, that is used here - texts preliminary to *Capital*, prepared by Marx in 1863 - remained completely unpublished until 1958.

401. Quoted in *K* 1958, 7, pp. 22-23.

402. Babosov, *NTR* p. 13.

403. Marx, *Capital I*: "... toward production of completely developed men."

404. *Ibid.* S. 512.

405. Cf. Dahm *DgA*; the section 'Restatement of Central Marxist Beliefs: the Ineliminability of "Alienation" and "Division of Labor"', S. 569-574.

406. Cf. A.A. Kusin, *Karl Marx und Probleme der Technik*, Leipzig, 1970, S. 70 f.

407. *MEW* Bd. 21, S. 274 (Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*).

408. Heinrich Stork, *Einführung in die Philosophie der Technik*, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977, S. 125 (Henceforward: Stork, *Technikphilosophie*).

409. Cf. *Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii* (Foundations of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy), Moscow, 1971, pp. 435 f.

410. *Ibid.* p. 423.

411. *Ibid.* p. 255.

412. *Ibid.* p. 425.

413. Cf. B. Petrov, *Filosofskaja nisceta marksizma* (The Philosophic Poverty of Marxism), Frankfurt/M, Posev, 1952, p. 126.

414. Developed by Stork from Wetter's *Sowjetideologie heute 1*, Frankfurt/M-Hamburg, 1962, S. 201.

415. Cf. F. Engels, 'Anteil der Arbeit an der Menschwerdung des Affen' (written in 1876), *MEW* Bd. 20, S. 444-455. Cf. 'Trud' (Labor) by Spirkin in *FE* t. 5, p. 261 f. (here: p. 262): "The whole of history is nothing but the formation of man through human labor." See 'Trud' (Labor) by E.L. Manevič in *FES* pp. 696 f. Cf. Helmut Dahm, *Die Dialektik im Wandel der Sowjetphilosophie*, Köln, Wissenschaft und Politik, 1963, S. 29-34; Chapter 4: 'Arbeit und Menschwerdung'.

416. Stork goes on in *Technikphilosophie* (on p. 109 f.): "Marx did not ... escape the temptation to over-estimate the breadth of his knowledge. This over-estimation comes clearly out in the view *that man created himself through labor*. To the extent that this statement wants to explain not just cultural but also *biological* evolution ... it is *untenable* ... What is decisive is ... that animals also can change nature

and use tools. Why do they not become men? Man, therefore, must *from the beginning* have had capacities which go beyond this. This does not prevent them from being perfected through labor and technology."

417. *Ibid.* S. 126-127.

418. Assen Ignatow, *Aporien der marxistischen Ideologielehre*, München, Minerva, 1984, 176 S., S. 9.

419. Cf. Dahm *DgA*, S. 79-148 ('Philosophic Problems of Cybernetics').

420. Cf. *Kratkij slovar' po filosofii*, iz. 3.

421. Cf. 'Beseda M.S. Gorbačëva s gruppoj dejatelej mirovoj kul'tury' (Conversation of M.S. Gorbachev with a Group of Figures from World Culture), in *Literaturnaja gazeta* October 22, 1986.

422. Literally 'scouts' (*za ramki čisto taktičeskich poiskov*).

423. Evgenij Plimak, 'Marksizm-leninizm i revoljucionnost' konca XX veka' (Marxism-Leninism and the Revolutionary Spirit at the Outset of the 20th Century), in *Pravda* November 14, 1986. Cf. also, from the same author - who is senior staff member at the Institute for the International Workers Movement of the AN SSSR - the article 'Novoe myšlenie i perspektivy social'nogo obnovlenija mira' (The new Thought and Perspectives for the Social Renewal of the World), in *VF* 1987, 6, str. 73-89.

424. *Pravda* December 5, 1986 ('O novom političeskom myšlenii').

425. Cf. Ju. Ždanov, 'Klassovoe i obščečelovečeskoe v jadernyj vek' (Class and Generally Human in the Nuclear Era), in *Pravda* March 6, 1987, p. 3, lines 2-8, and p. 4, lines 1-5.

426. *Pravda* March 6, 1987, p. 3, line 3.

427. Lenin, *Pss* t. 33, p. 36 (*Gosudarstvo i revoljucija*).

428. Quoted from Yuri Ždanov in *Pravda* March 6, 1987, p. 3, line 4.

429. Cf. Helmut Dahm, 'Kritik der kommunistischen "Rechtfertigung des Guten"', in Peter Ehlen (Hg.), *Ethik*, München, 1986, S. 503-635.

430. Ždanov, *op. cit.* p. 4, line 1.

431. *Ibid.* p. 4, line 2.

432. *Ibid.* p. 4, line 5.

433. Cf. Mil'ner-Irinin, *op. cit.*

434. Cf. Mil'ner-Irinin, 'Die Prinzipien wahrer Menschlichkeit', translated from the Russian by Joachim Sternkopf; in *Peter Ehlen, op.cit.*, S. 9-502 (Henceforward: Ehlen, *Ethik*).

435. Gela D. Bandzeladze (red.), *Aktual'nye problemy marksistskoj etiki* (Contemporary Problems of Marxist Ethics), Tbilisi, 1967.

436. Cf. Dahm in Ehlen, *Ethik* S. 537, Note 95.

437. Ehlen, *Ethik*, S. 7. Cf. also Peter Ehlen, *Die philosophische Ethik in der Sowjetunion*, München, 1972, and the reports on the discussions in *VF* 1968, 8, pp. 148-155 and *FN* 1969, 1, pp. 44-52.

438. Leonid Michajlovič Archangel'skij (b. February 3, 1925 in Chilok in the pre-Urals; d. October 22, 1982 in Moscow). He joined the CPSU at age 20 and from 1953 to 1965 he taught at the Urals University in Sverdlovsk, where he was teacher, chairman and then Dean. In 1965, he successfully presented his *Kategorii marksistskoj etiki* (Categories of Marxist Ethics) for the *Habilitation.* As of 1976 he directed the 'Ethics' section at the Institute of Philosophy of the AN SSSR and he was President of the 'Ethics' division of the Philosophic Society of the USSR. In 1974 Archangel'skij published *Social'no-etičeskie problemy teorii ličnosti* (Social-Ethical Problems of the Theory of the Person), and in 1983 *Marksistskaja etika: predmet, struktura, napravlenija* (Marxist Ethics: Object, Structure, Tendencies), which he finished in the last year of his life. Cf. the necrology in *VF* 1983, 1, str. 172.

439. Cf. Dahm in Ehlen, *Ethik*, S. 538, and *FN* 1968, 6, str. 172.

440. He then taught the History of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. As of 1979 (until early 1987) he was Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy. His official successor is Professor Ričard Kosolapov.

441. Report on the meeting in *FN* 1968, 6, str. 172, and Ehlen, *Ethik*, S. 538.

442. Cf. *MES* t. 3, p. 3: "V svoej dejstvitel'nosti suščnost' čeloveka est' sovokupnost' vsech obščestvennych otnošenij." (In his actual essence man is the ensemble of social relations).

443. Cf. Mil'ner-Irinin in Ehlen, *Ethik*, S. 12. At the end of the Preface, Mil'ner-Irinin notes that he depends "in his deciphering of Marx' definition of the essence of man as the totality of social relations" also on Lenin's thought that the essence of man also consists in his being (as conscious) the creator and reorganizer of what is, and one can "from this essence draw all the foundations of morality". (*ibid.* p. 15).

444. *Ibid.* p. 13.

445. *Ibid.* p. 14.

446. *Ibid.* p. 28, and pp. 58 f.

447. *Ibid.* p. 30.

448. *Ibid.* p. 31.

449. *Ibid.* p. 147.

450. *Ibid.* p. 173.

451. *Ibid.* p. 102.

452. *Ibid.* pp. 125 f.

453. *Ibid.* pp. 493 ff.
454. Bandzeladze, *op. cit.* p. 11.
455. *Pravda* March 6, 1987, p. 4, line 1: "Očevidna unikal'nost' ne tol'ko čelovečestva v celom, no i otdel'nogo čeloveka" (Evident is the uniqueness not only of mankind as a whole, but also of the individual man).
456. Cf. Ehlen, *Ethik* S. 147 and 173.
457. *Ibid.* p. 284.
458. *Ibid.* p. 240.
459. *Ibid.* p. 459.
460. *Pravda* March 6, 1987, p. 4, line 5.
461. Ehlen, *Ethik* S. 493 and 28.
462. *Ibid.* p. 438.
463. *Ibid.* pp. 439 f.
464. Cf. Aristotle, *Metafizika*, Moscow, Socekgiz, 1934, p. 63.
465. Cf. N.I. Kondakov, *Logika*, Moscow, AN SSSR, 1954, 512 str.
466. Especially in Chapter III on the law of contradiction. See also Dahm in Ehlen, *Ethik*, pp. 577 f., Note 79.
467. Cf. Kondakov, *Logika* p. 9. See the same author's *Logičeskij slovar'* (Logical Dictionary), Moscow, 1971, that was expanded and revised in 1975 as *Logičeskij slovar'-spravočnik.*
468. *Mt.* 5, 37.
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475. Cf. Mil'ner-Irinin in Ehlen, *Ethik* S. 493 f.

476. *Ibid.* p. 28.

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478. *Ibid.* pp. 596 and 570.

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483. Cf. Ehlen, *Ethik* p. 28.

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485. *Ibid.* p. 539.

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487. At the 27th Party Day of the CPSU (Feb-Mar 1986).

488. At the January plenum of the CC CPSU (January 27-28, 1987).

489. Cf. Aron Jakovlevič Avrech, 'Krušenie carizma i mif o reformistskoj al'ternative' (The Break-up of Tsarism and the Myth of a Reformist Alternative), in *K* 1987, 2, str. 54-62; here p. 55.

490. *Ibid.* p. 55, and Lenin, *Pss* t. 10, p. 313.

491. Cf. *KFS* pp 278-282.

492. *Pravda* July 1, 1986, p. 1.

493. Cf. his 'Filosofskie aspekty koncepcii uskorenija social'no-ekonomičeskogo razvitija sovetskogo obščestva' (Philosophic Aspects of the Notion of the Acceleration of the Social-Economic Development of Soviet Society), *FN* 1987, 4, str. 3-10, especially p. 4. By the same author, see 'Realizm - edinstvo teorii i praktiki v dejatel'nosti KPSS' (Realism - The Unity of Theory and Practice in the Activity of the CPSU), in *FN* 1986, 2, str. 3-9.

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501. Cf. *MEW* t. 2, p. 44; *LW* t. 38, p. 16.

502. Cf. *K* 1986, 7, p. 7.

503. Cf. Helmut Dahm, 'Moskau: Kritik an der Zeitschrift "Kommunist"', in *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart) 1987, 5, S. A251-A254.

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GEORGE L. KLINE

The Myth of Marx' Materialism[1]

Although Marx himself neither developed nor defended a materialist ontology, the myth that he did - propagated by a majority of Marxists, from Engels through Plekhanov and Lenin to contemporary Marxist-Leninists - draws its modicum of plausibility from factors both internal and external to Marx' own thought. Among the *internal* factors I shall consider (in the longer and more theoretical and 'hermeneutical' portion of this paper, comprising Sections I-III): Marx' repeated use of the term *materiell* to mean 'economic'; his assertion of the primacy of *economic* factors in social structure and historical development; his exclusive stress on the production of *goods* to the neglect of economic *services*; and what I call his 'intra-categorial' economic reductionism. I shall argue that *none* of these factors offers significant support for a materialist ontology.

Among the *external* factors I shall consider (in the shorter, more historical and 'sociological' portion of my paper, comprising Sections IV-V): Marx' conspicuous failure to disassociate himself from the materialist ontology which Engels put forward in *Anti-Dühring* (1878); Engels' tendentious editing of the first, and still widely used, English translation of *Capital*, Volume 1 (1887) (details in Appendix I below); and the twentieth-century Marxist institutionalization of the hyphenated author-authority 'Marx-Engels'.

I

Let me be explicit at the outset about precisely what I am denying when I refer to Marx' materialism as a "myth". I am denying that Marx, even the youngest Marx, was a philosophical materialist, *i.e.*, a theorist who develops or defends a materialist ontology, asserting the ontological primacy of matter and explaining whatever appears to common sense to be non-material (*e.g.*, thoughts, feelings, values, ideals, structures, laws) as manifestations, functions, or relational properties of "matter in motion". Thus a less elliptical and more explicit, if also more unwieldy, formulation of my title would be 'The Mythical Claim that Marx Developed or Defended a Materialist Ontology'.

I do *not*, of course, deny that *Engels* - as well as Plekhanov, Lenin and all contemporary Marxist-Leninists - were and are philosophical materialists, that they developed, or at least defended, a materialist

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ontology. But I reject their unanimous claim that in so doing they were following *Marx'* ontological lead.

Furthermore, I do not deny that Marx' own theory of social structure and historical development lays central stress upon economic factors. What I strongly deny is that the theoretical priority of economic factors entails, or supports, a materialist ontology. But I recognize that the claimed linkage of what is sometimes called 'economism' with philosophical materialism is given a certain surface plausibility by Marx' own uncritical use of the highly equivocal adjective *materiell* (material), something scarcely noticed by the legions of Marx- interpreters.

Of the seven distinct theoretical or systematic senses of this term which I have discovered in Marx' writings, only the first, 'material$_1$' (physical, spatio-temporal) is both philosophically appropriate and relevant to the question of whether or not Marx accepts a materialist ontology.

A theorist who is developing or defending a materialist ontology will tend to use the noun 'matter' at least as frequently as, and probably more frequently than, the adjective 'material'. After all, matter or material substance is the central category of a materialist's system. It is a striking though little noted fact that, whereas Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, and contemporary Soviet philosophers *do* make copious use of the noun - in such expressions as 'matter in motion' and 'the forms, properties, and relations of moving matter' - Marx himself rarely uses the noun *Materie*[2] and never in expressions of this type, the sole, and partial, exception being his doctoral dissertation of 1841. In that very early work, while expounding and analyzing the positions of Democritus and Epicurus, Marx occasionally uses the nouns *Materie* and *Materialität* (materiality), as well as the adjective *materiell* in the sense of 'physical' or 'spatio-temporal' (see below) in such expressions as "materielle ... Existenz" and "materielles Substrat" (material substratum). But even here he often contrasts the *Materie* with the *Form* of the Democritean atom, thus slipping into the quite different (sixth) sense of matter (*i.e.*, content).[3]

II

I list below the six meanings (with two subdivisions of the first, for a total of seven), identified by subscript numerals, in roughly systematic order.[4]

SENSES OF *MATERIELL* IN MARX

TERM	MEANING	PRIMARY DOMAIN OF APPLICATION
$material_1$	physical, spatio-temporal	ontology
$material_{1a}$	technological	economics, sociology
$material_2$	biological, physiological	biology
$material_3$	sensuous, sensual	psychology, physiology
$materialistic_3$	empirical, empiricist	epistemology
$material_4$	economic	economics, sociology
$material_5$	acquisitive or	ethics and
$materialistic_5$	consumption-oriented	social philosophy
$material_6$	related to content (=*inhaltlich*), non-formal	methodology

The fifth sense is of minor theoretical importance for Marx, appearing mainly in such early works as 'On the Jewish Question' (1843).[5] In what follows I shall concentrate on the relations among the first four senses (including the two subdivisions of the first sense), beginning with $material_3$, and then make a brief comment about $material_6$ in its relation to $material_3$. First a terminological remark: The noun "matter" is normally, and appropriately, used only in senses 1 and 6, not in senses 1a-5. Sometimes, as in the Aristotelian expression quoted below, it is also used in sense 3. But, confusingly, Feuerbach and Marx (especially in the latter's writings of the 1840s) used the term "materialism" to refer to philosophical positions which stress what is material in *any* of the first five senses (six in all, if we include $material_{1a}$).

Both Feuerbach and the young Marx, uncritically following certain incautious usages in Aristotle, Locke, and Kant, often associate, and sometimes appear to equate, the terms *materiell* and *sinnlich*.[6] Aristotle had spoken of the *hulēs aisthētēs* ("perceptible matter" or "matter of sense")[7], Locke had referred to the external objects of sensation as "sensible" *or* "material"[8], and Kant had characterized the Berkeleyan position which he rejected as *empirischen oder materialen Idealismus* ("empirical or material idealism").[9] The link between $material_6$ and $material_3$ is provided precisely by the Kantian tradition (with its roots in Aristotle), which understands the sensuous element in experience as *materiell* in the sense of *inhaltlich*. That is, the senses supply the "matter" (*i.e.*, *content*) of experience, in contrast to the understanding, which supplies its *form* (the categories, etc.). But the point which needs to be stressed in the present context is that claims about elements or factors which are either $material_3$, $material_6$, or both have *no* bearing on the claims of a materialist ontology.

That point, however, is obscured by the pervasive characterization - in *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and the *Theses on Feuerbach* - of sense-datum empiricism (*i.e.*, materialism$_3$) as materialism *tout court* (*i.e.*, materialism$_1$). Thus, in the Ninth Thesis on Feuerbach Marx criticizes Feuerbach's 'materialism' as a position which "does not comprehend sensuousness (*die Sinnlichkeit*) as practical activity". Here, as often in *The German Ideology*, *Materialismus* means simply empiricism.

The identification of "material" with "sensuous" or "sensual" permits Feuerbach to make such terminologically grotesque claims as that "Liebe ist *Materialismus*; *immaterielle* Liebe ist ein Unding" (Love is *materialism*$_3$; *immaterial*$_3$ [*i.e.*, non-sensuous or non-sensual] love is something unreal) - this in the context of a shrill assertion of "die Wahrheit der *Sinnlichkeit*" (the truth of *sensuousness* and *sensuality*).[10] In fact, this amounts to little more than the conventional nineteenth-century denial of the possibility of 'Platonic' love and a common-sense assertion that all love includes an element of sensuality. It has nothing whatever to do, despite Feuerbach's misleading use of the term *Materialismus*, with a materialist ontology.

Marx permitted himself such terminological grotesqueries only in his earliest works, when he was under the strongest influence of Feuerbach. Thus in *The Holy Family* he makes the parallel and derivative claim that "die Geliebte ist *sinnlicher Gegenstand*" (the beloved is a *sensuous/sensual object*), adding "Die Liebe ... ist ein ... *Materialist*" (Love is a *materialist*$_3$).[11] Despite the speculative lexicon, this means no more than what Feuerbach, four years earlier, had meant, namely, that love has a sensuous/sensual component.

In *The German Ideology*[12] the terms *materiell* and *materialistisch* are used in very loose ways, something which Marx in his later writings tended to avoid. In addition to *materiell* in the sense of 'material$_3$', and of *materialistisch* in the sense of 'empirical' or 'empiricist' (already noted), there are two other non-standard usages: (1) *materiell* in the weak sense of *wirklich* (actual), and (2) *materialistisch* in the odd sense of 'nominalistic'. Thus Marx refers to a "materielles, empirisch konstatierbares ... Lebensprozess" (material life-process, which is empirically verifiable).[13] I suspect that "materielles ... Lebensprozess" is a synonym for "wirkliches Lebensprozess" (actual life-process), an expression which occurs on the following page (27/37).

Marx praises Hegel for explaining the "existence of rights" in terms of the "empirical needs of individuals", and thus proceeding "unendlich materialistischer" (literally, "infinitely more materialistically$_3$") (301/319) than Stirner.[14] I take it that what Marx means by "unendlich materialistischer" is "infinitely more empirically". For a similar usage,

see 217/236.

In a crossed-out section of the manuscript of *The German Ideology* there is a juxtaposing of "die ganze materielle Welt" (the whole material$_3$ world) with Hegel's *Gedankenwelt* (world of ideas) (14n./24n.). *Materiell* here means not 'physical' but either 'actual' or 'empirical'. There is also the expression "[d]as empirische, materielle Verhalten" (empirical, material$_3$ procedure) (217/236).

Several passages appear to assimilate 'material$_3$' to 'material$_4$' (*e.g.* 44/40, 247/264, 337/354, 338/355).

'Materialistic' is stretched to mean 'nominalistic' in a passage in which Marx directs his critical irony at those theorists who "um recht materialistisch zu erscheinen" (to appear thoroughly materialistic) turn Hegel's self-determining concept into a "Reihe von Personen" (series of [individual] persons) (49/62).

Materiell is used fairly frequently in *The German Ideology* in the sense of material$_1$. Examples are the characterization of money as "der materielle Ausdruck dieses Nutzens" (the material$_1$ expression of this advantage) (395/410) and the references to "materielle Bedingungen" (material$_1$ conditions) (21/32, 29n./76), "materielle Lebensbedingungen" (material$_1$ conditions of life) (20/31, 468/479), and "materielle Lebensverhältnisse" (literally, "material$_1$ life-relations", but freely translated as "material$_1$ living conditions") (502/514; cf. also 25/35-36).

Clear uses of material$_{1a}$ (technological) are rare in *The German Ideology* and usually difficult to distinguish cleanly from material$_1$. Thus, the mention of "die materiellen Produktionsinstrumente" (material$_{1,1a}$ instruments of production) (67-68/87), although it obviously applies to tools and machinery, may refer either to their character as physical things or to their character as items of technology. (There is a similar ambiguity in the current use of the term "hardware".)

Materiell is used quite frequently in the sense of 'material$_2$' (biological) in such expressions as "das materielle Leben" (material$_2$ life) (21/31, 28/42, 68/82, etc.). The expression "die materielle Produktion des unmittelbaren Lebens" (the material$_2$ production of life itself, *i.e.*, "... of immediate life") (37/53) is confusing, but appears to refer to biology rather than physics. And "materielle Bedürfnisse" (material$_2$ needs) (396/411) means "biological needs" - for food, clothing, shelter, sex. (Cf. also 28/42). The related expression, "materieller Genuss" (material$_3$ enjoyment) (202/221) means "sense pleasure".

Materiell in the fourth, key sense (economic)[14] appears in all of Marx' writings, beginning with *The German Ideology*.[15] This is perspicuous in those cases where *materiell* is used to modify *Produktionsverhältnisse* (relations of production), which, on G.A. Cohen's reading, should happen only in those relatively specialized

cases where such relations are purely physical or technological, hence not social, not such as to "form the economic structure". Cohen ascribes to Marx a strict "disjunction of [non-social] *material* [*i.e.*, $material_1$ and $material_{1a}$] and [social] *economic* [*i.e.*, $material_4$] characteristics", failing entirely to note that Marx repeatedly uses the very same term - *materiell* - for *both* kinds of characteristics.[16]

Here are a few early examples of Marx' use of *materiell* in the sense of 'economic'. In *The German Ideology* medieval "Produktions- und Verkehrsverhältnisse" (relations of production and intercourse [*i.e.*, "economic interaction, including trade"]) are described as "*materielle* Verhältnisse" ($material_4$ relations) (160/176; italics added). Marx speaks of "a will that was ... determined by the $material_4$ relations of production" (178/195; italics modified). He refers to the "$materially_4$ motivated determinations (*die materiell motivierten Bestimmungen*) of the will of the French bourgeois" (178/195). This could, of course, be read more cynically as $materially_5$ (acquisitively); perhaps Marx meant *both*! "Materieller Verkehr" ($material_4$ intercourse, *i.e.* economic interaction) appears frequently (*e.g.*, 26/36, 27/37, 36/89, 379/395).

Marx' repeated contrasts between work or activity which is *materiell* and that which is *geistig* refer not to the "material vs. mental" or "physical vs. intellectual" - as these terms are standardly rendered - but to "*economic* activity vs. *ideological-cultural*" activity. (Cf. 26/36, 31/45, 32/45, 46/60, 50/64, and the key text: "The fundamental form of [the individual's] activity is economic [$materiell_4$], on which depend all other forms - ideological-cultural [*geistig*], political, religious, etc." (71/82).) This is the familiar relation of economic base to ideological-cultural superstructure, to which we shall have occasion to return.

Marx refers to the "materielle Grundlage" ($material_4$ basis) of bourgeois society (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) and "its bourgeois state" (344/366). The celebrated claim that the class which is the "herrschende materielle Macht" (dominant $material_4$ power) of a given society is also that society's "herrschende geistige Macht" (dominant ideological-cultural power) (46/59) makes little sense if *materiell* is taken to mean '$material_1$' or even '$material_{1a}$', but ample sense - in terms of the base-superstructure model - if it is taken to mean 'economic' ($material_4$).

"Die materielle Geschichte", in invidious contrast to Stirner's allegedly "heilige Geschichte" (202/221), is "$material_4$ history", *i.e.*, the history of economic development, as opposed to Stirner's "holy" - *i.e.*, purely ideological - history. *Materialistisch* is sometimes used in the sense of $materialistic_4$ (economistic, or simply economic), as in the reference to "die wirklichen, materialistischen Ursachen" (the real, $materialistic_4$ causes) of the historical repudiation of polygamy and incest (145/162), and in the statement that certain French and English

authors were the first to give history a "materialistische Basis" (materialistic$_4$ basis) by writing "histories of civil society (*die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*)[17], of commerce, and of industry" (28/42).

'Material$_4$' and 'material$_5$' (acquisitive) are fused in the expression "materielle Interesse" (material$_{4,5}$ interests), *e.g.*, at 178/195, and in the quotation from Stirner at 400/415. See also the reference to the "materielle Geburtsstätte" (material$_5$ source) of both egoism and altruism (229/247) and the claim that the opposition between egoism and altruism or self-sacrifice will disappear once their common source in an acquisitive socity has been revealed. (It is in this passage that Marx makes the famous statement that "communists preach no morality".)

In *The German Ideology* (1846) the term *ökonomisch* (economic) is used infrequently; in effect, its place is taken by *materiell* (material$_4$). But in both the *Grundrisse* (1858) and *Capital*, Volume 1 (1867), where *ökonomisch* occurs with much greater frequency, *materiell* in the sense of 'economic' (material$_4$) still appears in several crucial passages. In these later works 'material$_{1a}$' also occurs much more frequently, particularly in the chapter on 'Machinery and Large-Scale Industry' (Chapter 15) in *Capital*, Volume 1. In contrast, *materiell* is used much less frequently in the second and third senses.

In the *Grundrisse* the term *materiell* is used in the sense of 'material$_1$' (physical) in such expressions as "materieller Stoff" (material$_1$ stuff)[18], "materielle Produkten" (material$_1$ products) (387/487), and "materielle Existenz" (material$_1$ existence) (272/367; cf. also 63/145). Money is called the "materieller Repräsentant" (material$_1$ representative) of wealth (117/203, 130/216, 132/221, 134/222, 140/229, 144/233, 145/234).

Materiell is used in the distinct but related sense of 'material$_{1a}$' (technological) in such expressions as "materielle Weise der Produktion (material$_{1a}$ mode of production) (204/297). The "materieller Produktionsprozess" (material$_{1a}$ process of production) (211/304) is a technological process. (See also 5/83 and 188/277) However, in one passage "materielle Produktion" appears to be material$_4$ as well as material$_{1a}$: such production is contrasted with "artistic" production in ancient Greece. The former, according to Marx, is both economically and technologically backward whereas the latter still commands our admiration.

In the expression "materielle Grundlage" (material$_4$ basis or foundation) (30/110, 163/252) there is a clear allusion to the economic base of society.

In *Capital*, Volume 1, *materiell* in the sense of 'material$_1$' appears in such expressions as "ein materielles Substrat" (a material$_1$ substratum) of commodities[19], "materieller Verschleiss" (physical dete-

rioration) (426/528[twice]), and "materielle Bedingungen" (material$_1$ conditions) of factory work (448/552).

Materiell in the sense of 'material$_{1a}$' occurs more frequently than in the earlier works, *e.g.*, in the reference to the *Maschinensystem* (machine system) as a "fertige materielle Produktionsbedingung" (pre-existing material$_{1a}$ condition of production) (407/408). Machines are characterized as "ein materieller Produktionsmittel" (a means of material$_{1a}$ production) (452/555). References to the "material$_{1a}$ (process of) production" occur, *e.g.*, at 195n.5a/286n.6, 382/482, and 552/667.

In a number of passages in *Capital*, Volume 1, perhaps even more frequently than in the *Grundrisse*, Marx appears to use *materiell* in a deliberately ambiguous way, to mean both 'technological' and 'economic'. Thus, he speaks of the English Factory Acts as providing "die ... notwendigen materiellen Elemente" (the material$_{1a,4}$ elements necessary) for the transformation of "manufacture", *i.e.*, crafts and cottage industry, into the factory system (501/607). See also 532/644, 789/928.

Materiell in the sense of 'biological (material$_2$) occurs rarely in *Capital*, Volume 1. However, it is - I believe - intended in the comment about the relations among human beings "innerhalb ihres materiellen Lebenserzeugungsprozesses" (in the process of creating and reproducing their material$_2$ life) (93/173), since the implicit contrast is with their "geistiges Leben" (ideological-cultural life).

That *materiell* is used in the sense of 'material$_4$' (economic) is evidenced by a number of key passages in *Capital*, Volume 1. "Die materiellen Interesse" are "material$_4$ (and possibly also material$_5$) interests" (96n.33/176n.35). "Die geistigen Potenzen des materiellen Produktionsprozesses" are the ideological-cultural potentialities of the material$_4$ (and perhaps, in a derivative sense, the material$_{1a}$) process of production (382/482). In an important footnote, the expression "materielle Basis" is used in two senses, with a semantic slide from 'material$_{1a}$' in the first occurrence (392n.89/493n.4) to 'material$_4$' in the second (393n.89/494n.4), and a parallel equivocation on the expression "materialistische Methode". It turns out that the method is materialistic$_{1a}$ in that it takes the history of *technology* adequately into account in explaining the historical development of such "superstructural" elements as religion, but is also materialistic$_4$ in that it takes the history of the *economy* adequately into account in explaining that same development. (There is a similar equivocation at 94/173.)

Perhaps the clearest and most unequivocal instance of the use of *materiell* in the sense of 'economic' (material$_4$) in *Capital*, Volume 1, is Marx' characterization of law as a "Produkt der materiellen Produktionsverhältnisse" (product of the material$_4$ relations of production)

(643n.73/766n.4), rather than the reverse, as F.M. Eden had maintained. Marx comments drily: "L'esprit des lois, c'est la propriété" (644n.73/766n.4). Relations of production, the most important and "constitutive" of which are clearly economic and social, are here unequivocally characterized as *materiell* - something which Cohen's interpretation does not allow, since he restricts Marx' use of that term to material$_1$ and material$_{1a}$.[20]

Another feature of Marx' style which may have led some careless readers to assume that he was a philosophical materialist is the unusual amount, for scholarly works - even allowing for their admittedly sharp polemical edge - of colloquial 'popular-materialist' language. The hints of physiological reductionism which they contain are not, I think, to be taken with doctrinal seriousness. I refer to the repeated use of *Kopf* (head) and *Hirn/Gehirn* (brain) to mean 'mind', 'intelligence', or 'imagination'. Thus, in *The German Ideology* there is talk of the "Ausgeburten [of the human] Kopfes" (literally, "offspring [of the human] head", freely rendered as "products of [human] brains" (13/23). Marx adds: "If they were to get this notion (*Vorstellung*) out of their heads (*Kopfe*) [the word is singular in the original] ..." (13/24). The expression "die gebornen beschränkten Köpfe" (literally, "innate limited heads") is quite appropriately rendered as "innate limited intellects" (410/424), although this rendering loses the colloquially "materialistic" flavor of the original.

In the *Grundrisse* Marx characterizes thought as "ein Produkt des denkenden Kopfes" (a product of a thinking head) (22/101) and refers to "der Kopf" which "nur spekulativ verhält" - rendered, rather too literally, as "the head's conduct" which is "merely speculative" (22/102).[21] In *Capital*, Volume 1, Marx refers to the *Machwerk* of a person's "eignen Kopfes" (products of his own brain [literally "head"]) (649/772). A celebrated passage asserts that the worst of human architects is superior to the best of bees because he "die Zelle in seinem Kopf gebaut hat" (has built the cell in his imagination [literally "head"]) before beginning the actual construction (193/284). Even in the most colloquial English it would be odd to speak of an architect as "building a cell - or a stadium, or a railroad station - in his *head*"!

Similar expressions using *Hirn* or *Gehirn* (brain) occur in all of the works here considered. Thus, in *The German Ideology* there is a disparaging reference to "Nebelbildungen im Gehirn" (phantoms formed in the brain) (26/36). Marx adds that the *Gedanke* (idea or thought) of the Fatherland lies "unter dem Schädel" (literally "under the skull", but translated as "in the brain") (110/127). Elsewhere he refers to human beings as "self-conscious things (*Dinge*)" with "thinking brains", and asserts that the same *Zeitgeist* which "builds railroads with the workers' hands" also "builds philosophical systems in the brain

(*Hirn*) of the philosophers".[22]

The same colloquial usage continues in *Capital*, Volume 1. We are told that "das Gehirn ... spiegelt" ([his] brain reflects) (89/166) and that a certain fact "sich im Kapitalistenhirn widerspiegelt" (is reflected in the capitalist's brain) (572/690). A grotesque example of this *façon de parler* is Marx' reference to the capitalist "in dessen Hirn die Maschinerei und sein Monopol ... verwachsen sind" (in whose brain the machinery and his monopoly of it are ... fused together) (446/549). Also of interest are the references to the "dogmatisch ökonomischer Hirn" (literally "dogmatically economic brain", *i.e.*, "dogmatically minded [bourgeois political] economist") (667/791; and 268/363 and 531/643).

That such expressions should not be taken seriously as evidence of a physiological reductionism or materialist ontology is suggested by the fact that one of Marx' favorite polemical terms, *Hirngespinst* (cobweb in the brain, *i.e.*, fanciful or chimerical idea) - used, *e.g.*, in *The German Ideology* (13/23) - was also used by both Kant[23] and Hegel[24], neither of whom could be suspected of any sympathy for a materialist ontology, but both of whom occasionally said "head" when they meant "mind", "intellect", or "imagination".[25] All such usages are on the same level as Marx' use of *Holzkopf* (literally "wooden head", *i.e.*, "blockhead") (*e.g. Capital*, Volume 1, 85/163) and *Kopfzerbrechen* (literally "breaking [one's] head", *i.e.*, "racking one's brains") (465/569). They no more commit one to a materialist ontology than does the use of the English expressions 'brainless' and 'brainy' for 'stupid' and 'intelligent'; 'brainwashing' for 'undermining and replacing someone's political convictions'; or 'picking someone's brain' for 'gaining information, ideas, or insights from someone'.

Marx is an *economic*, not a physical or physiological, reductionist. He does undertake to reduce "das Geistige" to what he calls "das Materielle", but this means not "spirit to matter" or "mind to body" but rather "ideological and cultural elements to economic ones", *i.e.*, the superstructural to the substructural or infrastructural. In other words, Marx is using *materiell* in the sense of 'material$_4$' (economic). Even the much quoted passage from the 'Afterword' to the second German edition of *Capital*, Volume 1 - standardly taken as proof of Marx' philosophical materialism - seems to me more plausibly interpretable in this sense. Marx writes: "Bei mir ist umgekehrt das Ideelle nichts andres als das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle" (27/102). This is misleadingly rendered by Fowkes as well as the Engels edition. Fowkes has: "With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought." The Engels editions has: "With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world

reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought." (19) The rendering of *Kopf* as "mind" is understandable; but the interpretation of "das Materielle" as "material$_1$ world" is highly misleading. Despite the overt contrast of his own position with Hegel's, Marx means by "das Ideelle" not "the mental" ("forms of thought") but "the ideological-cultural"[26] and by "das Materielle" not "the physical" (material$_1$) but "the economic" (material$_4$). It is Marx' characteristic contention that the structures of the economic *Unterbau* (base) are *umgesetzt* and *übersetzt* (transposed and translated) in the ideological-cultural *Überbau* (superstructure). It is this transposition which generates ideology in the sense of "false" or "perverted" consciousness.

Not all reductionisms are alike. Some forms of reductionism - which I propose to call "trans-categorial" - undertake to reduce what is human to something non-human or sub-human, *e.g.*, intentional or purposive action to (manifestations of) physiological or biochemical processes. Engels' reductionism (beginning with the *Anti-Dühring*) is of this kind. In contrast, Marx' characteristic reduction is intra-categorial: it undertakes to reduce factors at one human level to factors at another human level, *viz.*, ideological-cultural factors to economic ones.[27] Like other forms of reductionism, this is theoretically unacceptable; but - and this point needs to be emphasized - it neither entails nor offers significant support for a materialist ontology.

Although Marx did not initiate the misuse of *materiell* to mean 'economic', he uncritically continued it, and thus caused untold hermeneutical confusion. He appears to have been oblivious to the fact that there is nothing peculiarly material$_1$ - or for that matter material$_2$ or material$_3$ - about *economic* activities and institutions, even that economic institution upon which he focussed his theoretical attention, namely, the mid-nineteenth-century steam-powered, partially automated factory or mill. A factory or mill - or a bank, insurance company, or stock-exchange (to mention three other peculiarly economic institutions) - is no more and no less 'physical' or involved with the 'biological/physiological' or 'sensuous/sensual' than any other social or cultural institution. Institutions whose primary function is non-economic - universities, churches, professional societies, museums, symphony orchestras - also require buildings and artifacts, including furniture, tools, and instruments, and, of course, human beings, in order to function. In this respect a factory (or a bank, insurance company, or stock-exchange) is no different. *All* such institutions are *social*; all are established and maintained by concerted human purpose, intelligence, inventiveness, and conscientiousness (all of which, needless to say, may be present in more or less adequate forms). There is nothing peculiarly material$_1$ (physical) - or material$_2$ (biological) or material$_3$

(sensuous/sensual) - about any of this.

III

But, Marx might object, factories produce goods, commodities (*Waren*); the other institutions referred to do not. They simply render - more, or less, useful - *services*. To this I make two responses:

(1) Marx does indeed stress the production of commodities, neglecting economic services (see below). And he sees the production of post-capitalist societies as equally goods-oriented, even though the goods produced by socialist factories will not be *commodities*, because not destined for the (capitalist) *market*. But a stress on commodities, products, things does not entail or support, though it may be vaguely suggestive of, a materialist ontology.

(2) The distinction between economic and non-economic institutions cuts across the distinction between the production of goods and the rendering of services. Many economic institutions - *e.g.*, banks, insurance companies, stock-exchanges, employment agencies - produce no goods at all, despite the fact that they render essential economic services.[28] It is a staggering fact that Marx' painstaking analyses of the capitalist system almost entirely neglect the role of economic services. Marx was interested only in the *production* (and distribution) of "shoes and ships and sealing wax", not in the *repairing* of shoes, the *piloting* of (passenger) ships, or the *insuring* of shipments of sealing wax. I suggest three possible reasons for Marx' massive neglect of economic services.

(a) The influence of Adam Smith - and of Sir James Steuart and the physiocrats before him - whose attitude toward economic services was at best ambivalent. The ambivalence is expressed in a double equivocation on the terms "productive" and "unproductive" as Smith uses them. The first sense of 'productive' is 'commodity-producing' (or, more generally, 'goods-producing'); I shall call this sense productive$_{1a}$. It has a special bearing on the question of Marx' stress on the production of *things* to the neglect of the rendering of *services*. But 'productive' is used in a distinct second sense by both Smith and Marx, the sense of 'capital-enhancing'; I shall call this sense 'productive$_{1b}$'. Work which is productive$_{1b}$ may or may not involve the production of things. Finally, there is a common-sense, somewhat moralistic use of 'productive' as equivalent to 'socially useful or valuable'; I shall call this sense 'productive$_2$'.

The three corresponding senses of 'unproductive' are: 'unproductive$_{1a}$' (non-goods-producing); 'unproductive$_{1b}$' (non-capital-enhancing); and 'unproductive$_2$' (socially useless or harmful). There is a

good deal of fusing and confusing of all three senses of both terms in Smith as well as in Marx.

On the one hand, Smith praises the unproductive$_{1a,b}$ rendering of services by the military and clergy; on the other hand, he censoriously catalogues such "frivolous" commodities - all of them presumably products of labor which is both productive$_{1a}$ and productive$_{1b}$ - as "little ornaments of dress and furniture, jewels, trinkets, gewgaws".[29] A related list includes "baubles" and "ingenious trinkets of different kinds".[30]

Marx, in the *Grundrisse*, tries vainly to establish that builders of pianos are productive (presumably in all three senses), even though - as he admits - it would be absurd to build pianos if there were no pianists to play them (212n./305n.). In a polyglot passage, Marx adds: "Die Produktion für unproduktive$_2$ Konsumtion [*e.g.*, of tobacco] ist quite as productive$_{1a,b}$ as that for productive$_2$ consumption; always supposed that it produces or reproduces capital" (213n./306n.). In a predominantly English passage he admits that workers in luxury shops "indeed produktiv$_{1b}$ sind, as far as they increase the capital of their masters; unproductive$_2$ as to the material$_1$ result of their labor" (184/273). Since their labor yields a "material$_1$ result", they are, of course, productive$_{1a}$.

Smith at least was aware that - as he put it - some of the "most respectable", some of the "gravest and most important" of the professions, as well as some of the most "frivolous" of them, are unproductive$_{1a}$ and typically unproductive$_{1b}$ as well. He includes among members of unproductive$_{1a}$ but respectable professions: military men, clergymen, educators, "lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds".[31] Among members of the unproductive$_{1a}$ and frivolous professions, he includes: "players [*i.e.*, actors], buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers".[32]

In my terms this means that although clergymen, educators, doctors, *et al.*, are neither productive$_{1a}$ nor (typically) productive$_{1b}$, they *are* productive$_2$, whereas actors, buffoons, musicians, *et al.*, are unproductive$_2$ as well as unproductive$_{1a}$ and (typically) unproductive$_{1b}$. Smith's classifications of occupations, needless to say, reveal his puritanical prejudices! (I shall return shortly to Marx' attempt to distinguish between purveyors of services who are productive$_{1b}$ and those who are not.)

(b) The influence of the celebrated master-slave dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in which *Dienst* (service) is characterized as an initial and dialectically inferior stage which is superseded by *Arbeit* (work). The former involves only the (ephemeral) fetching and carrying of materials provided by nature; the latter involves a reshaping of those materials which results in a new (and relatively permanent)

product. One should recall Adam Smith's disparaging remark about unproductive$_{1a}$ workers: "The work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production."[33] Marx both echoes and extends this claim, asserting that "types of work that are consumed as services and not in products separable from the worker ... are of microscopic [sic!] significance compared with the mass of capitalist production".[34] Marx' scorn for services is moral as well as theoretical. He speaks derisively in the *Grundrisse* about "so-called *services* (*Dienste*) from the bootblack up to the king" (369/465; Marx' emphasis). He is even blunter in other passages, speaking of those who render services, "from whore to pope" (183/272) and "from the prostitute to the king".[35]

(c) The etymological and conceptual connection of 'service' with 'servant', 'servitude', and 'servility'[36] seems to have led Marx to dismiss the rendering of economic services as humiliating, degrading, and inferior - morally as well as economically - to the production of goods. Here again one feels the terminological influence of Adam Smith's repeated references to "menial servants" as prime examples of workers who are unproductive in all three senses.[37]

Among economic services, transportation and communication present a rather special case. Smith explicitly mentions the building and maintenance of roads, bridges, and canals, as well as the functioning of the postal service. But he treats transportation only in relation to the moving of *goods*, not *passengers*. And he treats communication as ancillary to the production of commodities rather than as a means for people in general to maintain human contacts. Marx makes the same uncritical assumptions. In his scattered and sketchy discussions of the means of transportation[38] he considers the building and maintenance of roads, shipping, etc., only as ways of getting goods to market, as, in effect, spatial extensions of the process of commodity production. He never refers to the transportation of *passengers*, or to the rendering of any service of communication between *persons*, as having positive economic or social value.

Marx' paradigmatic factory workers are, of course, both productive$_{1a}$ and productive$_{1b}$. But the relation between commodity- or goods-production and capital-enhancement is problematic and turns out to be quite loose in the case of those workers who simply render services. Without being productive$_{1a}$, they can in certain cases be productive$_{1b}$: "A singer who sings like a bird [*i.e.*, for the joy of singing rather than to earn money]", Marx writes, "is an unproductive$_{1a,b}$ worker ... But if the same singer is engaged by an entrepreneur who makes her sing to make money [for the entrepreneur], then she becomes a productive$_{1b}$ [though not, of course, productive$_{1a}$] worker, since she *produces* capital directly." Marx offers a parallel example of a "school-master who instructs others", presumably being

self-employed or working for a non-profit educational establishment, and thus is not productive_{1b}, in contrast to one "who works for wages ... using his own labor to increase the money [*i.e.*, capital] of the entrepreneur who owns the knowledge-mongering [!] institution" and thus is a productive_{1b} worker.[39]

Marx did not extend this rather strained distinction to the major categories of service workers, *e.g.*, those in transportation and communication, perhaps because he was at least dimly aware of its artificiality.

Marx' neglect of services is, I suspect, related to his implicit claim that *geistige* (ideological-cultural) work is unproductive *tout court*. It is of course unproductive_{1a}; but Marx admits - as we have just seen - that it may be productive_{1b}. And some of it at least is surely productive_2 - as Smith, if not Marx, explicitly admits. Of course, if all rendering of ideological-cultural services is unproductive_2, as Marx sometimes seems to suggest, then his own life-work would be no exception. Conversely, it seems to have been Marx' tacit assumption that the great bulk of unproductive_{1a} work is ideological-cultural. But Smith's examples, and many others which should have come readily to Marx' mind, refute that hasty assumption. Consider workers in transportation and communication (those dealing with persons, not just goods), in banking and insurance, in cleaning, repair, and maintenance, in the hotel and restaurant business. It is these categories - productive_2 though unproductive_{1a} - of which Marx' most conspicuously fails to give an account. But that failure does not make him a philosophical materialist.

In extenuation of Marx' stunning neglect of economic services, it might be claimed that they did not play as commanding a role in the nineteenth-century English economy as they have come to play in the advanced economic systems of our own day. In the United States, for example, services have, since 1957, accounted for more than half of the gross national product - even though the many services performed by householders in general and parents in particular, such as cooking, cleaning, mending, repairing, painting, decorating, and childcare, are not included in this calculation. It may indeed be the case that a greater share of transportation was devoted to goods (freight) in Marx' day than in ours. Still, in his day the transport of passengers, and communications not directly ancillary to production, to say nothing of such services as banking, insurance, the provision of food and lodging, cleaning and repair of shoes, clothing, etc., all played a crucial part in the national economy. Some of these - Marx might have complained - were rendered by servants and thus did not count. But many such services were rendered by clerical and technical workers who were *not* servants: locomotive engineers and conductors, postal workers,

doctors, lawyers, and "men of letters of all kinds".

Capital, Volume 1, is drenched in commodities; in fact, nearly a hundred of them are explicitly identified in that work and the *Grundrisse* alone. They range alphabetically from boots, bread, and coats, through gloves, lace, and matches, to wallpaper, wine, and yarn. When Marx occasionally refers to a tailor, it is as a worker who *makes*, rather than one who *repairs*, *cleans*, or *alters* articles of clothing. Even the function of organizing or managing the process of production is, in *Capital*, Volume 1, treated quite negatively. In Marx' view, factory managers function as commissioned officers, foremen and shop-stewards as non-commissioned officers, "drill sergeants", of the industrial work-force (cf. 351/450). They maintain work-discipline, warn and punish slackers, and generally enforce the harsh rules which govern the lives of the productive$_{1a,b}$ factory workers. "The overseer's book of penalties", as he puts it, "replaces the slave-driver's lash" (447/550). The plaintive claims of factory managers and foremen that they too work and create value, that they are productive$_{1b}$ even if not directly productive$_{1a}$, are met with hoots of derision from Marx (207/299-300).

He mentions only in passing the important distinction between two contrasted forms of the "organization of production": (a) the "function of direction (*Funktion der Leitung*) which arises out of the nature of the communal (*gemeinschaftliche*) labor process" and (b) the "function of direction which is made necessary by the capitalist[ic] and therefore antagonistic character of that process" (352/450). It is (b) of course which involves the "drill sergeants" and "slave drivers" of the industrial army. But Marx offers no specific criteria for distinguishing between (a) and (b) with respect, for example, to work-discipline. And his more extensive, posthumously published discussion of the "organization of production" in *Capital*, Volume 2 (especially Chapter 6) and the *Theories of Surplus Value* do not make good this lack.

IV

In the light of what has been said, we may ask why the myth of Marx' materialism has been so widely accepted by both Marxists and non-Marxists, by both friendly and unfriendly critics of Marx' position. I suggest three possible reasons, of which only the first - and that only in part - can be laid to *Marx'* account. The others are entirely the work of the dominant, self-appointed "Marxist" tradition.[40]

(1) It is a historical fact that Marx did not disassociate himself from Engels' ineptly formulated materialist ontology, which was first set forth in the 1877 series of journal articles which became the book,

Anti-Dühring (1878).[41] I suggest five possible reasons for this *prima facie* puzzling fact, a central prop to the myth, since Marx' silence has been taken to imply agreement with Engels' philosophical position. The list begins with reasons which are external to the question at issue and end with reasons which are internal to it.

(a) Marx' loyalty to a lifelong friend and the fear that serious intellectual disagreement might trouble their personal relationship.

(b) Marx' strong need for Engels' moral, emotional, and financial support. During the last half-dozen years of his life (1877-1883) Marx had no friends except Engels. He had quarreled bitterly with everyone with whom he had been close, both inside and outside the First International. And Marx had virtually no other source of income during this period.

(c) Marx' lack of a strong continuing interest in questions of ontology; he had shown such an interest in the 1840s, but not much later.

(d) His feeling that disagreement on such abstruse theoretical issues was of only peripheral significance for the revolutionary struggle, and thus not worth a public quarrel.

(e) Marx may well have considered Engels' views too crude and naive to be taken seriously by philosophically sophisticated socialists.[42] Hence he was willing to let them fall of their own doctrinal weight. Marx could scarcely have imagined that within less than half a century after the publication of the *Anti-Dühring*, acceptance of Engels' simplistic ontology (and epistemology) would become a *sine qua non* for being a "Marxist".

(2) In the English-speaking world, Engels' tendentious editing of the Moore/Aveling translation of *Capital*, Volume 1 (first edition 1887, but still widely reprinted)[43] has tended, in a variety of ways, to make Marx sound more "materialistic" than the German text. (Details are given in Appendix I; see also Appendix II, which discusses the much *less* tendentious French translation of 1872-1875, in the preparation of which Marx himself played an important part).

(3) The institutionalized power of the editorial and rhetorical hyphen. Plekhanov and Lenin, in the 1890s, began the fusion of Marx and Engels into a single hyphenated authority. This practice penetrated the world of publishing at least as early as 1905-1906, in which years Franz Mehring edited the selected early works (1841-1850) of *Marx and Engels* in four volumes. It has been especially massive since the 1920s, when the collected works of "Marx-Engels" began to appear in both German and Russian editions (edited and published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow). In recent decades the "Works of Marx-Engels" have been churned out, literally, in billions of copies and in hundreds of languages and dialects.

References in Soviet, East German, and other East European

publications standardly take the form *Sočinenija Marksa-Engel'sa*, t. 5, str. 67, *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Bd. 4, S. 56, etc. It is usually impossible to ascertain, without actually checking the edition cited, whether the author of the passage in question was Marx or Engels.

A striking case of the "Engelsization" of Marx is afforded by the major article on Marx in the authoritative *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* (Moscow, 1964), Volume 3, pp. 300-313. In contrast to the signed articles in this five-volume work, all of which were written by contemporary Soviet authors, this one is an unaltered reprinting of an article which Lenin had written in 1913 (on the thirtieth anniversary of Marx' death) for the Russian *Granat Encyclopedia.* It seems clear that one of the motives for choosing Lenin - in the 1960s - to interpret Marx for philosophers was to shift to Lenin's ideologically infallible shoulders the burden of misrepresenting Marx as a defender of Engels' materialist ontology (and also of his copy theory of knowledge). The bulk of the article is on *economics*, which was appropriate enough for the general reference work for which it was written, but quite inappropriate for an encyclopedia of *philosophy*. On questions of economics Lenin indeed quotes Marx; but on philosophical questions he mostly quotes Engels. Although Marx was not a dialectical materialist and never used that expression[44] in his own writings, Lenin refers repeatedly to "Marx's dialectical materialism" (*e.g.* Volume 3, p. 310). And, predictably, almost all of the passages which Lenin quotes to support his claim that *Marx* was a philosophical materialist are drawn from the works of *Engels*.[45]

V

Marx' use of the term *materiell* in the sense of 'material$_1$' (physical) or the related but distinct sense of 'material$_{1a}$' (technological) neither entails nor in any way supports a materialist ontology. *A fortiori* his other uses of *materiell* and *materialistisch* can provide no such support. This applies to 'material$_2$' (biological), 'material$_3$' (sensuous/sensual), 'materialistic$_3$' (empirical/empiricist), 'material$_5$' and 'materialistic$_5$' (acquisitive), 'material$_6$' (*inhaltlich*, non-formal), and especially the notorious 'material$_4$' (economic). Nor is evidence of, or support for, a materialist ontology provided by Marx' colloquially "materialistic" turns of phrase; his stress on commodities to the neglect of economic services; his tacit assumption that what is unproductive$_{1a}$ (non-goods-producing) is also unproductive$_2$ (socially useless or harmful); or, finally, his intra-categorial economic reductionism.

It follows that in ontology - and also in epistemology, although I have not argued that question here - contemporary Soviet philosophers

are not, as they insistently claim, *Marxist*-Leninists, but rather *Engelsian*-Leninists. Their ontological - and epistemological - position is not only not identical with or derivative from Marx'. It remains, in its fundamentals, in a state of unresolved and, I suspect, unresolvable, tension with the theoretical position of Marx himself, a position which stands in sharp contrast to those of Engels and (early) Lenin on three key issues: (1) it is objectivist and "economistic" but *not* materialistic; (2) it limits the scope of the dialectic to human *history*, whereas they extend it to all of *nature*; (3) it stresses the *active* role of human consciousness, whereas they reduce human consciousness to a *passive* reflector of the external world.

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this paper appeared in *Annals of Scholarship*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1984), pp. 1-38. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions directed at earlier drafts of this paper by G.A. Cohen, Kenley R. Dove, Philip T. Grier, Frederic L. Pryor, James P. Scanlan, Tom Rockmore, and Kurt P. Tauber.

2. In both the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, Volume 1, Marx sometimes uses *Materie* in the non-ontological sense of 'the material to be used in the process of production'; in this sense it is a near synonym for *Rohstoff* and *Rohmaterial.*

3. See Karl Marx, 'Über die Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie', in *Marx-Engels-Werke* (hereafter *MEW,* East Berlin, Dietz, 1968, Supplemental Volume, Pt. 1, pp. 284-85, 287, 289, 293-96.

4. All of these senses of *materiell* - with the possible exception of 'material$_{1a}$' (technological) - are to be found in nineteenth-century authors other than Marx, *e.g.*, Feuerbach and Stirner. And it is a linguistic fact - though one which I deplore - that 'material$_4$' (economic) and 'materialistic$_5$' (acquisitive) are still current in both popular and scholarly writings.

5. Such *Materialismus*, *i.e.*, acquisitiveness, is associated with one sense of the ambiguous term, *Judentum*, namely 'buying and selling' or, less politely, 'haggling and huckstering'. In the first of the *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) Marx accuses Feuerbach of having grasped praxis only in its "schmutzig jüdischen Erscheinungsform" (dirty-Jewish form of appearance) (*MEW*, Vol. 3, p. 5). The expression "schmutzig jüdisch" (an abusive synonym for 'materialistic$_5$') represents a crude conflation of two Feuerbachian formulations: (1) the identification of *Judentum* with the "practical" principle of utility and exclusive self-interest, and (2) the characterization of that "practical" principle as *schmutzig* (dirty) because *befleckt* (soiled) by *egoism.* (See Ludwig Feuerbach, *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841), in *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl, Stuttgart, Frommann, 1960; original ed. 1903-1911, Vol. 6, pp. 134, 137, 141, 237). At the end of *'Zur Judenfrage'* - again following Feuerbach's lead (cf. *ibid.* chs. 12 and 20) - Marx brings together, in a vicious polemic, the three senses of *Judentum*: 'huckstering', 'Jewishness', and 'Judaism' (*MEW*, Vol. 1, pp. 374-377).

Engels offers a vivid if prolix account of materialism$_3$ (sensuality) *cum* materialism$_5$ (acquisitiveness): "Der Philister", he writes, "versteht unter Materialismus Fressen, Saufen, Augenlust,

Fleischeslust, ..., Geldgier, Habsucht, Profitmacherei und Börsenschwindel ..." (*MEW*, Vol. 21, p. 282).

6. This usage is common in the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* (1844), *e.g.*, in the Third Manuscript, where private property is described as being "materielle, unmittlebar sinnliche" ($material_3$, immediately sensuous [*i.e.*, apprehensible through the senses]) and the "materieller sinnlicher Ausdruck des entfremdeten menschlichen Lebens" (the $material_3$ sensuous expression of alienated human life) (*MEW*, Suppl. Vol., Pt. 1, p. 537).

7. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. 6, Ch. 1 (1025b36).

8. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2:1:2-4.

9. Quoted by Hegel, *Werke*, (2nd ed.), vol. 15, p. 517.

10. Feuerbach, *op. cit.*, p. 59; italics added. Cf. also Feuerbach's own association of materialism with empiricism, *e.g. ibid.*, p. 244. Here, and in subsequent direct quotations from Marx, Adam Smith, *et al.*, I shall use subscript numerals to distinguish various senses of terms in texts which are of course entirely innocent of such devices.

11. *Die heilige Familie* (1845), Ch. 4, § 3: *MEW*, Vol. 2, p. 22; emphasis in original. This particular section in this work written jointly with Engels has been identified as the work of Marx.

12. I shall frequently refer to and quote from *The German Ideology* (1846), despite the fact of its joint ownership with Engels. I shall draw mostly from the first part, which was mainly Marx' work. As of 1845 neither Marx nor Engels was either developing or defending a materialist ontology.

13. References to *The German Ideology* will be given in parentheses in the text: page number of the German text in *MEW*, Vol. 3, then (after a diagonal) page number of the English translation (by C. Dutt, W. Lough, and C.P. Magill) in Volume 5 of the *Collected Works of Marx and Engels* (Moscow, Progress; NY, International, 1976). I have frequently revised the Duff-Lough-Magill translation.

14. Cf. Engels' late reference to "[n]och höhere, d.h. nochmehr von der *materiellen, ökonomischen* Grundlage sich entfernende Ideologien" ([s]till higher ideologies, that is, such as are still further removed from [their] *material, economic* basis). See *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1888), in *MEW*, Vol. 21, p. 302; italics added.

15. G.A. Cohen's *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense* (Princeton, 1978), which has been justly praised for its analytical scruple, *e.g.* in distinguishing between a $basis_1$ (included in the whole which it supports) and a $basis_2$ (not so included) (p.30), is surprisingly lax in its analysis of Marx' uses of the term *materiell*. Cohen takes the

term to mean, unambiguously, 'material$_1$' or 'material$_{1a}$' and makes the problematic claim that the latter meaning is a special case of the former. But his most serious error, in my view, is to have *denied* (implicitly, without argument) that Marx ever uses *materiell* in the sense of 'material$_4$' (economic). I trust that my discussion will provide convincing evidence that this is indeed an exegetical error.

16. *Ibid.* p. 112; italics added.

17. The expression "bürgerliche Gesellschaft", normally translated as "civil society" (*e.g.*, in Knox' translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*), is generally rendered by the translators of *The German Ideology* more literally, and also more tendentiously, as "bourgeois society". The translation "civil society" in the present passage is an exception, perhaps to be explained by the fact that one of the "English" (in fact Scottish) works here referred to is *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* by Adam Ferguson (Edinburgh, 1767). See the note to this passage in *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 590.

18. References to the *Grundrisse* will be given in parentheses in the text: page number of the German edition (East Berlin, Dietz, 1953) followed (after a diagonal) by page number of the Martin Nicolaus translation (Vintage, 1973). In the present case: 169/258, 183/271-72.

19. References to *Capital*, Volume 1, will be given in parentheses in the text: page number of the German text in *MEW,* Vol. 23, followed (after a diagonal) by the page number of the Ben Fowkes translation (Vintage, 1977). In Appendix I, which discusses errors and misleading renderings in the Moore/Aveling translation edited by Engels, references will be given to the Engels edition and then, where appropriate, to the Fowkes translation.

20. Cohen is quite prepared to admit a close connection between the material$_{1,1a}$ and the material$_6$ in the sense that the former provides the *content* which is then "enveloped" in socio-economic *forms*.

21. The *Grundrisse* contains a number of other occurrences of the expression "im Kopf(e)", meaning "in the mind or imagination". Nicolaus translates all of them literally as "in the head" (cf. 26/106, 63/145, 82/165).

22. *MEW,* Vol. 1, p. 97; cf. Vol. 23, p. 217.

23. I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, in *Werke*, Akademie-Ausgabe, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1968 [1902], Vol. 5, p. 156 n.

24. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. G. Lasson, Hamburg, Meiner, 1966 (1934), Volume 2, p. 3.

25. Kant refers colloquially to "junge Köpfe" when he means "young minds" (*e.g.*, *Werke*, Vol. 8, p. 147). Hegel speaks of a "Prädikat, das im Kopfe ... ist" when he means a "predicate in the mind" (*op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 267). Such usages have no bearing on

ontology, materialist or otherwise.

26. It would have been clearer, of course, if Marx had said "das Ideologische" rather than "das Ideelle". But note that in *The German Ideology* the superstructure is called *idealistisch* (36/89), meaning, as the Soviet editors duly explain, "ideological" (p. 89 n.a).

27. Cohen sees a further reductionism in Marx, one which is perhaps closer to what I call 'trans-categorial' rather than 'intra-categorial', namely, a reduction of the ideological-cultural to the material$_{1a}$. While I do not share this view, or the generally "technological" interpretation of Marx which Cohen favors, I recognize it both as plausible and as supported to some extent by the texts.

28. Adam Smith, who was almost as strongly oriented toward the production of goods as Marx (see below), at least recognized the positive economic function of banks and insurance companies (cf. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), ed. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976, Bk. II, Ch. 2, pp. 320-321; Bk. V, Ch. 1, p. 757).

29. *Ibid.* Bk. II, Ch. 3, p. 349.

30. *Ibid.* p. 346.

31. Marx reproduces this list, making no reference to Adam Smith at this point, but with one striking omission. He includes as members of the "ideological group", literally "'ideological' classes" (*die 'ideologischen' Stände)*: "members of the government, priests, lawyers, soldiers" (*Capital*, Volume 1, 469/574), but conspicuously omits "men of letters of all kinds", that "ideological class" of which he himself was a prominent representative.

32. Smith, *op. cit.* Bk. II, Ch. 3, pp. 330-31.

33. *Loc. cit.*

34. 'Results of the Immediate Process of Production' (1863-1866). This is the appendix to the Fowkes translation of *Capital*, Volume 1, pp. 1044-45.

35. *Ibid.* p. 1042.

36. Except for the words for 'servility' (*Kriecherei* or *Knechtsinn*), which have a different etymology, the linkage of these English terms holds in German as well: *Dienst* (service), *Dienstleistung* ([rendering of a] service), *Diener* (servant), *Bedienter* (man-servant), and *Dienstverhältnis* ([condition of] servitude). Notice that Hegel's word for slave, *Knecht*, is present in *Knechtsinn*. Cf. Marx' sarcastic remark about the contemporary recreation of the "ancient domestic slaves, on a constantly extending scale, under the name of a servant class (*dienende Klasse*), including men-servants, women-servants, lackeys, etc." (*Capital*, Volume 1, 469/574).

37. Smith, *op. cit.* Bk. II, Ch. 3, p. 330; Bk. IV, Ch. 9, pp. 675, 676.

38. Cf. *The German Ideology*, 358/374, 380/395; *Grundrisse*, 424-25/524-26, 432-33/533-34; *Capital*, Volume 1, 469/573, 474/579, 503-504/609-10.

39. 'Results ...' (note 34, above), p. 1044; cf. also *Capital*, Volume 1, 532/644.

40. Karl Kautsky, who after Engels' death in 1895 was generally considered to be the leading Marxist theorist, took a somewhat independent, although not wholly consistent, position on these questions. On the one hand, he sided with the dominant tradition in treating Marx and Engels as inseparable, seldom referring to one without referring to the other, and frequently calling them "our two masters" (cf. *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, Berlin, Dietz, 1927, Volume 1, pp. 24, 28). He repeated the groundless claim of Plekhanov and Lenin that Marx and Engels themselves referred to their position as "dialectical materialism" and added that among twentieth-century Marxists the materialist Plekhanov is closest to both Marx and Engels, and even that Plekhanov's attack on the "Machian" or "empirio-critical" Marxists is justified (*ibid.* pp. 27, 28). But, on the other hand, Kautsky breaks sharply with the claim of Plekhanov and Lenin (although not mentioning them by name in this context) that the "materialist [*i.e.*, economic] *interpretation of history*" requires a materialist *ontology*. He claims, on the contrary, that it is compatible with a whole cluster of philosophical positions - "realism or monism, positivism or sensationalism (*Sensualismus*), empiricism or empiriocriticism" - indeed with *any* philosophy except idealism (*ibid.* pp. 28, 29)!

41. Engels developed his materialist ontology in two other writings, both published after Marx' death: *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy* (published as journal articles in 1886, as a brochure in 1888) and *Dialectic of Nature* (not published until 1925, although the manuscript was written between 1873 and 1883 - the year of Marx' death - and Marx might have seen some part of it).

Although Engels perhaps *implies* that Marx had expressed agreement with the ontology and epistemology set forth in *Anti-Dühring*, what Engels actually *says* is only that (a) he would not have undertaken such a work without Marx' knowledge ("dass diese meine Darstelung nicht ohne seine Kenntnis erfolgte"), (b) he had read the whole manuscript aloud to Marx before sending it to the printer ("Ich habe ihm das ganze Manuskript vor dem Druck vorgelesen"), and (c) Marx had drafted the brief section on the history of economic theory - something of no relevance to questions of either ontology or epistemology. (Cf. F. Engels, 'Vorwort zu der Auflage von 1885', *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*: *MEW*, Vol. 20,

p. 9). It is striking that in this passage Engels (1) makes *no* reference to either ontology or epistemology, and (2) makes *no* explicit claim to have obtained Marx' agreement with *anything* in the book.

42. After all, Marx had a Ph.D. in philosophy from a good German university, whereas Engels - although an experienced factory manager - was self-taught in philosophy.

43. The new translation by Ben Fowkes (Penguin, 1976; Vintage, 1977) is much more accurate and less tendentious than the Engels edition. (Details in Appendix I). One might hope that it would replace the Engels edition, but since the latter is heavily subsidized by the Soviet government, and produced in huge quantities at low cost, it is likely to remain in general use. Not only the low cost but the authority of Engels' name on the title page will continue to recommend it not only to devout Marxist-Leninists but to many serious students of Marx.

44. It appears that the expression "dialektischer Materialismus" was first used by Joseph Dietzgen in a work written in Chicago in 1886 and first published in Zürich in 1887. Cf. his *Streifzüge eines Sozialisten in das Gebiet der Erkenntnistheorie* in *Schriften in drei Bänden* (East Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1965), Vol. 3, pp. 61, 75, 79. In a much better known work, Plekhanov, four years later, used the expression "dialektischer Materialismus" (cf. his 'Zu Hegels sechzigstem Todestag', *Die neue Zeit*, 1891; English translation in G.V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works in Five Volumes* (Moscow, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 478, 741). However, Engels came fairly close to using the expression a decade before Dietzgen, characterizing what he called "der moderne Materialismus" as "wesentlich dialektisch" - though it is worth noting that these two expressions are separated by a dozen lines of type, and "wesentlich dialektisch" directly modifies only the pronoun *er*. (Cf. *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft*: *MEW*, Vol. 20, p. 24). It seems likely that Dietzgen's coinage was inspired by Engels' formulation and that Plekhanov in 1891 was repeating an expression that he had first encountered in Dietzgen, although he makes no reference to Dietzgen in this context.

45. Lenin offers a number of variations on the theme: "Marx asserts - as Engels puts it - that *p*." Thus: "Completely agreeing with, and expounding, this materialistic philosophy of Marx, Engels ... " (*Filosofskaja enciklopedija* Vol. 3, p. 302); " ... Engels statement, which expresses Marx' ideas, ... " (*ibid.* p. 309). Lenin ascribes to Marx not only what is due to Engels but also what is due to Dietzgen and Plekhanov, perhaps most flagrantly in the "Preface" to *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909), which contains the quite groundless claim that "Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism" (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, New York, International, 1927, p. 9).

APPENDIX I

A Critical Examination of Engels' Tendentious Editing of the First English Translation of *Das Kapital*, Volume 1

In at least three respects the first English edition of Marx' *Capital*, Volume 1 (London, Swan, Sonnenschein, Lowrey & Co., 1887), edited by Engels from the translation prepared by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, makes Marx sound measurably more "materialistic" than he does in the original German.

(I) It regularly uses the term 'material' to translate not only *materiell* - which is, of course, quite acceptable, despite the variety of senses which that term has in Marx' usage (see Section II above) - but also uses a spectrum of *other* German adjectives for which this rendering is seriously misleading.

(II) It distorts expressions which are quite neutral with respect to the question of a materialist ontology in two ways: (a) by gratuitous insertion of physiologically reductionist language, and (b) by flagrant mistranslation, which introduces the term 'materialistic' in a text where it has absolutely no counterpart in Marx' German.

(III) It eliminates, or at least seriously dilutes, Marx' often quite strikingly Hegelian terminology and diction.

I shall consider each of these points in turn.

I

In the Engels edition of *Capital*, Volume 1, the English adjective 'material' is used to translate no fewer than *eight* different German adjectives, not counting the adjective *materiell* itself. The meanings of five of these are quite unrelated to 'material'; those of the other three are related to, but still distinct from, *materiell*. The five terms are: (a) *äusserlich* (external); (b) *gegenständlich* (objective); (c) *sinnlich* (sensuous or sensory); (d) *körperlich* (bodily); (e) *natürlich* (natural).

(a) The expression "äusserliche Erscheinung" is mistranslated as "material phenomenon" (26/18)[1]; Fowkes corrects this to "external manifestation" (101).[2]

(b) Equally misleading is the repeated rendering of the adjective *gegenständlich* and its cognates by the adjective 'material' and its cognates. In the first place, *gegenständlich* is itself tendentiously rendered as 'material' at least half a dozen times (210/196, 217/203, 219/204, 329/310, 343/324, 649/621); Fowkes corrects all of these as

"objective" (303, 311, 312, 425, 441, 772). In the less frequent cases, where the Engels edition correctly renders *gegenständlich* as "objective" (76/61, 86/72, 97/82, 199/184, 557/535), Fowkes does the same (154, 164, 176, 291, 675).[3] The verb *vergegenständlichen* is repeatedly translated as "materialize" and the past participle, *vergegenständlicht*, as "materialized" (59n.15/44n.2, 195/180, 208/194, 209/195, 210/195, 228/214, 230/217, 231/217, 414/392, 427/404, 609/583). Fowkes corrects these to "objectify" and "objectified" (135n.15, 287, 301, 302, 303 [twice], 322, 325 [twice], 515, 528, 730). When *vergegenständlicht* is rendered by *two* words - "materialized", "incorporated", both of them misleading (232/218) - Fowkes puts the one correct term, "objectified" (326).

Other misleading renderings of *vergegenständlicht* in the Engels edition include "incorporated" (90n.29/76n.1, 111n.53/96n.2, 117/102, 172/158, 183/169, 186/172, etc.), "embodied" (53/38, 204/189, 205/190, 207/193, 236/222 [twice], 341/322 [twice], etc.), "realized" (77/63, 195/180, 201/186, 341/322, 574/551, 596/571, etc.), and "realized in a product" (593/568, 596/571). In all of these cases except two Fowkes rightly puts "objectified". The exceptions are: (a) He leaves "materialized" at 169 in the passage corresponding to 90n.29/76n.1, since this is the term employed by the English translator of Marx' 'Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie', a work which Marx himself is here quoting. (b) In the passage corresponding to 555/553 Fowkes omits the term altogether (670).

Fowkes also corrects the misleading rendering of *Vergegenständlichung* as "embodiment" (181/167) to "objectification" (270).

The noun *Gegenständlichkeit* is misleadingly rendered in at least two ways, the first being especially tendentious: (i) the expression "sinnlich grobe Gegenständlichkeit" is translated as "coarse materiality" (62/47); (ii) *Gegenständlichkeit* alone is rendered both as "the thing produced" (204/189) and as "substance" (209/195). In the first case Fowkes corrects this to "coarsely sensuous objectivity" (138), in the other two cases to "objectivity" (296, 302).

In several cases *gegenständlich* and its cognates are simply omitted in translation. The expression "gegenständlichen Faktoren" is reduced to "factor" (the plural is also reduced to a singular) (197/182); Fowkes corrects this to "objective factors" (289). *Vergegenständlichen* is omitted in translation (212/197), as is *vergegenständlicht* (210/196, 409/388); these are all restored by Fowkes (305, 303, 510, respectively).

(c) One of the most glaring examples of Engels' tendentious editing is the rendering of Marx' phrase - referring to a commodity - "Alle seine *sinnlichen Beschaffenheiten* sind ausgelöscht" as "Its *existence as a material thing* is put out of sight." (52/38) This amounts

to rendering *sinnlich* as "material", although the further changes introduced into the text by this overly free rendering tend to conceal that fact. Fowkes gets it right: "All its *sensuous characteristics* are extinguished." (128) Note that Marx' own formulation entails only an *empiricist*, even a phenomenalist, position, whereas the formulation of the Engels edition suggests a *materialistic* position. This, clearly, was Engels' intention.[4]

(d) Marx' expression "körperliche Bestandteile" (bodily components) becomes "material elements" (52/38); in this case, uncharacteristically, Fowkes follows the Engels edition, putting "material constituents" (128).[5]

The noun *Verkörperung* is mistranslated as "materialization" (72/58); Fowkes corrects this to "embodiment" (150). A possible, but unpersuasive, reason for rendering *Verkörperung* as "materialization" may be that in this passage "embodiment" is used to translate both *Verwirklichung* (72/58) and *Verwirklichungsform* (73/58). Fowkes renders these terms more accurately as "realization" and "form of realization", respectively (150), although "actualization" and "form of actualization" would, in my judgement, be better still. (In the same passage "embodied" is used, confusingly, to render a quite different German expression: "in der ... steckende" [73/58]. Fowkes also uses "embodied" at this point [150].)

Marx' rather odd, though widely used, term *Warenkörper* (literally, "body of the commodity") is not easy to render into English; but there is no justification for the repeated use of the adjective "material" in such renderings of that term as "material commodity" (71/57), "material form" (80/65), and "material substance" (71/56).[6] The expression "der Warenkörper selbst" becomes "a commodity ... so far as it is a material thing" (50/36). Fowkes' version - 'the physical body of the commodity itself' (126) - is only slightly less misleading. On the same page 'die Eigenschaften des Warenkörpers' is rendered as 'the physical properties of the commodity' (50/36), a rendering which Fowkes simply repeats (126). It would, I suggest, be less misleading to translate *Warenkörper* as "the commodity as a thing" and to translate "die Eigenschaften des Warenkörpers" as "the properties of the commodity as a thing".

The specialized term *Rockkörper* is misleadingly rendered as "material object, coat" (171/57); Fowkes puts it accurately as "the body of the coat" (149).

(e) The adjective *natürlich* is sometimes translated tendentiously as "material"; thus the expression "Formveränderung des Natürlichen" is rendered as "change of form in the material" (193/178). Fowkes' version - "change of form in the materials of nature" (284) - is only slightly less misleading.

Stoffwechsel, the standard German word for "metabolism" is

conveyed in a series of tendentious literalisms: "circulation of matter" (119/104 [twice]), "exchange of matter" (198/183-84), "interchange of matter" (134/121 [twice]), "material exchanges" (57/43), and "material re-actions" (192/177). Fowkes renders all of these accurately as "metabolism", "metabolic interaction", or "metabolic process" (198, 199, 290, 217 [twice], 133, and 283, respectively). The expression "Stoffwechsel der ... Arbeit" is distorted into "circulation of materialized ... labor" (120/106); "Stoffwechsel der Arbeitsprodukte" becomes "circulation of the material products of labor" (128/114). Fowkes renders these last two expressions accurately as "metabolic interaction of ... labor" (200) and "metabolism of the products of labor" (210).[7]

In certain cases the term "material" is gratuitously introduced where it has *no* counterpart in Marx' text. Thus the expression "objektiver Reichtum" becomes "material, objective wealth" (596/571); Fowkes renders this cleanly as "objective wealth" (716).

The pervasive tendentiousness of Engels' editing is clear from the fact that, although all five of the terms catalogued above are regularly translated as "material", the term *materiell* is never translated as either "external", "objective", "sensuous", "bodily", or "natural" - as would presumably happen if the errors and misleading versions were truly random.[8] And, although *vergegenständlichen* is repeatedly rendered as "materialize", *materialisieren* is never rendered as "objectify". Finally, although the verb "sich darstellen" is mistranslated as "[be] materialized" (202/187)[9], the verb *materialisieren* is never rendered as "[be] presented (or "represented")".

There are three terms the translation of which as "material", while not mistaken, is subtly misleading. The terms are *stofflich*, *dinglich*, and *sachlich,* derived, respectively, from the nouns *Stoff* (substance, content, or matter); *Ding* (thing); and *Sache* (thing, affair, or enterprise). Fowkes follows the Engels edition in translating all three terms as "material", although in at least one place he renders *stofflich* as "physical" (432) where the Engels edition has "material" (334/315).[10]

Two comments are in order:

(1) These three terms are decidedly less ambiguous than *materiell.* Their primary meaning is 'material$_1$' (physical), although *stofflich* is sometimes used in the sense of 'material$_6$' (related to content; in German *inhaltlich*). They are seldom if ever used to mean either 'material$_2$' (biological), 'material$_3$' (sensuous/sensual), or 'material$_4$' (economic).[11]

(2) The abstract term *Materialismus* is readily generated from the adjective *materiell.* But there is no term *Stofflichismus* which would correspond to *stofflich*, no term *Dinglichismus* which would correspond to *dinglich*, no term *Sachlichismus* which would correspond to

sachlich. Even Feuerbach, who (as we have seen at p. 161, above) went so far as to call love *Materialismus*, would have hesitated to call it *Stofflichismus*, *Dinglichismus*, or *Sachlichismus*! Similarly, Marx, who in an early work (see above, p. 161) referred to love as a *Materialist*, would scarcely have ventured to refer to love as a *Stofflichist*, *Dinglichist*, or *Sachlichist*!

In sum, Marx' copious use of the adjectives *stofflich*, *dinglich*, and *sachlich* offers *no* support for the claim that Marx defended a materialist ontology, although the copious use of the term "material" in the Engels edition to render all three of these terms may suggest such support. In *this* respect the otherwise quite untendentious Fowkes version is no less misleading than the heavily tendentious Engels edition.

II

Certain relatively rare but striking errors make Marx sound much more "materialistic" in the Engels edition than in the original German.

(a) The term *Denkprozess* is distorted into "life-process of the human *brain*" (27/19); Fowkes gets it right: "process of thinking" (102). This error gratuitously introduces a further instance of physiologically reductionist language, which - as we have seen (pp. 166-167, above) - is already present in Marx' own text.

(b) The expression "naturwissenschaftliche ... Forschungen" is rendered as "*materialistic* investigations" (195n.5a/180n.1); Fowkes corrects this howler to "investigations of natural science" (286n.6). This is so gross an error that one might assume it to have been unintentional, and *perhaps* it was in the 1887 edition. But it has been reproduced in numerous "corrected" Soviet editions of the Engels-edited translation, printed in millions of copies. The current (1975) printing even carries the statement on its flyleaf that the "editors have ... checked the original sources and have made the necessary corrections in the author's footnotes". So, the *continuation* of this gross error can hardly be unintentional.

III

Hegel is well-known as a powerful critic of materialist ontologies; Marx' language in *Das Kapital*, Volume 1, is massively Hegelian. Thus it is not surprising that the Engels edition should have undertaken to "de-Hegelianize" as well as to "materialize" Marx' terminology and diction. I shall consider the ways in which four clusters of key Hegelian terms are rendered, namely, the nouns *Aufhebung*, *Bestimmung*,

[*das*] *Moment*, and *Vermittlung* and their cognate verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. Other terms, such as *Begriff*, *Bewusstsein*, or *Übergang* could be added, but for present purposes this relatively brief list will suffice.

Certain of the mistranslations and misleading renderings already noted in Section I of this Appendix - *e.g.*, "material" for *gegenständlich*, "materialized" for *vergegenständlicht*, and "materiality" for *Gegenständlichkeit* - serve a "de-Hegelianizing" as well as a "materializing" function. That is, they not only make Marx sound *more* like a philosophical materialist but also make him sound *less* like a "Hegelian" than does his own German text.

It is a well established principle of scholarly translation that a given technical term should be rendered consistently by the same English term, unless there are special reasons, in specific contexts, for using other terms. In the Engels edition, however, as many as *thirteen* different English verbs are used to translate a single Hegelian verb (*bestimmen*; see pp. 189-190, below). Such terminological promiscuity inevitably dissipates the strong Hegelian flavor of Marx' language, even in those cases where *one* of the multiple renderings is a "standard" or at least widely accepted translation of the given term.[12]

Fowkes' record on this score is disappointing. His considerable success in resisting the "materializing" tendency of the Engels edition is not matched by comparable success in resisting its "de-Hegelianizing" tendency. In case after case Fowkes simply repeats the misleading renderings of the Engels edition.

It is by now generally recognized that the verb *aufheben* is used by Hegel to mean "cancel, preserve, and raise to a higher [dialectical] level"; widely used English counterparts are "supersede" and "sublate" (though neither is entirely satisfactory). The noun *Aufhebung* means "cancelling, preserving, and raising to a higher [dialectical] level"; it is often rendered as "supersession" or "sublation". The Engels edition employs *five* different terms to render *Aufhebung*, but all of them convey only the first of these three meanings.[13] The terms are "abolition" (512/488, 743/715), "overthrow" (483/459), "repeal" (704/675), "sweeping away" (514/489), "upsetting" (377/356). Astonishingly, Fowkes uses precisely these same five idiosyncratic terms (619, 876, 588, 830, 620, and 476, respectively).

The verb *aufheben* is rendered by a similar profusion of terms: "[be] destroyed" (568/546), "remove" (89/75), and "sweep away" (508/484); the verb "sich aufheben" is translated as "counteract one another" (550/528) and the participle "sich aufhebende" as "self-destructive" (558/536). Fowkes' departures from these renderings are insignificant: instead of "remove" he has "destroy" (168) and instead of "counteract one another" he puts "cancel each other out" (664).

Fowkes simply repeats the other three renderings of the Engels edition: "[be] destroyed" (686), "sweep away" (614), and "self-destructive" (676).

The characteristic Hegelian meanings of the verb *bestimmen* and the nouns *Bestimmung* and *Bestimmtheit* are best conveyed by the English words "determine", "determination", and "determinateness" or "determinacy", respectively. But *bestimmen* is rendered in the Engels edition by at least a *dozen* different words in addition to the accurate "determine", namely "arrange" (253/238), "calculate" (51/37), "condition" (246/232), "constrain" (190/176), "depend on" (338/319), "destine" (201/186, 591/566), "fix" (140/126), "give" (193/178), "intend" (405/385), "limit" (224/210), "move" (285/269), "require" (142/128). In the corresponding passages Fowkes uses only *five* of these misleading terms: "arrange" (348), "condition" (341), "depend on" (436), "destine" (293, 711), and "intend" (507). Instead of "require" he puts "fix" (225). In the other six cases he renders *bestimmen* accurately as "determine"; he also does this in the thirty-odd cases where the Engels edition has "determine".

The past participle *bestimmt* is sometimes acceptably rendered as "definite" (*e.g.*, 54/40) or "determined" (*e.g.*, 581/557), but never as the preferred "determinate". It is also rendered by at least *nine* other terms, including "certain" (*e.g.* 105/90), "definite and ... fixed" (122/107), "exact" (576/553), "fixed" (*e.g.* 150/136), "given" (*e.g.*, 115/100), "particular" (*e.g.*, 364/344), "proper" (71/57), "special" (56/41, 78/64), and "specified" (192/177). Fowkes follows suit in most of these cases, although he does replace "definite and ... fixed" by "determined" (202), and "particular" by "determinate" (463).

In a number of passages *bestimmt* is simply omitted in translation (*e.g.*, 53/39, 78/64, 401/380, 471/447). In the last two cases Fowkes, for no apparent reason, also omits the terms (502, 575). In the first two he restores the omitted term, translated as "particular" (129) and "specific" (156), respectively.

The present participle *bestimmend* is sometimes rendered accurately as "determining" or "that determines" (485/461, 583/559); Fowkes follows suit at 590 and 801. But the expression "bestimmender Zweck" is variously rendered as "chief end and aim" (243/230), "end and aim" (350/331), and "goal that attracts" (164/149). In all of these cases Fowkes uses the accurate expression "determining purpose" (338, 449, 250). The phrase "sich selbst bestimmende 'Genialität'" is rendered puzzlingly as "unrestricted play for the bent" (377/356). Fowkes corrects this to "self-determining 'genius'" (477).

The noun *Bestimmung* (plural, *Bestimmungen*) is sometimes accurately rendered as "determination" (*e.g.*, 85/71, 106/91). Fowkes follows suit in most of these cases, occasionally substituting

"determinant". But *Bestimmung(en)* is also rendered in at least *nine* other ways, as "character" (86/72), 197/182), "conditions" (309/292), "definition" (531/509), "distinct things" (105/90), "essential distinctions" (638n.67/611n.2), "fixing" (537/515), "provisions" (303/286, 768/740), "qualities" (106/91), "regulations" (289/273). Unfortunately, Fowkes follows the lead of the Engels edition in most of these cases, although he replaces "fixing" by "determining" (650), "character" by "characteristic" (164), and both "character" and "essential distinctions" by "determining characteristics" (289, 760n.55). Other changes introduced by Fowkes, such as replacing "distinct things" by "attributes" (185) and "conditions" by "regulations" (405) are not significant improvements.

Certain compound terms formed with *Bestimmung* are accurately enough rendered, *e.g.*, *Begriffsbestimmung* as "determination of the concept" (77n.23/63n.1), which in fact is preferable to Fowkes' "conceptual determination" (155n.25). *Wertbestimmung* is rendered as "determination of ... value" (70/56, 337/319), 542/519) or "determining the value" (187/173); *Preisbestimmung* is accurately paraphrased as "its value is ... determined" (131/118). Fowkes offers the paraphrase "it is used to determine prices" (214). However, in the rendering of other compounds the term is either eliminated through streamlining or else misleadingly rendered. Thus, *Arbeitsbestimmungen* becomes "characteristics of labor" (97/82) and *Ausnahmsbestimmungen* simply "exceptions" (518/494). Fowkes repeats both of these misleading renderings (176, 625). *Massbestimmungen* becomes "cases of measuring quantities" (113/98); Fowkes' modification - "cases where quantities ... are to be measured" (192) - is not a perceptible improvement.

The expression "[n]ach den Bestimmungen des Gesetzes" is reduced to "[b]y that Act" (423/401); Fowkes' formulation, although more elaborate, is not more accurate: "This Act lays it down that ..." (525). The technical Hegelian term *Reflexionsbestimmungen* is denatured into "reflex-categories" (72n.21/57n.1); Fowkes gets it right: "Determinations of reflection" (149.n.22).

The abstract noun *Bestimmtheit* is sometimes acceptably rendered as "determination" (67/53); Fowkes' "determinacy" is slightly preferable (144). Elsewhere the term is misleadingly rendered as "special form" (58/44), which Fowkes corrects to "determinate quality" (134).

Following Hegel, Marx distinguished carefully between the masculine noun "der Moment" (a moment of time) and the neuter noun "das Moment" (a dialectical phase, aspect, or component). "Das Moment" (plural, "die Momente") is translated in at least *nine* different ways: "apparition" (143/129), "element" (766/737, 771/743), "fact" (119/104), "factors" (*e.g.*, 193/178), "feature" (615/589), "moments"

(370/350), "momenta" (plural of the Latin *momentum*) (779/741), "phases" (*e.g.*, 120/105), "step" (512/488). Fowkes is equally prodigal in rendering "das Moment", although he stops short of using "apparition", "fact", or "step". His favored rendering - seldom if ever used in the Engels edition - is "aspect". The favored terms of the Engels edition are "factor" and "phase", each of which appears at least half a dozen times. In some passages the plural form *Momente* is simply omitted in translation (*e.g.*, 179/164); Fowkes restores it here, translated as "elements" (267).

The cluster of terms which includes the verb *vermitteln* (mediate), the nouns *Vermittlung* (mediation) and *Unmittelbarkeit* (immediacy), as well as the past participles *vermittelt* (mediated) and *unvermittelt* (unmediated) and the adjective/adverb *unmittelbar* (immediate/ly), is of central importance for Marx, as it was for Hegel. The Engels edition dissipates the unity of this cluster into a welter of unrelated and often idiosyncratic terms. The verb *vermitteln* is rendered in at least *ten* different ways: "bring about" (*e.g.*, 145/131), "[b]e connected" (179/164), "directly transfer" (195/180), "[be] effected" (130/116, 223/208), "effectuate" (119/104, 120/105), "establish by the instrumentality of" (793/766), "[be] the means that brings about" (150/136), "secure" (350/330), "serve" (168/153), "start" (159/145, 192/177). Fowkes corrects most of these misrenderings to either "mediate" or "be mediated" but follows the Engels edition in such misleading translations as "bring about" (229/316) and "secure" (448). And he adds certain idiosyncratic renderings of his own, *e.g.*, "accomplish" (200) and "transmit" (244).

The distinctive Hegelian sense of the past participle *vermittelt* (mediated) disappears in a series of vague and arbitrary renderings; *e.g.*, "brought about [by]" (373/352, 378/357) and "by means of" (193/179). Fowkes uncritically repeats these renderings (472, 478, 285). However, elsewhere he corrects the mistranslation of *unvermittelt* (as "without a mean" [179/164]) to "unmediated" (267). He also corrects the translation of the expression "vermittelt oder unvermittelt" from "whether ... brought about or not" (380/359) to "whether mediated ... or not" (480). The rendering of *unvermittelt* as "immediately" (152/138), repeated by Fowkes (236), obscures the important distinction between *unvermittelt* (unmediated) and *unmittelbar* (immediate). The Hegelian expression "unvermittelter Widerspruch" (unmediated contradiction) is Latinized into "contradiction without a *terminus medius*" (151/137); puzzlingly, the adjective is simply omitted by Fowkes (235).

The present participle *vermittelnd*, misleadingly rendered as "intermediate" (107/92), is corrected by Fowkes to "through which ... has been mediated" (187). It is also rendered by the noun "agent"

(152/138), which Fowkes unhelpfully replaces by another noun, "intermediary". (235). In a passage which Marx quotes from Hegel's *Encyclopedia* Logic (§ 209 Zusatz), *vermittelnd* is correctly rendered in the Engels edition as "mediating" (194n.2/179n.1), but distorted to "intermediative" in the Wallace translation which Fowkes uses (285n.2).

The noun *Vermittlung* is seldom if ever translated straightforwardly as "mediation". It is typically rendered through elaborate paraphrase, *e.g.*, "by means of which it has acquired" (197/183); or else by expressions such as "intermediate stage" (170/155) and "means of effecting" (144/130); or, finally, by such terms as "instrumentality" (723/695). In certain cases Fowkes substitutes an expression containing the needed term "mediating", *e.g.* "role played ... in mediating" (289) or "way of mediating" (228). But in other cases he simply repeats the misleading renderings of the Engels edition, such as "intermediate stage" (257) or replaces "instrumentality" by the equally inappropriate term "agency" (851). Fowkes also repeats (at 449) the Engels edition's curious rendering of "Funktion der ... Vermittlung" (as "work of ... adjusting" [350/331]), although he corrects the misrendering of "durch die Vermittlung" (as simply "within" [209/194]) to "through the mediation of " (302).[14]

Accurate renderings of the adjective/adverb *unmittelbar* (as "immediate/ly") are rather more frequent in the Engels edition than is the case with most other Hegelian terms. It is so rendered at 109n.50/94n.1, 141/127, 183/169, 549/526, 630/603, 789/760 [twice], and in nearly a dozen other cases. Similarly in Fowkes (*e.g.*, 204, 273, 292, 325, 345, 504, 663, 710, 752, 927). The most frequent alternative rendering, in both the Engels edition and Fowkes, is 'direct/ly'. Cf. 70/55 [twice], 76/62, 82/68 [three times], 103/88 [three times], 554/532, 633/606, and a couple of dozen additional cases; in Fowkes: 135, 147 [twice], 154, 647, 669, 682, 683, 755, 776, 927, and a couple of dozen additional cases. But *unmittelbar* is also translated in at least *seven* other ways, some of them quite idiosyncratic; *e.g.*, "actual" (50n.4/36n.1), "at once" (103/88), "first" (194/179), "gross" (147/134), "prima facie" (170/155), "simple" (148/134), "simplest" (162/146), "simply" (93/78). Fowkes retains the misleading term "actual" (126n.4); otherwise he replaces all seven of these idiosyncratic renderings by "directly" (171, 183, 231, 232, 247, 257, 285). In at least a dozen passages the Engels edition simply omits *unmittelbar* (*e.g.*, 59/44, 103/88, 107/92, 367/347, 546/524). Fowkes also omits the term in several places (*e.g.*, 186, 467, 660).

The often quite strikingly "Hegelian" feeling of Marx' German text results not only from his copious use of key Hegelian terms but also from his broadly "Hegelian" diction and rhetoric. This feeling is

difficult to describe; but perhaps the following brief passage will give some sense of it. Marx writes: "Während des Arbeitsprozesses setzt sich die Arbeit beständig aus der Form der Unruhe in die des Seins, aus der Form der Bewegung in die der Gegenständlichkeit um." (204) The rather stolid Engels version manages to convey almost *none* of the Hegelian quality of this passage: "While the laborer is at work, his labor constantly undergoes a transformation: from being motion, it becomes an object without motion; from being the laborer working, it becomes the thing produced." (189) Unfortunately, the measurably more accurate Fowkes version conveys only a marginally greater share of the Hegelian flavor: "During the labor process, the worker's labor constantly undergoes a transformation from the form of unrest into that of being, from the form of motion into that of objectivity." (296) The word "unrest" in particular fails to convey the Hegelian sense of *Unruhe*, namely, "restlessness" - as in the expression "dialektische Unruhe" (dialectical restlessness).

* * *

It has been the aim of this Appendix to show - through an exhaustive (and perhaps exhausting!) comparison of Marx' German text with the English translation edited by Engels in 1887 - how the repeated mistranslations and misleading renderings of this edition, together with its pervasive distortions, frequent omissions, and occasional additions, combine to make Marx sound more "materialistic" and less "Hegelian" in English than he does in German. We have also seen that the Fowkes translation, which on the whole successfully resists and reverses the "materializing" tendency of the Engels edition, is much less successful in resisting or reversing the equally powerful "de-Hegelianizing" tendency of that edition.

NOTES TO APPENDIX I

1. In this and subsequent references, the first number will refer to the page of the German text of *Das Kapital*, Volume 1, in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, Volume 23, and the second number (following a diagonal) to the 1887 translation edited by Engels, currently published by Progress Publishers (Moscow, 1965) and International Publishers (New York, 1967). The Fowkes translation is referred to by page number of the Vintage Books edition (New York, 1977). Italics in all quoted passages are my own.

2. In a few cases *äusserlich* is rendered correctly as "external" (*e.g.* 102/86, 146/132), and Fowkes gets these right as well (*e.g.*, 181, 229). But the occasional correct renderings of this and certain other terms discussed in this Appendix do not make the various mistranslations and tendentious renderings any less misleading; they simply make the terminology as a whole more inconsistent.

3. The adjective *gegenständlich* is sometimes confused with the past participle *vergegenständlicht*, or at least is rendered by the same term in English. Thus the Engels edition renders *gegenständlich* as "realized" at 559/537 and, surprisingly, Fowkes translates it as "objectified" rather than "objective" (677).

The adjective *objektiv* is translated, appropriately enough , as "objective" (143/129); also by Fowkes (226). But Fowkes rightly replaces the Engels edition's "objective" for *objektiviert* (143/129) with "objectified" (226).

4. Other misleading renderings of *sinnlich* include "every-day", *e.g.*, the expression "ordinäres sinnliches Ding" is rendered blandly as "common, every-day thing" (85/71). "Sinnlich verschiedene Dinge" becomes "clearly different things" (73/59). Fowkes improves the former to "an ordinary, sensuous thing" (163) and the latter to "things ... distinct to the senses" (151). Marx' deliberate oxymoron "sinnlich übersinnliches Ding" is flattened into "something transcendent" (85/71); Fowkes has "a thing which transcends sensuousness" (163). Cf. the somewhat more elaborate rendering of "sinnlich übersinnliche Dinge" as "things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses" (86/72); Fowkes renders this accurately as "sensuous things which are at the same time suprasensible" (165).

5. Of course, *körperlich* is occasionally translated correctly as "bodily" (*e.g.*, 193/178, 394/374).

6. In the first two cases Fowkes' versions are equally misleading: he uses "material objects" (148) and "material commodity" (149). In the third case his "physical shape as a commodity" (158) is a measurable improvement over the "material form" of the Engels edition.

7. Less misleading, but still tendentious, is the rendering of *Stoffwechsel* as "circulation of *commodities*" (144/130) and "interchange of *products*" (152/138, 158/144). In the first two passages Fowkes corrects this to "metabolic process" (228) and "social metabolism" (235), respectively. But in the third passage Fowkes repeats the wording of the Engels edition; in fact, he repeats the last fifteen words of the sentence verbatim (242).

8. The only case I have noted in which *materiell* is translated by a word other than "material" is in Marx' footnote reference to St. Jerome's struggle against both "materieller Fleisch" and "geistiger Fleisch", rendered as "*bodily* flesh" and "spiritual flesh" (118n.64/103n.1). Fowkes sticks to the more literal "*material* flesh" (197n.15).

However, in the English translation (1892) of *Anti-Dühring*, supervised by Engels himself, the expression "materielle Interesse" is twice rendered as "*economic* interests" (*MEW*, Vol. 20, p. 25; English translation [reprinted from the authorized English version of 1892, Moscow, Progress, 1969, p. 37]) - a tacit acknowledgment that *materiell* in this context means 'material$_4$'.

9. Fowkes duly corrects this to "[be] represented" (294). But in another case in which "sich darstellen" is rendered by "embody itself" (55/40), Fowkes retains the misleading expression "[be] embodied" (130).

10. When translating difficult or problematic German terms, Fowkes regularly inserts the original in brackets. Here, however, he inserts the wrong term; his *dinglich* (166) should in fact be *sachlich*, as at *MEW*, Vol. 23, p. 87.

11. Although Marx repeatedly characterizes the relations of production as *materiell* in the sense of 'material$_4$' (economic), he never characterizes them as either *sachlich* or *dinglich*.

12. Certain translators of Hegel are guilty of even greater terminological promiscuity. In his translation of the *Encyclopedia* Logic, W.V. Wallace renders *Bestimmung* not only as "determination" but also in at least *thirty-five* other ways, ranging from "attribute" through "function" and "principle" to "vocation". And he renders *Bestimmtheit* not only as "determinateness" but also in at least *fifteen* other ways, ranging from "character" through "feature" and "property" to "term".

13. Engels may have assumed that Marx was using this characteristic Hegelian term in a non-Hegelian way, to mean simply "cancel" or "eliminate". This is doubtful, especially in view of Marx' repeated use of the term in Hegel's sense in the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844. But, even if the assumption were justified, the use of *five* different English words to render a single German term

obscures the terminological consistency of Marx' own usage.

14. An entire sentence containing the word *Vermittler* (mediator) is omitted, not only in the Engels edition (114) but also in Fowkes' version (209). A possible explanation of this *prima facie* puzzling fact is that the same sentence was omitted in the first French translation (1872-1875), in the final preparation of which Marx himself was actively involved (see Appendix II, below). The omitted sentence reads: "Als Vermittler der Warenzirkulation erhält das Geld die Funktion des Zirkulationsmittels." (*MEW*, Vol. 23, p. 128) (Money, as a mediator of the circulation of commodities, takes on the function of a means of circulation).

APPENDIX II

A Comparison of the First French Translation of *Das Kapital*, Volume 1 (in which Marx was heavily involved) with the Engels Edition

The first English translation of *Capital*, Volume 1, edited by Engels, was completed after Marx' death. In contrast, the first French translation was prepared fifteen years earlier (1872-1875) and benefitted from the close and sustained involvement of Marx himself.[1]

In numerous letters written between 1872 and 1875, Marx, Engels, and Marx' daughter Jenny (who was carrying on some of the correspondence of her overworked and ailing father) make repeated references to the hard and continuing work which Marx is devoting to the correction and revision of the French translation prepared by Joseph Roy of Bordeaux, someone who had been highly recommended by Charles Longuet, the French socialist and journalist who in October of 1872 married Jenny Marx.[2] Roy was recommended in particular on the basis of his "successful" translations of Feuerbach.[3]

In the beginning Marx refers to Roy as an "excellent" translator and master of both languages[4], but with the passage of time, and closer scrutiny of Roy's draft translations, he complains more and more loudly that the translation is too literal, that the language is not suitable for his French audience, that he has to correct and revise in great detail, that it would have been less work for him if he had done the whole job from scratch - without a translator![5] Although Marx was of course entirely fluent in French, having composed a book (*La misère de la philosophie* [1846]), several articles, and a great many letters in that language, he also took advantage of the linguistic expertise of his French son-in-law Longuet, who was living in England at the time.[6]

The "materializing" tendency of the Engels edition documented in Appendix I (above) does not have a counterpart in the French translation, and there is every reason to credit this to Marx' influence, just as there is every reason to assign responsibility for the "materializing" tendentiousness of the first English translation to its editor Engels. On the other hand, there is a general "de-Hegelianizing" tendency in the French translation which corresponds fairly directly to that of the Engels edition.

In what follows, I shall consider a number of problems of terminology and translation, in the order in which they were treated in Appendix I.

I

The five German terms, *all* of which were translated by "material" in the Engels edition are much more adequately rendered in French.

(a) "Äusserliche Erscheinung", tendentiously rendered as "*material* phenomenon" (26/18) is carefully and untendentiously translated into French as "phénomène extérieur" (820/350a).[7]

(b) The record on *gegenständlich* (objective) and its cognates is somewhat mixed. In most of the cases where the Engels edition has "material" (210/196, 217/203, 219/204, 343/324) the French translation has *matériel* (184/83b, 192/87a, 193/87b, 332/141b). In several other cases of "material" in the Engels edition the French translation omits the term through paraphrase.

However, in a key case of distortion in the Engels edition we find an accurate and untendentious rendering: the expression "sinnlich grobe Gegenständlichkeit" which was rendered as "coarse *materiality*" (62/47) here becomes simply "grossierté du *corps*" (22/18b).

I have noted only one case in which the French translation is clearly more "materializing" than the Engels edition: "gegenständlicher Schein" which is rendered in English as "objective appearance" (97/82) appears in French as "apparence matérielle" (60/32b).

In its treatment of the past participle *vergegenständlicht* the French translation is measurably superior to the Engels edition. There are at least half a dozen cases (as we have seen in Appendix I, above), in which this term is tendentiously rendered by "materialized" (59n.15/44n.2, 208/194, 210/195, 231/217, 232/218, 427/404); all of these appear in French as *réalisé* or "se ... réalise" (19n.15/17b n.1, 182/83a, 185/84a, 204/92a, 205/93a, 207/93b, 423/175a). In certain other cases the term is omitted in paraphrase. And once where the Engels edition has "incorporated" (for *vergegenständlicht*) (201/187), the French translation has *réalisé* (181/82b), which is appreciably better.

I have found only one case where the French translation renders *vergegenständlicht* as *matérialisé*, and that appears to be motivated by the need (Marx' insistence?) to preserve the punning formulation of the original: "Die Arbeit ... ist vergegenständlicht und der Gegenstand ist verarbeitet" (195/180). This becomes "Le travail ... s'est matérialisé et la matière est travaillée" (167/78a).

However, instead of the tendentious "is materialized" of the Engels edition (rendering "sich darstellen" [202/187]) the French translation offers the clear and accurate "se représente" (174/80b).

(c) With respect to *sinnlich*: the sentence "Alle seine sinnlichen Beschaffenheiten sind ausgelöscht", tendentiously translated as "Its

existence as a *material thing* is put out of sight" (52/38) - is simply omitted (12/14b), although it is present in the second German edition. At least its *absence* is not misleading in the way that the *presence* of the English expression "material thing" (for "sinnliche Beschaffenheiten") clearly is.

(d) The record with *körperlich*, once again, is mixed. On the one (tendentious) hand, "körperliche Bestandteile", rendered in English as "*material* elements" (52/38) is also "éléments *matériels*" in French (12/14b). And *Verkörperung*, rendered as "materialization" (72/58) is also *matérialisation* (33/23a).

On the other hand, *Warenkörper*, rendered in the Engels edition as "a commodity ... so far as it is a *material* thing" (50/36) is more accurately translated into French as "corps de la marchandise" (10/14a). And *Rockkörper*, mistranslated as "*material* object, coat" (71/57) comes out cleanly as "corps habit" (33/22b). Finally, where *Warenkörper* is tendentiously translated as "*material* commodity" (71/57), the French edition has simply *corps* (33/22b).

(e) The record on *natürlich* is about the same as in the Engels edition. "Formveränderung des Natürlichen", which in English is "change of form in the *material*" (193/178) is also " ... les *matières* naturelles" (164/76b), although the noun *matières* is somewhat vaguer than the adjective *matériel* would be.

The situation with *Stoffwechsel* is also about the same in the French edition as in the Engels edition. It is rendered by such expressions as "circulation matérielle" (17/16b) and "permutation de matériaux" (85/44a). However, in two cases at least the term is simply omitted in paraphrase. And "natürliche Stoffwechsel", rendered in the Engels edition as "exchange of matter" (198/183-84), comes out rather better as "agents *naturels*" (170/79a).

II

There is *no* counterpart in the French translation of the tendentious howlers identified in Appendix I (p. 187, above).

(a) "Denkprozess", which is distorted in the English into "life-process of the human *brain*" (27/19), comes out nicely as the untendentious "mouvement de pensée" (821/350b).

(b) "Naturwissenschaftlich ... Forschungen", mistranslated as "*materialistic* investigations" (195n.5a/180n.1) is cleanly rendered in French as "recherches scientifiques des naturalistes" (166n.5a [continued on p. 167]/77b n.3).

The problematic phrase discussed above (pp. 167-168), "... das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle", which appears in

the Engels edition as " ... the *material world* reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" (27/19) is less tendentiously rendered in French as " ... la réflexion du *mouvement réel*, transporté et transposé dans le cerveau de l'homme" (822/350b). "Le mouvement *réel*", I submit, fits better with my interpretation (pp. 167-168, above) of "das Materielle" as "material$_4$" (the economic) than does the expression "the *material* world" of the Engels edition.

III

As indicated above, the French translation is not much more successful in retaining the strong "Hegelian" flavor of Marx' German text than is the Engels edition.

It renders *Aufhebung* by a number of different terms, such as *destruction*, *suppression*, and *abolition*, all of which, like the terms used in the Engels edition, convey only the *first* of Hegel's three senses, namely, 'cancelling' or 'eliminating'. And the verb *aufheben* is similarly rendered by a variety of paraphrases with the same general meaning, among them "tout en montrant que ... ne ... " (52/30a) and "tout en supprimant" (510/209b).

The French translation uses *détermination* in several cases where the Engels edition uses a variety of terms to render *Bestimmung* (52/30a. 70/37b, 169/78b; which correspond to 89/75, 106/91, and 197/182, respectively). But it has its own variety of terms, among them *caractère*, *préscription*, and *disposition*. Thus, as in the Engels edition, the terminological unity of Marx' text is seriously compromised.

"Das Moment" (dialectical phase or aspect) is frequently omitted in paraphrase (it would be interesting to know whether Roy had "le moment" and Marx eliminated it as "too literal"), but occasionally is rendered by terms similar to some of those in the Engels edition, namely, *élément*, and *trait* (164/77a, 610/258a).

The noun *Vermittlung* is often omitted in paraphrase, but occasionally rendered misleadingly, *e.g.* as "terme moyen" (138/65b), where the Engels edition has "intermediate stage" (170/155). The adjective/adverb *unmittelbar* seems to be translated most often as *directe/ment* (*e.g.*, 165n.2/77a n.3).

The passage with the heavily Hegelian flavor discussed in Appendix I (pp. 192-193, above) loses most of that flavor in the French version as well: "Pendant le procès de la production, le travail passe sans cesse de la forme dynamique à la forme statique" (177/81a; corresponding to 204/189).

IV

In view of Marx' comment to the effect that having a French translation available would make it more certain that there would be an English translation and also easier to produce one[8], I note a few cases of apparent influence of the French version on the Engels edition.

(a) The expression "zweckmässige Tätigkeit" (purposive activity) is idiosyncratically rendered as "activité *personnelle*" (164/77a), the apparent source of the idiosyncratic English rendering "*personal* activity" (193/178).

(b) As I noted above (p. 196, n. 14), a sentence missing in the Engels edition is also missing in the French translation (94/47b; corresponding to 184/114). Engels was presumably relying on Marx' authority for this omission, which strikes me as otherwise unmotivated. The sentence was definitely included in the second German edition as well as the third German edition, from which the Engels-edited translation was made.

(c) In at least one passage where the Engels edition has "realized" for *gegenständlich* (as contrasted to *vergegenständlicht*, which is often, and understandably, rendered as "realized"), the French translation has *réalisé* (556/232a; corrresponding to 559/537).

(d) The French use of *réalité* to render *Gegenständlichkeit* (objectivity) in the compound form *Wertgegenständlichkeit* (value objectivity) is apparently the source of, or at least the model for, the use of "reality" in the Engels edition (cf. 22/18b [twice]; corresponding to 62/47 [twice]).

* * *

It seems fair to conclude that in several significant respects the French translation is *less* tendentiously "materialistic" in terminology and diction than the Engels edition. In this respect at least, Engels was *not* being faithful to Marx' intentions as expressed in the French version, in the preparation of which Marx himself was heavily involved.

NOTES TO APPENDIX II

1. *Le Capital*, trans. by Joseph Roy, "traduction entièrement revisée par l'auteur", Paris, Lachâtre, 1875. The work was first issued in a series of pamphlets or *livraisons* between 1872 and 1875; it was prepared from the second German edition of 1872, which Marx furnished to Roy in manuscript before it was actually published. The Engels edition, of course, was based on the third German edition of 1883. In a letter to Friedrich A. Sorge (June 21, 1872) Marx asserted that the words "entièrement revisée par l'auteur" were not just an empty phrase, that he had in fact put *Teufelsarbeit* into the project (*MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 492).

2. The relevant letters may be found in *MEW*, Vols. 33 and 34.

3. Roy had in fact published "authorized translations" of two of Feuerbach's most influential works: (1) *Essence du Christianisme* (traduction de l'allemand, avec autorisation de l'auteur par Joseph Roy), Paris, 1864, 390 p., and (2) *La religion: mort, immortalité, religion* (traduction de l'allemand avec autorisation de l'auteur par Joseph Roy), Paris, 1864, 369 p.

4. Marx to Paul Lafargue, March 21, 1872: *MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 437: Marx to Nikolai F. Danielson, May 28, 1872: *MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 477.

5. See in particular Marx to Sorge, December 21, 1872: *MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 552; Marx to Danielson, January 18, 1873: *MEW* Vol. 33, p. 560. In the Afterword to the French edition (dated April 28, 1875) Marx announced that he had substantially revised Roy's overly literal version in order to make his book more accessible to the (French) reader. (This Afterword is included in the German edition of *Das Kapital* [*MEW*, Vol. 23, p. 32] as well as in the Engels edition [p. 22]). In several letters Marx mentions improvements and additions that he had introduced while working on the French translation, particularly in the final chapters (on the accumulation of capital). See Marx to Max Oppenheim, January 20, 1875: *MEW*, Vol. 34, p. 119; Marx to Peter L. Lavrov, February 11, 1875: *MEW*, Vol. 34, p. 122; Marx to Sorge, April 4, 1876, and September 27, 1877: *MEW*, Vol. 34, pp. 178 and 295; Marx to Danielson, November 15, 1878: *MEW*, Vol. 34, p. 358.

6. Cf. Engels to Sorge, November 16, 1872: *MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 540; Marx to Jenny [Marx] Longuet, April 20-24, 1874: *MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 625.

7. In this and subsequent references the first number will refer to the page of the second German edition of *Das Kapital* (Hamburg, Meissner, 1872) and the second number (following a diagonal) to the French edition (Paris, Lachâtre, 1875); the 'a' and 'b' refer respectively

to the lefthand and righthand columns of these double-column pages. As in Appendix I, references to the Engels edition will be given (following a diagonal) after references to the German text in *MEW*, Vol. 23. All emphases in direct quotations are mine.

8. Marx to Friedrich Bolte, February 12, 1873: *MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 564. In a letter to Danielson, dated May 28, 1872, Marx had gone so far as to assert: "Es wird später um so leichter sein, die Sache aus dem Französischen ins Englische ... zu übersetzen" (*MEW*, Vol. 33, p. 477).

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GEORGE L. KLINE: Writings on Marx, Engels, and Non-Russian Marxism

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TOM ROCKMORE

Kline on Marx and Marxism

My task in this paper is to make some remarks about George Kline's contribution to the study of Marx, Engels and non-Russian Marxism. Now this division is perhaps artificial, since Russian Marxism, or more precisely writings on Marxism in the Russian language, clearly belongs to Marxism in general. Nevertheless, it seems better, in view of the close link of Russian Marxism with Sovietology, to which Kline has made a major contribution, to discuss his work in this area in a separate paper.

Even before we begin, we can concede that strictly speaking the study of Marx and Marxism is not Kline's main field of interest. He is certainly better known for his work on Spinoza and Whitehead, and above all for his important writings in philosophical Sovietology. But it would be an error to dismiss out of hand Kline's work in this other field. Over a period of many years, he has published a number of papers on various aspects of Marx and Marxism. My aim here will be to describe and to evaluate these papers separately and together in relation to current work in this area.

We can begin with some general remarks in order to indicate the overall shape of Kline's work in this domain, before proceeding to more detailed discussion. It is fair to say that Kline's study of Marx and Marxism displays the many positive qualities of his work in other philosophical domains, including: enormous and enormously helpful attention to detail, painstaking clarity, great sensitivity to problems of translation combined with profound knowledge of foreign language sources (especially Russian), concern with ethical values and the practical consequences of philosophical doctrines, consistent seriousness, and the selfless desire to encourage the work of other, especially younger, scholars.

Kline has done a great deal, but for those of us who know him well, it is clear that he would have accomplished even more had he not given so unsparingly of his time and energy on behalf of so many, including the present writer. In a word, Kline's intellectual rigor, which leads him to reject most sharply theories he finds harmful for human beings, is combined with a charity towards others which, although perhaps not visible in his writings, is a quality intrinsic to the philosopher and the person. I would argue that what Aristotle called *megala kardia* is constitutive of Kline's critique of the philosophical theories of Marx and Marxism precisely in terms of their possible impingement on

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the social context.

Kline's writings on Marx and Marxism are not organized around a single central theme. They rather concern a variety of themes which emerge in a series of writings, some of which are relatively or even wholly discontinuous, and others of which demonstrate varying degrees of thematic overlap; this is not simple repetition, but repeated and increasingly developed treatment of similar questions. Speaking generally, we can describe Kline's discussion of Marx and non-Russian Marxism as unorthodox, non-Marxist, and text-centered.

In modern philosophy, the problem of orthodoxy arose in German Idealism. In the wake of the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, numerous Kantian students (*e.g.* Reinhold, Maimon, Fichte, Fries) made the claim to offer the only correct interpretation of the critical philosophy. In fact, their interpretations were often conflicting and even mutually exclusive. The same situation recurs in Marxism in the well-known concern to base claims for political legitimacy on purported conceptual orthodoxy. Not all the best students of Marx and Marxism , for instance Lukács, are unorthodox in this respect, but Kline is certainly among them.

There is, of course, no satisfactory manner in which to define the term "Marxist", although my own inclination is to allow anyone who so desires to make that claim. In general, at least in the West, many of the best students of Marx and Marxism are not Marxist. There are important exceptions, such as Gerald Cohen, whose excellent defense of historical materialism gave rise to the current interest in analytic Marxism.[1] Unlike Cohen, who desired to defend Marx at all costs, Kline is more interested in a critical appreciation of the different aspects of the position. Since he does not identify himself with Marxism, and since his interpretations of Marx and Marxism are not directed towards demonstration of the alleged continuity between them, he can be ranged among the non-Marxist interpreters. As understood here, this appelation does not mean that he is necessarily anti-Marxist, even if some of his views certainly are anti-Marxist; it does mean that in a basic sense his discussion of this domain is not obviously influenced by political criteria, either for or against. In a word, so-called *partijnost'* has no role to play in his writings.

I believe that the most significant characteristic of Kline's study of Marx and Marxism is his careful attention to the texts. Close textual study has always been a necessary feature of philosophical interpretation. Perhaps because Marxism has consistently eschewed so-called bourgeois thought, the interpretation of Marx and Marxism has frequently been far removed from the actual writings, more dependent on conceptual hearsay than on actual textual examination. In part the relative absence of textual reference contributes to the poor

quality of much of the discussion of Marx and Marxism. A recent example among many is provided by Habermas' lengthy account of 'Marx and the Thesis of Inner Colonisation' in a chapter 59 pages long, with 71 footnotes, but without a single direct reference to a Marxian text.[2] On the contrary, Kline is distinguished by the painstaking care with which he tests views of the text against itself, above all in his account of what he calls the myth of Marx' materialism, which we will consider in detail below.

His writing in this area is also distinguished by a fruitful employment of the history of philosophy. Unfortunately few of the commentators, especially Marxists, are able or even willing to test the claims for Marx' position against the history of philosophy. Since Engels, Marxists in general have often merely dismissed various forms of philosophy, or philosophy itself, about which they are in general uninformed. In practice, this has meant that absolute claims for Marx and Marxism are frequently made without scrutiny of the relevant background. Kline, who is not a Marxist, is unusually adept at comparing Marx' theory with those of his philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, especially Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard. The most interesting facet of these comparisons is that he shows in detail not only what Marx learned from others, but also what he unfortunately failed to learn.

Kline's writings on Marx and non-Russian Marxism can be divided into various categories from different angles of vision. If we were to draw a diagram of Kline's writings in this area, it would not be linear, since his writings on Marx and Marxism do not have a deductive interrelation. On the contrary, they follow a rather different kind of logic in which main themes emerge in clusters and are pursued separately, often through several stages. In pictorial form the whole would look like a ramified structure, such as the Indo-European family of languages, or the tree of knowledge, starting from a single main trunk, which gives rise to main branches, some of which are more elaborately developed than others.

In Kline's case, from the chronological angle of vision there are several early reviews, in which he raises certain substantive questions, which he then initially refocussed in a couple of early articles. Here we find a series of four main themes, which he later studies in some detail, often through a series of increasingly adequate formulations in succeeding articles, including: the relation of Marx to the philosophical tradition, with special attention to Hegel and Nietzsche; forms of Marxism (*e.g.*, Kołakowski and Lukács); and the problems of humanism and materialism in Marx' thought. Since Kline is still writing, it is too soon to describe the final form of his overall discussion of this area. At present, he has reached a stage in which he is

simultaneously pursuing three related themes, already well represented in his work on Marx and Marxism: the detailed study of special themes in Marx' position, Marx' theory in relation to others, and the critique of important Marxists (*e.g.*, Engels and Lukács).

From the chronological perspective, the origin of Kline's study of Marx and Marxism lies in his early review (1954) of Rodolfo Mondolfo's book, *Il materialismo storico in Federico Engels*, and his nearly contemporaneous (1955) note on Karl Kautsky. These two sources are very different, but retrospectively significant for the future development of Kline's views. The review of Mondolfo's work on Engels is slightly longer and more substantive than the note on Kautsky. Kline here displays erudition in the discussion of a book written in Italian and scholarly care in the detection of a series of misprints. The discussion, which is sharply critical, contains objections to Mondolfo's omission of significant material in a new edition of his book as well as to the main theses he proposes. Kline's remarks on this work are important for the attention to the problem of materialism, which hence arises here at the very beginning of his attention to this domain, and for his further remarks on the ethical basis of Marx and Marxism, which anticipates his later discussion of the problem of humanism.

According to Kline, Mondolfo's three main theses, which he regards as echoes of Antonio Labriola's view, are that Engels' view of historical materialism is *not*: based upon a philosophical materialism, but on a philosophy of practice; an economic determinism, but an interactionist theory; an amoral doctrine. In this regard, Kline remarks that "One might concur, with qualifications, in Mondolfo's denial that Marx was a philosophic materialist"[3] but one must reject this claim for Engels. Kline further denies Mondolfo's effort to argue for a humanistic basis in the views of Marx and Engels on the grounds that he had failed to differentiate their theoretical statements from propagandistic exhortation formulated in humanistic, even Kantian language.

The most significant aspect of this early review is the rapid treatment of the problem of materialism in the views of Marx and Engels. This point is important for the comprehension of Marx and Marxism as well as for Kline's later writings on their views. Kline here discovers a theme which will recur in ever greater detail in his later writings, and whose analysis arguably represents his major contribution. Here, at the very beginning of his study of Marx and Marxism, he begins to drive a conceptual wedge between Marx and Engels by denying an important dimension of the presupposed continuity of their positions. Since the Marxist claim for the continuity of Marx and Engels is the basis for the supposedly seamless web

linking Marx and Marxism, which has only begun to unravel in recent years, Kline's effort to distinguish their positions in relation to the notion of materialism suggests a different, non-Marxist manner of understanding Marx' position.

The remarks on Kautsky are informative and precise. Kline here describes in outline Kautsky's career and writings. From the perspective of his later discussion, the most interesting feature is his insistence on the difference between Kautsky and the Bolsheviks concerning the relation of means and ends. Kline correctly points out that the former, who rejected Bolshevik moral relativism, accepted Kant's insistence on the absolute worth of certain moral principles or values.[4] In this way, Kline began to clarify in his own mind the theme of the relation of ethics to Marx and Marxism which he had just raised in the Mondolfo review.

Even at this initial stage, Kline's discussion of Marx and Marxism displays a detailed understanding of the main doctrines and their interpretative variants, as well as the outlines of the history of Marxism. This is evident in his remarks on the possible ways to restate Mondolfo's arguments and the available evidence. Kline's early interest in the materialistic and ethical dimensions of Marx and Marxism is further amplified in two early articles[5], in which he begins to develop these and other themes. Although there is an important thematic overlap in the two papers, they are very different. The account of 'Marx, the *Manifesto*, and the Soviet Union Today' is directed towards a comparison of then contemporary Soviet practice with Marxist theory, whereas the slightly later text concerning 'Some Critical Comments on Marx's Philosophy' takes up a series of allegedly intrinsic deficiencies of the Marxian view.

It is obviously fair to compare Soviet practice with Marxist theory, since Marx, and Marxists in general, have always invoked the criterion of practice and the Soviet Union has claimed to follow the principles of the theory. Now in a sense, Kline's discussion is overly narrow, since, despite his wide knowledge of the topic, here he examines only a single text, the *Manifesto*. The points he raises, are, however, more general. He rejects the claim of Marx and Engels to offer a purely descriptive, value-free account on the grounds that this text contains two types of statements: "descriptive generalizations and theoretical explanations of social change".[6] He further maintains, in a point he will repeatedly emphasize here and later, that because of Marx' view of the human being as a producer he over-emphasized the production of economic goods to the virtual neglect of economic services.[7] In other words, Kline believes that there is an intrinsic limitation in Marxian political economy following from the concept of human being as producer rather than as consumer.[8] Kline traces this supposed defect to his belief that

Marx agrees with Nietzsche's rejection of utilitarianism, that is, the aim of a so-called freedom-oriented life of active creation.[9] But I believe it is more probable, as I have argued elsewhere[10] that Marx is in fact following what Taylor sees as Romantic expressivism[11] present in the immediate philosophical context in the views of Schiller and especially Fichte, as well as earlier in Aristotle's concept of activity.

Here Kline's critique of the underlying theory is subordinated to his concern to use it as a measure of contemporary Soviet practice. In his critical comments on Marx' theory, he turns directly to the description and criticism of Marx' position. Rejecting, correctly in my opinion, the view that the philosophically interesting aspect of Marx' thought occurs in the early writings, he suggests that the early writings are variations on Hegelian themes. Adopting quasi-Feuerbachian terminology, he writes in part, in a description of those writings, that "what is philosophically original in them is not profound, and what is philosophically profound is not original -- because it is so clearly derivative from Hegel".[12] But this peremptory judgment raises more problems than it resolves. Even if one wanted to concede that Marx' position was largely derivative, one should resist this suggestion since it rests on the indemonstrable, and I believe false, Marxist supposition that from the philosophical angle of vision we can satisfactorily understand Marx' theory in terms of Hegel's. Kline himself calls this supposition into question when he alludes to the presence of a non-Hegelian, Kantian dimension in Marx' thought, especially as concerns the concept of the individual.

In the course of the paper Kline makes a number of penetrating observations. Again recurring to the problem of humanism, he maintains that Marx is not an ethical humanist since he offers a humanist ideal but allegedly rejects humanist principles to attain it.[13] He returns to the theme of '"Materialism" and Economics' in some detail in order to argue that Marx' theory is never formulated as an ontological materialism in any of its stages; it is rather a generalized reductivism since in his writings 'material' means 'economic'.[14] Kline suggests that Marx has too often been regarded as an ontologial materialist in virtue of a supposedly careless conflation of these terms. He further supplements his earlier point about the alleged Marxian neglect of economic services by relating it to a putative misuse of the term "material". According to Kline, this neglect is due to what he calls the dialectical inferiority of service to work in the master-slave dialectic in Hegel's *Phenomenology*.[15]

At this point in his development, Kline has already sounded in varying degrees the four main themes he will elaborate in his later discussion of Marx and Marxism, including: the problem of humanism, the critical discussion of Marxism, Marx' relation to the surrounding

philosophical tradition, and the role of materialism in Marx' thought. Although he has written forcefully on various forms of Marxism, the main stress has always been on various dimensions of Marx' own position. We need now to follow the evolution of these four main themes in Kline's later work in this field.

Kline's attention to Marxism is a persistent, but minor theme in his writing in this domain. If we bracket the interesting, but occasional remarks in articles and reviews on a variety of Marxists, especially Russian-language Marxists who are relatively unknown in the English language discussion, we can say that Kline has mainly focussed on two dissimilar figures within Marxism: Leszek Kołakowski, the dissident Pole, one of the main Marxist scholars of our time, who has now severed his ties with Marxism; and Georg Lukács, the multi-faceted Hungarian thinker, whose brilliant early work, *History and Class Consciousness*, continues to shape the Marxist discussion nearly two-thirds of a century after its initial publication.

His approach to Kołakowski and Lukács is not the same, as befits their very different relation to Marxist orthodoxy. In his Marxist phase, Kołakowski, who was quickly recognized as a critical force, opposed anti-democratic tendencies. Kline, who has always been critical of Marxism, was especially concerned to call attention to the significance of Kołakowski's work. He made a series of attempts to point out the value of Kołakowski's thought in different ways: as a form of Marxist revisionism and, later, for itself.

Kline's interest in Marxist revisionism follows his earlier interest in Kołakowski's writings. His discussion of Kołakowski begins in a review of one of the latter's books.[16] It continues in another review, where he comments on the general problem in the discussion of a book appropriately entitled *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas;* here he praises Kołakowski's contribution for its "dialectical brilliance and [its] moral passion".[17] He further considers Kołakowski's thought in detail from this angle of vision in a long paper which appeared shortly afterwards, 'Leszek Kołakowski and the Revision of Marxism', which is an expanded version of the slightly earlier essay, 'Philosophic Revisions of Marxism'.

This paper, which begins with an interesting discussion of the idea of revisionism, is based on the assumption that Marxist revisionism is more interesting than philosophical orthodoxy.[18] Kline here introduces distinctions between political and philosophical forms of revisionism as well as the approach to Marxism as ideology and as philosophy. He describes Kołakowski as the leading theorist of revisionism and as its most productive representative.[19] Kline points out that Kołakowski combines a belief in Marxism - which he, parenthetically, subsequently renounced, as Kline suggested he might some day do[20] - with a desire

to represent the so-called humanist left which makes revisionism a permanent part of its work.

The paper, which refers to certain of Kołakowski's untranslated Polish writings, but draws mainly on German translations, contains an interesting sketch of revisionism in Marxism. Kline correctly points out that for the most part revisionism represents the rejection of aspects of Engels' view.[21] He helpfully differentiates and characterizes three prior waves of Marxist revisionism: the early Kantian and Nietzschean effort, particularly in Russia; the neo-Hegelianism following from Lukács (and, we can add, Korsch); and what he calls the Kantian-existentialist, or anthropological strand, whose chief spokesman is supposedly Kołakowski.[22] Although this classification is insightful, it is unclear why there is no mention of others, especially Sartre, who, in his later Marxist turn[23], seems to have played an equal role in this movement. In fact, he is acknowledged by Kline as a main influence on Kołakowski's thought.[24]

About a third of the essay is devoted to an analysis of the Kantian-existentialist attempt to reconcile individual moral responsibility with the objective march of history, with special attention to the parallel efforts, separated by about a half-century, of Berdayev and Kołakowski. Kline suggests that the first wave of Kantian revisionism in Marxism, to which Berdyaev (with Struve) in his Marxist phase belonged, addressed the question of the justification of the claim for the superiority of the Marxist perspective. He maintains that Kołakowski, who is not influenced by Berdyaev, differs in his greater stress on the moral autonomy of the individual.[25] In particular, he resolutely condemns the idea of the "sacrifice of the existing individual to an abstract historical future".[26] Kline describes as the dilemma of Kantian Marxism Kołakowski's point that either social progress, or moral values, must be prior, but not both.[27] He concludes with a brief description of the logic of revisionism[28] which in part traverses a defense of Marx against Marxism, ending in the rejection of Marx and Marxism, in a manner which clearly anticipates Kołakowski's later break with Marxism.[29]

I believe that this essay is important for the way it brings out the Kantian background tacitly presupposed by the recent attention to the concept of human being in Marx' early writings, especially the *Paris Manuscripts*. Somewhat paradoxically, the quasi-Kantian side of the Marxian theory is more apparent in the first wave of Kantian revisionism that did not have access to these texts. The result is to reveal a non-Hegelian side of Marx' position which has precisely been covered up in the wake of the neo-Hegelian interpretation fostered by Lukács and others. The further result is to suggest that, as is Kline's practice in further accounts of Marx' thought in relation to other

thinkers than Hegel, especially including Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, there is much to learn by attempting to understand Marx against the background of the wider philosophical tradition.

Kline here discusses Kołakowski as a representative of Marxist revisionism. In the reader Kline later edited, he considers Kołakowski's thought, not as a representative of any other movement, but for itself.[30] This volume includes a foreword, a selective bibliography compiled by Kline which updates the bibliography of Kołakowski's principal writings included in the book on *European Philosophy Today*, twelve articles by Kołakowski on various topics, and a substantial discussion of the latter's work by Kline, significantly entitled 'Beyond Revisionism: Leszek Kołakowski's Recent Philosophical Development'. In comparison with his earlier discussion of Kołakowski's thought, this later effort retains all of the positive qualities, and is further augmented by a healthy critical attitude. Although Kline's appreciation of Kołakowski's importance has not diminished but increased, he does not hesitate to question numerous aspects of the latter's position at this point.

Since at this point Kołakowski has admittedly moved beyond Marx and Marxism, this paper, although interesting, mainly falls outside the limits of the present discussion. For present purposes, it will be sufficient merely to mention some main themes. Kline begins with the observation that although the revisionist phase in Kołakowski's thought is by now well-known - in no small measure, one should note, thanks to Kline's efforts - there is a post-revisionist phase dating from approximately 1959 which is as yet nearly unknown. After some general remarks, he notes that beyond intense moral commitment, personal courage and integrity, Kołakowski's revisionist and post-revisionist writings share an interest in 'rationalism'. Kline organizes his discussion around the clarification of this vague term in sections devoted *inter alia* to such topics as: rationalism in opposition to positivism, the nature and function of philosophy, insistence on the autonomy of culture, the critique of the reflection theory of knowledge, the problems of freedom and responsibility, the problem of values, and historical relativism.

The other Marxist figure to whom Kline devotes special attention is the Hungarian philosopher Georg Lukács. In general terms, Kline is sympathetic to Kołakowski's revisionist Marxism, but more respectful and more critical of his post-revisionist writing. On the contrary, he is highly critical of Lukács' more orthodox approach to Marx and Marxism. His study of Lukács, less developed than that of Kołakowski, includes two stages, an early, informative discussion based on a personal encounter[31] and a sharp, recent attack on Lukács' position.[32]

The former is mainly a report on three meetings with Lukács in Budapest towards the end of his long life. Kline here describes and comments in a relaxed way on his personal impressions of Lukács as an individual and as a thinker. In retrospect, several remarks are interesting for Kline's own views of Marx and Marxism. He notes that he mentioned having encountered Leszek Kołakowski to Lukács, who immediately stressed the need to combat every form of revisionism.[33] He mentions Lukács' critical comments on Stalinism, although he could not anticipate the later appearance of the posthumously published work, *Demokratisierung heute und morgen*.[34]

The discussion includes particularly interesting asides on the elderly Lukács' firmly positive assessment, despite his still orthodox brand of Marxism, of Hegel and Aristotle. According to Kline, in conversation Lukács described the former as the "discoverer of virgin land, an initiator of epoch-making significance" and the latter as "an exceptional innovator, who in countless fields was the first to open the path ... to new insights."[35] These comments are not only interesting, but also true; yet, as concerns Hegel, there is a direct contrast with Lukács' insistence, throughout his Marxist period, on the distinction in kind of idealism and materialism, in virtue of which to the bitter end he continually condemned Hegelian idealism.[36] Finally, the fact that, as Kline reports, in conversation Lukács spoke seriously[37] of cognitive and artistic "reflection" makes one wonder whether the latter's consistent claim to orthodoxy was only a tactical pose, as some have maintained, and not a description of fact.

The clearly respectful tone of Kline's report of his personal encounters with Lukács is obviously absent in his account of his later encounters with the latter's philosophy.[38] Whereas he earlier praised Lukács' intelligence, critical sense, erudition and synthetic powers, he is justifiably skeptical of the use to which their possessor had put them in the published *corpus*. He here criticizes Lukács for serious tensions and inconsistencies as well as by implication for his orthodox Marxist zealotry.[39]

Kline begins by pointing to tension between the Hegelian and scientistic strand of Lukács' thought. He points out problems in the view of self-consciousness and correctly notes the Fichtean background of the famous identical subject-object of history, or more precisely of Fichte as (mis)interpreted by Hegel. He helpfully demonstrates Lukács' willingness, motivated by considerations of political orthodoxy, to abandon his earlier, correct critique of Engels' views of ontology and epistemology as soon as he learned that Lenin also shared them.

I am troubled by an aspect of his reading of Lukács' relation to Hegel. He remarks that like Marx, so Lukács, in a faulty imitation of Hegel, uses the notion of historical transition to refer to the present and

future, whereas "Hegel was always scrupulously careful to locate such transitions in the historical *past*."[40] This comment reverts to a topic already noted in the earlier meetings with Lukács, where Kline was intrigued by the latter's conversational references to the present as a transitional period.[41] Now although Kline is certainly correct about the later Hegel of the *Rechtsphilosophie*, he is arguably mistaken as concerns the early Hegel of the *Phänomenologie* who precisely thought that history had arrived at a critical turning point[42], a view he only later abandoned.

Kline is more helpful in his comments on Lukács' quite uncritical, authentically Marxist tendency to conflate and to misidentify the positions of Marx and Engels. Kline is certainly correct that, despite some early objections to Engels' views, which he, we should note, later seems to withdraw, Lukács unfortunately remained a disciple of Engels' general approach. Examples, cited by Kline, include: the repeated, but erroneous reference to the position of "Marx *and* Engels"; the claim, following Lenin, that Marx' position is dialectical materialism, although the latter never used the term later introduced by Dietzgen and then popularized by Plekhanov; and the inexact attribution to Marx of a theory of historical materialism, which, as he again notes, is not a doctrine of materialism in any ontological sense.

There are some interesting remarks on the problem of revisionism, as noted, an important theme in Kline's earlier writings on Kołakowski. Following Leninist practice, as Kline points out, Lukács employs terms such as "revisionist", "opportunist", etc. in a strongly pejorative manner. He helpfully observes, however, that Lukács is not averse to revisionism from above, even to the point of falsely attributing to Lenin the Stalinist doctrine of socialism in one country[43], which was the notorious source of the break between Stalin and Trotsky.

Kline's strongest philosophical criticism is reserved for Lukács' supposedly quasi-Nietzschean, pseudo-Marxian, but anti-Hegelian future orientation. Lukács not only, as noted, allegedly misinterprets Hegel's interest in transitional periods to apply to the future; he also, going even beyond Marx, regards the future as already actual, in an example of what Kline, in a Whiteheadian turn of phrase, calls the "fallacy of the actual future".[44] Kline sees this future orientation as the basis of Lukács' twin convictions: that any form of socialism is better than any form of capitalism; and that actually living individuals may justifiably be sacrificed in favor of future, merely possible individuals.

The suggested ethical priority of the actual over the merely potential is a significant philosophical doctrine, which Kline has elsewhere developed at greater length.[45] There are certainly obvious consequences of this doctrine as concerns such pressing social problems as population control, international conflicts, etc. Now there is no doubt

that Marxist practice, in contrast with Marx' evident desires, I believe, is guilty of a perhaps unavoidable tendency towards what Kline usefully calls 'transitional totalitarianism'. But I am less persuaded that in all cases the more general doctrine of the ethical priority of the actual over the merely potential need be accepted.

An example, among many, is the case of parents thinking of starting a family who begin to make sacrifices with the future well-being of the as yet unborn and perhaps even unconceived children in mind. In a word, the deeper problem is not necessarily a future orientation as such, which can on occasion be problematic; the deeper problem, I believe, is a tendency to sacrifice people in the name of ideas, for example in terms of what Zinoviev has called a radiant future (*svetloe buduščee*).[46] Although this practice is not unique to Marxists, they are certainly among its most enthusiastic proponents.

After this discussion of Kline's views of Marxism, especially Kołakowski and Lukács, we can turn to his treatment of the relation of Marx and Marxism to the prior and succeeding history of philosophy. Now in a sense this is a constant theme in Kline's writings in this domain, which are characterized by a detailed and careful knowledge of the intellectual background. I have already noted that as early as his first publication in this area he possessed a wide grounding in the texts and in the relevant sides of the philosophical tradition, which has certainly increased over the intervening period. Nevertheless, we can distinguish between the occasional remarks on Marx and Marxism in relation to the surrounding philosophical tradition and direct study of this topic.

In Kline's work on Marx and Marxism, there is only a single paper directly devoted to this topic.[47] This essay, which dates from 1967, hence from the period of the flowering of the existentialist debate about Hegel and Marx, remains important as an early discussion of the phenomenon by someone who was at best an interested observer, as distinguished from those due to such participants as Sartre or Merleau-Ponty. In that sense, Kline's writing on this topic is comparable to such nearly contemporary accounts as the earlier, more rapid discussion of the "existentialist attempt in Marxism" by Jürgen Habermas in the course of a longer paper[48], but more compressed than Poster's later, more developed account.[49]

Kline's paper is informative in the best sense of the term and, as concerns the later Sartre, highly controversial.[50] Here we find an informative account of the rediscovery of the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, a similar section on the rediscovery of the young Marx, an account of the existential interpretation of both, with special attention to objectification and alienation, and brief, but polemical remarks on Sartre's Marxism.

In the 'Introduction', Kline states that he will focus on existential

phenomenology of the Sartrean type since it is mainly Sartre who brought the Hegel of the *Phenomenology* and the early Marx into the existentialist mainstream. But there is a certain ambivalence about his identification of existential phenomenology, as several examples will show. He takes Natanson to task for the view that Sartre's method is phenomenological in a Hegelian sense, but only quasi-phenomenological from a Husserlian perspective.[51] But surely Natanson is correct since, although Sartre shows clear evidence of Husserlian influence, he lacks a method in the Husserlian sense of the term. He further seems to suggest that Heidegger should be classed among the German existentialists, although the latter, perhaps not incorrectly, has strongly attacked this classification.[52] And it is perhaps misleading to state without qualification that the "mature" Marx was unappealing to either German or French existentialism[53]; more precisely, it is arguable that in *Being and Time* Heidegger's notion of alienation is an attempt to answer Lukács' early discussion of reification in *History and Class Consciousness*.[54]

These minor slips as concerns the precise description of existential phenomenology should not be allowed to detract from the compressed, but excellent account of the rediscovery of the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*. This account is particularly helpful for the attention to the Russian sources and to the influence of Royce on Jean Wahl. But I find unconvincing the statement in passing that "Kojève and Hyppolite between them have supplied a more useful and comprehensive commentary than any of the numerous German scholars who have written on Hegel's philosophy."[55] Kline himself inadvertently calls this generalization into question with his remarks on how odd Kojève's Marxist influenced commentary is, as well as in approving comments on the fine work of such German-language scholars as Kroner and N. Hartmann.

The comments on the early Sartre's relation to Hegel are mainly judicious and helpful. I accept the claim that in comparison with Hegel's view Sartre's dialectic is pessimistic, truncated and lacking in reconciliation. In his comparison of the Sartre of *Being and Nothingness* to Hegel, Kline develops in short compass the type of insightful reading which Klaus Hartmann, to whom he refers, has elaborated in more detail.[56] I am less satisfied by an apparently general lack of sympathy which elsewhere in this article "colors" Kline's understanding of Sartre's position and of his relation to Marxism. For instance, Kline's unqualified assertion that in his view of social relations Sartre twists Hegel's meaning[57] is only convincing if Sartre, who is influenced by Hegel, was wrong to disagree with him. It is also not clear that Sartre's Marxist turn can be attributed simply to a general sympathy with Communism.[58] To accept this point is to suppose that

ideas can be reduced to the surrounding social context, a view which Kline surely does not endorse. Although Marx admittedly lacks in his own view of alienation elements present in Hegel's, it seems hasty to accuse Marx of simplification and distortion[59] if, as I believe, his and Hegel's projects differ in crucial ways.

I have a number of specific bones to pick concerning Kline's discussion of Sartre as a Marxist. As an unqualified claim the statement that "Sartre has always been pro-Communist"[60] is simply a mistake. Well before Kline's essay appeared, Sartre had been attacked by French Communists as an anti-Communist and responded to them in a critical discussion entitled 'Les communistes et la paix', which he followed with a philosophically critical, but neglected article, 'Matérialisme et révolution'. It is possible, as Kline asserts, that Sartre's economic theory is a caricature of Smith and Ricardo.[61] But it is not silly and is in fact based, as I have argued elsewhere, on Aristotle's view of need.[62] It is further hasty to say that Marxism of any kind has simply absorbed existentialism[63]; as the long work on Flaubert shows, Sartre remains committed, in spite of Kline's contrary assertion[64], to the existentialist emphasis on the subjectivity of free individuals, which has always been a central feature of his thought. In fact, we can say that it is paradoxically because Sartre does not abandon his earlier existentialist view, which he only further develops in his later Marxist turn, that the announced project of a fusion of his own thought with Marxism failed.[65]

Kline's direct discussion of Marx' thought, as distinguished from numerous, helpful remarks in a long series of reviews and essays, focusses on three aspects: the appropriation of Hegel's thought, humanism, and materialism. The former is a focus of the recent discussion in which Kline considers Hegel's relation to both Marx and Nietzsche.[66] The topic of Nietzsche's relation to Marx and Hegel recurs often in Kline's writings, especially in the earlier study of Kołakowski's revisionism, where there is an interesting account of so-called Nietzschean Marxism.[67] Although the remarks on Nietzsche are insightful, they go beyond the scope of the present discussion. In the present context, Nietzsche is of interest only as he supposedly shares Marx' relation to Hegel.

In this paper, Kline concentrates on the appropriation by Nietzsche and Marx of certain aspects of Hegel's views of philosophy and culture, more precisely what Hegel understood as the headings of historical development and objective spirit. According to Kline, in this respect Marx appropriated two ideas from Hegel[68]: the doctrine of the cunning of reason, reformulated as the claim that the capitalist class unwittingly brings about its own downfall through the production of the proletariat; and the concept of a future Communist society as a

projection of the concept of *Sittlichkeit*, or *sittliches Leben*, which Hegel discerned in the Greek *polis*.

Now these insights are important. It is plausible to hold that the idea of the cunning of reason survives in Marx' thought. The significance of this point is to deny in part the Marxist effort - represented, for instance, in Lukács' claim[69] that in his appeal to this concept Hegel falls into mythology - to separate idealism from materialism. Although Marx knew Aristotle's thought well, it is further plausible to interpret Hegel's insistence on the recovery of the ideal of the Greek *polis* as an influence on what is arguably Marx' quasi-Aristotelian extension of *praxis* to all people in general in a future Communist society. Taken together, the two points Kline suggests tend to call into question the general Marxist view of the distinction in kind between Marx' position and the surrounding philosophical tradition. Kline implies, properly I believe, that the relation of Marx' thought to Hegel's is closer than has often been suspected.

Kline further examines what he regards as the "abuse" of Hegel by Nietzsche and Marx under the headings of critique, reduction, and reversal. He maintains in part that both Nietzsche and Marx demand that "historical developments be described and interpreted not after, but before, they occur".[70] Now it is of course correct that as a result of his own stress on the efficacy of thought, Marx favored the apparently more 'activist' Hegel of the *Phenomenology* than the supposedly more 'passive' thinker he later became in the *Philosophy of Right*. But it is an exaggeration to criticize Marx for maintaining a view of the future as history. With the possible exception of the well-known, but rather vague passage in *The German Ideology*, which does not support the objection, there is no passage in the published *corpus* which can be cited in defense of this criticism.

The most important objection Kline raises against Marx here is the latter's supposedly excessive orientation towards the future at the expense of the present. Kline writes in part that Nietzsche and Marx possessed a "shared hatred of and contempt for the world-historical *present*, which both of them saw as an obstacle to be removed or surmounted".[71] Now I believe that this statement is excessive and tends to obscure the parallel between the positions of Marx and Hegel on this point. One should not minimize Hegel's own critical stance towards the shortcomings of the present day, which, in a famous comment, he described as the rose in the cross of the present.[72] It would be a further error to overlook Marx' acknowledgment that, despite the human suffering caused by capitalism, this phase of social development is desirable and indeed necessary in order to develop the means of production as a precondition of the alleged transition to Communism. Nor do I subscribe to the claim that such Marxian

doctrines as the increasing impoverishment of the proletariat open the door to what Kline calls transitional totalitarianism.[73] In contrast, Kline is on firmer ground in his allusion to the dangers of the often mentioned, but conceptually vague, concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[74]

Kline's objection to what he sees as Marx' excessive orientation towards the future at the expense of the historical present is closely linked to Kline's understanding of Marxian humanism. The problem of humanism is already implicit elsewhere, for instance in an earlier essay on Kołakowski, where Kline notes with approval the latter's concern to condemn the sacrifice of existing individuals in the name of an abstract historical future.[75] In Kline's later writings, he elaborates this theme at greatest length in an article appropriately entitled 'Was Marx an Ethical Humanist?' Kline's sensitive discussion falls under the heading of the problem of the relation of the possible means to the end of human social self-realization, or self-fulfillment.

From the political angle of vision, there has been much debate about the relative responsibility of Marx and Marxism for the phenomenon of Stalinism.[76] Kline here proposes an interesting variation on this theme in his analysis of the Marxian concept of humanism with respect to the social reality of so-called transitional totalitarianism. Beginning from the point that the question of Marx' alleged humanism has been raised by a variety of commentators in connection with the publication of the early writings and the desire to distance Marx from Stalin, he examines Marx' thought against the background of a general idea of humanism.

He usefully distinguishes a "humanism of ideals", which is explicitly future oriented, from a "humanism of principles", which is present oriented.[77] According to Kline, only the latter form of humanism, which is concerned "to assert and defend the intrinsic value of existing individuals, "deserves to be called 'ethical humanism'". Now this distinction is perhaps problematic; it is perhaps artificial to introduce a rigorous separation of present and future orientations, as Heidegger, for instance, argues in his notion of *ecstasis*. As already noted, it is perhaps difficult to draw an inflexible line between the commitment to individual human beings and future orientation. One can readily imagine situations in which the ethical angle of vision in fact calls for a decision in favor of the future which is prejudicial to those in the present.

Kline, who presupposes the viability of his distinction between forms of humanism, argues on this basis that Marx was never an ethical humanist in the sense of a basic commitment to presently existing individuals; and he further argues that only this form of humanism could provide an appropriate vantage-point, from which to attack

Stalinism in its various forms.[78] According to Kline, Marx was committed to the future to the exclusion of the present. For this reason, he believes that Marx is closer to Nietzsche than to Kierkegaard. Against contemporary Marxists who argue that Leninism and Stalinism are not implicit in the early Marx, he maintains that there is no evidence that Marx accepted the so-called non-instrumental value of human beings.[79]

We can paraphrase this important point as the claim that Marx implicitly rejects the Kantian idea of respect for human individuals. In Kline's interpretation, actuality, or presently existing people, take absolute precedence over possible, or only future existing people. He explicitly rejects the utilitarian response that a commitment to human beings requires a future orientation. He specifically maintains that Mills' utilitarian theory is similarly future oriented, and therefore compatible with transitional totalitarianism but incompatible with ethical humanism. More generally, although he is careful not to accuse either Marx or Mill of favoring a tyranny of the future over the present, Kline believes that in each case the position taken is compatible with totalitarianism.

Now this analysis is not unproblematic. It seems equally possible to imagine a totalitarianism of the present over the future, that is, a situation in which the rights of the living were supposed as unlimited, for instance if the available ecological resources were to be recklessly consumed without regard to future generations. Now Kline can only accept this point as valid if he agrees that the future population of the planet has certain rights which should be respected even against the wishes of those now alive. But to do so would, in my view, undermine his original correlation of an orientation towards the present with ethical humanism by admitting that some kinds of future orientation, even against the presumed interests of presently existing individuals, can be moral.

The other, major strand of Kline's discussion of Marx is a study in several phases of the relation of the latter's thought to materialism. This study, which was already adumbrated earlier in repeated denials that Marx' position can be correctly understood as ontological materialism, is developed in three phases, including: an article on what Marx could and should have learned from Hegel[80], a more specialized acount of the problem of materialism in the views of Vico and Marx[81], and in the magisterial, final essay on the myth of Marx' materialism.[82]

The article on what Marx ought, but allegedly failed to learn from Hegel in part overlaps with the later paper on the 'Use and Abuse of Hegel by Nietzsche and Marx'. Kline here continues his inversion of the Marxist effort to show that Marx surpasses Hegel, in which he maintains that Marx in fact falls below the level of Hegel's thought. This short paper consists of a series of remarks directed against the

views of Herbert Marcuse and, in a single instance, Andreas Wildt's reading of Hegel's understanding of the French Revolution.

Kline here states a number of points, some of which are familiar from his previous writings. He repeats his view that Marx, unlike Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin, is not an ontological materialist, and then accuses Marcuse of misinterpreting Marx' position as historical materialism.[83] He further restates his belief that Marx could have learned from Hegel to avoid all utopianism, which, allegedly, is visible in Marx' excessively future-oriented position.[84] He again criticizes Marx' supposed refusal of humanitarian principles despite the latter's commitment to a humanitarian ideal.[85] He rejects Wildt's view that Hegel rejected only revolutionary Jacobinism, on the grounds that Hegel objected in principle to the idea of total revolution.[86] And he ends with a question intended to demonstrate the conceptual distance between Marcuse on the one hand and Hegel and even the mature Marx on the other.[87]

As concerns the widespread, but uncritical assumption that Marx is a materialist, the thrust of Kline's examination of this dogma, here and elsewhere, is to call into question the supposed distinction in kind between Marx' position and the philosophical tradition as such. He continues this task in the more specialized examination of the problem of materialism in the views of Vico and Marx. His double aim now is to show that Vico's form of idealism is closer to Hegel's than to either Berkeley's or Kant's, and to deny that Marx was ever a philosophical materialist.[88] As concerns the latter point, he concedes that various forms of Marxism may qualify as materialism; but he asserts that even if Marx used the term *materiell* in a careless manner, the latter's insistence on the priority of economic factors does not commit him to a materialist ontology.[89]

Kline notes Vico's belief - which, parenthetically, anticipates Wittgenstein's later view - that errors in philosophy spring from the equivocal use of language[90], and then applies this doctrine to separate no less than six distinct meanings of the term "material" in Marx' corpus![91] He maintains that the frequent misinterpretation of Marx' position as a philosophical materialism is due to the latter's imprecise terminology, as well as to two further factors[92]: a stress on the production of goods to the exclusion of economic services, and a generalized economic reductionism. He further maintains, correctly I believe, that Marx' form of reductionism does not justify its description as a materialist ontology, presumably because Marx' position makes no claim about matter at all.

If Kline had done nothing else in this domain, his useful differentiation of a half dozen senses of the term 'material' would count as a fundamental contribution in a confused and confusing debate where

the texts are only rarely scrutinized with care. In breaking with the frequent, but sterile practice of countering undemonstrated assertions through other equally undemonstrated assertions, Kline casts a clear and strong light on what Marx said as opposed to what he is supposed to have said. Certainly, careful discussion of this kind is a reasonable precondition for progress in this domain, if indeed such is possible at all. It is significant that at this late date, and to a perhaps unprecedented degree, agreement is lacking even on the broader outlines of Marx' overall theory. In distinction to the more usual tendency to ignore wholly or mainly the printed page in discussions of Marx and Marxism, Kline's careful attention to the Marxian texts is important, useful, and a model of its kind.

The remainder of this paper contains a rapid sketch of Vico's ontology, and its invidious comparison to Marx' view. Kline's aim is to show that as concerns the study of human institutions, Vico is not only closer than is Marx to Hegel, but also closer to the truth. According to Kline, Vico's superiority lies in his wider awareness of cultural factors in human history.[93] I think we can safely concede that Vico proposes a richer analysis than does Marx of what - in terminology Marx only occasionally used - is the superstructural plane. On the contrary, Vico seems to lack a concern which Marx made central to his social analysis, and which arguably is in part responsible for the relatively "thin" character of Marx' understanding of various facets of culture, that is, the intention to comprehend culture in general, what Hegel would call *Bildung*, as a function of the economic organization of society.

In the final phase of his study of Marx' alleged materialism, Kline takes up this topic again in a valiant, indeed, heroic effort to lay the ghost of this misleading dogma to rest. The discussion is based on the synthetic reformulation and further elaboration of various strands of an argument which has emerged piecemeal in a number of earlier publications. His attempted refutation, which is exceedingly thorough and well thought out, includes analysis[94]: of factors internal to Marx' thought, such as a certain terminological imprecision; the insistence on the primacy of economic factors in the comprehension of the social context; the stress on goods and the neglect of economic services; and a so-called intra-categorial form of economic reductionism; and of factors external to Marx' position, such as the failure to disassociate himself from Engels' materialism, the latter's tendentious editing of the first and still used English translation of *Capital*, and the widespread Marxist tendency to conflate Marx and Engels as "Marx-Engels".

Although this version of the argument is indeed much improved, it is also in part repetitive of discussions we have previously mentioned. It will be sufficient to note the ways in which Kline now goes beyond or otherwise improves upon earlier efforts to refute the characterization

of Marx' position as materialism. As compared with the paper on Vico and Marx, the present essay offers a notably fuller account of the six ways Marx employs the term "material", including a careful description of the differences between various writings, and comparisons to various senses of "material" in the wider philosophic tradition.

This is close textual reading in its most impressive form, so highly unusual as to be almost unprecedented in the study of Marx and Marxism. In the course of this part of the discussion, Kline further comments on a number of related matters. For instance, he notes that his differentiation of the various meanings of "material" may be problematic for Cohen's well-known interpretation of Marx.[95] He further speculates that Marx' tendency to employ such words as *Kopf*, *Hirn*, and *Gehirn* to mean 'mind' may mislead commentators into thinking that Marx is an ontological materialist.[96] And he distinguishes usefully between economic and other forms of reductionism in order to argue, correctly in my view, that Marx' effort to explain various aspects of the superstructure in terms of the economic base did not commit him to a materialist ontology.[97]

Kline further considers the relation of Marx' focus on commodities and general neglect of economic services to his alleged materialism. He notes that in itself commodity analysis does not commit Marx to a materialist ontology.[98] He further attempts to explain Marx' neglect of economic services in terms of[99]: the admittedly ambivalent attitude in the work of Smith, Steuart and preceding writers; Hegel's depiction of *Dienst* as superseded by *Arbeit*; and the etymological connections of such terms as "service", "servant", "servitude", and "servility". And he notes Marx' tacit assumption that economic goods satisfy so-called primary, or *materielle Bedürfnisse*.[100] But although these are factors which tend to explain why Marx was more interested in goods than services in general, it seems unlikely that his neglect of services in favor of goods is responsible for the misattribution to him of a form of materialist ontology. In fact, I am unclear as to the precise relation of this otherwise interesting *excursus* on the intrinsic limits of Marxian political economy to the overall effort to refute the Marxist dogma of materialism.

Kline ends his paper by listing a series of three reasons to explain the fact that what he regards as the myth of Marx' materialism has been so uncritically accepted[101]: Marx' failure to disassociate himself from the materialist ontology sketched in what became *Anti-Dühring*; Engels' editing of the Moore/Aveling English translation of Volume 1 of *Capital* in ways which make it sound more 'materialistic' than the original; and the power of the institutionalized insistence on the strange, mythical, hyphenated beast known as "Marx-Engels", which exists only in the Marxist literature and Marxist political reality. Now the first reason can

hardly be denied, and Kline usefully provides an abundance of textual evidence to support his view of Engels' "translation crimes". And although there are many political reasons to believe in the existence of that mythical author called Marx-Engels, there are no philosophical ones.

In this paper, I have retraced and commented on the main lines of George Kline's discussion of Marx and Marxism over a period of some thirty years. As we have seen, Kline's particular talent is the analytical discussion of individual concepts through a painstaking textual exegesis against the background of the wider philosophical tradition. This kind of discussion, which is rare in any event, is especially rare, but equally desirable, in the area of Marx and Marxism, which continues to suffer from a politically inspired literature composed too frequently of assertion and counter-assertion whose relation to the text is distant at best. An example among many is provided by Kline's finely crafted refutation of the dogma of Marx' materialism, which he has decisively demolished. In this way, there is no question that he has opened a major, but widely unperceived breach, in the continuous wall connecting Marx to Marxism which Marxists have been concerned to erect.

In general terms, Kline's work in this domain contributes to the demystification of Marx and Marxism by criticizing some of the mythical views, especially as concerns Marx, rampant in the secondary literature. The result, as he notes is the case for Marxist revisionism in general, is to separate Marx from Marxism. I am convinced that this is useful and indeed necessary if we are ever to take the measure of Marx' view, which, despite the best efforts to conflate it with Marxism, differs radically from those of his followers. I am further convinced that at this late date it is highly unlikely that political passions have as yet cooled to the point where this has become a likely possibility. I conclude, therefore, that Kline's careful discussion of Marx and Marxism holds out important promise for further work in this field; but we have not yet reached the historical moment when it is likely that his contribution, which in other regions of the philosophical tradition would receive an important echo, is likely to be appreciated in terms of its intrinsic value.

NOTES

1. See G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defense*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978.
2. See Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., 1981, II, 'Marx und die These der inneren Kolonisierung', pp. 489-548.
3. 'Review of Rodolfo Mondolfo, 'Il Materialismo storico in Federico Engels', *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 51 (1954), p. 387.
4. See 'Karl Kautsky', [see p.214, above] p. 534.
5. 'Marx, the *Manifesto*, and the Soviet Union Today', and 'Some Critical Comments on Marx' Philosophy'.
6. 'Marx, the *Manifesto*, and the Soviet Union Today', *Ohio University Review*, Vol. 6 (1964) p. 67.
7. See *ibid.* p. 69.
8. See *ibid.* p. 71.
9. See *ibid.* p. 72.
10. See my book, *Fichte, Marx and the German Philosophical Tradition*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1980.
11. See Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, Cambridge University Press, 1975.
12. 'Some Critical Comments on Marx's Philosophy', in *Marx and the Western World*, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz, Notre Dame U.P., 1967, p. 419.
13. See *ibid.* p. 421.
14. See *ibid.* pp. 424-425. Kline here follows, as he notes, the Russian intellectual historian Paul Milyukov.
15. See *ibid.* p. 428.
16. See 'Review of Leszek Kołakowski, *Der Mensch ohne Alternative: Von der Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit Marxist zu Sein.*', *Ethics* Vol. 73 (1962-1963) pp. 64-66.
17. Leopold Labedz (ed.), *Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas*, NY, Praeger, 1962. p. 70.
18. See 'Leszek Kołakowski and the Revision of Marxism', in *European Philosophy Today*, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1965, p. 14.
19. See *ibid.* p. 124.
20. See *ibid.* p. 152.
21. See *ibid.* p. 129.
22. See *ibid.* p. 128.
23. See especially Jean-Paul Sartre, *Search for a Method*, Random House, NY, 1968.
24. See, *e.g.*, 'Beyond Revisionism: Leszek Kołakowski's

Recent Philosophical Development',*Tri-Quarterly 22: A Kołakowski Reader* (1971), p. 14.

25. *Ibid.* p. 143.
26. *Ibid.* p. 144.
27. See *ibid.* p. 149.
28. *Ibid.* p. 155.
29. This break is clearly apparent in his masterly, three-volume study, *Main Currents of Marxism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978.
30. See *A Leszek Kołakowski Reader.*
31. See 'Impressions of the Man and his Ideas', in *ibid.*
32. See 'Lukács' Use and Abuse of Hegel and Marx' (in ms.).
33. See 'Impressions ... ', p.63.
34. This book, edited by László Sziklai, was published by the Akadémiai Kiadó in Budapest in 1985 and then curiously almost immediately withdrawn from publication.
35. See *ibid.* p. 65.
36. On this point see Georg Lukács, *Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. Hegels falsche und echte Ontologie*, Luchterhand, 1971. For a study of Lukács' reading of Hegel's thought, see my 'Lukács et la lecture marxiste de Hegel', *Laval théologique et philosophique*, 43, 1 (février 1987), pp. 81-90.
37. See 'Impressions... ', p. 66.
38. See 'Lukács Use and Abuse ... '
39. He comes close to Kołakowski's famous assessment of Lukács as the outstanding example in our time of the betrayal of reason. See Kolakowski, *Main Currents ...*, vol. 3, p. 307.
40. *Ibid.* p. 9.
41. See 'Impressions of the Man ... ', p. 63.
42. For instance, in the famous *Vorrede* to the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, he writes: "Es ist übrigens nicht schwer zu sehen, da ss unsre Zeit eine Zeit der Geburt und des Übergangs zu einer neuen Periode ist." See Hegel, *op. cit.* p. 15.
43. See 'Lukács Use and Abuse ...', p. 13.
44. See *ibid.* p. 14.
45. See, especially, his article '"Present", "Past", and "Future" as Categoreal Terms, and the "Fallacy of the Actual Future"', in *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 40, no. 2, December 1986, pp. 215-235.
46. See Alexandre Zinoviev, *L'avenir radieux,* Paris, 1978.
47. See 'The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and Marx', in *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
48. See Jürgen Habermas, 'Literaturbericht zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus (1957)', in *Theorie und Praxis*, Suhrkamp, 1972, pp. 389-463. This text was originally

published in 1957.

49. See Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France*, Princeton University Press, 1975.

50. In a recent book, a well-known Sartre specialist has taken issue with Kline's attempt to drive a conceptual wedge between the early and later phases of Sartre's thought. See Thomas R. Flynn, *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism*, University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. xii.

51. 'The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and Marx', p. 113, n. 1.

52. See Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', in David F. Krell (ed.), *Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings*, Harper and Row, 1977.

53. See 'The Existentialist Rediscovery ... ', p. 121.

54. See Lucien Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger.*

55. 'The Existentialist Rediscovery ... ', p. 120, n. 19.

56. See Klaus Hartmann, *Sartre's Ontology*, Northwestern University Press, 1966, and *Sartre's Sozialphilosophie. Eine Untersuchung zur "Critique de la raison Dialectique, I"*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1966.

57. See 'The Existentialist Rediscovery ... ', p. 128.

58. See *ibid.* p. 122.

59. See *ibid.* pp. 132-133.

60. See *ibid.* p. 135.

61. See *ibid.* p. 136.

62. *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 5, ch. 5, 1133a25-28. For a discussion, see my paper, 'Sartre on Living Theory', *Eros*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 82-94.

63. See 'The Existentialist Rediscovery ... ', pp. 137, 138.

64. *Loc. cit.*

65. For a recent examination of this question, see Flynn, *op. cit.*

66. See 'The Use and Abuse of Hegel ... '.

67. See 'Leszek Kołakowski and the Revision of Marxism', pp. 135 ff.

68. See 'The Use and Abuse ... ', pp. 2-3.

69. See Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 1971, pp. 146-149.

70. 'The Use and Abuse of Hegel ... ', p. 7.

71. *Ibid.* p. 9.

72. For some discussion of this point, see my paper, 'Hegel and the Social Interests of Reason', in *Zur Architektonik der Vernunft*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1987.

73. See 'The Use and Abuse ... ', p. 22.

74. *Loc. cit.*

75. See 'Leszek Kołakowski and the Revision of Marxism', p. 145.

76. For a helpful summary of six analyses of this problem, see David Joravsky's Introduction to Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge, The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, Vintage, NY, 1973, esp. pp. xiv-xv.

77. See 'Was Marx an Ethical Humanist?', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 9 (1969), p. 93.

78. *Loc. cit.*

79. See *ibid.* p. 99.

80. See 'Was Marx von Hegel hätte lernen können ... und sollen', *Hegel-Studien*, 1974, pp. 497-502.

81. See 'The Question of Materialism in Vico and Marx', in *Vico and Marx: Affinities and Contrasts*, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities, 1983, pp. 114-125.

82. See 'The Myth of Marx' Materialism', *Annals of Scholarship* Vol. 3, No. 2 (October 1984) pp. 1-38..

83. See 'Was Marx ... ', p. 499.

84. See *ibid.* p. 500.

85. See *ibid.* p. 501.

86. *Loc. cit.*

87. *Loc. cit.*

88. See 'The Question of Materialism in Vico and Marx', p. 114.

89. *Loc. cit.*

90. *Loc. cit.*

91. See *ibid.* p. 116.

92. See *ibid.* p. 118.

93. See *ibid.* p. 125.

94. See 'The Myth of Marx' Materialism', p.1; in the present volume, p. 158.

95. See *ibid.* p. 9; in the present volume, p. 166.

96. See *ibid.* pp. 9-11; in the present volume, pp. 166-167.

97. See *ibid.* pp. 11-12; in the present volume, pp. 167-168.

98. See *ibid.* pp. 12-13; in the present volume, pp. 169-170.

99. See *ibid.* pp. 13-15; in the present volume, pp. 170-171.

100. See *ibid.* p. 17. In the revised version of 'The Myth of Marx' Materialism' included in the present volume, Kline has omitted the controversial section on *materielle Bedürfnisse.*

101. See *ibid.* pp. 17-19; in the present volume, pp. 173-175.

PHILIP T. GRIER

George L. Kline's Influence on the Study of Russian and Soviet Philosophy in the United States

The published contributions of Professor George L. Kline to the study of Russian and Soviet philosophy are by now so numerous, and have been continuously sustained over so many years, that the field itself owes a significant part of its shape to them. It is also true that his personal presence has made a substantial difference: the unfailing generosity with which he has encouraged and assisted numerous other scholars over the years, and the example of scrupulous care he has set as a scholar, have been persistent influences for many of us. Such contributions as these last ones are not denumerable, and hence must be left largely out of account in a survey of his published works such as this will be. However it is difficult to imagine what the shape of Russian and Soviet philosophical studies in America would have been over the past thirty years or so without the presence of George Kline as one of its central figures. Nor has his influence been confined to the American intellectual scene; he is widely known and respected among European scholars, and has often served as a personal bridge between scholars on both continents.

In order to understand the significance and quality of Kline's contribution to the field, it is important to remember that Russian and Soviet philosophy constitute only one among a number of his fields of scholarly work. His commentaries on Russian and Soviet philosophy have been complemented by his contributions as a philosopher, intellectual historian, and translator, to name a few of the more obvious descriptions which could be applied. In a review many years ago of Isaiah Berlin's then newly published *The Hedgehog and the Fox,* Kline remarked that, "Professor Berlin is unique among contemporary scholars in being equally at home in general philosophy and in the intellectual and cultural history of Western Europe and of Russia."[1] Whether or not the remark was true when uttered, I think it could not be held true now, if only because of the career of Kline himself. Also, there seems to be a generally greater familiarity with Russian and Soviet philosophical perspectives on the part of many writers in Western Europe and America today. Perhaps that very fact is also some measure of the degree to which scholars such as Kline have succeeded, in the period since the second World War, in bringing about a much wider awareness of the contributions of Russian thought, and also in demonstrating their relevance to Western European experience more

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narrowly conceived.

As a philosopher, Kline is particularly known for his studies of the metaphysics of Spinoza, Hegel, and Whitehead. His interest in the interpretation and critique of Marx and Marxism is well established, and is the subject of a separate article in the present volume.[2] (That interest is of course significantly intertwined with his studies of Russian and Soviet culture). One of the persistent strands in his critique of Marx has been *ethical*.[3] That concern with the ethical represents another significant dimension of his work as a whole. Over the years he has returned to the subject frequently, most often in defense of the presently existing individual threatened with subsumption under some future-oriented valuational scheme, either cultural (Nietzsche) or collectivist (Marx).

As an intellectual historian Professor Kline's interests have ranged over much of modern philosophy and culture, touching especially upon developments in ethics, religious thought, and politics. His discussions of the development of thought in Russia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe have woven them very knowledgeably into the larger tapestry of European thought.

As a translator he is particularly well-known in recent years for his numerous translations of poems by Joseph Brodsky, and various introductions to them. He was largely responsible for introducing the poetry of Brodsky to English readers. Kline's contribution as one of the principal English translators of Brodsky's work, in collaboration with the poet, is an especially interesting story and deserves separate treatment elsewhere.[4] It is only mentioned here as a reminder of his exceptional abilities as a linguist and translator.

The majority of his published translations are from Russian to English; though others are from German and from Spanish. For example, Kline's mastery of the relevant languages is nicely illustrated in a recent paper of his devoted to an appreciation (and critique) of Gustav Shpet's Russian translation of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.[5] In that paper he selects passages from Shpet's Russian text under five headings: "(1) passages which exhibit key points of Hegelian doctrine; (2) passages which are marked by special eloquence and rhetorical power; (3) passages which exhibit a - perhaps unexpected - beauty and lyricism; (4) passages which display Hegel's famous irony; and finally (5) those which exhibit his mordant wit and even 'black humor'."[6] These five headings, it seems to me, serve as evidence of Kline's own very special sensitivity to language, a sensitivity which is always tuned both to philosophical nuance and to poetic achievement. If further evidence be needed, one might also cite Kline's 1974 essay on 'Philosophical Puns', in which he identified and classified numerous philosophical puns occurring in Greek, German, Russian, French, and Danish, not to mention English.[7]

In this respect Professor Kline has quite admirably transcended the ancient suspicions of the philosopher directed toward the poet, especially where language itself is concerned. In one of his earliest works, discussing the task of the humanist, Kline commented on the point at which poetry and philosophy intersect:

> A part of the humanist's task, I would argue, is what, paraphrasing Whitehead, we might describe as "the attempt to express the infinity of the world in finite language". And it is precisely in their approach to this hopeless yet noble undertaking that poetry and philosophy enter into their most intimate and fruitful interaction.[8]

Kline was there recalling Santayana's observation that the natural and cosmic background against which human actions and passions play themselves out, and not the immediate foreground of human social arrangements, supplies the most appropriate perspective for estimating human achievements and failures. Santayana, himself a splendid writer, exemplifies this occasional intersection of philosophic and poetic ability, as do, incidentally, a striking number of the Russian thinkers who have particularly interested Kline.

In any event, these observations on philosophy and poetry have a double relevance in the present context. First, Professor Kline has produced many of the translations employed by students in the field, for which we may be grateful. Second, and quite independently of the translation question, Kline's work in philosophy is characterized by an exceptional consciousness of terminological nuance, exactitude, and consistency of usage, be it in the texts of Whitehead, Spinoza, Hegel, or Marx, whatever the language of the text.[9] In his case skill in the philosophical use of language and skill in poetic use appear to go hand in hand to an unusual degree.

Since Kline's contributions to the study of Russian and Soviet philosophy have been so numerous, and have come in a variety of forms, in what follows I shall divide them into two general categories: (1) enhancement of resources available to scholars in the field, and (2) Kline's own studies of the subject, which will be further subdivided into four themes or topics of research.

I. ENHANCEMENT OF AVAILABLE SCHOLARLY SOURCES

Apart from his own studies of the subject, English-speaking students of Russian and Soviet philosophy owe much to Professor Kline for the enhancement of resources available to them in at least six other forms: (1) translation of the single most important and comprehensive history

of the subject, (2) translations of numerous Russian and Soviet philosophic texts, (3) providing numerous encyclopedia articles on the subject, (4) reviewing contemporary Russian-language publications in philosophy (Soviet and other), (5) providing bibliographic compilations, and (6) rendering tireless editorial services of the highest order in a great variety of contexts.

1. Zenkovsky's *History of Russian Philosophy*

One of Kline's earliest major services to the field was of course his very prompt, fine translation of Zenkovsky's *History of Russian Philosophy*.[10] The two volumes of the original Russian text appeared in 1948 and 1950 in Paris. Kline's translation of both volumes was completed in 1952 and published in 1953, incorporating revisions and corrections offered by Zenkovsky subsequent to the publication of the original Russian edition. In that sense, Kline's translation became the authoritative version of the text.

Despite the appearance of other histories of Russian thought in the interim, none has superseded Zenkovsky's as the standard account of the subject for most philosophical purposes; it remains the single source most useful as a general survey and reference for the student of Russian philosophy. While it does not cover developments in Soviet philosophy beyond the immediate post-Revolutionary period, it contains a full account of the contributions of Russian philosophers and theologians in exile, up to the time of publication in the late 1940's.

2. Translations of Original Sources

Turning to translations of Russian and Soviet philosophical texts themselves, one of Kline's earliest works (1952) was the book *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy* which contained, in addition to a very substantial introductory essay on the treatment of Spinoza by Russian and Soviet philosophers, translations of seven Soviet studies on Spinoza from the period of the 1920's.[11] These essays all preceded the imposition of the more extreme Stalinist controls on published philosophy, and reveal the early struggles of would-be 'dialectical materialists' to define the nature of their own 'materialism' partly by comparison and contrast with that of Spinoza.

Kline also contributed a significant number of translations of original Russian philosophic texts to the very important three-volume anthology *Russian Philosophy*, edited by James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, and Mary-Barbara Zeldin "with the collaboration of George L. Kline".[12] That anthology has played a crucial role in furthering the

study of Russian philosophy in English-speaking countries over the twenty years since its original publication. Its appearance made it feasible for the first time for college and university instructors routinely to offer courses in Russian philosophy based upon an excellent, representative sampling of texts from the entire history of the subject, presented in fine English translations with very useful introductions. The existence of this anthology has contributed enormously to an awareness of the distinctive content of Russian philosophy among successive generations of students.

Kline's contribution included translations of Skovoroda, Kovalinsky, Radishchev, Leontiev, Fyodorov, Soloviev, Shestov, Bogdanov, and Akselrod. More than that, as the editors stated in their 'Acknowledgements', Kline

> also gave substantial help by revising several other translations, by suggesting selections to be included, by putting at our disposal his vast fund of general and specific knowledge in the field of Russian thought and Russian philosophy, and by giving us invaluable aid and advice in the preparation of this work as a whole and of each of its parts. Without his help and inspiration the publication of this historical anthology of Russian philosophy could have been neither successfully planned nor achieved.

3. Encyclopedia Articles

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, has played a unique role in the recent history of English-speaking philosophy, replacing all previous attempts at a philosophical encyclopedia in English (also surpassing them greatly in size and coverage of the subject).[13] It is still regularly consulted by students of philosophy. At twenty years of age the *Encyclopedia* is perhaps less consulted for its treatments of contemporary topics in philosophy, which are by now in many instances growing somewhat dated, but still much consulted for its extremely useful accounts of the history of various problems in philosophy and for its capsule summaries of the contributions of an enormous number of individual philosophers.

George Kline's contribution to the *Encyclopedia*, in addition to serving on the Editorial Board, consisted of fifteen articles, including the survey article on 'Russian Philosophy', and articles on fourteen individual Russian philosophers, ranging from major figures such as Herzen, Solovyov, Shestov, and Frank, to lesser known philosophers such as Kavelin, Kareyev, Bazarov and Volsky. Kline's articles, together with those of James P. Scanlan (another member of the

Editorial Board, who contributed a similar number of articles on individual Russian philosophers), plus a few other contributions, made the Edwards *Encyclopedia* a significant resource for students of Russian philosophy.

In addition to his contributions to the Edwards *Encyclopedia*, Kline has produced articles for at least seven other encyclopedias and dictionaries on a variety of topics such as 'Russian Philosophy', 'Current Soviet Morality', 'Russian Religious Thought', 'Brodsky', 'Shestov', and 'Solovyov', to name a representative sampling of them.[14]

4. Reviews of Russian-Language Sources

Over the years Professor Kline has written a great many reviews connected with Russian and Soviet philosophy, reviews of other scholars' studies of the subject, as well as reviews of Soviet publications in philosophy. For instance, during the 1950's Professor Kline reviewed approximately thirty Soviet publications in the fields of formal logic, philosophy of logic, and mathematics, primarily for the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*. These, combined with studies and translations which he also did in the same time frame, provided a rather detailed look at the main directions of Soviet work in the (for them) newly emerging field of formal logic.

5. Bibliographies

In quite a few contexts Professor Kline has made available bibliographies which he was uniquely positioned to contribute. These include bibliographies of works in Russian and also in other languages concerning the history of Russian thought and culture, a bibliography of Brodsky's published writings, and others.[15]

6. Editorial Services

It would not do to pass over in silence Kline's services as an editor in a great variety of contexts. In addition to editing a number of anthologies such as *Soviet Education* (1957), *Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on his Philosophy* (1963), *European Philosophy Today* (1965), in which he also wrote the chapter on Kołakowski, as well as co-editing the above-mentioned three-volume anthology *Russian Philosophy*, he also serves as consulting editor of the *Sovietica* monograph series, the journal *Studies in Soviet Thought* and several other journals not directly

related to Russian or Soviet philosophy.[16] His care and exactitude as an editor are extraordinary, as anyone who has worked with him can attest; perhaps not every reader is aware, however, of the tireless efforts taken on his or her behalf in Kline's editorial work.

II. KLINE'S STUDIES OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET THOUGHT

Looking back over the years, one can see that Professor Kline's own studies of Russian and Soviet thought have been focused on several connected topics. (1) Most prominent among these topics perhaps would be religion and religious thought in Russia and in the U.S.S.R. In addition to the book *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia*, a considerable number of articles touching on that subject in one way or another have been published. (2) Russian and Soviet ethical thought constitute another major focus of his work. He has published a number of articles on this subject, and has for many years taught a course on the history of Russian ethical and social theory based upon materials of his own, some of which are unpublished. (3) Soviet Marxism-Leninism has received particular attention, both as a philosophical position in its own right, and in its connections with Soviet policy and practice, *e.g.* Soviet concepts of crime and legality. He has concentrated especially upon the topic of Soviet 'dialectical materialism' and more generally upon the notion of 'materialism' in Marx. That particular work is the province of another contributor to this volume, however, so I shall not deal with it here.[17] (4) In a number of contexts over the years Kline has very ably explored and defended a version of ethical individualism to which he is committed. That underlying commitment can be examined through various essays having no explicit connection with Russian or Soviet thought, such as his Presidential Addresses for the Metaphysical Society and the Hegel Society this past year.[18] However, since this theme often emerges in connection with his studies of Russian and Soviet thought, and of Marx, it is appropriate to link them with it here.

1. Religious Thought and Religion in Russia and the U.S.S.R.

In his well-known work *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia*, Kline assembles a panorama of ten significant Russian critics and adherents of religious belief, drawn approximately from the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.[19] These ten figures are treated in pairs, a chapter devoted to each pair. Bakunin's anarchistic, violently anti-religious political views are treated

in conjunction with what Kline terms Tolstoy's *cultural* anarchism, his scepticism toward all established churches, and his attempt to found his own version of Christianity, reducing it largely to ethics. The "Neo-Conservative" religious thought of Leontyev and Rozanov are compared with each other, as are the religious existentialisms of Shestov and Berdyaev. Each of these last four professed a strong Biblical faith; but each possessed a somewhat eccentric vision of that faith by the standards of the established church. Still more removed from any doctrine acceptable to the church, the pseudo-religious interpretation of socialism by Gorky and Lunacharsky as an act of "God-Building" is the next viewpoint discussed by Kline. The claim that a perfected humanity, in the form of "socialist man", would become God attracted a significant number of followers among Bolshevik intellectuals, until Lenin emphatically declared the view a heresy in 1913. Lenin's unrelenting hostility to any form of religious belief, a hostility which he conceived as a necessary element of the proletarian class struggle, is contrasted to the relatively milder anti-religious views of Plekhanov, who tended to depict religious belief as a remnant of superstition which would gradually evaporate in the atmosphere of scientific progress promoted by socialism.

Kline's selection of these ten figures provides a remarkable survey of the sheer variety (one is also tempted to say, eccentricity) of responses to the problem of religious faith contained in the most recent century of Russian thought. Equipped with these vivid portraits of religious and anti-religious thought, one is able to approach the problem of discerning religious elements in contemporary Soviet forms of life in a much more informed way, as the concluding chapter of Kline's own book illustrates.

In that concluding chapter Kline distinguishes three forms of religious or pseudo-religious attitudes in contemporary Soviet society discoverable outside of the church. First, the collectivist atheism of established Marxist-Leninist ideology appears to function as a kind of secular pseudo-religion for some of its most devout adherents, though these last are not so numerous as they once were, and are presumably dwindling in number.[20] Second, "a scientific-technological Prometheanism", not unrelated to the "religion of God-building", seems to characterize a much larger group, particularly among the ranks of the scientific and engineering elite both within and without the Party.[21] Third, there are evidences of a genuinely religious sense of life emerging among some poets, writers and artists outside of the church, influenced by such earlier figures as Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, and Akhmatova.[22]

Using the perspectives developed in *Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia*, Kline has produced a number of other studies of

religious thought in the Soviet Union. For example, In 'Religious Ferment Among Soviet Intellectuals', he elaborates on his own typology of religious attitudes to be found outside the church, identifying three themes or forms of religious concern often encountered among Soviet intellectuals: the "Skovorodian", the "Teilhardian", and the "Rozanovian".[23] Skovoroda's concern is with the worship of the powers of science and technology which fails to notice that human spiritual needs may go unrecognized and unsatisfied in a world defined increasingly by expanding technological possibilities.[24] The Teilhardian concern takes the form of a hope that the technological transformation of the world might somehow be guided into a path which would simultaneously amount to a spiritual renewal or even transfiguration of it, the "spiritualization" of nature.[25] The "Rozanovian" concern is with the preciousness and precariousness of individual existence, and the ease with which the joys of present moments may be sacrificed in the name of some duty to the future, or to moralizing in general.[26] Kline points out that this general concern seems to lead in some cases to the "Kierkegaardian" project of an intense experience of "subjectivity", and in other instances to an "aesthetic" preoccupation with a hedonism of the moment. The first alternative often seems to lead to an interest in such Russian religious thinkers as Shestov, Berdyaev, and occasionally Rozanov himself.[27]

There is of course a connection between Kline's work on Russian and Soviet religious thought, and his interest in the poetry of Joseph Brodsky. Brodsky is heir to the tradition of concern with religious themes found in several of the great Russian poets from earlier in the twentieth century. This connection is explored in Kline's study 'Religious Themes in Soviet Literature' as well as in commentaries on Brodsky's poetry.[28] Kline's sensitive explorations of the various forms in which religious thought has been manifested in the Russian and Soviet contexts are especially relevant to the current situation in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's relatively relaxed censorship policies have led to the appearance of significantly more explicit religious themes in some very recent publications and, although it is too early to say, perhaps will also lead to more public discussion of the subject in general.[29] In any event Kline's many contributions to our understanding of the variety of forms which religious consciousness has taken in the Russian context form an excellent basis for understanding future developments in that area.

2. Russian and Soviet Ethical and Social Theory

Kline's interest in the subject of Russian (and Soviet) ethical and social

theory has been a persistent one over the years. He regularly teaches the subject to his students at Bryn Mawr, and it is clearly one of his preferred organizing frameworks for surveying the history of Russian and Soviet thought generally. In addition to a number of encyclopedia articles which touch significantly on the theme of Russian ethical and social theory, three specific studies are especially pertinent: 'Changing Attitudes Toward the Individual', '"Nietzschean Marxism" in Russia', and 'The Nietzschean Marxism of Stanislav Volsky'.[30] In the first of these three articles Kline surveys the entire spectrum of Russian social thought, beginning about 1861, with respect to the issue of "ethical individualism" or the degree to which the freedom, worth, and dignity of the human individual figured as crucial values in the tradition. He argues that the weight of nineteenth-century Russian tradition is clearly on the side of ethical individualism:

> We have seen a continuing defense of the individual person by Russian thinkers who span a broad political spectrum: radicals like Pisarev, Chernyshevsky, and Dobroliubov; leftward-moving liberals like Lavrov; moderate liberals like Kavelin, Chicherin, and Kareev; revisionist Marxists like Lunacharsky and Volsky; rightward-moving Marxists like Struve and Berdiaev; conservatives like Dostoevsky, Leont'ev, and, to a degree, Pobedonostsev.[31]

Among significant Russian social theorists prior to the Revolution, only "the collectivist tendencies of Tolstoy, Solov'ev, and such Marxists as Bogdanov and Bazarov" seem to stand out as exceptions to the general dominance of ethical individualism.[32]

As Kline observes in the same place, Kant, J.S. Mill, and Nietzsche have all served, at various times, as important influences on Russian ethical and social theory, especially in support of ethical individualism. Kline has made a distinctive contribution to our understanding of Nietzsche's influence, particularly in the first decade or so of this century. His studies of the "Nietzschean" Marxists, with special emphasis on Volsky, have highlighted one of the more fascinating episodes in the development of Marxist thought in Russia, an episode which still serves very usefully as a yardstick by which to measure subsequent failures of imagination in Soviet Marxism.

As Kline points out, "Nietzschean Marxism" in Russia emerged about 1903, close on the heels of the "Kantian Marxism" espoused by such thinkers as Berdyaev, Bulgakov, and Struve during the years 1896 through 1902.[33] As a movement it flourished mainly between 1903 and 1912, and included Volsky, Lunacharsky, Bogdanov, and Bazarov as its most visible representatives.

Quoting Kline,

> Four young Russian Marxists turned in the early 1900's to Friedrich Nietzsche for an ethical and social theory to supplement historical materialism; their position involved an explicit rejection of the category of moral obligation and a central emphasis upon the individual as free creator of values and ideals. Of this group, Lunacharsky and Volsky are most "individualistic", hence closest to Nietzsche himself. Bazarov and Bogdanov, while sharing their comrades' rejection of moral norms and obligation, are more social-minded and "collectivistic" in their interpretation of creativity, hence less concerned with the freedom and dignity of the individual *per se*.[34]

As Kline also notes elsewhere, all four of these thinkers agreed that "Marx's proletariat, like Nietzsche's *Übermensch*, stands 'beyond (bourgeois-Christian) good and evil.'"[35] Likewise, all of them repudiated any form of deontological ethics, both because such an ethic was present oriented, failing to regard the present merely as "a necessary evil on the path to a glorious future", and because it focused upon duty and obligation, placing intolerable constraints upon the "free creativity" of the individual.[36]

Volsky was the most consistently individualistic of the four, and his major work, *Filosofija bor'by: Opyt postroenija etiki marksizma* (The Philosophy of Struggle: An Essay in Marxist Ethics, [Moscow, 1909]) was the most elaborate and imaginative Russian attempt to marry Nietzsche and Marx. Kline has given summaries of that remarkable book in two or three places which cannot be repeated here for reasons of space.[37] However I believe it is correct to suggest that, but for Kline's service in drawing attention to Volsky and the other Nietzschean Marxists, the entire episode and its significance would be much less well appreciated by contemporary students of Russian thought. (In this connection it might be noted that an anthology on Nietzsche in Russia, with a Foreword by Kline, has just been published).[38]

Moving into the Soviet period, Kline has also dealt in several places with the connected subjects of Soviet ethical theory, morality, and legality.[39] In addition to surveying the dominant views on ethical theory in Soviet Marxism-Leninism, he has also dealt with such issues as sexuality, marriage and the family as they have been affected by Bolshevik intellectual and moral fashions, especially in the Twenties. Guided I believe by his enduring interest in the theme of the rights of the individual, Kline has also written on Soviet concepts of state and legality, and in particular on the subject of capital punishment in connection with "economic crime".[40]

Finally, on the subject of ethical and social theory, I believe Kline's particular affection for Skovoroda, the "Russian Socrates" should be mentioned. This eighteenth-century moralist, theologian, metaphysician, and writer of fables remains a remarkably original, free spirit, attractive to most who become familiar with his writings. Kline has directed a significant amount of attention to Skovoroda, translating some of his work into English, and most recently, contributing a study of Skovoroda's metaphysics.[41]

3. Soviet Philosophy

Soviet philosophy, mainly in the form of works published under the Soviet system of censorship, but also in the form of uncensored ("underground") works, represents another focus of Kline's work. His publications on that subject commenced in 1952, with the appearance of his book *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy* containing translations of seven Soviet essays on Spinoza, all drawn from the 1920's during the period in which Soviet philosophers were preoccupied with working out the implications of their Marxist commitment to 'dialectical materialism', and were curious about what 'materialism' signified to Spinoza. This development was partly due to the influence of Plekhanov, who had declared that Marxism was 'a variety of Spinozism'.[42] Plekhanov's view of the connection between Spinozism and Marxism was one of four distinct attitudes which Kline identified. The second was that of the 'mechanists' who approved the general emphasis on determinism ("mechanical conformity to law") in Spinoza, but remained highly sceptical of the overall tenor of religiosity and "dualism" of his metaphysics. The struggle to define the attitude of Soviet Marxism-Leninism on some of the fundamental implications of 'dialectical materialism' actually took the form in part of a struggle over the interpretation of Spinoza, as Kline recounts in his lengthy introduction to the book, and which is revealed in the essays which he translated.[43] A third "compromise" position emerged by the early Thirties, acknowledging Spinoza's "essential" materialism and atheism (!), but refusing to assimilate his system as a whole into the materialist tradition due to the theological and other metaphysical elements of the system as a whole.[44] That "compromise" position became the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine, unaltered as of 1952.

Kline identifies a fourth tendency in the interpretation of Spinoza among Russian Marxists which was less significant than the others, except perhaps for the fact that Bogdanov was influenced by it. This was a 'revisionist Marxism', popular about the turn of the century, which tended to an extreme sociology of knowledge in terms of which

all philosophical systems were to be explained (explained away?) by social, economic, and political conditions. Bogdanov's view, while not so simplistic as the one just cited, was opposed to the serious study of the philosophical systems of the past for the reason that human knowledge had vastly increased in the intervening period, rendering much of the 'speculation' necessarily engaged in by a Spinoza superfluous for a modern thinker.[45]

During the 1950's Kline continued to monitor developments in Soviet philosophy quite closely, paying special attention to the emergence of the "new" field of formal logic. Formal logic had been condemned as "idealistic" and "bourgeois" in the years prior to 1947. In that year, however, by decree of the Central Committee, it was abruptly declared to be a legitimate field of inquiry along with dialectical logic. The teaching of formal logic in secondary schools and universities was authorized. Textbooks were commissioned, departments of logic were established in major universities, a section of logic was added to the Institute of Philosophy, and numerous publications began to appear.[46]

Unfortunately, however, the decree which legitimated the field of formal logic failed to specify its relation to dialectical logic with much exactitude, and it soon became apparent that a great deal of the activity, at least by Soviet philosophers as opposed to mathematicians, swirled about the issue of how to conceive the relation between formal and dialectical logic. A succession of textbooks on formal logic were condemned as misrepresenting the nature of that relation. A series of conferences was convened to resolve the issue, without a consensus emerging, and finally in late 1950 the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* (Questions of Philosophy) invited Soviet philosophers and logicians to air the dispute in print.[47] That began a still more intense period of public debate over the nature of formal logic and of its relation to dialectical logic.

During this period Kline monitored the unfolding debate quite closely, reviewing a substantial number of publications for the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*. In a series of seven multiple reviews published in that journal between the years 1950 and 1954, Kline reviewed a total of 28 articles and books on formal logic and the problem of its relation to dialectical logic.[48] Two of these multiple reviews together contain an excellent overview of the debate in *Voprosy filosofii*, which began at the end of 1950 and was terminated by an official editorial statement in December, 1951.[49] The entire spectrum of positions defended during that debate cannot be recounted here, but one or two are of particular interest as revealing the nature of the problem for Soviet philosophy. One of the editors of *Voprosy filosofii*, B. M. Kedrov, summarizing the debate criticized two extreme, "one-sided" positions: "(a) formal

logic is a 'lower stage' or 'component part' of a 'single' dialectical logic; (b) formal and dialectical logic are distinct and independent; there are 'two separate logics.'"[50] Kedrov himself argued that "formal logic and dialectic are related, but not identical - distinct, but not mutually exclusive".[51] Kedrov went on to reveal that by "formal logic" he meant the *four* (!) "laws of thought" (identity, contradiction, excluded middle, and sufficient reason). Kline observed that Soviet writers regularly included this fourth Leibnizian "law", thus, in effect blurring the distinction between deductive and inductive inference. Since they wish to interpret formal logic as a "science" concerned with *truth* (*i.e.* "adequate reflection of reality") rather than mere formal validity, this expansion of formal logic to "include" induction is quite apropos.[52] Dialectical logic was defined by Kedrov as the science of thought which recognizes the universal connection and development of things and the precipitate and contradictory character of processes of development.[53]

The Georgian philosopher K. S. Bakradze took the relatively bold step of declaring that dialectical logic was not itself logic, strictly speaking, but a theory of knowledge. He denied that any Soviet logician had ever succeeded in distinguishing clearly between formal logic and dialectic as different methods of treating the same subject matter.[54] It seemed to follow that formal logic should apply to all thinking, and that the study of formal logic could be kept separate from the study of dialectic.

On the other hand, another disputant, P. S. Popov, agreed that formal logic and dialectic could be separated for pedagogical purposes, but insisted that the cognitive process in which both are involved is *one*.[55] Dialectical thinking must be formally correct, he argued; there are no propositions which are true for formal logic and false for dialectic, though the terms of dialectical logic change during the process of inference.[56] According to Kline, Popov also scolded other Soviet logicians for an irrational fear of 'formalism,' and also expressed a degree of discomfort rare among Soviet philosophers about transferring the Hegelian concept of contradiction as an ontological category from an idealistic to a "materialistic" ontology.[57]

Summarizing the results of the debate as a whole, Kline observes that the outcome was only a qualified victory for the independence of formal logic. It was agreed that logical forms and laws are not superstructural, but non-class, universally human in character, and that formal logic is a science of the elementary laws and rules of correct thinking, dealing with obvious properties of things. It is related to dialectic as lower mathematics is related to higher, but cannot be "dialecticized" without destroying it as logic.[58]

The subsequent history of this debate among Soviet philosophers as to the relation of formal and dialectical logic has been surveyed by

other students of the subject; however, Kline's efforts in monitoring and translating the essential terms of the original debate provided an interesting window on a significant period in the development of Soviet philosophy as it unfolded, and revealed the terms and boundaries which were to apply to nearly all subsequent debates on the subject in the Soviet Union.

While on the subject of formal logic, one other contribution of Professor Kline should be mentioned. In 1965 he published a paper entitled 'N.A. Vasil'ev and the Development of Many-Valued Logics' concerning the issue of priority in the development of three-valued and many-valued logic.[59] In that paper he points out that the Russian philosopher Vasil'ev (1880-1940), a professor at Kazan University, set forth the idea of a three-valued logic in a series of four papers published between 1910 and 1913, and that Vasil'ev's contribution has gone generally unrecognized by historians of logic.[60] Although Vasil'ev did not work out a formal calculus of three-valued logic as did Łukasiewicz and Post (separately) about a decade later (and, Kline notes, did not seem to have a clear idea of what such a formal calculus would involve), nevertheless he did set forth the essential elements of a three-valued (or *n*-valued) logic, and insisted that his "imaginary logic", as he called it, would be a consistent system, and he specified the rules which govern the truth-values of the various kinds of propositions.[61] In retrospect it appears that Vasil'ev's name should be added to those of Łukasiewicz and Post as the founders of the study of many-valued logic.

Perhaps enough has been said already to suggest the range and quality of Kline's contribution to the study of Soviet philosophy. One major aspect of that contribution has not been discussed here, for the reason that it is the subject of another paper in this volume, and is also connected with a further contribution by Professor Kline also included in this volume: the notion of "materialism" in Marx and hence, the problem of the meaning of "dialectical materialism" as a philosophical position.

4. Ethical Individualism

It is appropriate to recall at least one other focus of Kline's thought here: his enduring commitment to what he has termed "ethical individualism" or a "humanism of principles". Although it transcends his work on Russian and Soviet thought and on Marx, strictly speaking, it is so frequently glimpsed in his contributions to these subjects that it seems to me fitting to conclude with an acknowledgement of it. One senses a variety of motives and interests guiding Professor Kline's

work over the years, but one of the most consistent and striking has been his concern for the dignity and worth of the presently existing individual. He has defended the ethical priority of the presently existing individual against theoretical assaults from several directions, from Nietzsche as well as from Marx and Mill, from the right as well as from the left. That concern has been evident from his very earliest to his most recent published work.

In a very early essay entitled 'Humanities and Cosmologies: The Background of Certain Humane Values' he argued for a re-dedication of the humanities to certain traditional values, including "a wise humility with respect to human accomplishment and aspirations, and a compassionate forbearance and sympathetic tolerance for human shortcomings and pretensions".[62] Discussing the attitude of the ancient Stoics toward the immensity of the cosmos, he applauded their values of humility, tolerance, and universal compassion.[63] He also insisted that one could adopt these humane values of classical Stoicism without necessarily absorbing either its fatalism or political conservatism. Citing Spinoza as a more modern exemplar of these same values, he pointed out that Spinoza could hardly be regarded as a social or political conservative; his attention was centered on the prospects for human happiness through rational activity in society, but all of this, both political and scientific activity, was viewed in a cosmic perspective: *sub specie aeternitatis*.[64]

To quote Kline:

> More importantly, perhaps, Spinoza looked upon man as, at his noblest and most reasonable, a contemplative intellect, an enjoyer of speculative and aesthetic values - not simply as a moral reformer or scientific problem-solver, as some contemporary pragmatists would have us believe. Ultimately it is the imaginative cosmological background which makes all the difference.[65]

In another context, in a discussion of Marx' alleged "humanism", Kline was concerned to distinguish any sense in which Marx could be called a "humanist" from what he referred to as "ethical humanism" *stricto sensu*, "namely the assertion of the intrinsic (non-instrumental) value of living human individuals, and hence of the basic (inalienable) rights and freedoms of human persons".[66] Humanism in one common meaning employed by Marx signified only secularism - man-centeredness as opposed to God-centeredness. But that sense of the term has little or nothing to do with ethical humanism, according to Kline.[67]

Two other senses of 'man-centeredness' can be distinguished, but only one of them coincides with ethical humanism. The first of these senses he calls 'humanism of ideals,' the second 'humanism of

principles'. A *humanism of ideals* is future-oriented; a *humanism of principles* is present-oriented, concerned to assert and defend the intrinsic value of existing individuals. Only the latter sense deserves to be called 'ethical humanism', he claims.[68] Kline's central theses are that Marx was never an 'ethical humanist' in the sense defined here, but only a 'humanist of ideals', and that the latter position could not unambiguously justify opposition to Leninism, Stalinism, neo-Stalinism, or any other form of political oppression which claimed to be sacrificing the present on behalf of a more humane future.[69] "Only a present-oriented ethical humanism, a humanism of principles, which respects living individuals, can, with theoretical consistency, exclude the recourse to anti-humanist means in the service of a humanist ideal."[70] In a typically painstaking survey of all the relevant quotations from Marx usually cited as evidence of "humanism" in a stronger, ethical sense, Kline convincingly argues that none of the actual language of Marx justifies such an attribution.

In two of his most recent philosophical contributions, his Presidential Addresses for the Metaphysical Society of America and for the Hegel Society, Kline has returned to this same general theme, in two different contexts. In the Presidential Address for the Hegel Society Kline argued that Nietzsche and Marx, despite various doctrinal differences between themselves, agreed in three crucial *mis*appropriations of Hegel's thought. First, both Nietzsche and Marx attacked the priority (both ontological and valuational) which Hegel placed upon the world-historical present and past.[71] Second, both thinkers reduced the universality of Hegel's *objektiver Geist* to what were for Hegel only subordinate aspects of it: Nietzsche restricting his focus to high culture alone, and Marx, to socio-economic institutions alone as the unique bearers of value in their respective future-oriented "world-historical" schemes.[72] Third, they displaced that value priority to the world-historical *future*, thus committing what Kline has labelled "the fallacy of the actual future" and "the fallacy of deferred value".[73]

Kline argues that for Nietzsche no individual has value except as a creator of cultural values, values which are to be realized in the distant future.[74] Marx is of course similarly future oriented, except that *society* turns out to be the bearer of value. Neither the presently existing individual, nor culture *per se*, turns out to have other than instrumental value in the historical process of building a Communist society for Marx. Whether the hypothetical individual inhabiting a Communist society at some date in the future could be conceived as having intrinsic value within Marx' theory remains a somewhat ambiguous point. However, what is clear for both Nietzsche and Marx is that the claims of the present are outweighed by the claims of the future. Kline argues that no sense can be made of such claims by either

thinker unless we concede a peculiar ontological status to the future. If the claims of the present can be *actually* outweighed by the claims of the future, the future must in some sense count as having a reality which can figure in the present. But this, he claims, is to commit "the fallacy of the actual future". The nature of that fallacy is explored in detail in the Metaphysical Society address. In the Hegel Society address Kline continued in a different direction, arguing that neither Marx nor Nietzsche could claim any justification whatsoever for the future orientation of their respective positions in the writings of Hegel. In a careful examination of relevant passages from all three thinkers, Kline argues that no basis can be found for attributing the "fallacy of the actual future" to Hegel, whereas both Marx and Nietzsche are conspicuous offenders in this regard.

In the Metaphysical Society address, Kline begins by noting that among certain physicists, philosophers of science, and metaphysicians one encounters the view that, to quote Bertrand Russell, "time is an unimportant and superficial characteristic of reality. Past and future must be acknowledged to be as real as the present."[75] One implication of such a claim would be that 'past', 'present', and 'future' do not mark ontological or categorial distinctions. Another implication would be that relations between present and past, on one hand, and present and future, on the other, might turn out to be symmetrical. Both these implications figure significantly in the work of many contemporary ethical, social and political theorists, according to Kline.[76]

Kline insists on the contrary that present, past and future are indeed categorial terms, that past and future are ontologically asymmetrical, that time-reversal is not possible, and finally, that the present is therefore ontologically prior.[77] In defense of these claims, he argues that "the present is characterized by actuality in the sense of actualization or *activity*; only present existents are *agents*".[78] The past on the other hand is characterized by *efficacy*. "The efficacy of the past involves real potentiality for actualization in the present".[79] Although the relation of the past to the present is causal, past existents are efficacious, but not active. "They 'make a difference' not by acting, but by providing what I have called 'unrefusable data' for present appropriation, thus 'requiring' present existents to conform - partially, not totally - to the settled determinateness of the past."[80] Historical realism, according to Kline, recognizes that the past (the totality of past existents) is unchangeable. ("If past existents were, in any sense or to any extent, active, the past might at any (present) moment begin to shift and change, invalidating any historical knowledge which we might claim to have attained.")[81] Historical realism is still compatible with the claim that present existents may modify themselves by causally objectifying past existents in different ways, thus changing the *meaning* (but not the

being) of the past. For example, a successful psychoanalysis might involve what is called a "reconstruction of memory", and in that sense a modification of the past. Strictly speaking, what undergoes modification are the patient's *present* memories of past events, including the emotional content of such memories. As Kline remarks, "It is the *meaning*, not the *being*, of those events which is changed, and that change takes place in the present."[82]

Kline devotes several pages to defending this distinction between the meaning and the being of the past, which cannot be summarized here. However, supposing the distinction to be valid, it is then possible for Kline to summarize his view as follows:

> One categoreal difference between present, past, and future can be expressed by saying that the past is unchangeable, whereas the present, as locus of activity, is a locus of change, and the future as locus of possibilities which are open to actualization in the present is in that (restricted) sense, subject to change.[83]

The past-present asymmetry can then be expressed in the claim that "the present existent is altered by the fact of being related to (causally objectifying) the past existent; but the past existent is not altered by the fact of being related to (providing data for) the present existent".[84] This asymmetry of the present-to-past relation is the ground of the irreversibility of the temporal order and the directionality of the "arrow of time".

Kline further concludes at this point:

> The future as indeterminate and the past as fully determinate are alike lacking in *subjectivity*. No past existent is a subject; and, since there is no such thing as a "future existent", there is, *a fortiori*, no such thing as a "future subject". Subjectivity, and hence (ontological) privacy, experiential immediacy, decision, purpose, and freedom are limited to subjects; which means that they are found only in the *present*.
>
> The past and future are both characterized by *objectivity*, although in slightly different senses: the objectivity of the past is an aspect of its real potentiality; the objectivity of the future is an aspect of its pure possibility or, more precisely, pure possibilities. There is no mode or type of being which is *unique* to the future. But since pure possibilities (in contrast to real potentialities) are not time-dependent, the future may be harmlessly characterized as the "realm" of pure possibility, even though, strictly speaking, possibilities, as timeless, also have a kind of "locus" in the present and the past. What the future "holds" is (timeless) possibilities for

present actualization.[85]

Kline next argues that the "fallacy of the actual future" orginates in an attempt to think through the problem of past, present, and future by means of a *spatial* model of the *temporal*, a project which finally collapses into a fatal (but often unrecognized) incoherence.[86] As a consequence, those social and political theorists who are oriented toward a "world-historical future" often speak "as though their eu-topia is a kind of Shangri-La hidden lofty mountains, difficult to reach, but just as determinate and actual, just as fully 'there' as anything in the living present".[87]

> This ontological fallacy of the actual future and the related axiological "fallacy of deferred, or temporally displaced, value" involves the denial that any *present* existent - community, culture, practice, or person - has *intrinsic*, non-instrumental value. For such otherwise opposed theorists as Marxists, Nietzscheans, and utilitarians, every present existent - every community, culture, practice and person - has only *instrumental* value, positive or negative, depending upon whether that present existent facilitates or obstructs the establishment, in the "world-historical future" (typically many centuries, even millennia, in the future) of communities, cultures, practices, and persons which ultimately *will*, or at least *may*, have intrinsic, non-instrumental value.[88]

By this point in the argument it becomes clear that a (perhaps the) fundamental motive for Kline's excursion into the problem of the ontology of time was the defense of ethical individualism. This account of the ontology of time articulates and defends one of the foundations of the doctrine of ethical individualism to which Kline has been consistently committed over the years, making clear the depth and seriousness of that commitment.

The four papers discussed in this final section stretch over practically the whole of Kline's career to date (1953-1986), but they could readily be woven into a single whole constituting a determined defense of "ethical individualism" as he has defined it. The relevance of that commitment to Kline's treatment of the entire history of Russian and Soviet thought (as well as Marx) is readily apparent. One can look through that very sizeable body of work and discover that the whole is informed by, sometimes explicitly organized by, this concern over how the presently existing individual fares at the hands of successive theorists of the human condition. That is of course only one motivation among many for Kline's work, but it is an unmistakeable one, and in its consistency, clarity, and humaneness, compels admiration.

NOTES

1. *Ethics*, vol. 64 (1953-54), p. 313.
2. See the article by Rockmore in this volume.
3. See below section II.4.
4. See in this connection Kline's 'Translating Brodsky', *Bryn Mawr Now*, Spring, 1974, p. 1, and 'Working with Brodsky', *Paintbrush*, Vol. 4, No. 7-8 (1977), pp. 25-26.
5. 'Shpet as a Translator of Hegel', Draft of a paper read at Conference on Shpet, Bad Homburg, Federal Republic of Germany, June, 1986. Proceedings of the conference are forthcoming, edited by Alexander Haardt and Frijthof Rodi.
6. *Ibid.* p. 1.
7. Kline, 'Philosophical Puns', in *Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts: Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider on his Eightieth Birthday,* ed. John P. Anton and Craig Walton, Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1974, pp. 213-35.
8. 'Humanities and Cosmologies: The Background of Certain Humane Values', *Western Humanities Review*, Vol. 7 (1953), p. 95.
9. His essay on 'The Myth of Marx's Materialism' included in this volume is I think an illustration of that quality of his work, though by no means the only one which could be cited.
10. V. V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, two volumes, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York, Columbia University Press, 1953.
11. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York, Humanities Press, 1952; reprinted: Westport, Conn., Hyperion Press, 1981.
12. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1965; revised paperback edition, 1969; reprinted: Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1976, 1984.
13. New York, Macmillan and Free Press, 1967, 8 volumes. See the bibliography of Kline's writings on Russian and Soviet philosophy in this volume, item 1967(1). (Henceforward: *Kline Bibliography I*).
14. See the *Kline Bibliography I*, items 1956(2), 1961(2), 1985(1) and 1985(3). See also articles on Brodsky, Shestov, and Solovyov in the *Columbia Dictionary of Modern European Literature* (ed. William B. Edgerton), New York, Columbia University Press,1980.
15. See the *Kline Bibliography I*, items 1962(2) and 1964(3). See also 'A Bibliography of the Published Writings of Iosif Alex-

androvich Brodsky', *Russian Literature TriQuarterly*, No.1 (1971), pp. 441-55.

16. Prof. Kline is also a consulting editor for the *Journal of Value Inquiry* (1967-present), *Process Studies* (1971-present), *Philosophy Research Archives* (1975-present), and the *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1976-present). He was editor of the philosophy section of the *American Bibliography of Slavic Studies* (1957-1967), consulting editor for philosophy of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (1961-64), co-editor (1959-64) and consulting editor (1964-78) of the *Journal of Philosophy,* consulting editor of *Soviet Union* (1975-1980) and of *Slavic Review* (1977-79).

17. See the article by Rockmore in this volume.

18. The Presidential Address for the Metaphysical Society is published as '"Present", "Past", and "Future" as Categoreal Terms, and the "Fallacy of the Actual Future"', in *The Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 40, no. 2 (December, 1986), pp. 215-35. The Presidential Address for the Hegel Society was kindly made available to this writer in the form of a draft being prepared for publication.

19. The Weil Lectures, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

20. *Ibid.* p. 164.

21. *Ibid.* pp. 164ff.

22. *Ibid.* pp. 168-71.

23. In *Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power,* ed. M. Hayward and W.C. Fletcher, New York, Praeger, 1969, p. 57.

24. *Ibid.* pp. 58-64.

25. *Ibid.* pp. 64-65.

26. *Ibid.* pp. 66-69.

27. *Ibid.* p. 67.

28. See Kline, 'Religious Themes in Soviet Literature', in *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union: 1917-1967*, ed. Richard H. Marshall, Jr., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 157-86.

29. I have in mind, for example, the novel *Plakha* by Chingiz Aitmatov, published in *Novy mir*, 1986, Nos. 6, 8 and 9.

30. 'Changing Attitudes Toward the Individual', in *The Transformation of Russian Society*, ed. C.E. Black, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 606-25; '"Nietzschean Marxism" in Russia', in *Demythologizing Marxism*, ed. Frederick J. Adelmann, S.J., Vol. 2 of *Boston College Studies in Philosophy*, Boston and the Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, pp. 166-83; and 'The Nietzschean Marxism of Stanislav Volsky', in *Western Philosophical Systems in Russian Literature: A Collection of Critical Studies*, ed. Anthony Mlikotin, Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 1979,

pp. 177-95.

31. 'Changing Attitudes Toward the Individual', p. 625.

32. *Loc. cit.*

33. '"Nietzschean Marxism" in Russia', p. 169.

34. 'Changing Attitudes...', pp. 618-19.

35. 'The Nietzschean Marxism of Stanislav Volsky', p. 179.

36. *Loc. cit.*

37. See especially 'The Nietzschean Marxism of Stanislav Volsky', but also '"Nietzschean Marxism" in Russia' and 'Changing Attitudes...'.

38. *Nietzsche in Russia*, ed. Bernice G. Rosenthal, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986.

39. See *Kline Bibliography I*, items 1956(2), 1960(1), 1963(1), 1963(2), 1969(4), and 1979(1).

40. See *Kline Bibliography I*, items 1952(2), 1962(1), 1963(1). See also 'Economic Crime and Punishment', *Survey* No. 57 (1965), pp. 67-72.

41. See Kline's translations of Skovoroda and Kovalinsky in *Russian Philosophy*, Vol. 1; also see his forthcoming 'Skovoroda's Metaphysics', in *Skovoroda: Anniversary Essays*, ed. Thomas E. Bird and Richard H. Marshall, Jr., Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, forthcoming 1987.

42. *Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy*, p. 15.

43. *Loc. cit.*

44. *Ibid.* p. 16.

45. *Ibid.* p. 17.

46. For an account of these developments see Kline's collective review of thirteen Soviet papers on formal logic and dialectic, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 17 (1952), pp. 124-28.

47. Kline, *ibid.*

48. See items in *Kline Bibliography I.*

49. *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 17 (1952), pp. 124-28 and Vol. 18 (1953), pp. 83-86.

50. Kline, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 18, p. 84.

51. *Loc. cit.*

52. *Loc. cit.*

53. *Loc. cit.*

54. Kline, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 17, p. 125.

55. *Ibid.* p. 126.

56. *Loc. cit.*

57. *Ibid.* p. 127.

58. Kline, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 18, p. 86. For an account of the outcome of this entire episode, see Kline, 'Recent Soviet Philosophy', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social*

Science, Vol. 303 (1956), pp. 126-38.

59. 'N.A. Vasil'ev and the Development of Many-Valued Logics', in *Contributions to Logic and Methodology in Honor of J.M. Bocheński*, ed. A.T. Tymieniecka and C. Parsons, Amsterdam, North Holland, 1965, pp. 315-26.

60. *Ibid.* p. 316.

61. *Ibid.* p. 321 and p. 325.

62. 'Humanities and Cosmologies: The Background of Certain Humane Values', *Western Humanities Review*, Vol. 7 (1953), p. 95.

63. *Ibid.* p. 97.

64. *Ibid.* p. 103.

65. *Loc. cit.*

66. 'Was Marx an Ethical Humanist?' in *Studies in Soviet Thought*, Vol. 9 (1969), p. 93.

67. *Ibid.* pp. 92-3.

68. *Ibid.* p. 93.

69. *Ibid.* pp. 94-6.

70. *Ibid.* p. 96.

71. Pre-publication draft, p. 5.

72. *Ibid.* p. 9.

73. *Ibid.* pp. 9-18.

74. *Ibid.* p. 5.

75. '"Present", "Past", and "Future" as Categoreal Terms, and the "Fallacy of the Actual Future"', in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 215.

76. *Ibid.* pp. 216-17.

77. *Ibid.* p. 218.

78. *Ibid.* p. 219.

79. *Ibid.* p. 220. See also Kline's article on this subject, 'The Past: Agency or Efficacy?', in *Akten des XIV. Internationalen Kongresses für Philosophie* (Vienna, 1968), University of Vienna, Herder Verlag, 1969, IV, pp. 580-84.

80. '"Present", "Past", and "Future"...', p. 220.

81. *Loc. cit.*

82. *Ibid.* p. 221.

83. *Ibid.* pp. 223-24.

84. *Ibid.* p. 224.

85. *Ibid.* pp. 224-25.

86. *Ibid.* pp. 225ff.

87. *Ibid.* p. 229.

88. *Loc. cit.*

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